Jakia Thomas v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00512-COA

JAKIA THOMAS APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/01/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WINSTON L. KIDD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARCUS AMIR WILLIAMS
KEVIN BRIAN BASS
LAWRENCE STEPHEN BLACKMON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/25/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Jakia Thomas was convicted of the second-degree murder of her boyfriend, DeMarcus

Harris. On appeal, she argues that the trial court made errors in the admission and exclusion

of evidence, her conviction was against the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and

cumulative error warrants reversal. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm.

FACTS

¶2. In December 2018, Thomas and Harris lived together with their five-month-old child

in Jackson, Mississippi. They had been dating for approximately a year and a half to two
years. On December 27, 2018, Harris’s mother, Janice Harris, called Harris and asked him

if her boss could borrow a commercial-grade dolly. Harris agreed. Around 12:30 p.m., he

let Janice know that he was picking up pizza for their lunch, and he arrived at Janice’s

workplace in Jackson with the pizza and dolly around 1 p.m. Janice testified that Harris was

in good spirits and was happy to learn that her boss possibly had a job opportunity for Harris.

Harris left between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m. Janice called him approximately thirty minutes after

he left to let him know that she had given Harris’s phone number to her boss, and Harris was

“fine” during their conversation.

¶3. Harris’s brother, Lynn Harris, testified that he called Harris between 4:30 and

5:30 p.m., and they spoke on the phone for about twenty minutes and discussed meeting up

that evening to smoke weed. Before they ended the call, Harris said to “give him 20

minutes.” Lynn testified that Harris seemed normal during their conversation.

¶4. At approximately 5:43 p.m., shortly after Harris hung up with his brother on the

phone, Thomas called 911 and reported that Harris had shot himself in their home. An

ambulance was dispatched and arrived at the home at 5:57 p.m. Officer Zekia Lewis with

the Jackson Police Department was the first officer on the scene. She testified that when she

arrived, Thomas was crying and saying, “[H]elp him, help him, he tried to harm himself.”

Officer Lewis testified that the scene did not seem “normal” to her. Harris was sitting

slumped over in a chair, a framed picture of a woman “was laying in both of his hands, and

he was tilted over to the right.” Officer Lewis noted that although she later learned from

Thomas that Harris was right-handed, Harris had been shot in the back-left side of his head,

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and a gun was on the floor to his left. He was moving and able to talk, although she could

not understand what he was saying. Officers later identified the woman in the photograph

as Harris’s sister, who had died in a car accident two years prior.

¶5. Thomas told Officer Lewis that prior to Harris being shot, she and Harris had an

argument, and Harris was holding a photograph of his deceased sister and saying, “I want to

go with you.” Thomas told Officer Lewis that Harris “had just been crying a lot and just

sitting in that chair holding this picture of his deceased sister.” Officer Lewis testified that

Thomas told her that Harris had been holding a gun to his head, and when she tried to take

it from him, the gun discharged.

¶6. Officers examined the gun that was found on the floor to Harris’s left and found a

stove-piped shell casing lodged inside. A second shell casing fell from Harris’s body onto

the front porch as paramedics were transporting him on a stretcher from the house. Harris

died four days later in the hospital. An autopsy showed that Harris’s cause of death was a

gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was homicide.

¶7. After Harris was taken to the hospital, Thomas was immediately detained for

questioning. After waiving her Miranda1 rights, she told officers that she and Harris had

been arguing for the past few days because Harris had commented, “I’m hungry,” on another

woman’s Facebook post showing food the woman was preparing. Thomas explained that she

told Harris, “You a man that’s taken you can’t be saying you’re hungry they are going to take

that as I ain’t feeding you or any other thing.” Thomas said that Harris did not understand

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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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how his comment was disrespectful. Thomas maintained that Harris shot himself as she was

attempting to stop him. Gunshot residue was found on Thomas’s and Harris’s hands.

¶8. Thomas was indicted in the Hinds County Circuit Court for the first-degree murder

of Harris. After a jury trial, Thomas was found guilty of second-degree murder. On March

1, 2023, the circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve thirty years in the custody of the

Mississippi Department of Corrections. The circuit court denied Thomas’s motion for a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and Thomas appealed.

¶9. On appeal, Thomas argues that this Court should reverse her conviction for the

following reasons: (1) the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion to exclude a

Facebook post that she alleges was pertinent to Harris’s mental state; (2) the circuit court

erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict based on the Weathersby rule;2 (3) the

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (4) the verdict was against the

overwhelming weight of the evidence; (5) the circuit court erred in allowing the medical

examiner to testify outside his area of expertise and give rebuttal testimony; (6) the circuit

court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement to police; (7) the circuit court

erred in permitting the introduction of gruesome photographs; and (8) cumulative errors

deprived her of a fair trial.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Facebook Post

¶10. Thomas’s defense at trial was that Harris was depressed following his sister’s death

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Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481, 482 (1933).

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two years prior in a car accident and shot himself while Thomas tried to stop him from

committing suicide. Thomas sought to introduce into evidence a post from Harris’s

Facebook page that Thomas contends supported her theory that Harris had a suicidal mental

state. The post was made on May 24, 2018, approximately seven months prior to Harris’s

death on December 27, 2018. The post stated in its entirety, “Just trying to have a life of

happiness, but I’m starting to feel like I shouldn’t have a life at all.”

¶11. Prior to trial, the State moved to exclude the post on the basis that it was too remote

in time and not relevant under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401. Alternatively, the State

argued that the post was improper under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 because its

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the post

could be misleading to the jury, and it could not be authenticated. The circuit court granted

the motion, finding that the Facebook post was “of no relevance to the hearing matter and

remote in time.”

¶12. “The standard of review regarding admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of

discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 71 (¶9) (Miss. 2010). We will not disturb an

evidentiary ruling “unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Id.

(quoting Mingo v. State, 944 So. 2d 18, 28 (¶23) (Miss. 2006)). “Evidence that is remote in

time or is otherwise far-removed from an issue at trial is not relevant under M.R.E. 401 and

may be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of discretion.” Tillis v. State, 661 So. 2d

1139, 1142-43 (Miss. 1995).

¶13. Thomas cites Parr v. State, 362 So. 2d 634, 636 (Miss. 1978), where the Supreme

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Court found no error in the trial court’s admission of threats made by the defendant thirteen

months before the killing. However, there is a key distinction between this case and Parr.

In Parr, the Supreme Court considered that a continuing course of conduct existed between

the defendant and victim between the period before the threats and up until the murder. The

court noted, “The record indicates that for a period before the threats were made up until the

date of the homicide, there was hostility, bitterness, and ill will between appellant and his

wife [(the deceased)]. Such a situation rendered the threats relevant and competent.” Id.

¶14. Similarly, in May v. State, 524 So. 2d 957, 960 (Miss. 1988), a witness testified that

the defendant, Dorothy May, had told her the year prior to May’s husband’s death that she

had tried to poison her husband. On appeal, May argued that the trial court erred in not

striking the statement as too remote in time. Id. at 965. The Supreme Court found no abuse

of discretion because even if the statement was too remote in time, “several other persons

testified to similar threats” that May made leading up to the murder, including a threat made

by May less than a week prior to her husband’s death. Id. Therefore, the court found that

even if the admission of the remote statement was error, it “was surely harmless” given the

testimony of “a more contemporaneous threat.” Id.

¶15. Here, no evidence was presented that Harris continued to make similar allegedly

suicidal statements or exhibit suicidal behavior between his Facebook post and his death

seven months later. Therefore, even if Thomas is correct that Harris’s Facebook post showed

he had suicidal thoughts seven months prior to his death, there is no evidence that those

suicidal thoughts continued until his death. To the contrary, the State presented evidence that

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Harris did not dwell on his sister’s death and was generally happy.

¶16. Harris’s mother, Janice, testified for the State regarding the events on the day of

Harris’s death and her knowledge of his mental state following his sister’s death. Janice

testified that after her daughter, Harris’s sister, died in a car accident, Harris and his brother

were “torn to pieces.” But, over time, they got better; “[i]t was a normal grief. At first it may

have been unbearable, but as time has went by, you know, they are fine.” Janice testified as

follows regarding Harris’s mental state in December 2018 just prior to this death: “[I’m] not

saying that he didn’t grieve his sister, but he didn’t have mopey feelings or anything like that.

He was back to normal. . . . [H]e was a happy kid . . . .”

¶17. Janice testified that she regularly spoke to Harris on the phone. On the morning of

Harris’s death, she called him and asked if her boss could borrow a commercial-grade dolly.

Harris agreed and brought the dolly and pizza for himself and Janice around 1 p.m. Janice’s

boss asked Janice what type of work Harris did and then asked if Harris “would look at the

property and let [him] know how much [Harris] would charge initially to do a cleanup for

[him] and to continue—do the upkeep on it at least once a month.” When Janice relayed this

message to Harris, she said that Harris “was ready to work. He says, well, can I start today[?]

. . . [H]e was excited. He was calling people about the little job.” Janice testified that Harris

left between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m., and she called him around thirty minutes later to tell him

that she was giving her boss Harris’s phone number. Janice testified that during the

conversation, “[h]e was fine.” She testified that he had never expressed having any mental-

health issues to her. Finally, she was asked if he ever said anything between the ages of

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twenty-five and the time of his death at age thirty-two regarding “if something was

concerning him”; she answered no. Harris’s brother, Lynn, testified that he spoke to Harris

on the phone moments before Harris’s death. He testified that Harris seemed “normal”

during their conversation; he was not depressed or sad, and they did not discuss their sister.

¶18. We cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the Facebook

post as too remote in time and irrelevant to show Harris’s state of mind at the time of his

death. The Facebook post was made seven months prior to Harris’s death, and there was no

evidence that Harris continued to make such statements or exhibit any behavior that would

support Thomas’s theory that Harris continued to have suicidal thoughts. The circuit court

did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Facebook post.

II. Weathersby Rule

¶19. Thomas argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the

Weathersby rule. Our Supreme Court has held that motions “for a directed verdict and

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the guilty verdict,” that the “standards of review for a denial of directed verdict

and JNOV are identical,” and that reversal is warranted where, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable and fair-minded juror could only find the

accused not guilty. Croft v. State, 992 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (¶24) (Miss. 2008).

¶20. The Weathersby rule states:

Where the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses are the only eyewitnesses to
the homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless
substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or
witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts or by the facts of common

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knowledge.

Childress v. State, 395 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (¶27) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Weathersby, 147 So.

at 482). “Where the Weathersby rule applies and the defendant’s version affords an absolute

legal defense, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Johnson v. State,

987 So. 2d 420, 424 (¶10) (Miss. 2008). The applicability of the Weathersby rule is a

determination for the court, not the jury. Id. “[I]t is a rare case that meets all of the

requirements of the Weathersby rule.” McQuarters v. State, 45 So. 3d 643, 650 (¶21) (Miss.

2010) (quoting Sartain v. State, 311 So. 2d 343, 345 (Miss. 1975)). Where factual issues

exist, the case must be submitted to the jury. Id.

¶21. It is undisputed that Thomas and her and Harris’s infant child were the only ones in

the home when Harris was shot. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Thomas moved for

a directed verdict in part based on the Weathersby rule. The circuit court denied the motion.

Thomas argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict because she was the only witness

to the shooting, and the State failed to present substantial evidence to contradict her account

of the events. Thus, she asserts that her version of events must be accepted as true.

¶22. Thomas’s account of Harris’s shooting was that Harris was holding a gun while crying

and holding a picture of his deceased sister, and he was saying, “I want to go with you.” She

approached Harris in an attempt to prevent him from shooting himself, and through accident

and misfortune, the gun went off.

¶23. However, the State presented evidence that contradicted Thomas’s version of events.

For instance, Officer Lewis testified that the scene of the shooting did not appear normal to

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her or consistent with Thomas’s assertion that Harris shot himself. Officer Lewis testified

that it appeared the gun used in the shooting had been fired twice because a shell casing was

found stove-piped in the gun, and another fell from Harris’s body as he was being transported

by paramedics. Further, Officer Lewis noted that despite Thomas’s statement to her that

Harris was right-handed, he was shot in the left side of his head behind his ear, he was

slumped over to the right, and the gun was on the ground on his left side. Dr. Mark

LeVaughn, a state forensic medical examiner, testified that the manner of death was not

consistent with a suicide because there was no evidence that the gun was in close range to

Harris’s head when it was fired.

¶24. We cannot find that the Weathersby rule applies here. Not only did Officer Lewis

testify that the scene appeared inconsistent with Thomas’s version of events, but Dr.

LeVaughn testified that the manner of death was homicide and inconsistent with suicide. Dr.

LeVaughn’s “expert testimony [regarding the manner of death], admissible under our rules

of evidence, substantially contradicted [Thomas’s] version of the incident and created a

question for the jury to resolve.” Booker v. State, 64 So. 3d 965, 975-76 (¶33) (Miss. 2011).

¶25. The circuit court did not err in denying Thomas’s motion for a directed verdict on this

issue and submitting these factual issues to the jury to decide. This issue is without merit.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶26. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Haymon v. State,

346 So. 3d 875, 881 (¶14) (Miss. 2022). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,

“[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether

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rational, reasonable fair-minded jurors could have found that the State proved each essential

element of the crime” beyond a reasonable doubt. Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293 (¶20)

(Miss. 2010) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶27. Second-degree murder is a killing “done in the commission of an act eminently

dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although

without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual[.]” Miss.

Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2020). A finding of intent to kill is not required. McCool

v. State, 328 So. 3d 173, 183 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). However, the defendant’s conduct

must be “so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the

safety of human life.” Montana v. State, 822 So. 2d 954, 967 (¶55) (Miss. 2002).

¶28. The jury heard Thomas’s theory of the case that Harris was holding the gun and crying

about his deceased sister while holding her picture, and Harris was shot while Thomas was

trying to prevent Harris from committing suicide. The jury also heard evidence that Thomas

and Harris had been arguing prior to the shooting and that the crime scene and autopsy report

showed Harris’s death was not consistent with suicide. Specifically, the jury heard that

Harris, who was right-handed, was shot in the left side of the head, the gun was found on the

ground to his left, and the autopsy showed no indication that the gun was in close range to

Harris’s head when it was fired. The jury was also told that it appeared that the gun had been

fired twice and that it was not reasonable to believe Harris could have fired the gun a second

time after sustaining the injury from the first shot.

¶29. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could

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find that Thomas shot Harris and, in doing so, committed “an act eminently dangerous to

others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life[.]” Miss. Code Ann.

§ 97-3-19(1)(b). Therefore, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove each essential

element of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV. Weight of the Evidence

¶30. “A request for a new trial is a challenge to the weight of the evidence.” Haymon, 346

So. 3d at 883 (¶23). “The trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial is reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict.” Id. (citing Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶21) (Miss. 2017)). “We will not

order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight

of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.”

Jones v. State, 390 So. 3d 498, 503 (¶20) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Whitten v. Cox, 799 So. 2d

1, 13 (¶26) (Miss. 2000)).

¶31. Thomas argues that the verdict of second-degree murder was against the

overwhelming weight of the evidence because the State presented no evidence that she took

“any hostile action” toward Harris prior to his death; rather, she called 911 and sought help

for Harris after he was shot. She further argues that the State failed to show a motive for the

murder and that the State’s theory regarding how Harris was shot was not supported by

scientific testing or physical evidence but, instead, was based on speculation.

¶32. Thomas further argues that the testimony of her expert witness “should hold

considerable weight given the facts and circumstances of this case, in addition to the lack of

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evidence detailing the shooting presented by the State.” Eric Warren, who was tendered as

an expert in the “field of shooting incident reconstruction and firearms,” testified for the

defense. Warren testified that based on summaries of the crime scene, Thomas’s interview

with the police, and the medical evidence, “the scenario that is most consistent with all of

that evidence as a whole is . . . in agreement with the recounting of events that Ms. Thomas

told to the Jackson Police Department.”

¶33. To the contrary, the State presented evidence that Harris’s manner of death was not

consistent with the account Thomas gave to police. Both the medical examiner who

performed the autopsy and the medical examiner who testified at trial agreed that Harris’s

death was a homicide. Law enforcement found it was not plausible that Harris, who was

right-handed, shot himself in the back of his head on the left side. As motive for the murder,

the State presented evidence of an ongoing argument between Harris and Thomas regarding

a Facebook comment that Harris made on another woman’s post. Thomas acknowledged that

she and Harris had been arguing over it prior to his death.

¶34. While Thomas argues that the State’s evidence was speculative and the substantial

weight of the evidence weighs in her favor, we must acknowledge that “where the verdict

turns on the credibility of conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witness, it is the

jury’s duty to resolve the conflict.” Wilson v. State, 343 So. 3d 1041, 1051 (¶47) (Miss.

2022). “‘[T]he jury is the judge of the weight and credibility of testimony and is free to

accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness.’” Young v. State, 236 So.

3d 49, 57 (¶35) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Meshell v. State, 506 So. 2d 989, 992 (Miss. 1987)).

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¶35. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot find that

the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The circuit court

did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomas’s motion for a new trial.

V. Admission of Medical Examiner’s Testimony

a. Scope of Expert Testimony

¶36. Thomas argues that State Medical Examiner Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony was outside

the scope of his expertise and mere speculation. Specifically, she argues that Dr. LeVaughn

was unqualified to testify as to the manner of Harris’s death, bullet trajectory, and distance

of the gun from Harris’s body because (1) he did not personally view Harris’s body or the

crime scene or speak with witnesses, and (2) he “is not a shooting incident scene

reconstructionist.”

¶37. The trial court acts “as gatekeeper on questions of admissibility of expert testimony.”

Chisholm v. State, 365 So. 3d 229, 241 (¶43) (Miss. 2023). “This Court reviews the trial

court’s admissibility determination for abuse of discretion.” Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d

278, 295 (¶28) (Miss. 2014).

¶38. No specific objection was made at trial regarding Dr. LeVaughn’s qualification to

testify as to Harris’s cause or manner of death based on the fact that Dr. LeVaughn was not

present for the autopsy. Nor was there any objection made that Dr. LeVaughn impermissibly

testified regarding the trajectory of the bullet through Harris’s head. Therefore, this issue is

waived for appeal. Brady v. State, 337 So. 3d 218, 227 (¶27) (Miss. 2022) (stating that issues

not presented to the trial court are waived). Thomas argues that the issue is not waived

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because she continuously objected to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony. While Thomas did object

throughout Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony, the objections were based on the failure of the State

to produce Dr. LeVaughn’s report in a timely manner, the authenticity of the autopsy

photographs, and Dr. LeVaughn’s use of a demonstrative aid.3 Thomas alternatively argues

that the issue should be reviewed for plain error. See id. (stating that an issue may be

reviewed for plain error “in unusual circumstances” affecting a defendant’s substantive or

fundamental rights to “prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice”).

¶39. Because there was no objection made at trial to Dr. LeVaughn’s qualifications or his

ability to give his opinion on the cause and manner of death when he was not present for the

autopsy, we find these issues are waived. We also find the issues are not appropriate for

plain error review. Therefore, we decline to address them on appeal.

b. Rebuttal Testimony

¶40. Thomas argues that the circuit court erred by permitting Dr. LeVaughn to give rebuttal

testimony. Thomas called one witness at trial, Eric Warren, an expert on shooting-incident

reconstruction and firearms. As part of his testimony, Warren simulated how Harris’s

gunshot wound could have been self-inflicted. After his testimony, the State announced its

3
Thomas also objected to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony that the lack of soot or stippling
on a person indicates “that the gun was fired greater than three feet.” Thomas’s counsel
immediately moved to strike this statement from the record because the testimony regarding
the specific distance of three feet was outside the scope of the autopsy report and not timely
disclosed to the defense, and the motion was granted. The circuit court instructed the jury
to disregard the statement. To the extent that Thomas challenges this specific testimony on
appeal, we find the issue without merit because the circuit court instructed the jury to
disregard the statement, and “[t]he jury is presumed to follow instructions from the trial
court . . . .” Young, 236 So. 3d at 57 (¶38).

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intent to call Dr. LeVaughn, who testified for the State in its case-in-chief as an expert in the

field of forensic pathology, back to the stand as a rebuttal witness. The defense objected on

the basis that the rebuttal testimony was a backdoor attempt to introduce Dr. LeVaughn’s

report, which the circuit court had previously excluded, and on the basis that Dr. LeVaughn

was not a proper rebuttal witness because he and Warren were certified in two different areas

of expertise. The prosecution responded that Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony would be

limited to Warren’s testimony regarding “the angle of the projection and stippling.” The

circuit court overruled the objection and allowed Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony, limiting

it to those two issues.

¶41. During rebuttal, the prosecution asked Dr. LeVaughn if Warren’s demonstration

regarding the angle of the gun when it was fired was accurate. Dr. LeVaughn responded that

“based on the actual true wound path through the head, that animation is not consistent with

that.” Dr. LeVaughn was not asked about stippling. On appeal, Thomas argues that Dr.

LeVaughn was not qualified to rebut Warren’s testimony because Dr. LeVaughn is not a

firearms expert, and his rebuttal testimony lacked any probative value and could not be

substantially countered with a surrebuttal.

¶42. “The determination of whether evidence is properly admitted as rebuttal evidence is

within the trial court’s discretion.” Jackson v. State, 840 So. 2d 739, 741 (¶6) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2003) (citing Powell v. State, 662 So. 2d 1095, 1098-99 (Miss. 1995)). Our Supreme

Court has set forth the following guidelines on whether the admission of rebuttal testimony

is proper:

Generally, the party bearing the burden of proof must offer all substantive

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evidence in its case-in-chief. Where, however, there is doubt as to whether the
evidence is properly case-in-chief or rebuttal evidence, the court should
resolve the doubt in favor of reception in rebuttal if: (1) its reception will not
consume so much additional time as to give an undue weight in practical
probative force to the evidence so received in rebuttal, and (2) the opposite
party would be substantially as well prepared to meet it by surrebuttal as if the
testimony had been offered in chief, and (3) the opposite party upon request
therefor is given the opportunity to reply by surrebuttal.

McGaughy v. State, 742 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (¶12) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted).

¶43. Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony was brief, and the defense cross-examined him but

did not seek surrebuttal testimony. As a forensic pathologist, Dr. LeVaughn was qualified

to testify as to a bullet’s trajectory through Harris’s head, and his rebuttal testimony was

limited to his opinion regarding the accuracy of Warren’s demonstration of the trajectory of

the bullet through Harris’s head. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 632 (¶29) (Miss. 2013)

(“[A] forensic pathologist may testify as to what produced [a victim’s] injuries,” including

“wounds . . . and the means of infliction of injury,” and “what trauma such an injury would

produce.”). The rebuttal testimony could not have been presented during the State’s case-in-

chief because the State was unaware that Warren would provide such a demonstration. Dr.

LeVaughn offered no additional testimony. For these reasons, we cannot find that the circuit

court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony.

VI. Statement to Law Enforcement

¶44. Before Thomas was interrogated by law enforcement, she was advised of her right to

remain silent and her right to counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Thomas waived her

Miranda rights and signed a waiver-of-rights form. Thomas argues that despite her waiver

of rights, her statements to law enforcement, which were given approximately an hour and

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a half after the shooting occurred, were not voluntary, and the circuit court erred by denying

her motion to suppress the statements. Specifically, Thomas argues that she was still in a

“very emotional state,” and “officers induced her with leniency and promises to speak on her

behalf to the judge.”

¶45. A valid waiver under Miranda “must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id. A

“[w]aiver is considered voluntary if it is the result of a ‘free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion or deception.’” Jordan v. State, 995 So. 2d 94, 106 (¶31) (Miss. 2008)

(quoting Coverson v. State, 617 So. 2d 642, 647 (Miss. 1993)). “Knowing and intelligent

waiver must be made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The State bears the burden to show the waiver was valid. Id. “The determination of the

voluntariness of a waiver of rights is a mixed issue of law and fact,” and this Court “will not

reverse a trial court’s findings if they were based on appropriate principles of law and

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at (¶32).

¶46. Despite Thomas’s argument that she was coerced into giving inculpatory statements

because she was in an emotional state, the interrogation video shows she was calm and able

to answer the officers’ questions and give a statement. Thomas’s argument that the officers

coerced her into giving a statement by threatening to speak to a judge about her case is also

without merit. The only specific statement by an officer that Thomas cites from the

interrogation is as follows:

So like I told you when he walked out, it’s best to tell the truth and exactly
what happened. But going before a judge saying, no, she wasn’t remorseful,

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and she shot him. That’s all I’ve got, judge. Instead of saying, judge, they had
an argument earlier, it got a little heated, and a gun was involved. It was an
accident.

However, Thomas had already given her version of events before the officer mentioned

speaking to a judge, and there is no allegation that the officer’s statement coerced Thomas

to give any further information.

¶47. After review, we find that the circuit court applied “appropriate principles of law,”

and the circuit court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was “ supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. at (¶32). Therefore, we find the circuit court properly admitted Thomas’s

statements to law enforcement into evidence.

VII. Autopsy Photographs

¶48. Thomas argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the autopsy photographs

marked as Exhibits S-14 E and G, which showed Harris’s skull and brain, over her objection

on the basis that they were gruesome and provided minimal evidentiary or probative value.

Thomas argues that the State introduced other sufficient photographs to identify Harris and

the gunshot wound. She asserts that it was undisputed that Harris died of a gunshot wound

to the head, and the admission of Exhibits S-14 E and G was unnecessary, highly prejudicial,

and improperly inflamed the jury. The circuit court found that while the photographs were

gruesome, their probative value was not outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

¶49. We review a trial court’s decision to admit a photograph into evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Barfield v. State, 22 So. 3d 1175, 1181 (¶14) (Miss. 2009). We “must consider

whether the pictures were so gruesome and inflammatory as to lack any evidentiary purpose

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and, therefore, be inadmissible.” Id. “[P]hotographs have evidentiary value when they (1)

aid in describing the circumstances of the killing; (2) describe the location of the body and

cause of death; and (3) supplement or clarify witness testimony.” Id. at (¶15) (quotation

marks omitted). “Some probative value is the only requirement needed in order to support

a trial judge’s decision to admit photographs into evidence.” Martin v. State, 289 So. 3d 703,

705 (¶7) (Miss. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320, 340

(¶73) (Miss. 2008)). “So long as a photograph has probative value and its introduction serves

a meaningful evidentiary purpose, it may still be admissible despite being gruesome, grisly,

unpleasant, or even inflammatory.” Id. Gruesomeness alone will not render a photograph

inadmissible in a murder trial; it is not unusual for crime-scene photos to be “gruesome,

grisly, [or] unpleasant.” Id.

¶50. Exhibits S-14 E and G are autopsy photographs depicting the injury to Harris’s skull

and brain. Dr. LeVaughn described Exhibit S-14 E as “a photograph after the top of the skull

bone is removed and also the brain is removed, so we’re looking at in this photograph what

we call the base of the skull or the bottom part of the skull,” and the photograph showed “a

probe through the cranial cavity.” Dr. LeVaughn testified that Exhibit S-14 G was “a view

from the left side of the head” showing “the entry wound into the skull.”

¶51. At trial, Thomas’s theory of defense was that Harris shot himself while Thomas tried

to stop him from committing suicide. The State’s theory was that the entry wound to the

back-left side of Harris’s head and the subsequent wound path were consistent with a

homicide. Testimony regarding the wound path was highly disputed at trial, with Thomas

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objecting to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony that the wound path was “slightly upward” rather

than “upward” as described in the report of Dr. Eserman, the medical examiner who

performed the autopsy.4

¶52. Because the photographs were relevant to the wound path, which was a disputed issue

at trial, we cannot find that the circuit court erred in concluding that the probative value of

the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect. See Martin, 289 So. 3d at 705 (¶7)

(stating that only “[s]ome probative value” is needed to support the admission of photographs

into evidence (emphasis added)). This issue is without merit.

VIII. Cumulative Error

¶53. Thomas argues that cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial. “Under the

cumulative-error doctrine, individual harmless errors may be aggregated with other errors to

create reversible error ‘where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a

fundamentally fair trial.’” Warren v. State, 187 So. 3d 616, 628 (¶34) (Miss. 2016) (quoting

Osborne v. State, 54 So. 3d 841, 848 (¶27) (Miss. 2011)). However, “where there is no error

in part, there can be no reversible error to the whole.” Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 970 So.

2d 151, 157 (¶24) (Miss. 2007)).

¶54. We have identified no reversible error. Therefore, there can be no cumulative error.

This issue is without merit. Thomas’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

4
Dr. LeVaughn prepared his own report; however, Thomas moved to exclude any
findings from Dr. LeVaughn’s report because it was produced to the defense only four days
before trial. The circuit court granted the motion on the basis that Dr. LeVaughn’s report
was not timely produced, and the circuit court limited Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony to the
findings in Dr. Eserman’s report.

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¶55. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND
IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McDONALD, J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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