Curtis Henry Johnson v. Paul Benton

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CP-01087-COA

CURTIS HENRY JOHNSON APPELLANT

v.

PAUL BENTON APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES CHRISTOPHER WALKER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CURTIS HENRY JOHNSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: KATHERINE BARRETT RILEY
BRANDI RATLIFF HAMILTON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/05/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Paul Benton and certain members of Curtis Johnson’s family jointly own a tract of

land (the Property) formerly owned by Walter Johnson, Curtis’s great-grandfather. Known

as the “Johnson Tract,” it consists of approximately 286 acres in rural Holmes County,

Mississippi. This case stems from a petition for the partition and division of the property

filed by Paul and Bobby Benton (the Bentons), who at the time this case commenced owned

approximately sixty percent of the Property. The parties entered into an agreed order

finalizing the partition and providing, among other matters, that the parties should not enter

certain areas of each other’s property. The record, however, shows that Curtis had been

trespassing on the Bentons’ land for several years.
¶2. After entry of the agreed order, Curtis continued to trespass repeatedly on Paul’s

property. Paul accordingly filed a petition for contempt with the chancery court. In

response, Curtis filed a motion to dismiss Paul’s petition, claiming for the first time he is

subject to tribal sovereign immunity because he is “Chief of the Creek Indians East of the

Mississippi.” After a hearing, the chancellor denied Curtis’s motion to dismiss and granted

Paul’s petition for contempt. Aggrieved, Curtis appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. This lengthy lawsuit commenced on December 31, 2013, when the Bentons filed a

petition for partition of the Property.1 The rural property, owned by the Bentons and certain

members of Curtis’s family as tenants in common, is located north of Lexington,

Mississippi, along Highway 17. In 1918, Curtis’s great-grandfather Walter Johnson

purchased the Property. At his death it was devised to his two sons, Reginald and Henry

Johnson (Curtis’s grandfather). Interest in the Property was subsequently passed down to

numerous children, one of whom was Curtis’s father, Joe Lewis Johnson. The Bentons own

adjacent land and over the years had purchased interest in the Property from several Johnson

family members.2 When the suit commenced, the Bentons owned approximately sixty

percent of the Property, and the Johnsons owned about forty percent.

¶4. Defendants responded that they did “not object to a partition in kind but want[ed] to

ensure that their interests in natural resources and mineral rights [we]re adequately protected

1
The partition of the Property was never challenged.
2
The children who had not sold their interest in the Property to Paul Benton were the
defendants in the partition action.

2
in the proposed partition.” They requested special commissioners be appointed3 to inspect

and value the Property, and to ascertain the existence of any sand, gravel, or subsurface

water on the land. In July 2014, the chancery court appointed four commissioners: an

appraiser, a forester, a surveyor, and a geologist.

¶5. The record indicates problems with Curtis began around April 2014, as alleged in the

Bentons’ August 29, 2014, first amended petition for partition of real property, which

included a request for injunctive relief against Defendants for damage to their property and

to prevent their reentry. The Bentons own private land adjacent to the land at issue and

maintain a hunting camp with expensive equipment on the land. The Bentons’ request for

injunctive relief was in response to the following alleged incidents: in April 2014, two gates

on a road that leads to the Bentons’ hunting cabin located on adjacent property were

destroyed by a blowtorch. The Bentons contended these gates did not prevent the Johnsons

from accessing their own property. The Bentons also had photographs of Curtis destroying

the Bentons’ gates. Photographs from “trail cameras” further showed Curtis using the access

road to enter the Bentons’ private land. In July 2014, Curtis changed the locks on a gate,

thereby preventing Paul Benton from accessing his adjacent property, resulting in the loss

of his soybean crop.

¶6. In May 2015, the Bentons filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO)

because Defendants had refused to keep the gates closed on the access roads to the Bentons’

hunting camp, which includes the northern border of the land being partitioned. Due to the

3
See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-21-15 (Rev. 2019).

3
expensive equipment at the hunting camp, the Bentons were concerned about theft. The

chancery court granted the motion and ordered Defendants to keep the gates shut. In

response to the order, Curtis and his father Joe Lewis, now appearing pro se, filed a motion

for contempt against the Bentons and to “dismiss the order,” claiming the Bentons did not

own the road where the gates were located and did not have permission to use it.

¶7. The Bentons denied any violation of the court’s TRO and cited an incident when Paul

and several hired men were working on the property and access road near his hunting camp.

Paul claimed that on June 7, 2015, Curtis ripped the gate that secures the access road off its

posts, thereby leaving his property unsecure. Days later, the Bentons filed an emergency

motion for a TRO against Defendants, citing this destruction and several other similar

incidents.4 The Bentons attached photographs from trail cameras and affidavits that

supported their contentions. The motion stated Curtis’s actions were “irrational, malicious,

and reckless,” causing the Bentons, as well as their friends and workers, to fear for their

safety. After a hearing, in August 2015 the chancery court entered a final decree granting

the Bentons a permanent injunction. Curtis and Joe Lewis filed a motion to dismiss the

court’s TRO, contending that the Bentons did not own the land where their hunting lodge

is; instead, this land was “the remaining property of the Walter Johnson Jr. estate,” and

further, the Bentons were attempting to adversely possess the land.

4
In May 2015, the Bentons related how Curtis locked the Bentons out of their own
property; thus, they had to cut the lock and install a new one. Another time, the lock and
chain were found missing from the gate. Yet another time, Curtis and Joe Lewis entered the
Bentons’ private property and told the Bentons’ workers they were trespassing. Finally, the
Bentons claimed Curtis removed hidden trail cameras and placed “No Trespassing Johnson
Estate” signs on the common property.

4
¶8. On February 3, 2016, the four appointed special commissioners filed their report and

recommendation on the Property, finding approximately sixty acres to be open land and

valuing the remainder timber land at $48,000. A survey map divided the Property into four

tracts, all fronting Highway 17. One tract comprised approximately 282 acres with a value

of $1,500 per acre, with the remaining three tracts comprising about one acre each with a

value of $750 per acre. The commissioners found the Bentons owned 60.20% of the

property, and Defendants owned 39.80%; the commissioners accordingly divided the

Property to result in the same percentages of total property value in timber and gravel. The

division also gave the parties full access to their parcels with adequate public road frontage,

interior travel roads, and buffering.

¶9. Basing their division off the survey map, the commissioners divided the property into

six tracts and suggested granting the Bentons approximately sixty percent of the total

property value, with the remaining forty-percent value being granted to Defendants. Time

and expenses for the commissioners’ duties totaled approximately $56,000. Also on

February 3, 2016, the parties, including Curtis, signed an agreed order. The Bentons

received Tract 5 consisting of approximately 172 acres. Defendants were granted Tracts 1

through 4 and Tract 6, totaling approximately 113 acres. The agreed order provided “no

Defendants shall be allowed on any portion of Plaintiffs’ [the Bentons’] property identified

as Tract 5. Likewise, Plaintiffs [the Bentons] shall not be allowed on Tracts 1-4 or Tract 6.

Defendants agree that no Defendant shall have any access to the licensed roadway at any

time.” However, Curtis “repeatedly violated” the order by “blatantly trespassing” on the

5
Bentons’ property, including private property that was not a part of the partition suit.

¶10. On April 25, 2019, the Bentons filed a petition to cite Curtis for civil and criminal

contempt after repeatedly requesting Curtis to cease trespassing. The petition described an

incident on October 10, 2018, when the Bentons and some friends were again working on

the deer camp. Curtis “barreled down the access road in his truck and into the field where

they were working.” He approached Paul in a “violent and aggressive manner” and was

shouting. Paul asked someone to call the sheriff’s department. Curtis shouted in response

that neither the sheriff nor the court could “do anything” to him because he was “an Indian.”

The Bentons attached to their petition photographs from trail cameras showing Curtis

trespassing that day.5 The Bentons exhorted the chancery court to punish Curtis for nearly

eight years of endless harassment and trespassing, as well as thousands of dollars in needless

attorney’s fees and costs.

¶11. On May 3, 2019, in response, Curtis filed a motion to dismiss Paul’s petition for

contempt, claiming he is a Creek Indian and subject to tribal sovereign immunity, which

protects him and his family from particular suits, especially land disputes. Curtis attached

to his motion a statement to “Honorable Judges of Justice Court or any State Court” that his

ancestors were “Indians” and that his great-grandfather Walter Johnson “had to reacquire

5
In the petition, the Bentons explained that after the encounter, they filed criminal
trespassing charges against Curtis in the Holmes County Justice Court the same day. The
justice court judge, however, dismissed the charges, directing Paul to file a petition for
contempt in the chancery court’s partition action. In its final judgment of contempt, the
chancery court found that while it had jurisdiction over a petition for contempt, the justice
court had jurisdiction over prosecutions for criminal trespass, and the chancery court
suggested that any future actions for criminal trespasses should be heard in justice court.

6
his ancestral lands.” Further, he claimed his family had been in possession of these lands

since 1840 “and have lived as Indians since then.” He cited to the “Treaty With the Creeks

1790” and maintained that “[a]nything adverse to those treaties or any federal laws for

Indians is a violation of our rights as Indian[s].” He argued that any case brought against

the Creek Indians must be argued in “Tribal Courts.” Curtis referred to himself as “Chief”

of the “Creek Indian Tribe East of the Mississippi” and began signing his name to court

documents with an “X.”

¶12. On June 5, 2019, a hearing was held on Curtis’s motion to dismiss and Paul’s petition

for contempt. Curtis, appearing pro se, explained that he had “filed papers at the

courthouse” giving notice “that [the Johnsons] are Creek Indians that live East of the

Mississippi [River] in Mississippi.” Curtis testified that he traced his ancestry, which

revealed that his family was not African-American but Creek Indian. Later, Curtis testified

that he has lived his entire life “as an Indian.” He claimed his great-grandfather Walter L.

Johnson, who died in 1970, was a Creek Indian. The chancellor asked for proof, but Curtis

responded that he did not bring it to court that day.

¶13. The Bentons’ counsel accurately stated that the issue before the court was not whether

Curtis was “an Indian or not”; the issue was the offenses he committed on Paul’s private

property. Further, the laws and cases Curtis cited to the court applied only to acts occurring

on federally recognized reservations. In 1832, the Creek were compelled to cede “their

original homelands east of the Mississippi for a reservation promised in what is now

Oklahoma.” McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020). Therefore, any “Creek

7
Tribe East of the Mississippi” does not have such a reservation. Counsel argued that there

is no regulation that allows Curtis to trespass on someone else’s property because he is

allegedly a Native American. Further, Curtis waived any claim to tribal sovereign immunity

because he had never asserted he was a Native American, only an African American. The

chancellor denied Curtis’s motion to dismiss from the bench, ruling that even if Curtis were

immune as chief of his tribe, he did not prove his status as a Native American in a

recognized tribe that would provide him with sovereign immunity.

¶14. Next, testimony was taken from Paul and Curtis regarding Paul’s citation for

contempt based upon the October 10, 2018 incident at Paul’s hunting camp. Paul testified

that Curtis pulled up to Paul and some workers, screaming about whether Paul “had seen a

sign.” Paul did not know what sign Curtis was talking about at the time.6 Curtis was acting

“belligerent, aggressive, and . . . frankly . . . a little crazy.” Paul asked him to leave and

respect the property lines settled by the courts. Curtis refused. Paul claimed he was on Tract

5 of the Property during the incident, and Curtis did not have permission to be there.

Curtis’s behavior had been increasingly “erratic,” and he continuously crossed Paul’s

property to use an access road he had agreed not to use. Further, Curtis had allowed hunters

to hunt on Paul’s property without Paul’s permission.

¶15. Curtis testified that the October 10 encounter was to inform Paul that he and his

family were Creek Indians and that Paul was trespassing on his land. Curtis said that when

Paul asked him to leave, he did. Further, he denied being belligerent, contending “we are

6
Paul later testified that there are two signs on Curtis’s property—one says “Johnson
Estate Land Company,” and the other says, “You are entering the Creek Indian Nation.”

8
peaceful people.” Curtis claimed that he was not trespassing under the partition order

because he did not leave the gravel access road. He further refused to admit the road was

in the midst of Paul’s land.

¶16. After the hearing, the chancery court entered a judgment of contempt against Curtis

for willfully entering the Bentons’ Tract 5 land, as well as the licensed roadway, repeatedly.

The chancellor noted the action was forbidden by the February 3, 2016 agreed order, which

all the parties, including Curtis, had signed. He also noted that while the contempt matter

should have been resolved by the Holmes County Justice Court, it was within the chancery

court’s authority to find Curtis in contempt.7 Additionally, the court ordered Curtis to pay

$5,000 for the Bentons’ attorney’s fees. Importantly, the chancery court found Curtis failed

to offer “any evidence whatsoever” to prove he is Native American or that Tract 5 or the

licensed roadway is “Indian Land.” The court aptly stated, “This case has nothing to do with

Indian tribal law but with the Order of Court and the laws of the State of Mississippi.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17. This Court employs a de novo standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of

a motion to dismiss. Benson v. Neshoba Cnty. Sch. Dist., 102 So. 3d 1190, 1192-93 (¶8)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Questions of law such as jurisdictional issues are also reviewed de

novo. Jones v. Billy, 798 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (¶2) (Miss. 2001). Regarding a citation for

contempt, the standard of review “is determined upon the facts of each case and is a matter

for the trier of fact.” Showers v. Norwood, 914 So. 2d 758, 761 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)

7
While Paul requested criminal as well as civil contempt, the chancellor did not
imprison Curtis but stated any future violation would “be treated extraordinarily harshly.”

9
(citing Milam v. Milam, 509 So. 2d 864, 866 (Miss. 1987)). Further, “[i]t is well-settled law

that contempt matters are committed to the substantial discretion of the chancellor. This

Court will not reverse a contempt citation where the chancellor’s findings are supported by

substantial credible evidence.” Id.

ANALYSIS

¶18. Curtis states that his appeal concerns whether he, claiming status as a Native

American, can be cited for contempt of court for trespassing on his ancestral lands.

Relatedly, he raises four issues: (1) the trial court should have applied Article VI of the

United States Constitution to his case; (2) the trial court erred in denying his status as a

Native American for “lack of proof”; (3) Native Americans or their descendants cannot be

cited for contempt in Mississippi courts for trespass on their ancestral lands; and (4) a

descendant of a Native American settler in Holmes County is entitled to the same laws that

apply to all Native Americans.

¶19. The chancery court found this case had nothing to do with Indian or tribal law but

with Curtis’s blatant disregard of the laws and court orders of Mississippi. We agree and

find none of Curtis’s issues have merit. We shall first discuss the chancery court’s denial

of Curtis’s motion to dismiss and then the chancery court’s finding of contempt against

Curtis.

I. Curtis’s Motion to Dismiss

¶20. Curtis argues the chancery court should have granted his motion to dismiss Paul’s

petition for contempt because he “asserted tribal immunity.” Curtis claims that the chancery

10
court lacked jurisdiction over him as the self-proclaimed “Chief of the Creek Indian Tribe

East of the Mississippi.” He further contends the chancery court erred in failing to recognize

his Indian status and improperly applied Mississippi law instead of federal Indian tribal law.

Interestingly, it was not until Paul filed his petition for contempt in April 2019 that Curtis

asserted that he is protected by tribal sovereign immunity.

¶21. In Jones v. Billy, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that “where the cause of

action arose on tribal land, federal law preempted the exercise of state court jurisdiction over

a legal dispute between Mississippi Choctaw tribal members,” a federally recognized Indian

tribe. Jones, 798 So. 2d at 1239 (¶3). Further, “[i]n a civil suit initiated by a non-Indian

against an Indian for a debt arising on [an] Indian reservation, the United States Supreme

Court held that allowing ‘the exercise of state court jurisdiction here would undermine the

authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs . . . .’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee,

358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)). To be subject to Indian tribal law, a party must first prove that

he/she is a member of a recognized tribe and then that the action occurred on recognized

tribal lands. Federal statutory law defines an “Indian” as “all persons of Indian descent who

are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons

who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the

present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of

one-half or more Indian blood.” 25 U.S.C. § 5129. As for being a Creek Indian, according

to the tribe’s official website, the current citizenship criteria for the Muscogee (Creek)

11
Nation8 “is that you must be Creek by Blood and trace back to a direct ancestor listed on the

1906 Dawes Roll by issuance of birth and/or death certificates.”9 See supra note 8.

¶22. The chancery court correctly found that Curtis offered no proof that he or his

8
The Muscogee are also known as the Creek Indians. According to the tribe’s
website, “The Citizenship Board office is governed by a Citizenship Board consisting of five
members. This office provides services to citizens of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of
Oklahoma or to potential citizens in giving direction or assisting in the lineage verification
process of the Muscogee (Creek) people. The mission of this office is to verify the lineage
of descendants of persons listed on the 1906 Dawes Roll. In doing so, research is involved
in the whole aspect of attaining citizenship.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Citizenship,
https://www.muscogeenation.com/services/citizenship/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2021). A
citizenship application must be submitted with required documents. Id. “[L]ineal research,
which is the responsibility of the applicant, may or may not be required for a Citizenship
application; this is dependent on each applicant’s direct lineage to the original enrollee.” Id.
9
“Congress created the Dawes Commission in 1893 to create authoritative
membership rolls for all Native American tribes in Oklahoma” (which included the
Muscogee-Creek tribe). Davis v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 n.2 (W.D.
Okla. 2002). The Commission created the Dawes Rolls in 1906, “which were citizenship
lists dividing members into the ‘Creek Nation Creek Roll,’ allegedly comprised of Creek
citizens with Creek blood and the ‘Creek Nation Freedmen Roll,’ allegedly comprised of
Creek citizens who were formerly enslaved and devoid of Creek blood. The Dawes Rolls
closed in 1907.” Muscogee Creek Indian Freedmen Band Inc. v. Bernhardt, 385 F. Supp.
3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2019) (citations omitted).

Curtis does not argue that he or his ancestors were “Freedmen” but Indians by blood.
Even if he did argue he was a descendant of the Freedmen, he offers no proof of this status
either. Further, even if he proved it, the tribe currently does not recognize the Freedmen as
tribal citizens: in 1979, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN) adopted a new constitution
whereby Freedmen descendants are not entitled to tribal citizenship and are not recognized
as citizens of the tribe. Bernhardt, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 19. The new constitution “stripped
individuals on the 1906 Creek Freedmen Rolls and their then-living lineal descendants of
their MCN citizenship; and [it] . . . prevented the unborn lineal descendants of individuals
who were enrolled on the 1906 Creek Freedmen Rolls from becoming citizens of MCN.”
Id. Recently, however, the Muscogee Nation in Oklahoma is considering changes to their
constitution that would allow descendants of Freedmen to become full tribal citizens. See
Associated Press, Two Oklahoma Tribes Consider Tribal Citizenship for Freedmen, ABC
News (May 28, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/oklahoma-tribes-tribal-
citizenship-freedmen-77970134.

12
ancestors are Native American beyond his own testimony. Curtis attached to his motion to

dismiss a self-written statement that he is a Creek Indian and that his community has its own

tribal courts on the property, which is “Indian country”; therefore, he is immune from the

laws of Mississippi. At the hearing on the motions, Curtis claimed to have proof that he and

his family are Creek Indians, but he was “not prepared” to offer it to the court that day (nor

did he ever offer it). Curtis now argues that his mere “existence and family’s occupancy”

of the Property is sufficient to prove his status as a Native American. We disagree. As the

chancellor told Curtis, “[J]ust because you say it [doesn’t] make it so.”

¶23. While Curtis now claims he is chief of the Creek Indian Tribe East of the Mississippi,

he offers no evidence to prove his membership or that this tribe is even legally recognized.

In his brief, Curtis discusses the possible Native American ethnicity of his great-grandfather

Walter and Walter’s grandparents, but Curtis admits not knowing if these ancestors were

Indian, African-American, or European. He then charges the chancery court with racial

discrimination against him because it did not accept his Indian status without proof.

However, even the Creeks themselves require more than just an individual’s “word,” i.e.,

proof of a direct ancestor listed on the Dawes Rolls.

¶24. Curtis cites numerous federal cases and statutes related to Native American law to

support his tribal sovereign-immunity claim. However, because he fails to prove his

membership in a federally recognized tribe, this authority is inapplicable. Curtis cites 18

U.S.C. § 116210 in support of his proposition that the trial court “lacked subject matter

10
This code section provides certain states jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed by or against Indians in Indian country; Mississippi is not included as one of the

13
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity” and that any suit involving Creek Indians must be

heard in tribal courts. However, tribal sovereign immunity is only available to a federally

recognized tribe, and Curtis fails to prove the “Creek Indian Tribe East of the Mississippi”

is such a tribe.

¶25. Curtis also cites 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which provides the definition of “Indian

country,”11 to support his claim that the land at issue is Indian country. Curtis also argues

that Paul’s private property is “ancestral land” that rightfully belongs to Curtis12 and the

Creek Indian Tribe East of the Mississippi due to various historical treaties entered into

between Indians and the U.S. government. Curtis cites the Treaty with the Creeks of 1790,

the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of 1830, and the Trail of Tears. The United States

Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020),

explained that in 1832 the Creek were compelled to cede “their original homelands east of

the Mississippi for a reservation promised in what is now Oklahoma,” and “in 1866, they

ceded and conveyed a portion of that reservation to the United States.” (Citing Treaty With

the Creek, 1832, Art. I, Mar. 24, 1832, Stat. 366; Treaty With the Creek Nation of Indians,

Art. III, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 786 (discussing state or federal court jurisdiction for an

states. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).
11
This statute provides that “Indian country” means “all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151.
12
The Bentons correctly note that Curtis is not, nor ever has been, a record title owner
to the land at issue. According to the “First Amended Petition for Partition,” Curtis’s father,
Joe Lewis Johnson (along with his four siblings), inherited an undivided interest in the
property from his grandfather Walter Johnson.

14
Indian criminal defendant who committed sexual crimes in Indian country)). Because these

lands are “ancestral,” Curtis claims he could not be trespassing. Curtis states in his appellate

brief that his family’s “oral history” indicates they settled in Mississippi with other Indian

tribes in the mid 1800s, and his great-grandfather Walter was an Indian who acquired over

1,000 acres of land in Holmes County. Curtis also states in his brief that he was told by his

grandfather Henry Johnson that none of Walter’s land “could be sold and that any of his

descendants could farm, hunt, and fish as long as the land was there.” This statement

appears to be the basis for Curtis’s contention that Paul was the trespasser on Curtis’s

“ancestral land.” No evidence to this effect, however, was ever presented to the trial court,

and therefore the statement cannot be considered on appeal. See Gale v. Thomas, 759 So.

2d 1150, 1159 (¶40) (Miss. 1999) (“[A]n issue not raised before the trial court is deemed

waived.”). Moreover, while statements concerning a person’s ancestry are admissible under

the hearsay exception of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(19) (Reputation Concerning

Personal or Family History), Curtis presented no testimony or evidence to the trial court to

support his contention about his ancestry. Additionally, this “oral history” statement in his

brief contradicts Curtis’s testimony at the hearing where he stated that he and his family

thought they were African American but found out a few years ago that they were Creek

Indians. Curtis also presented no proof that Paul’s private land is part of a legally

recognized Indian reservation or is “ancestral land”; thus, he could not validly enter Paul’s

land.

¶26. Curtis argues that private citizens cannot purchase lands from Native Americans,

15
citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). However, M’Intosh dealt with

determining the power of the federal government to extinguish Indian title to land. Id. at

604-05. In M’Intosh, two Indian tribes sold Thomas Johnson title to some land in Illinois

before American independence. Id. at 559-60. After independence, the tribes sold the same

land to the United States government, which then sold it to William M’Intosh. Id. at 560.

The United States Supreme Court upheld M’Intosh’s ownership and “refused to recognize

land titles originating in grants by Indians to private parties . . . .” Oneida Indian Nation of

New York State v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1974) (citing M’Intosh, 21 U.S.

(8 Wheat.) at 604-05). “[T]hose grants were contrary to the accepted principle that Indian

title could be extinguished only by or with the consent of the general government.” Id. at

669. However, the federal government could grant non-Indians land held by Indian tribes,

but the grantees took title subject to the Indian “right of occupancy” because the Indians had

used and occupied the land since “time immemorial.” Id. at 664, 667-68 (citing M’Intosh,

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 550, 574). M’Intosh does not further Curtis’s argument, nor is the

case applicable here, as we have neither a federally recognized tribe nor Indian land at issue.

¶27. In sum, the chancery court did not err in denying Curtis’s motion to dismiss or

declining to apply Indian tribal law because Curtis failed to offer any evidence he or his

ancestors are Indian or that the Property is Indian country or ancestral lands.

II. Paul’s Petition for Contempt

¶28. Curtis’s citation for contempt of the February 3, 2016 agreed order is the crux of this

case. However, Curtis makes no specific arguments related to it beyond claiming he was not

16
trespassing on Paul’s private land because of his rights as a Native American. Regardless,

we shall address the chancery court’s proper citation of contempt against Curtis for his

repeated trespass onto Paul’s private property.13

¶29. A chancellor is allowed “wide discretion in ‘exerting his [or her] coercive powers to

enforce his [or her] decrees.’” Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So. 3d 143, 147 (¶13) (Miss. 2011)

(citing Matthews v. Matthews, 227 Miss. 358, 360, 86 So. 2d 462, 462 (1956)). “Civil

contempt orders enforce a private party’s rights or compel compliance with a court’s order.”

Id. (citing Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 796 (Miss. 1994)). “[A] citation for criminal

contempt [is] to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court” when the offending party

“has wilfully, deliberately and contumaciously ignored the court, or the court’s directive.”

In re Smith, 926 So. 2d 878, 887-88 (¶13) (Miss. 2006). A reviewing court “will not reverse

the chancellor’s finding of contempt unless the decision was manifestly wrong.” Lewis v.

Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 178 (¶39) (Miss. 2015) (citing Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d

703, 713 (¶31) (Miss. 2014)).

¶30. Curtis participated, through counsel, in the negotiations regarding the partition of the

Property. On February 3, 2016, he, along with the other parties, signed the agreed order,

which explicitly stated that Defendants were not to enter “Tract 5,” while the Bentons could

not enter “Tracts 1-4” and “Tract 6.” However, since signing the order, the Bentons showed

Curtis had repeatedly trespassed on Tract 5, as well as Paul’s private property, with

impunity. The chancery court was within its authority to enforce the agreed order. The

13
While Paul requested both civil and criminal contempt, only a citation for civil
contempt was issued.

17
chancellor’s findings of contempt were supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the

chancery court did not abuse its discretion in granting Paul’s petition for contempt.

¶31. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.

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