Pilot Travel Centers, LLC and Gina Franklin, Individually v. Willa Womack

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CA-00035-COA

PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC AND GINA APPELLANTS
FRANKLIN, INDIVIDUALLY

v.

WILLA WOMACK APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/26/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WINSTON L. KIDD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: GREGORY TODD BUTLER
D. STERLING KIDD
MALLORY KAYE BLAND
JOHN PATRICK McMACKIN
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN
JAMES W. SMITH JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/17/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Willa Womack sustained multiple injuries when she slipped and fell on a collapsed

wet-floor sign lying flat on its side as she entered a Pilot Travel Center (Pilot) in Hinds

County, Mississippi. Womack filed a premises-liability lawsuit against Pilot Travel Centers

LLC and Gina Franklin, individually, as the general manager of the Pilot where the incident

occurred. Following a trial in the Hinds County Circuit Court, a jury found that the

Appellants’ negligence in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition had solely
and proximately caused Womack’s fall and subsequent injuries. The jury awarded Womack

$393,000 in economic damages and $3,000,000 in non-economic damages. In accordance

with the monetary limit set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-1-60(2)(b) (Rev.

2019), the circuit court reduced Womack’s award of non-economic damages to $1,000,000,

resulting in a total monetary award to Womack of $1,393,000.

¶2. On appeal, the Appellants assert the following: (1) the collapsed wet-floor sign failed

to constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition; (2) Womack failed to prove that the

Appellants had notice of the collapsed wet-floor sign; (3) the circuit court erred by denying

the Appellants’ motion for a new trial; and (4) Womack’s monetary award for non-economic

damages was excessive and should be further remitted. Upon review, we find no reversible

error. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s amended final judgment.

FACTS

¶3. Womack suffered injuries to her neck, back, and knee when she slipped and fell on

a collapsed wet-floor sign as she entered Pilot around 11 a.m. on January 6, 2020. According

to the testimony of a former Pilot employee who was working at the time of Womack’s fall,

employees usually mopped the convenience store’s floors each morning between 5:30 a.m.

and 6 a.m. To alert customers that the floor might be wet, employees would set out wet-floor

signs. On the morning of Womack’s fall, a wet-floor sign stood inside the store’s vestibule,

which was a small enclosed area that separated the parking lot from the store’s interior. The

vestibule had a set of two glass doors on each side. One set of glass doors led to the store’s

parking lot and gas pumps, and the opposite set of glass doors led into the main area of the

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store.

¶4. At 10:50 a.m. on January 6, 2020, the wet-floor sign was still in place. At that time,

Pilot’s security cameras recorded a customer knocking over the sign as he exited the doors

leading from the main part of the store and proceeded through the vestibule on his way to the

parking lot. Over the next ten minutes, the collapsed wet-floor sign remained on the

vestibule floor as customers continued to enter and exit Pilot. At several different points

during the ten-minute interval, Pilot’s security cameras captured various customers stepping

on, slipping on, or skirting around the collapsed sign. The security cameras also captured

Franklin, Pilot’s general manager, walking directly in front of, nearby, or facing the doors

leading into the vestibule as she set up a hot dog station a few feet away.

¶5. Around 11 a.m., Womack entered Pilot from the parking lot. As Womack walked

diagonally across the vestibule to enter the main part of the store, she slipped on the

collapsed wet-floor sign, hit her head on the glass doors leading into the store, and then

struck her knees on the vestibule floor. Ultimately, Womack required an ambulance to

transport her to the hospital for treatment.

¶6. In August 2020, Womack filed a premises-liability lawsuit against the Appellants.

Following a trial, the jury found that the Appellants’ negligence was the sole and proximate

cause of Womack’s fall and subsequent injuries and awarded damages as previously

described. After a reduction by the circuit court to comply with statutory guidelines,

Womack’s monetary award totaled $1,393,000. Following the circuit court’s entry of its

amended final judgment, the Appellants unsuccessfully moved for judgment notwithstanding

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the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a new trial. Aggrieved, the Appellants appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Dangerous Condition

¶7. The parties do not dispute that Womack was an invitee on Pilot’s premises. Although

we recognize that a business owner “is not an insurer against all injuries” on his premises,

“the ‘owner still owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to keep the

premises in a reasonably safe condition or warn of dangerous conditions not readily apparent,

which [the] owner . . . knows of, or should know of, in the exercise of reasonable care.’”

Rhodes v. RL Stratton Props. LLC, 376 So. 3d 385, 389 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting

Vu v. Clayton, 765 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (¶7) (Miss. 2000)). “[M]ere proof that the invitee fell

and was injured while on the premises is insufficient to establish liability.” Carroll v.

Singing River LLC, 309 So. 3d 567, 570 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Patterson v. Mi

Toro Mexican Inc., 270 So. 3d 19, 21 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). Rather, “in every

premises-liability case, the plaintiff must show that a dangerous condition exists.” Keckley

v. Estes Equip. Co., 276 So. 3d 1230, 1236 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting McCullar

v. Boyd Tunica Inc., 50 So. 3d 1009, 1012 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)). “Proof that a

dangerous condition actually caused the invitee’s injury ‘is an essential element of the claim’

because ‘a property owner cannot be found liable for the plaintiff’s injury where no

dangerous condition exists.’” Carroll, 309 So. 3d at 570 (¶7) (quoting Patterson, 270 So.

3d at 21 (¶7)). “Whether a dangerous condition exists may be a question of fact for the jury.”

Keckley, 276 So. 3d at 1236 (¶18).

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¶8. Here, the Appellants contend that a collapsed wet-floor sign fails to constitute an

unreasonably dangerous condition sufficient to impose liability on them for Womack’s fall.

They instead argue that the collapsed wet-floor sign was “a safety feature, not an

unreasonably dangerous condition” and that “it would turn premises-liability law on its head

to find negligence based on items used to prevent injuries.” According to the Appellants, the

collapsed wet-floor sign inside Pilot’s vestibule amounted to one of the “usual dangers that

customers normally expect to encounter on a business’s premises,” and therefore, the

collapsed sign “fail[ed] to constitute [a] reasonably dangerous condition[.]” Martin v.

Trustmark Corp., 292 So. 3d 245, 248 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

¶9. For support, the Appellants reference an unreported case from Michigan in which a

woman “tripped over a collapsed wet[-]floor sign” that “was lying partially underneath a

table and partially in the travel aisle of defendants’ Taco Bell.” Salisbury v. Sundance Inc.,

No. 271328, 2006 WL 3826753, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006). The trial court in

Salisbury granted summary judgment to the defendants after finding “the collapsed

wet[-]floor sign was an open and obvious danger, and . . . no special aspects existed.” Id.

On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals explained that “the collapsed wet[-]floor sign was

an open and obvious danger if it was reasonable to expect that an average person of ordinary

intelligence would have discovered it upon casual inspection.” Id. at *2. The appellate court

noted the plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the collapsed wet-floor sign was visible and that

her companion had avoided tripping over it. Id. at *3. The Salisbury court concluded that

“the sign was visible to anyone who looked in its general direction, the sign was

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avoidable[,]” and the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate otherwise. Id. As a result, the

appellate court held that the open-and-obvious doctrine barred the plaintiff’s premises-

liability claim. Id.

¶10. While Salisbury considered a fall caused by a collapsed wet-floor sign, the parties

here do not dispute that in Mississippi, the open-and-obvious doctrine no longer serves as

either an absolute defense to or a complete bar to recovery in premises-liability claims. See

Vivians v. Baptist Healthplex, 234 So. 3d 304, 308 (¶¶17-18) (Miss. 2017). Upon review of

current Mississippi caselaw involving premises-liability claims, we find our analysis in

Keckley to be particularly relevant to the circumstances of the present case.

¶11. In Keckley, we addressed a very similar argument to the one the Appellants proffer

here. The discussion in Keckley centered on yellow caution tape, another safety item

intended to prevent injuries, and the defendants’ contention that the caution tape constituted

the type of “normally encountered dangers” a customer must expect to find on a business’s

premises. Keckley, 276 So. 3d at 1236-37 (¶19). Keckley, the injured customer, tripped over

a piece of yellow caution tape that lay across a sidewalk outside a convenience store. Id. at

1233 (¶1). Keckley stated that although the caution tape was lying flat on the ground as she

approached, the wind suddenly blew the tape off the ground as she attempted to step over the

tape. Id. Keckley asserted that the caution tape essentially acted as a tripwire, and she only

realized after her fall “that the tape was tied to a pole on one side of the sidewalk and a brick

pillar on the other.” Id. In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the circuit court

found “that the open and obvious yellow caution tape at issue [wa]s not an unreasonably

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dangerous condition as a matter of law. Id. at 1235 (¶13).

¶12. On appeal, this Court explained that we would have agreed with the defendants’

argument that yellow caution tape constitutes the type of danger normally encountered on a

business’s premises if Keckley had alleged that “ordinary caution tape . . . strung three or

four feet off the ground for the purpose of limiting customers’ access to an area of the

premises” had caused her injuries. Id. at 1237 (¶21). Keckley, however, testified that the

caution tape “looked as though it was loose and had been discarded,” and “the sudden wind

gust caused it to function as a tripwire.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted

that in Keckley that “the tripwire-like effect of the caution tape was hidden and surprising”

and that customers do not normally “expect to encounter tripwires on a business[’s]

premises.” Id. at 1237-38 (¶¶22-23) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). We

therefore held that the change in nature of “the alleged defective condition[,]” which

occurred “suddenly and without warning[, was] sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude

that [the yellow caution tape] create[d] an unreasonable or unusually dangerous condition.”

Id. at 1238 (¶23) (quoting Cox v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., 755 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir.

2014)). Finding that genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute, we reversed the

circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants and remanded the matter for

further proceedings. Id. at 1241 (¶37).

¶13. As with the caution tape at issue in Keckley, we agree here that the presence of a wet-

floor sign in Pilot’s vestibule, without more, fails to present an inherently dangerous

condition and poses the type of danger a customer could reasonably expect to encounter on

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a business’s premises. We note, however, that as in Keckley, Womack did not allege that a

safety feature in its expected and intended state of being caused her injuries. Rather,

Womack testified, and the video footage confirmed, that Womack slipped and fell on a

collapsed sign in the middle of Pilot’s relatively small but highly trafficked vestibule. The

ten minutes of video footage admitted at trial showed that one customer knocked over the

wet-floor sign, a second customer slipped on the collapsed sign and slid it to the middle of

the vestibule, a third customer stepped on the collapsed sign, and a fourth customer narrowly

avoided the collapsed sign before Womack entered the convenience store and actually tripped

over the collapsed sign.

¶14. When reviewing a jury’s verdict in a civil case, this Court “will disturb [the] verdict

only when convinced that . . . the final result will result in an unconscionable injustice.”

Hegman v. Adcock, 377 So. 3d 1020, 1030 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Erves v.

Hosemann, 335 So. 3d 603, 612 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). “In determining whether a

verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we must accept as true the

evidence presented as supportive of the verdict.” Id. “Once a verdict has been returned in

a civil case, we are not at liberty to direct that a judgment be entered contrary to that verdict

short of a conclusion on our part that, given the evidence as a whole, taken in the light most

favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical finder of fact could have made the same

finding.” Id. (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). As with the surprising “tripwire-

like effect” of the caution tape in Keckley, which we held a reasonable jury could find to be

a dangerous condition, the jury here could and did find that the unexpected position of the

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wet-floor sign in Pilot’s vestibule also “create[d] an unreasonable or unusually dangerous

condition” under the circumstances presented. Keckley, 276 So. 3d at 1238 (¶23). And

based on our review of the record and relevant caselaw, we cannot find a sufficient basis

upon which to reverse the jury’s verdict with respect to this issue.

II. Knowledge of the Condition

¶15. The Appellants next argue that even if Womack demonstrated the existence of a

dangerous condition, another customer’s act of knocking over the wet-floor sign could not

impute knowledge of the condition to them. The Appellants also argue that the trial evidence

failed to establish that they had either actual or constructive knowledge of the collapsed sign.

¶16. Included within a business owner’s duties “to keep the premises reasonably safe” and

“warn of dangerous conditions not readily apparent” is the “duty to conduct reasonable

inspections to discover dangerous conditions existing on the premises.” Rhodes, 376 So. 3d

at 389 (¶¶11-12) (citations omitted). “[O]ur [Mississippi] Supreme Court has held that a

premises owner’s liability for failure to conduct reasonable inspections is limited[,]”

however, in that “[t]here is no liability for harm resulting from risks the occupier did not

know and could not have discovered with reasonable care.” Id. at (¶12) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

¶17. In addition, where a business owner’s own negligence does not create the dangerous

condition, “the plaintiff must prove that the [business owner] had actual or constructive

knowledge of the condition.” Id. at (¶13) (quoting Gillespie v. Lamey, 338 So. 3d 653, 657

(¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). If “a dangerous condition on the premises is caused by a third

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person unconnected with the store operation, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the

operator had actual or constructive knowledge of its presence.” Carroll, 309 So. 3d at 570

(¶6) (quoting Patterson, 270 So. 3d at 21 (¶7)). “Constructive knowledge is established by

proof that the condition existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of reasonable

care, the proprietor should have known of [the condition].” Lasseter v. AWH-BP Jackson

Hotel LLC, 380 So. 3d 232, 238 (¶22) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Waller v. Dixieland Food Stores

Inc., 492 So. 2d 283, 285 (Miss. 1986)).

¶18. Here, the Appellants assert that Womack cannot “attribute the tripping hazard to Pilot”

because it was “undisputed that a departing patron, not a Pilot employee, knocked over the

sign.” Moreover, the Appellants contend that ten minutes provided an insufficient length of

time for Pilot to have known about the collapsed sign. In support of their arguments, the

Appellants cite a Georgia case involving a customer’s slip and fall in a bakery. Warberg v.

Saint Louis Bread Co., 565 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). As the customer, Warberg,

walked to the bakery counter to place her order, she stepped on a collapsed wet-floor sign,

slipped, and fell backward. Id. At the time of Warberg’s fall, there was a bakery employee

(the cashier) standing behind the counter who operated the cash register and took customers’

orders. Id. The cashier stated that she did not see Warberg fall. Id.

¶19. In addition, the cashier stated that prior to Warberg’s fall, she had not seen the wet-

floor sign either standing upright or lying flat on the ground in the area where the incident

occurred. Id. The cashier testified that she only looked up when another customer

mentioned the fall. Id. At that point, the cashier saw Warberg on the floor with the collapsed

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wet-floor sign on the ground beside her. Id. The cashier informed the bakery’s general

manager of the accident. Id. According to the general manager, he had “checked the area

around the bakery for debris on the floor and general cleanliness” a few minutes before

learning of Warberg’s fall. Id. At the time of his inspection, the general manager noticed

a wet-floor sign standing upright by a wall, but he did not see any debris on the floor. Id.

¶20. On appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the bakery, Warberg

alleged that the proximity of the cashier and the general manager to the fallen sign provided

the bakery with constructive knowledge of the hazard. Id. at 563. Warberg asserted that the

cashier “was in the immediate vicinity of the collapsed sign and could have seen it.” Id. As

the Georgia Court of Appeals noted, though, the cashier’s testimony reflected that she saw

the collapsed sign next to Warberg only after the fall, and no evidence “raise[d] a question

of fact as to whether [the cashier] could have easily seen this hazard” during the short time

that the sign lay collapsed “and taken action to correct it before Mrs. Warberg slipped.” Id.

at 564. As to the general manager, the appellate court pointed out that although he stated that

he had seen an upright wet-floor sign prior to the incident, it was “[t]he collapsed” sign that

had caused the fall, and Warberg had failed to present any evidence the general manager was

either “in the immediate vicinity of or could have easily seen the flattened sign on which

Mrs. Warberg fell.” Id. at 563. The appellate court also explained that Warberg had “not

raised a question of fact regarding the reasonableness of the [bakery’s] inspection

procedures[,]” and in previous cases “where a proprietor ha[d] shown that an inspection

occurred within a brief period prior to an invitee’s fall,” the court had “held that the

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inspection procedure was adequate as a matter of law.” Id. at 564 (footnotes omitted).

¶21. Upon review, we are not persuaded and find Warberg is distinguishable from the

present case. As the Georgia court specifically noted in Warberg, the bakery’s general

manager stated that just prior to learning of Warberg’s fall, he had inspected the bakery floor

for debris. Id. at 562. Although the general manager in Warberg observed an upright wet-

floor sign, he indicated that he had not seen either a collapsed wet-floor sign or other

potential hazards to customers during his inspection. Id. Here, however, the record reflects

no similar testimony from Pilot’s employees that they performed a reasonable inspection in

the period of time leading up to Womack’s fall “to discover dangerous conditions existing

on the premises.” Rhodes, 376 So. 3d at 389 (¶12). Pilot’s general manager, Franklin,

testified that she performed a safety walk of the premises when she first arrived at the store

around 8 a.m. Franklin provided no further testimony, though, that she performed additional

safety inspections of the premises between the time she entered Pilot around 8 a.m. and when

Womack entered the store almost three hours later around 11 a.m.

¶22. Also in contrast to Warberg, Womack provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find

that if an inspection of Pilot’s premises had occurred, the employees reasonably could have

discovered the collapsed wet-floor sign before she tripped over it. Unlike the more open area

generally encountered in front of a business’s counter and cash register area, Pilot’s vestibule

presented a small enclosed space that comprised the main point of entry into and out of the

store’s interior. The vestibule received a high volume of foot traffic as various customers

continuously—and sometimes simultaneously—entered and exited the store. The video

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footage from Pilot’s cameras showed that although the doors on both sides of the vestibule

were made of clear glass, the doors leading from the vestibule to the parking lot had large

stickers across them that obstructed an approaching customer’s view into the vestibule. In

addition, Womack testified that at the time of her fall, sunlight shone on the vestibule doors

facing the parking lot, which further decreased her ability to see inside the vestibule before

she entered.

¶23. By contrast, the glass doors on the interior-store side of the vestibule were free of any

stickers or signs and allowed a person standing nearby to look into the vestibule with an

unobstructed view. In fact, Franklin acknowledged during her testimony that her view into

the vestibule was unobstructed and that she was close enough to the vestibule to be able to

see the wet-floor sign. Indeed, the video footage showed that at multiple points during the

ten-minute interval between the collapse of the wet-floor sign and Womack’s accident,

Franklin was in the vicinity of the doors leading to the vestibule. The video footage reflected

that Franklin walked directly back and forth in front of the glass doors, walked a few feet

away from the doors, and stood facing directly toward the glass doors as she set up the hot

dog station just inside the store.

¶24. Thus, unlike in Warberg, Womack presented evidence from which the jury reasonably

could conclude that Pilot’s employees not only had the opportunity to observe the collapsed

sign inside the vestibule but also to take action to correct the hazard before Womack’s fall.

And because the record contains evidence from which the jury reasonably could have

imputed constructive knowledge of the collapsed wet-floor sign to Pilot, we find no basis for

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reversing the jury’s verdict as to this issue.

III. Motion for a New Trial

¶25. The Appellants also assert that the circuit court erred by denying their post-trial

motion for a new trial. In reviewing this issue,

we afford the trial court substantial deference to its determination on the
weight of the evidence issue and whether to grant a new trial. We will only
reverse when such denial amounts to an abuse of that judge’s discretion.
Additionally, we give great deference to the jury verdict itself. A new trial
may be granted where the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence or when the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result
of bias, passion, and prejudice. Our role as appellate court is to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only
when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow
it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Reversal is only proper
when this Court is convinced that the trial court has abused its discretion in
failing to grant a new trial. Thus, the scope of review on this issue is limited
in that all evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Kirk v. Newton, 380 So. 3d 252, 266 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, the Appellants contend that Womack’s safety expert, Ken

Goodrum, and her expert in orthopedic surgery, Dr. Chad Hosemann, provided opinions that

were “unqualified, unreliable, and ever-changing . . . .” In addition, the Appellants allege

that the closing argument Womack’s trial attorney made was intended to inflame the jury.

A. Goodrum’s Expert Testimony

¶26. The Appellants challenge Goodrum’s statements regarding what Womack would have

been able to see as she entered Pilot’s vestibule and what Pilot’s employees should have

observed as they walked through the store’s interior. The Appellants assert that such

opinions constituted human-factors testimony but that Goodrum neither had training or

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expertise in that field nor was accepted as a human-factors expert. As a result, the Appellants

argue that Goodrum was unqualified to offer such opinions. Moreover, the Appellants allege

that Goodrum’s opinions were based on his everyday experience and his review of Pilot’s

video footage rather than any specialized knowledge or accepted methodology. As a result,

they also challenge his human-factors testimony as unreliable. With regard to any allegedly

improper human-factors testimony that Goodrum may have offered, however, we note that

the Appellants raised no contemporaneous objections at trial to such statements.

“Well-established precedent holds ‘that when a party fails to make a contemporaneous

objection at trial, he waives any error on that issue on appeal.’” Scott v. Boudreau, 375 So.

3d 688, 697 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting McCullough v. McCullough, 52 So. 3d

373, 379 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). Thus, with regard to the complained-of human-

factors testimony, we find the Appellants failed to preserve this issue for appeal.

¶27. The Appellants also argue that the circuit court erroneously accepted Goodrum as an

expert in premises safety. Goodrum’s career in the military, law enforcement, and private

security dealt primarily with security issues. Thus, while the Appellants acknowledge that

Goodrum’s professional experience may have qualified him to testify as an expert in security

measures, they contend that his expertise failed to extend to such general safety issues as the

negligent placement of safety signs. As a result, the Appellants assert that Goodrum was

unqualified to testify as a premises-safety expert. In addition, the Appellants allege that

many of Goodrum’s trial opinions were based not on specialized knowledge but on purported

violations of Pilot’s own policies and procedures. The Appellants therefore argue that

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Goodrum’s testimony as a premises-safety expert was not only unqualified but also unreliable

and irrelevant.

¶28. When considering the admissibility of expert testimony, Mississippi Rule of Evidence

702 provides that

expert testimony should be admitted only when the trial court can affirmatively
answer a two-fold inquiry. The first prong mandates that a witness must be
qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience, or education.
Second, the witness’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
must assist the trier of fact to understand or decide a fact in issue. Put simply,
the expert’s proposed testimony must be both relevant to the case at hand and
based on reliable methodology.

Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Kelly, 358 So. 3d 1054, 1057 (¶10) (Miss. 2023) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to

admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Id. at (¶9). In so doing, we may

only reverse a case based on the admission or exclusion of evidence if the decision “results

in prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Chaupette v. State,

136 So. 3d 1041, 1045 (¶7) (Miss. 2014) (footnote omitted).

¶29. Upon review, we agree that although Goodrum’s “knowledge, skill, experience,

training, [and] education” may have qualified him to testify as an expert in security matters,

nothing that he provided qualified him to testify as an expert in premises safety. MRE 702.

We further agree with the Appellants’ argument that Goodrum’s expert testimony was based

not on any “specialized knowledge” or accepted and “reliable principles and methods . . . .”

Id. Instead, as the Appellants point out, Goodrum’s testimony about Pilot’s violations of

safety measures was based on his review of Pilot’s internal policies and procedures and the

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testimony of Pilot’s employees. We therefore conclude that the circuit court abused its

discretion in allowing Goodrum to testify as an expert in premises safety.

¶30. We further conclude, though, that any error in admitting Goodrum’s expert testimony

as to premises safety was harmless. As discussed, Mississippi appellate courts “may reverse

a case only if[] the admission or exclusion of evidence results in prejudice and harm or

adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Chaupette, 136 So. 3d at 1045 (¶7) (citation

and footnote omitted). Goodrum’s testimony failed to prejudice the Appellants because the

evidence Goodrum relied on had already been admitted into evidence during the testimony

of other witnesses, and the opinions he gave were substantially similar to the testimony of

those prior witnesses. Thus, we find that any error in allowing Goodrum to also testify to

those matters failed to harm or prejudice the Appellants. See Tuggle v. State, 380 So. 3d 991,

997 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (finding that even if error had occurred by allowing a

witness to testify as an expert, any wrongfully admitted testimony would result in “harmless

error because of the bulk of evidence corroborating” the expert’s testimony). As a result, we

find no basis for reversing the jury’s verdict.

B. Dr. Hosemann’s Expert Testimony

¶31. The Appellants contend that the circuit court also erred by admitting the expert

testimony of Dr. Hosemann, the orthopedic surgeon who performed Womack’s independent

medical examination (IME). Although the Appellants raised no challenge to Dr. Hosemann’s

qualifications to testify as an expert, they asserted that Dr. Hosemann’s testimony was

unreliable and that he provided a new opinion shortly before trial.

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¶32. Dr. Hosemann noted in his IME findings that Womack had reported experiencing

“very minimal achy pain in her knees” prior to her fall inside Pilot’s vestibule. As of the date

of the IME, Dr. Hosemann found that Womack had meniscal tears in her right knee and

“end-stage osteoarthritis” in both knees. Dr. Hosemann opined that the “fall may have

resulted in the meniscal tears” and had “dramatically aggravated” Womack’s preexisting

knee conditions, which included her osteoarthritis and pain. Most importantly, Dr.

Hosemann found that Womack’s fall had “significantly altered the natural course of her

osteoarthritis” and had led “to the need for knee replacement much sooner than had she not

fallen.” Dr. Hosemann concluded that Womack would be unable to “gain any lasting relief

without undergoing bilateral total knee replacement.”

¶33. Dr. Hosemann’s subsequent deposition testimony further reflected the opinions

provided in his IME report. According to the deposition excerpts contained in the record,

when asked what led him to opine that Womack’s fall may have caused the meniscal tears

in her right knee, Dr. Hosemann responded as follows: “Because meniscal tears can often

times be caused from falls, and apparently, she had a fairly significant fall that resulted in her

having to go to the hospital that day. So certainly a twisting knee type injury can result in a

meniscus tear.” Because only an MRI of Womack’s right knee had been taken after her fall,

Dr. Hosemann could not state whether Womack also had any meniscal tears in her left knee.

¶34. Regardless of when Womack’s meniscal tears occurred, Dr. Hosemann opined that

Womack needed knee surgery because of the fall and its aggravation of her preexisting knee

conditions. At the time of Dr. Hosemann’s deposition, Womack had undergone surgery on

18
her right knee but still awaited surgery on her left knee. During his deposition, Dr.

Hosemann was asked whether he could “tie the need for a left knee total knee procedure to”

Womack’s fall. He answered, “Yes . . . .” He then explained that Womack “fell on both her

knees, and they’re arthritic. And she had to go to the ER, and she went to the doctor several

times. It sounds to me like [the fall] really made her symptoms dramatically worse.” In

response to additional questions from Womack’s attorney, Dr. Hosemann reiterated that

Womack had preexisting osteoarthritis in both her knees that the fall aggravated, and based

on the information Womack had provided to him, the fall was the reason she required knee

surgery.

¶35. Prior to trial, the Appellants moved for partial summary judgment as to Womack’s

knee injuries. They argued that Dr. Hosemann’s testimony had failed to establish that

Womack’s fall caused the meniscal tears in her right knee. As a result, the Appellants

asserted that Womack had failed to sufficiently prove that her fall caused injuries that

required her to undergo knee-replacement surgery.

¶36. In responding to the Appellants’ motion, Womack provided an affidavit from Dr.

Hosemann that stated the following:

My opinions were and still are [that] Willa Womack had a fall on
January 6, 2020[,] at the Pilot store where she landed on her knees. It was my
opinion that the fall caused trauma to her knees and aggravated her preexisting
condition of osteoarthritis.

As I previously stated in my report and deposition, it was and still is my
opinion that the fall and injury to her knees was the cause of her knee pain and
the cause for her needing a right knee and left knee bilateral total knee
replacement.

19
My opinion was that she also had medial and lateral meniscal tears in
her knees. I do not understand the legal terms attorneys use so I stated the fall
“may have” caused the meniscal tears that then led to a surgery. So that the
record is clear on legal terminology[,] it is my opinion that Willa Womack’s
fall on January 6, 2020[,] caused the meniscal tears. Because Willa Womack
reported she fell[,] I can say within a reasonable degree of medical probability
that the fall caused the meniscal tears.

¶37. The Appellants then filed a reply to Womack’s response and argued that Dr.

Hosemann’s affidavit attempted to change his testimony to include a new opinion about the

meniscal tears. The Appellants asserted that the circuit court should exclude any change to

Dr. Hosemann’s opinions because the change lacked a reliable basis and had been untimely

provided.

¶38. At a hearing on several pre-trial motions, the Appellants’ attorneys argued the issues

with Dr. Hosemann’s opinions that they had raised in their reply to Womack’s response to

their motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellants again asserted that Dr.

Hosemann’s affidavit had provided a new opinion as to Womack’s meniscal tears that was

unreliable and untimely. In its subsequent order, the circuit court found that genuine issues

of material fact existed as to Womack’s alleged knee injuries. As a result, the circuit court

denied the Appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to that issue.

¶39. At trial, just before Dr. Hosemann testified, the Appellants stated that they wished to

“renew [their] objection to his testimony based on the Daubert motion previously filed.”

When both the circuit judge and Womack’s attorneys requested clarification as to which

motion the Appellants were referring, the Appellants’ attorney referenced the motion for

partial summary judgment as to Womack’s knee injuries, in which the Appellants had argued

20
that Womack’s evidence failed to prove the fall caused a need for her knee surgeries. In

making his argument, however, the Appellants’ attorney stated that he did not “believe Dr.

Hosemann’s opinions were based on reliable methodology or otherwise helpful to the jury.”

The circuit judge again denied the motion. Before the circuit judge accepted Dr. Hosemann

as an expert in orthopedic surgery, the Appellants provided that they would “rest on the

arguments already stated.” The circuit judge then admitted Dr. Hosemann as an expert

witness.

¶40. At trial, Dr. Hosemann gave testimony consistent with the findings contained in his

IME report, which he had completed prior to the filing of the motion for partial summary

judgment and the complained-of affidavit. In addition, his trial testimony was consistent

with the excerpts included in the appellate record from his deposition. Dr. Hosemann stated

at trial that prior to her fall, Womack had moderate arthritis in her knees. Dr. Hosemann also

stated that although Womack had meniscal tears in her right knee after her fall, he could not

tell if the tears predated her fall. Dr. Hosemann did testify, however, that meniscal tears were

very common and that people continued to function with them all the time. Thus, even if

Womack had meniscal tears before her fall, Dr. Hosemann explained that their presence

would not necessarily require her to imminently need knee surgery. Rather, in his expert

opinion, Dr. Hosemann testified that Womack’s need for knee surgery resulted from the

trauma caused by her fall at Pilot on January 6, 2020.

¶41. Following trial, the Appellants filed a motion for a new trial that included a heading

asserting they were “entitled to a new trial because Dr. Hosemann’s opinions were

21
inadmissible.” The Appellants then stated that “Dr. Hosemann’s testimony justifies a new

trial for the same reasons that it justifies a JNOV.” They further stated that they incorporated

the arguments raised in their motion for JNOV. In the motion for JNOV, the Appellants

reasserted their pretrial argument that Womack’s evidence, particularly Dr. Hosemann’s

testimony, had failed to prove “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident

caused her to need knee surgery.” The Appellants did not, however, reassert their pretrial

claims that Dr. Hosemann’s affidavit opinion regarding Womack’s meniscal tears was either

unreliable or untimely provided. On appeal, the Appellants now contend that Dr.

Hosemann’s testimony was unreliable under Rule 702 and changed shortly before trial. They

therefore allege that the circuit court erred by denying their motion to exclude Dr.

Hosemann’s trial testimony and compounded the error by denying their motion for a new

trial.

¶42. Despite the Appellants’ contentions on appeal, the record reflects that they raised a

different argument as to Dr. Hosemann’s testimony in their motion for a new trial. Our

caselaw is clear that the failure to raise an issue in a motion for a new trial procedurally bars

the claim on appeal. Bradford v. State, 391 So. 3d 1254, 1268 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).

Procedural bar notwithstanding, we find that any error related to Dr. Hosemann’s expert

testimony was harmless. Dr. Hosemann’s trial testimony was based on and consistent with

the original findings provided in his IME report. Moreover, his testimony and any

discrepancies with prior statements or other admissible trial evidence were subject to

thorough cross-examination by the Appellants’ attorneys. Viewing the evidence before us

22
in a light most favorable to the verdict, and affording the circuit court substantial deference

in its decision to deny the Appellants’ motion for a new trial, we remain unconvinced that

the circuit court abused its discretion. Kirk, 380 So. 3d at 266 (¶35). We therefore decline

to reverse the circuit court’s determination as to this issue.

C. Closing Argument

¶43. The Appellants next allege that Womack’s trial attorneys improperly employed “us-

versus-them,” “conscience-of-the-community,” “send-a-message,” and “golden-rule” themes

throughout their closing argument. With regard to claims of impermissible closing-argument

comments,

[i]t is well settled that to preserve an objection to alleged improper remarks by
counsel during closing argument, the complaining party must not only make
a contemporaneous and specific objection to the remarks, but [he] must also
obtain a definitive ruling from the trial court on his objection and must request
corrective action.

Mai v. State, 384 So. 3d 1242, 1253 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Rials v.

Duckworth, 822 So. 2d 283, 287 (¶22) (Miss. 2002)). “[W]here an objection is made and a

definitive ruling is not obtained nor any corrective action requested[,]” the complaining party

“waives his objection . . . .” Rials, 822 So. 2d at 288 (¶22) (quoting Walters v. State, 720 So.

2d 856, 864 (¶25) (Miss. 1998)).

¶44. Here, during Womack’s closing argument, one of the Appellants’ attorneys asked to

approach the circuit judge. In the bench conference that followed, the Appellants’ attorney

told the circuit judge that he hated to interrupt closing argument but that he had allowed

Womack’s attorney to go as far as he could. The Appellants’ attorney then stated that the

23
litigation was “not about us against them, Hinds County versus them. This is about the facts

of this case.” The circuit judge ordered Womack’s attorney to move along in his argument,

and the bench conference ended. Based upon our review, even if we were to find that the

Appellants raised “a contemporaneous and specific objection” to remarks made by

Womack’s attorney during closing argument, the record fails to reflect that the Appellants

“also obtain[ed] a definitive ruling from the trial court on [the] objection and . . . request[ed]

corrective action.” Mai, 384 So. 3d at 1253 (¶34) (quoting Rials, 822 So. 2d at 287 (¶22)).

We therefore find that the Appellants waived this issue for appellate review. Rials, 822 So.

2d at 288 (¶22).

¶45. Notwithstanding the waiver, we also find that this issue lacks merit. “[A]ttorneys are

to be given wide latitude in making their closing arguments.” Carr v. State, 385 So. 3d 1300,

1305 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Spiers v. State, 361 So. 3d 643, 662 (¶71) (Miss.

2023)). “‘[W]ide latitude of discussion is allowed’ as long as the [attorney] ‘keeps fairly

within the evidence and issues involved.’” Id. (quoting Spiers, 361 So. 3d at 662 (¶71)).

Our caselaw prohibits attorneys from using “tactics which are inflammatory, highly

prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.” Id. Error occurs when

an attorney “departs entirely from the evidence in his arguments or makes statements

intended solely to excite the passions or prejudices of the jury, or makes inflammatory and

damaging statements of fact not found in the evidence.” Id. (quoting Spiers, 361 So. 3d at

662-63 (¶71)). When viewed in context, we can find no reason for reversal due to the

allegedly improper closing-argument remarks made by Womack’s attorney. Because we

24
cannot conclude that the comments at issue entirely departed from the evidence, were

intended solely to inflame the jury, or “create[d] such an unjust prejudice against the

[Appellants] as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created[,]” we will not

reverse the jury’s verdict based on this issue.

IV. Award of Non-Economic Damages

¶46. The jury considered Womack’s evidence that her past and future medical expenses

amounted to $393,000 and awarded her that amount for economic damages. The jury also

awarded Womack $3,000,000 for non-economic damages. In compliance with the statutory

limit for non-economic damages, the circuit court reduced that portion of Womack’s award

to $1,000,000. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-60(2)(b). Thus, Womack received a total

monetary award of $1,393,000. On appeal, however, the Appellants argue that despite the

circuit court’s remittitur of Womack’s non-economic-damages award, the amount remains

excessive and requires further reduction.

¶47. We review for abuse of discretion the circuit court’s denial of the Appellants’ request

for further remittitur of Womack’s non-economic-damages award. See MIMG C Woodridge

Sub LLC v. Course, 356 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). Regarding this

issue, we have explained that

we will not disturb the trier of fact’s award of damages unless its size, in
comparison to the actual amount of damage, shocks the conscience. A
remittitur is appropriate when either (1) the trier of fact was influenced by bias,
prejudice, or passion, or (2) the damages were contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. The bias, prejudice, or passion standard is purely a
circumstantial standard. Evidence of corruption, passion, prejudice, or bias on
the part of the trier of fact (if any) is an inference to be drawn from contrasting
the amount of the verdict with the amount of the damages.

25
Miss. Dep’t of Rehab. Servs. v. Butler, 384 So. 3d 546, 557 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)

(quoting MIMG C Woodridge Sub LLC, 356 So. 3d at 1251 (¶35)).

¶48. In addition,

we proceed on a case-by-case basis in determining whether a jury award is
excessive. Even if we think the amount awarded in the verdict is liberal, we
are not allowed to supplant our judgment for that of the jury unless we
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the award of damages.
We are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, giving [the verdict] the benefit of all favorable inferences that may
reasonably be drawn.

Also, while pain and suffering is, to a large degree, not susceptible to
monetary quantification, the jury necessarily has especially broad leeway.

MIMG C Woodridge Sub LLC, 356 So. 3d at 1251 (¶¶36-37) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

¶49. Here, the jury’s award to Womack of $3,000,000 in non-economic damages amounted

to about 7.6 times the total economic damages of $393,000 that Womack received for past

and future medical expenses. As we recently noted, however, throughout the years,

Mississippi “appellate courts have examined this issue many times and approved verdicts in

a great range.” Id. at (¶38) (affirming jury’s verdict of non-economic damages for almost

10.7 times the award for economic damages).

¶50. In addition to the evidence of her past and future medical expenses, Womack

presented testimony—not only her own but also that of other witnesses—regarding the

physical and emotional effects she had experienced due to her fall. The evidence included

testimony about the trauma to Womack’s neck, back, and knees; the permanent scarring to

her right knee; the need for a knee brace on her left knee as well as injections and physical

26
therapy for her various injuries; her reduced mobility and stability during daily activities; and

her increased dizziness, anxiety, and depression.

¶51. “It is the jury who determines the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the

witnesses at trial[,] and it is the primary province of the jury to determine the amount of

damages to award.” Robb v. McLaughlin, 371 So. 3d 761, 778 (¶48) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)

(quoting Colville v. Davidson, 934 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). In light

of the proof presented at trial and the deference afforded to the jury in reaching its verdict,

we cannot say that the jury’s non-economic-damages award to Womack was so excessive as

to be characterized as “beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount[,] and outrageous.”

MIMG C Woodridge Sub LLC, 356 So. 3d at 1254 (¶58) (quoting Miss. State Fed’n of

Colored Women’s Club Hous. for Elderly in Clinton Inc. v. L.R., 62 So. 3d 351, 368 (¶58)

(Miss. 2010)). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of the

Appellants’ request to further reduce Womack’s non-economic-damages award.

CONCLUSION

¶52. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm the circuit court’s amended final

judgment awarding Womack $1,393,000 in damages.

¶53. AFFIRMED.

CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND WEDDLE, JJ.,
CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EMFINGER, J., CONCURS IN
RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WILSON, P.J.,
DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES, C.J.;
WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS IN PART.

WILSON, P.J., DISSENTING:

27
¶54. I concur with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing

Kenneth Goodrum to testify “as a safety expert.” However, I disagree that the error can be

disregarded as harmless. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶55. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible only if the

proponent shows that

(a) [the witness possesses] scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.

MRE 702. Applying Rule 702, our Supreme Court has held that

expert testimony should be admitted only if it withstands a two-pronged
inquiry. First, the witness must be qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge,
skill, experience or education. Second, the witness’s scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact in understanding or
deciding a fact in issue. In addition, Rule 702 does not relax the traditional
standards for determining that the witness is indeed qualified to speak an
opinion on a matter within a purported field of knowledge.

Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 35 (¶7) (Miss. 2003) (quotation marks

and citations omitted). Further, “[a]n expert is qualified only if the witness possesses

scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge on the particular topic of his opinion.”

Hyundai Motor Am. v. Hutton, 328 So. 3d 592, 604 (¶47) (Miss. 2021) (quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

¶56. “The proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing the admissibility

28
of such testimony.” Scarborough v. Logan, No. 2022-CA-00965-SCT, 2024 WL 4510804,

at *4 (¶12) (Miss. Oct. 17, 2024) (quoting Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Kelly, 358 So. 3d 1054,

1058 (¶14) (Miss. 2023)). Under Rule 702, “[t]he trial court is vested with a ‘gatekeeping

responsibility.’” McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 36 (¶11) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). The trial court has a “duty to determine whether

or not a witness is qualified.” Evans v. State, 25 So. 3d 1054, 1060 (¶15) (Miss. 2010). The

trial court also must determine whether the testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact and

whether it is based on a reliable methodology reliably applied to the facts of the case.

Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 294-95 (¶¶24-26) (Miss. 2014).

¶57. In this case, Kenneth Goodrum testified that after high school, he served in the

military on active duty for two years, worked as a private security guard for two years, and

was a patrol officer for the University of Mississippi Medical Center for two years. He then

served with the Jackson Police Department (JPD) for twenty years, eventually earning a

promotion to the rank of precinct commander. Since retiring from JPD, Goodrum has owned

a private security firm that provides patrol and security services for a subdivision in Jackson.

Goodrum has previously testified as an expert regarding security issues in premises liability

cases involving violent crimes, but this is the first time he has testified as an expert in a slip-

and-fall case.

¶58. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to exclude Goodrum from testifying as an expert,

arguing that he “possesse[d] no scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge as to

warnings or wet floor signs.” However, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion. At

29
trial, Womack tendered Goodrum “as a safety expert.” Over the defendants’ renewed

objection, the trial court allowed Goodrum to testify as a safety expert.

¶59. At trial, Goodrum described his “methodology” as follows:

A methodology is how you go about to look at an incident, plain and simple.
Different fields have their own different methodologies. I use a group of
books, as it relates to investigating, as well as looking at the floors and the
policies, the procedures for the company. I look at the codes that the city sets
forth. I, also, look at industry standards. That means, for Pilot what do they
use as their policy as it relates to safety. I look at their policies and their
standards. And I go down a checklist, look at it, decide what’s going on, what
happened, and I just follow a checklist to determine if anything was done right
and anything was done wrong. And then, I use all the information given to me,
with the evidence that the lawyer has -- the defense and the plaintiff’s
attorneys have given, and I use that to determine and give my opinions.

Goodrum then testified that his methodology and opinions in this case did not depend on any

codes or industry standards; rather, this case was about alleged violations of “[p]olicies and

procedures that the company [(i.e., Pilot)] set forth.”

¶60. Goodrum then read from Pilot’s internal training materials and policies and opined

that Pilot’s employees violated company policies by leaving the wet-floor sign out too long,

placing a floor mat in the vestibule,1 failing to “regularly check key travel paths,” failing to

“visually assess walk areas for slip and fall hazards,” and not “keeping the walkways clear

from hazards.” Goodrum testified that Pilot committed five different violations of its own

1
Although Goodrum testified that Pilot’s policies prohibited placing a floor mat in the
vestibule, there is no evidence that the floor mat had anything to do with the incident in this
case. On cross-examination, Goodrum acknowledged that standards promulgated by the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) state that “[b]uilding entrances shall
be provided with mats or runners, or other means to help remove foreign particles and other
contaminants from the bottom of pedestrian footwear.” However, Goodrum testified that he
would put “more weight [on Pilot’s] policies than the [ASTM standards].”

30
policies and that those violations caused Womack’s fall.

¶61. As the majority acknowledges, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing

Goodrum to testify “as a safety expert” because nothing in his experience, training, or

education qualified him as an expert in the proper placement of warning signs or slip-and-fall

prevention. In addition, as the majority acknowledges, Goodrum’s testimony also should

have been excluded because he did not employ any reliable principles or methods. As

Goodrum himself explained, his “methodology” was simply to read Pilot’s policies and

identify alleged violations.

¶62. I would add that Goodrum’s testimony also should have been excluded because it was

utterly unhelpful to the jury. See MRE 702 (providing expert testimony is inadmissible

unless it “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue”). Again, Goodrum simply read Pilot’s policies and identified alleged violations. The

average juror is as every bit as capable and qualified as Goodrum to read convenience store

policies and decide, as Goodrum put it, whether “anything was done wrong.” “[T]he

conclusion that [Goodrum] reached was one that could have been reached by the jury . . .

without expert guidance. It follows that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony . . .

because the opinion rendered and explanation thereof demonstrated that it was not helpful

to the trier of fact.” Seal v. Miller, 605 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 1992); see also Peters v. Five

Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that “[e]xpert testimony was

unnecessary” and properly excluded because “the jury could adeptly assess [the issues] using

only their common experience and knowledge”).

31
¶63. While I agree with the majority that the trial court erred by admitting Goodrum’s

testimony, I respectfully disagree that the error can be disregarded as “harmless.” The trial

court told the jury that “[t]he court [would] accept [Goodrum] as an expert.” As other courts

have recognized, “[t]here is often an inherent danger with expert testimony unduly biasing

the jury because of its aura of special reliability and trust.” United States v. Litzky, 18 F.4th

1296, 1304 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C.

Cir. 1992)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has explained,

because of an expert’s stature qua expert, jurors may assign more weight to
expert testimony than it deserves. Because such testimony can carry with it an
unwarranted aura of special reliability and trustworthiness, courts must guard
against letting it intrude in areas that jurors, by dint of common experience, are
uniquely competent to judge without the aid of experts.

United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

This is exactly what occurred here. An unqualified “expert” was allowed to tell the jury that

Pilot’s employees were negligent and that their negligence caused Womack’s injuries despite

the fact that the jurors were “uniquely competent to judge” those issues based on their own

“common experience” and “without the aid of experts.” Id. Moreover, Goodrum’s stature

as a longtime JPD officer exacerbated the risk that the jury would give his “expert” opinions

more weight than they deserved. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “because the

public hold police officers in great trust, the potential harm to the objecting party requires

reversal where a police officer gives expert testimony without first being qualified as such.”

Kirk v. State, 160 So. 3d 685, 693 (¶19) (Miss. 2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Roberts v.

Grafe Auto Co., 701 So. 2d 1093, 1099 (Miss. 1997)). Allowing such an unqualified

32
“expert” to offer unreliable and unhelpful opinions on the ultimate issue in the case is

“inconsistent with substantial justice” and “affect[ed]” the defendants’ “substantial rights.”

M.R.C.P. 61. Accordingly, the error is not harmless and requires a new trial.2 Id. Since the

majority instead affirms, I respectfully dissent.

BARNES, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS
OPINION IN PART.

2
It is true, as the majority notes, that the documents that Goodrum read from were
already in evidence. However, defendant Gina Franklin and Pilot employee Latosha
McGriggs testified that they complied with applicable store policies on the day in question.
The evidence in this case was not overwhelming and could have supported a defense verdict
on the issue of liability. Goodrum’s improper “expert” opinion that Pilot’s employees were
negligent and caused Womack’s injuries cannot be dismissed as merely cumulative. Under
these circumstances, it is impossible to say with confidence that the erroneous admission of
the testimony of a purported expert was harmless.

33