J. Larry Buffington v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CA-00880-COA

J. LARRY BUFFINGTON APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/09/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID SHOEMAKE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SMITH COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHRISTOPHER RANDALL PURDUM
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: MATTHEW WYATT WALTON
ASHLEY SULSER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 01/05/2021
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.

GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. During a May 6, 2019 pretrial conference conducted in the Smith County Chancery

Court, Judge David Shoemake found J. Larry Buffington in criminal contempt of court. On

May 9, 2019, Judge Shoemake entered an order, nunc pro tunc to May 6, 2019, holding

Buffington in direct criminal contempt and sentencing Buffington to serve twenty-four hours

in the Smith County jail. Judge Shoemake attached exhibits to the May 9, 2019 order that

included the transcript and audio recording from the May 6, 2019 pretrial conference. The

attached exhibits also included transcripts and audio recordings from prior proceedings and

copies of previously filed court documents that Judge Shoemake referenced during the
contempt proceedings.

¶2. On appeal, Buffington argues that Judge Shoemake erroneously held him in contempt,

and he asks this Court to reverse Judge Shoemake’s order. Buffington also filed a motion

to strike any audio recordings and exhibits attached to the May 9, 2019 contempt order that

pertained to proceedings other than the pretrial conference on May 6, 2019. Buffington’s

motion was passed for consideration with the merits of this appeal.

¶3. In holding Buffington in direct criminal contempt, Judge Shoemake discussed at

length the exhibits that pertained to the prior proceedings and filings. Judge Shoemake then

made the evidence part of the record during the May 6, 2019 contempt proceedings and

attached the evidence as exhibits to the contempt order. Because we consider the evidence

as part of the record on appeal, we deny Buffington’s motion to strike.

¶4. Upon review of the transcript and audio recording of the proceedings, we note that

Buffington’s alleged contemptuous conduct presented a combination of both direct and

constructive criminal contempt. As a result, Buffington was entitled to certain due-process

safeguards, including notice of the specific charges against him and a separate hearing on

those charges. We therefore reverse the judgment holding Buffington in direct criminal

contempt and remand this case to allow another judge to conduct a de novo hearing to

determine whether Buffington’s conduct and filings before Judge Shoemake amounted to

criminal contempt. In so doing, we make no determination as to whether Buffington’s

behavior before Judge Shoemake on May 6, 2019, or his behavior and filings before Judge

Shoemake on previous occasions, warrant a finding of criminal contempt. In addition, we

2
make no determination with regard to any matters that fall under the purview of either the

Mississippi Bar Association or the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Conduct.

FACTS

¶5. After taking office in 2011, Judge Shoemake began presiding over child-custody

matters between Lauren Blakeney and Verba Shoemaker. In February 2017, Shoemaker filed

a petition to modify child custody. Shoemaker asserted that Blakeney had filed false child-

abuse allegations against him, and he requested that the chancellor award him sole custody

of the parties’ minor child. At the time the 2017 child-custody proceedings began, Eugene

Tullos and John Tullos represented Blakeney, and Corey Gibson represented Shoemaker.

After a telephonic conference with the parties, Judge Shoemake entered a March 6, 2017

temporary order appointing a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor child. Judge Shoemake

ordered the GAL to investigate the abuse allegations, to provide a written report of her

findings, and to make a recommendation based on her findings.

¶6. On May 2, 2017, Judge Shoemake held a conference with the GAL and the parties’

attorneys. Following the conference, Shoemaker’s attorney prepared and submitted an order

for Judge Shoemake to sign. The May 8, 2017 order acknowledged that the Mississippi

Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) had opened a case in response to the child-

abuse allegations. In light of the GAL’s appointment, however, the order relieved CPS of

any further investigative duty and authorized the GAL to continue with her investigation.

¶7. The following year, on May 8, 2018, the parties and their attorneys appeared before

Judge Shoemake and announced that they had agreed to modify child custody. The parties

3
submitted an agreed order signed by each of them as well as their respective attorneys. The

June 8, 2018 agreed order stated as follows:

[T]he parties have acknowledged and agreed that a substantial and material
change in circumstances adverse to the best interest of the minor child . . . has
occurred which necessitates a change in custody. The material and substantial
change is a result of Lauren Blakeney . . . making numerous allegations against
the father of the child that were ultimately unsubstantiated and then subjecting
the child to testifying in Justice Court. The . . . [GAL] further investigated the
facts and circumstances of this case and recommended in her report that Verba
Allen Shoemaker Jr. be granted full custody of the minor child . . . .

The agreed order granted the parties joint legal custody of the minor child. Shoemaker

received sole physical custody while Blakeney retained visitation rights. The agreed order

also released the GAL from her duties.

¶8. In December 2018, Buffington began representing Blakeney in the custody matter.

On December 26, 2018, Buffington filed a petition on Blakeney’s behalf that asserted a new

claim of child abuse against Shoemaker and stated that “the child’s best interest has been

ignored . . . .” The petition requested that the chancellor grant Blakeney temporary physical

custody of the minor child and allow CPS to investigate the new abuse allegation. The

petition also sought to modify child custody. On February 15, 2019, Buffington filed an

amended petition on Blakeney’s behalf.

¶9. In April 2019, Buffington filed a civil lawsuit against Judge Shoemake on behalf of

clients he represented in a different matter. On May 3, 2019, Buffington filed a motion for

Judge Shoemake to recuse himself from the custody dispute between Blakeney and

Shoemaker. The recusal motion cited the civil lawsuit as a basis for Judge Shoemake’s

recusal. On May 5, 2019, Buffington had Judge Shoemake served with a summons for the

4
civil lawsuit.

¶10. On May 6, 2019, Judge Shoemake conducted a pretrial conference on the ongoing

child-custody matter between Blakeney and Shoemaker. During the pretrial conference,

Judge Shoemake inquired about the language used in the December 26, 2018 petition

Buffington had filed on Blakeney’s behalf. Judge Shoemake asked whether Buffington had

intended to imply in the petition that Judge Shoemake had ignored the best interests of the

minor child or whether he (Judge Shoemake) had misread the petition. Buffington responded

his intent was to point out that Judge Shoemake’s previous orders had instructed CPS not to

investigate any more claims from his client and had left the parties without a GAL. Judge

Shoemake stated that every order entered in the matter prior to Buffington’s involvement had

been agreed to by both parties. Buffington disagreed with Judge Shoemake and asserted that

the order releasing the GAL had only been signed and submitted by Shoemaker’s attorney.

Judge Shoemake instructed Buffington to keep his voice down, and Buffington replied that

he did not appreciate the manner in which Judge Shoemake was speaking to him. Judge

Shoemake again instructed Buffington to keep his voice down and warned Buffington that

he had “just crossed the line.” Judge Shoemake further stated, “You’ve crossed the line three

or four other times with me, but this is going to be the last time you cross the line, so don’t

do it.”

¶11. Immediately following Judge Shoemake’s warning, Buffington referenced the recusal

motion he had filed against Judge Shoemake in the custody dispute and the recent lawsuit he

had filed against Judge Shoemake in another matter. Although the record reflected that

5
Judge Shoemake had been served with a summons for the lawsuit the previous day, he had

not yet been served with Buffington’s recusal motion. With regard to the two filings,

Buffington stated:

While we’re here, though, . . . we filed a motion for you to recuse on
Friday after we were hired to file a lawsuit against you for the costs that [were]
incurred when you operated outside your judicial duties, so that is pending.
And I know you know it because you got served.

Also, due to the fact that we had to go to the Supreme Court to get you
to do what you were supposed to do to begin with as far as in another matter,
not in this matter, when you recused and then tried to unrecuse yourself for
some reason, I have no idea.

¶12. Judge Shoemake warned Buffington that he was once again crossing a line by

bringing up outside matters. Judge Shoemake stated that Buffington was not only “being

disrespectful to the Court” but was also “disrupting this forum and . . . trying your best to

impugn the integrity of the Court.” After Buffington again disagreed that he was being

disrespectful, Judge Shoemake asked Buffington “not to cross [the line] anymore” but to

proceed with his argument. Judge Shoemake further told Buffington, “[Y]ou’ve already

crossed the line twice in th[e] five minutes that we’ve been here. And I’m asking you not to

cross it anymore, but if you choose to, then that’s your business.” Buffington once more

disagreed with Judge Shoemake’s statements that he had crossed any lines.

¶13. Following this exchange, Judge Shoemake again referenced Buffington’s December

26, 2018 petition and stated that one of the paragraphs had implied that he had issued an

improper and illegal order. After recounting some of the case’s procedural history, Judge

Shoemake stated:

6
My point is, the language in your petition reads as if I have ruled and ordered
[the GAL] appointed; I have ruled and ordered []CPS [to] not be involved in
this case; that I have neglected the best interest of the child[;] and all of that,
the way it’s written is disparaging and disrespectful to the Court.

¶14. Buffington began to defend the wording of his December 26, 2018 petition when

Judge Shoemake interrupted and again warned that Buffington was using an “argumentative

tone and behavior” that was “disrespectful to the Court.” The following exchange ensued:

BUFFINGTON: I don’t see how it’s disrespectful when I’m responding to
what you’re putting on the record to make sure if I have
to go to the Supreme Court like I did on the recusal
matter that it’s in there, what needs to be put in there.
And . . . so, no, I’m not.

THE COURT: And further, your speech about the lawsuit you filed
against me and all of that, . . . that is disrespectful.
There’s no necessity for you to get in here and remind the
Court that you’ve just sued the Court and you just had the
Court served with a summons. That is highly
disrespectful[,] and it insults the dignity of this Court.

BUFFINGTON: I don’t know how you say that. All I said was we filed a
motion to recuse based on that. And we put it before you
and, of course, not being disrespectful, but more than
likely we would have gotten an order from any other
judge we have sued going ahead and recusing himself
from all of our cases because it’s quite obvious that a
regular person on the street would look at that and
wonder how you could treat us fair[ly]. And then you’re
here, you were prepared to try to say I’ve been
disrespectful. I don’t think I’ve been disrespectful. I
may have raised my voice once or twice, but it was not
disrespectful. You have determined that I’ve been
disrespectful.

¶15. Buffington and Judge Shoemake continued to disagree about the circumstances

surrounding the May 8, 2017 order Judge Shoemake had signed that allowed CPS to

7
withdraw from investigating the prior abuse allegations. After Judge Shoemake once again

stated that Buffington was crossing the line and being disrespectful, Buffington responded:

Okay. Well, do whatever you’ve got to do then. I’ll go to the Supreme Court
if I have to. I’ve done it once[,] and I will do it again. I don’t think I have
[been disrespectful]. I think the record will reflect that. You are the one [who
is] trying to create a problem, not me. All I have done is apprise you of where
we are. After you put stuff on the record, I responded to show I don’t care
who presented the [May 8, 2017] order to you, to where what you said was not
entirely correct because you represented that all the parties were present.
[CPS] was never present. Never.

¶16. Following Buffington’s comments, Judge Shoemake held Buffington in direct

criminal contempt. In so doing, Judge Shoemake read into the record several prior instances

where Buffington’s behavior had also been argumentative and disrespectful. These prior

instances included hearings in March 2018, June 2018, and April 2019 in different matters

as well as an April 2019 hearing on the proceedings between Blakeney and Shoemaker. In

referencing these prior instances, Judge Shoemake stated that his recitation of Buffington’s

prior conduct was simply “for background and history purposes” and did not serve as the

basis for the criminal-contempt holding. Instead, Judge Shoemake stated that he was holding

Buffington in direct criminal contempt for Buffington’s disrespectful conduct, language, tone

of voice, and accusations during the present proceedings, which Judge Shoemake found had

disrupted the pretrial proceedings, demonstrated disrespect, and attacked his integrity.

¶17. By order entered May 9, 2019, nunc pro tunc to May 6, 2019, Judge Shoemake

ordered Buffington to serve twenty-four hours in the Smith County jail and set Buffington’s

bail at $1,000. As an exhibit to his order, Judge Shoemake attached the May 6, 2019 audio

recording and transcript. Judge Shoemake also attached to his order all transcripts and audio

8
recordings from prior court proceedings, as well as any previously filed court documents, that

he referenced during the May 6, 2019 contempt proceeding. Aggrieved, Buffington appeals

from the May 9, 2019 order holding him in contempt of court. Buffington also moved to

strike all exhibits to the May 9, 2019 order other than the audio recording and documents

from the May 6, 2019 pretrial conference. As stated, we deny the motion to strike.

DISCUSSION

¶18. Buffington argues that his conduct during the May 6, 2019 pretrial conference failed

to justify a holding of direct criminal contempt and that he received no notice of the criminal

proceedings against him. Buffington contends that Judge Shoemake actually based the

contempt holding on previous instances of alleged contemptuous behavior and on previously

filed documents with which Judge Shoemake took issue. Asserting that all his alleged

contemptuous conduct occurred outside Judge Shoemake’s presence and prior to the May 6,

2019 pretrial conference, Buffington asks this Court to reverse the order holding him in

direct criminal contempt.

¶19. With regard to contempt matters, “the standard of review depends on the classification

of the contempt citation.” Hayes v. Hayes, 281 So. 3d 1002, 1008 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App.

2019) (quoting C.W. v. Lamar County, 250 So. 3d 1248, 1252 (¶9) (Miss. 2018)). “[W]hen

reviewing a citation for criminal contempt,” this Court does not apply the manifest-error rule

but instead “will proceed ab initio and will determine on the record whether the person is

guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting C.W., 250 So. 3d at 1252 (¶9)).

“[T]he party asserting that contemptuous conduct has occurred” bears “[t]he burden of

9
proof[,]” and “in a proceeding for criminal contempt, evidence of guilt must be established

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Spore v. State, 214 So. 3d 223, 226 (¶8) (Miss. 2017) (quoting

In re Smith, 926 So. 2d 878, 886 (¶9) (Miss. 2006)).

¶20. “Two forms of criminal contempt exist: direct and constructive.” Latham v. Latham,

261 So. 3d 1110, 1112 (¶8) (Miss. 2019). “[D]irect criminal contempt involves words

spoken or actions committed in the presence of the court” while “[c]onstructive contempt

involves actions which are committed outside the presence of the court.” Harris v. State, 224

So. 3d 76, 81 (¶22) (Miss. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Corr v. State, 97 So. 3d 1211,

1214 (¶8) (Miss. 2012)). Because “direct criminal contempt takes place in the very presence

of the judge making all the elements of the offense personal knowledge[,]” the “[p]unishment

for direct contempt may be meted out instantly by the judge in whose presence the offensive

conduct was committed.” Id. at (¶23) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Corr, 97 So. 3d at 1214

(¶8)). By contrast, when constructive criminal contempt is involved,

defendants must be provided with procedural due process safeguards,
including a specification of charges, notice, and a hearing. We also have
found that in cases of indirect or constructive criminal contempt, where the
trial judge has substantial personal involvement in the prosecution, the accused
contemptor must be tried by another judge.

Id. at (¶21) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if Buffington’s conduct

“actually constituted constructive criminal contempt, his due process rights would guarantee

him more than the immediate sentence he received, including a different judge to hear the

contempt proceedings.” Id. (quoting In re Smith, 926 So. 2d at 888 (¶14)).

¶21. Appellate courts “normally favor finding that the contemnor’s actions involved

10
constructive contempt when there is a legitimate issue as to whether the contemnor has

committed constructive or direct contempt since constructive contempt requires a

specification of charges, notice[,] and a hearing.” Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 798

(Miss. 1994); see also Wood v. State, 227 So. 2d 288, 290 (Miss. 1969) (providing that any

doubt regarding the classification of the alleged contemptuous conduct should be resolved

in favor of constructive contempt, especially where the court charged the contemnor with

criminal contempt).

¶22. In Purvis, the husband (Purvis) filed a pro se motion seeking the chancellor’s recusal

from the parties’ divorce proceedings. Purvis, 657 So. 2d at 795. At the hearing on Purvis’s

recusal motion, the chancellor read aloud Purvis’s motion and concluded that Purvis had

made multiple unfounded and offensive allegations directed at the chancellor. Id. at 795-96.

After reading aloud Purvis’s motion, the chancellor gave Purvis the opportunity to expound

on the allegations contained in his motion. Id. at 796. The chancellor refused to recuse

himself and scheduled a subsequent hearing for Purvis to show why he should not be held

in contempt for his remarks. Id. The chancellor found that Purvis had committed both direct

and constructive criminal contempt. Id. The chancellor stated, however, that he was only

holding Purvis in direct criminal contempt for “wrongfully attempt[ing] to, and intentionally

tr[ying] to obstruct the proceedings of the court through his motion, through his telephone

calls, through his statements at the hearing on the motion, and through his intentional failure

to set the motion.” Id.

¶23. In reviewing Purvis’s appeal from the chancellor’s judgment, the Mississippi Supreme

11
Court concluded that despite the chancellor’s statement “that Purvis was being punished only

for his direct criminal contempt, the basis and substance of the court’s ruling was founded

on constructive criminal contempt.” Id. at 797. As the supreme court explained:

The court in issuing its decision made reference to a single activity committed
in the presence of the court, Purvis’[s] language in the courtroom as he
personally argued his motion for recusal. Otherwise, Purvis’[s] actions were
committed outside the presence of the court [(i.e., filing the recusal motion,
calling the court, and failing to set the motion for hearing)]. The court
expressly concluded that Purvis was guilty of constructive criminal contempt
in addition to direct criminal contempt. The suspension of twenty days of his
sentence was based upon Purvis’[s] promise not to engage in other acts
classified as constructive contempt. The essence of the trial court’s ruling was
founded on constructive criminal contempt regardless of what acts the
[c]hancellor said were attributed with the penalty imposed.

Id. at 797-98. The supreme court further found that because Purvis’s alleged contempt was

constructive and involved pointed personal attacks on the chancellor and his ability to

perform his job, due process required another judge to preside over Purvis’s contempt

hearing. Id. at 798-99. The supreme court therefore reversed the judgment of contempt and

remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 799.

¶24. Like the chancellor in Purvis, Judge Shoemake stated here that he was only holding

Buffington in direct criminal contempt for Buffington’s conduct during the May 6, 2019

pretrial conference. As the record reflects, however, “the basis and substance of the court’s

ruling” was much less clearly delineated and relied on alleged contemptuous conduct that

presented a combination of both direct and constructive criminal contempt. Id. at 797.

Similar to the facts presented in Purvis, Judge Shoemake began the May 6, 2019 pretrial

conference by addressing language he found to be objectionable in Buffington’s previously

12
filed petition. Judge Shoemake referenced the portion of the petition at issue and then asked

whether he had misinterpreted Buffington’s words. Later in the exchange, Judge Shoemake

again referenced Buffington’s petition and stated that the petition had been written in a

manner that was “disparaging and disrespectful to the Court.” At another point in the

proceedings, Judge Shoemake commented that Buffington’s “speech about the lawsuit you

filed against me and all of that, . . . that is disrespectful.” Finally, in actually holding

Buffington in direct criminal contempt, Judge Shoemake provided a detailed account of prior

interactions with and documents filed by Buffington that Judge Shoemake believed displayed

Buffington’s argumentative and disrespectful behavior toward him. As noted, Judge

Shoemake also attached the evidence of these prior interactions and filings as exhibits to the

contempt order.

¶25. As in Purvis, much of the conduct that Judge Shoemake referenced during the

contempt proceedings occurred outside Judge Shoemake’s presence or prior to the May 6,

2019 pretrial conference. Because much of Buffington’s alleged contemptuous conduct falls

under the classification of constructive rather than direct criminal contempt, we conclude that

Buffington was entitled to “more than the immediate sentence he received, including a

different judge to hear the contempt proceedings.” Harris, 224 So. 3d at 81 (¶21) (quoting

In re Smith, 926 So. 2d at 888 (¶14)). We therefore reverse the judgment of criminal

contempt and remand this matter for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶26. Because much of Buffington’s alleged contemptuous conduct amounted to

13
constructive rather than direct criminal contempt, we reverse the judgment holding

Buffington in direct criminal contempt. We further remand this case so that another judge

may conduct a de novo hearing to determine whether Buffington’s behavior and filings

before Judge Shoemake amounted to contempt of court. As previously stated, we make no

determination as to whether the behavior and filings at issue amounted to criminal contempt

or as to any matters that fall under the authority of the Mississippi Bar Association or the

Mississippi Commission on Judicial Conduct.

¶27. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE
AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE
RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

14