Anthony Bernard Reading v. Amanda Frances Reading

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2021-CP-01002-COA

ANTHONY BERNARD READING APPELLANT

v.

AMANDA FRANCES READING APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/08/2021
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CARTER O. BISE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANTHONY BERNARD READING (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOHN R. REEVES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/15/2022
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Anthony Reading appeals from the Harrison County Chancery Court’s judgment

awarding his ex-wife Amanda Reading title to marital property. On appeal, Anthony argues

that the chancery court violated his constitutional rights to due process of law. After review,

we find that Anthony’s claim on appeal is procedurally barred because it fails to comply with

Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(7). The rule requires a party to cite relevant

authority and use the authority to develop “meaningful legal arguments.” Accordingly, we

affirm the chancery court’s judgment.

FACTS

¶2. Amanda and Anthony were married on February 26, 1999, in Conway, New
Hampshire. They have five children together and moved to Mississippi twenty days before

separating on May 19, 2017.

¶3. On January 29, 2018, Amanda and Anthony’s daughter, Susan Reading,1 received a

letter from Heather A. Searcy, the Assistant State Attorney (ASA) for the State of Florida.

Susan was the victim of sexual assault by Anthony in Florida. The letter notified Susan that

Anthony had pled guilty to two counts of sexual activity with a child. Anthony was

sentenced to serve thirty years of incarceration in Perry, Florida, in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections.

¶4. On August 7, 2018, Amanda filed a complaint for divorce against Anthony on the

grounds of incarceration and irreconcilable differences. Anthony was served with process

on September 14, 2018, at the Taylor Correctional Institute in Florida.

¶5. On September 20, 2018, Anthony filed a motion to dismiss the divorce complaint

alleging that Amanda and her attorneys violated his Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Anthony claimed his rights were violated because the criminal-

conviction letter, which contained a summary of the sexual-abuse charges, was attached to

the divorce complaint, and he could not respond. He also claimed he would be subject to

further prosecution if he admitted or denied the allegation.

¶6. On June 4, 2019, the case was called for trial in the Harrison County Chancery Court.

The chancery court denied Anthony’s motion to dismiss because the letter from the ASA did

not relate to the truth or falsity of the sexual-abuse allegations and, instead, related only the

1
For the purpose of this opinion, we use a pseudonym for the child’s name for
privacy purposes.

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fact that Anthony had pled guilty and had been sentenced to serve time in a penitentiary.

¶7. At trial, Anthony was called three times as a witness, but he did not answer. The

chancery court noted that an order requesting transport was issued to the Florida penal

system, and the State of Florida’s response to not abide by that request was not within the

court’s jurisdiction to address.2

¶8. On June 21, 2019, the Harrison County Chancery Court entered judgment granting the

divorce and awarding Amanda sole physical and legal custody of the minor children. The

chancery court reserved the distribution of marital property and any other assets for a later

date.

¶9. On April 19, 2021, Amanda filed a petition for the distribution of “any and all marital

assets not otherwise distributed in the judgment.” Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 81, a summons was issued and served upon Anthony by mail to the Wakulla

Correctional Institution in Crawfordville, Florida. The summons requested that Anthony

appear or defend the petition for distribution in the Harrison County Chancery Court on July

7, 2021.

¶10. On May 10, 2021, the Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office sent Amanda a “non-

enforceable return of service,” stating:

Summons was received on “4/27/2021 at 10:52 A.M. and served on
READING, ANTHONY, the within names, at 9:00 A.M. on 5/5/2021 in
Wakulla County, Florida, by delivering to the within named a true copy of this
Writ with the date and hour of service endorsed thereon by me, and at the same

2
On March 12, 2019, the chancery court entered an “Order Requesting Transport
From The State of Florida.” The order required Anthony to appear before the Harrison
County Chancery Court on June 4, 2019.

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time I delivered to the within a copy of the plaintiff’s initial pleading as
furnished by the plaintiff.”

¶11. On July 1-2, 2021, Anthony responded with a written “Statement of Facts,” “Formal

Complaint of Illegal Activity,” and “Request for Investigation.” Anthony alleged the

following:

(1) He had “no knowledge of or have ever[] seen the [referred] document,
listed by the [Amanda’s] lawyer, in the document included with the Summons
[and was never issued] any FINDING, RULING OR DECREE in this case, by
the Court . . . .” (2) “No JUDGEMENT, FINDING OR RULING was issued
to me from the court on a motion to the Court to PROTECT and PRESERVE
my CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS in the court . . . .” (3) He was “denied [his]
ability to appeal or submit further motions . . . . (4) [and had] been subject to
threats by MARK R. READING, acting on behalf of [Amanda] to have [him]
sign over PROPERTY.” (5) “Susan, did willingly violate a standing no contact
order, issued by The State of Florida on behalf of [Amanda].”[3] (6)
[Amanda’s] Attorney, Mr. Reeves contacted [him] by mail and falsely claimed
that [he] had been in negotiations with [Amanda] and agreed to conditions
. . . .”[4]

¶12. Anthony also requested a formal review of (1) “all documents filed with the court,

with [his] signature to ensure . . . assets [were] there and that [his] signature [could] be

verified . . . with the legal mail stamp from a Florida Department of Corrections Institution”;

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Anthony stated that his daughter Susan made “third party contact through [his]
Healthcare Advocate/Emergency Contact, Sharon J. Elieff” and that Susan requested Elieff
use “any influence [she had over him]” to get Anthony to sign over property to Amanda.
Anthony also stated that Elieff notified him, through “JPAY Email,” that Susan admitted to
participating in illegal activities with Amanda to gain control over the property to sell it.
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Anthony also explained that he responded to Reeves’s letter and told him that the
statements regarding negotiations were false. In addition, he asked Reeves “to provide the
details of when, where and how these negotiations took place” and “requested an accounting
of all assets being held by [Amanda].” Anthony stated that Reeves submitted only his brief
in response. Anthony believed “this [was] an attempt to cover up illegal activity of
[Amanda] and to hide the illegal sale of property not belonging to [Amanda].”

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(2) “legal proceedings to ensure [his] constitutional rights have been protected”; and (3) “any

illegal activity be prosecuted, showing [him] as the victim . . . .”

¶13. Lastly, Anthony “formally lodge[d] a complaint with the court” against Amanda’s

attorney, Reeves, “in the matter of false statements in a legal document” and requested that

the court “stop these proceedings until a investigation is conducted, [its] finding[s] brought

before the court and a complete disclosure of evidence.”

¶14. On July 7, 2021, the chancery court held a hearing on the distribution of the real

property, which was the only remaining issue in the divorce. Amanda testified that she

bought the house about “a year and a half” before the divorce. She explained that she and

Anthony came to Mississippi to purchase the house and that Anthony lived in the house only

about thirty days before he went back to Florida “to retrieve [their] oldest daughter,” and was

incarcerated for the crimes against Susan. She also stated that both of their names were on

the paperwork. She explained that she used money from her 401(k) account to pay the down

payment, and Anthony did not participate in any of “the financial aspect of the house.”

Amanda stated that she had paid every monthly payment since purchasing the home.

¶15. On July 8, 2021, the Harrison County Chancery Court found process was sufficient,

and entered final judgment on the petition for distribution filed on April 19, 2021. The

chancery court awarded full title, possession, and ownership of the marital property to

Amanda.

¶16. On July 29, 2021, Anthony wrote a letter to the Harrison County Chancery Court

requesting “a copy of the schedule of fees required for filing an appeal in a civil case.”

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Anthony noted that he was “under a time constraint” and would appreciate a “quick

response.” The same day, Anthony filed a “Notice of Intent To Appeal” and a “Motion For

Extended Time To Answer/Comply With The Verdict of The Court.” He requested a

ninety-day extension. On August 10, 2021, Anthony filed a motion to amend the record, and

on August 24, he filed an “Appeal of All Verdicts, Decrees Orders And Judgments.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17. It is well settled that this Court “applies a limited standard of review on appeals from

chancery court.” Rodgers v. Moore, 101 So. 3d 189, 193 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting

Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (¶10) (Miss. 2001)); see also Reddell v. Reddell, 696

So. 2d 287, 288 (Miss. 1997). The chancery court’s factual findings will not be disturbed if

they are “supported by substantial evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that

the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous[,] or

applied an erroneous legal standard.” Biglane v. Under the Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 13-14

(¶17) (Miss. 2007) (quoting Cummings v. Benderman, 681 So. 2d 97, 100 (Miss. 1996)).

Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 14 (¶17); see also Rodgers v. Moore, 101 So.

3d 189, 193 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).

ANALYSIS

¶18. Anthony argues the chancery court violated his constitutional rights to due process

when the court (1) did not notify him of an “order of extradi[t]ion,” and he “was not given

the chance to waive the objection”; (2) did not “issue a Decree of Divorce or any other

documents” pertaining to the ruling in Amanda’s favor, which stopped him from timely filing

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appeals; (3) did not “read any motions, notices, or statements from the appellant into the

record”; and (4) did not respond to “requests from the appellant to investigate alleged

criminal activity” being conducted by Amanda and her attorneys. He cites only the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provides no legal argument for his

contentions.

¶19. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(7) governs the argument section of

appellate briefs, and states, “The argument shall contain the contentions of appellant with

respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” The rule “does not simply require a

party to mention authority; the authority must be used to develop the argument in a

meaningful way.” Walker v. State, 197 So. 3d 914, 919 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)

(emphasis added) (quoting Archer v. State, 118 So. 3d 612, 621 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)).

Arguments that do not comply with the rule are procedurally barred. Hill v. State, 215 So.

3d 518, 524 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

¶20. In an analogous case, this Court found that an appellant failed to sufficiently brief his

arguments because he provided only a “summary of his arguments” and “did not elaborate

his point.” Hill v. State, 940 So. 2d 972, 973 (¶¶4-5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). Hill only listed

issues such as “[t]he defendant was denied due process of law by the court not introducing

evidence . . . [[that] would have shown a propensity for violence and . . . would have been

relevant to the issue.” Id. at 973 (¶5). This Court explained that the “argument” was

insufficient because Hill “did not include an argument at all.” Id.; see M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7)

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(stating the appellant’s duty to provide “the reasons for [his] contentions, with citations to

the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on”). Hill also failed to cite authority.

Id. at 974 (¶8). Although Hill cited five cases, he “did not cite any one case for any

particular argument or proposition.” Id. Also, none of the cases were relevant to any

argument. Id. This Court held that Hill failed to comply with Rule 28(a)(7) and did not

address the merits. Id.

¶21. Likewise, Anthony failed to sufficiently brief his arguments. Anthony cited only some

parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the citation was not relevant or entirely accurate.

He also failed to cite any other legal authority. Other than the four legal issues (see supra

at ¶19) and the inaccurate citation to the Fourteenth Amendment, Anthony provided no

meaningful argument or citation to relevant authorities to support and develop his issues on

appeal. See M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7); see also Carter v. Carter, 324 So. 3d 327, 334 (¶29) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2021) (holding that an appeal failed to comply with Rule 28, “which procedurally

bars the appeal because appellant failed to provide caselaw and sufficient reasons to support

the arguments”).

¶22. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated, “[I]ssues cannot be decided based on

assertions from the briefs alone. The issues must be supported and proved by the record.”

Patton v. State, 109 So. 3d 66, 75 (¶22) (Miss. 2012). The appellant must support his

argument “with reasons and authorities.” Id. (emphasis added). This “is part of an

appellant’s burden on appeal.” Id. Moreover, “[i]n the absence of meaningful argument

and citation of authority, [appellate courts] generally will not consider the assignment of

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error.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Siggers v. State, 342 So. 3d 1213, 1218 (¶16) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Stewart v. State, 291 So. 3d 738, 748 (¶39) (Miss. 2020)).

¶23. It is impossible to discern exactly what issues Anthony raises because of his failure

to cite legal authority and his failure to make meaningful arguments. For example, he asked

the chancery court to “investigate” numerous alleged criminal activities, but those arguments

are factually nonsensical and make no legal sense. At one point he alleged the violation of

an “order of extradition” but again cited no legal authority or provided any meaningful

argument. It is hard to determine how a criminal “extradition” can start in chancery court or

how that court violated such an order. As a result of a complete failure to abide by the Rules

of Appellate Procedure by citing no relevant legal authority or providing any meaningful

argument, we find Anthony’s claim on appeal is procedurally barred.

CONCLUSION

¶24. Upon review of the record, this Court concludes that Mississippi Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28(a)(7) procedurally bars the assignment of error on appeal because the appellant

failed to cite relevant legal authority and failed to provide meaningful legal arguments. It is

impossible for this Court to understand the exact legal errors he alleged were committed by

the chancery court since he included no relevant authority, no meaningful arguments, and

no references to the record. Therefore, as a result of the procedural bars already referenced

and the inability of this Court to decipher Anthony’s arguments on appeal, the judgment of

the chancery court is affirmed.

¶25. AFFIRMED.

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BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, McDONALD,
McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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