Julie Pace v. James Michael Pace

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CA-01259-COA

JULIE PACE APPELLANT

v.

JAMES MICHAEL PACE APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/21/2022
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBORAH J. GAMBRELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: NICHOLAS ANTHONY SAKALARIOS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: MARY LEE HOLMES
PAUL HARDIN HOLMES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART -
6/11/2024
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal originated from divorce proceedings between Julie and James Michael

(Michael) Pace. In the 2019 divorce judgment, the Forrest County Chancery Court ordered

the sale of the couple’s jointly owned commercial building, Pace Medical Clinic (or “subject

property”), because Michael had abandoned his medical practice in 2018 and moved to

California. However, Michael returned to Mississippi in 2020 and resumed his clinical

practice at the subject property, which Julie had listed for sale.

¶2. Thus began a series of competing motions filed by the parties, many of which

concerned the occupancy and sale of the subject property. After several hearings, the

chancery court entered a judgment on August 11, 2022, ordering Michael to purchase Julie’s
one-half interest in the subject property and its contents; in return, Julie was to sign a

quitclaim deed relinquishing her interest. The chancery court also denied Julie’s request for

attorney’s fees from a prior contempt motion, as this issue had not been addressed in the

court’s prior order of contempt related to that matter, and Julie had failed to provide the court

with a detailed accounting of the attorney’s fees incurred.

¶3. Julie filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Mississippi

Rules of Civil Procedure. Michael subsequently filed a motion for contempt because Julie

refused to sign the quitclaim deed to the subject property as ordered by the court. On

November 21, 2022, the chancery court denied Julie’s Rule 59 motion and granted Michael’s

motion for contempt. Julie appeals, alleging that the court erred (I) in citing Julie for

contempt; (II) by failing to enforce the 2019 final judgment and division of marital property;

and (III) by refusing to award Julie attorney’s fees related to the court’s 2020 contempt order

against Michael.1

¶4. Because we find the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to grant Michael’s contempt

motion, we vacate the court’s ruling finding Julie in contempt. We affirm the court’s

decision ordering that Michael buy out Julie’s interest in the subject property, and we find

no error in the court’s denial of Julie’s Rule 59 motion. We also affirm the chancery court’s

ruling not to award Julie attorney’s fees.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1
Julie presents four issues in her brief, and we have combined Issues I and II (both
concerning the contempt ruling) and Issues III and IV (both concerning the court’s ruling
to compel the forced buyout).

2
¶5. Julie and Michael were married in 2005. The couple had one child, born in 2006.

Julie filed for divorce on September 15, 2018, after discovering that Michael was having an

extramarital affair. In the meantime, Michael had quit his medical practice and moved to

California. The chancery court entered a final judgment of divorce on July 2, 2019. The

chancery court ordered the parties to sell the marital home and subject property and awarded

Julie “the remainder of the cash proceeds approximately $120,000 for the . . . sale and

maintenance of the [subject property].” Julie was also to “maintain receipts or cancelled

checks for all expenses associated with preparing the personal property, marital home and

[subject property] for sale,” with Michael being “responsible for reimbursing her one half of

those expenses.”

¶6. Michael appealed the court’s equitable division of the marital property.2 This Court

affirmed the judgment. Pace v. Pace, 324 So. 3d 369, 381 (¶40) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). In

our ruling in Pace, we noted that the chancellor’s final judgment had directed Julie “to make

necessary preparations” for the sale of the marital home and the subject property (i.e., Pace

Medical Clinic). Id. at 380 (¶37). During the pendency of the appeal, however, Michael

resumed his clinical practice in Mississippi; so he filed an emergency motion for an ex parte

restraining order against Julie on July 15, 2020. Michael requested that the chancery court

bar Julie from coming onto the subject property and enjoin her “from harassing Michael, his

patients and causing further harm to Michael.”

¶7. In response, Julie asserted that Michael violated the court’s 2019 judgment by

2
Neither party requested a stay of the order to sell the properties pending the appeal
from the original judgment.

3
“retak[ing] possession of the building and practic[ing] medicine from the building.”

Included in her response was a motion for a citation of contempt based on Michael’s failure

to pay the court-ordered child support. Julie’s contempt motion also asked the chancery court

to hold Michael in contempt for his failure to allow her to maintain and sell the
building[;] to clarify that Julie has the exclusive right to use and occupancy of
the building until such time as it sells[;] . . . [and] to enjoin Michael from
interfering with her efforts to sell and maintain Pace Medical Clinic.

Alternatively, Julie asked the court “to require Michael to pay her . . . one-half of the current

asking price for the building [(one-half being $75,000)], at which time she will convey her

interest in the building to Michael.” She also sought attorney’s fees.

¶8. At the motion hearing on July 29, 2020, Julie’s attorney proposed that if Michael

wished to resume his practice at the clinic then he “should go ahead and pay [Julie] her half

of the equity in the building[.]” The court agreed that if the subject property could “be

utilized” for Michael’s practice, then the parties should obtain “a fair market value of the

building” and have Michael “pay [Julie] out of her one-half[.]” Julie noted that she “would

prefer” that Michael buy her out and let her “go somewhere else” to conduct her newly

formed nutrition business. However, because the appeal of the 2019 judgment was still

pending before this Court, the chancery court declined to make any ruling related to the

marital-property division. The court entered an order on August 11, 2020, finding Michael

in contempt for his failure to pay the court-ordered child support and imposing a judgment

of $14,400. The court’s order did not address the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees.

¶9. Ten days later, Michael filed a “Motion for Contempt, Modification of Custody,

4
Psychiatric Evaluation, and Other Relief.”3 A hearing was held on November 15, 2021,

during which the chancellor inquired why the subject property had not been sold. Julie’s

attorney complained that Michael was preventing a sale, stating: “[Julie’s] had realtors put

signs up; we’ve had three potential buyers, and the signs get yanked out of the building.” Yet

Michael’s attorney asserted that Michael was “ready to sell it . . . right now” if Julie had a

buyer. Eventually, under the chancery court’s direction, the parties agreed to an appraisal of

the subject property, as well as the marital home.

¶10. On April 26, 2022, Julie filed a “Complaint for Citation of Contempt,” claiming

Michael had “thwarted [her] efforts” to sell the subject property. Julie further alleged that

Michael’s “taking over the building” had “interfered with her ability” to run her nutrition

business from the subject property until it was sold; so he “should be required to pay or

reimburse her for loss of business.” She requested that Michael reimburse her expenses in

maintaining the property prior to his occupancy in July 2020. Lastly, Julie noted the

chancery court’s failure to address the issue of attorney’s fees in its prior order from August

2020, and she sought those “attorney’s fees and court costs she incurred in attempting to

collect unpaid child support.”

¶11. A hearing was held on May 3, 2022. The chancellor noted that the subject property’s

appraised market value was $186,000 and that the value of the medical equipment was

$24,000. Exasperated with the parties’ failure to sell the subject property, the chancellor

asked the parties, “Who has got the money to buy this and let me be done with it?” Julie

3
The allegations in this motion concerned visitation and custody and are not relevant
to the issues raised on appeal.

5
insisted that she had a buyer that would pay $250,000; so the chancellor ruled, “If $250,000

is tendered to the chancery clerk’s office by Monday morning at noon, I am going to order

[the clerk] to accept it and [Michael] to vacate the premises.” Michael then offered “to pay

[Julie] to . . . get her out of the clinic” and the marital home, but Julie did not agree to his

offer. The chancellor issued a bench ruling that if Julie failed to produce a buyer by the

following Monday, then either party wishing to keep the subject property should tender

$105,000 with the chancery clerk the following day (Tuesday). No buyer appeared, however,

and neither party submitted any funds to the court.

¶12. A month later, Michael filed an “Urgent Motion to Sell Real Property,” requesting that

the court compel Julie to execute a quitclaim deed for the subject property.4 Julie filed a

motion for reconsideration and a response to Michael’s contempt motion on June 10, 2022.

She sought a continuance of the matter, noting that Michael’s motions “were not set in

accordance with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” She further argued that neither

party had pled the relief ordered by the chancery court in its bench ruling on May 3, 2022.

Julie claimed that because Michael had only tendered $1,000 in the court’s registry, she could

not “be held in contempt for her refusal to sign a deed at this point[.]” She also asked the

court to order Michael to pay her rental income at fair market value for the subject property.

¶13. A hearing was held on June 13, 2022. Julie’s (new) attorney stated that Julie did not

wish for Michael to buy her interest in the subject property. The chancery court entered an

4
The motion also raised issues concerning the sale of the couple’s marital home, but
we have limited any reference to those rulings regarding the marital home unless they are
relevant to our analysis of the issues raised.

6
order allowing the parties ten days “to plead any issues regarding partition, contempt, or any

other relief,” and the court scheduled a hearing for July 20, 2022. Michael filed a petition

requesting that the court partition the real property at issue. Julie filed a contempt motion,

asking the court to find Michael in contempt for his continued interference with the sale of

the subject property.

¶14. At the July 20, 2022 hearing, Michael testified that he had deposited $100,000 into

the chancery court’s registry. Julie’s position was she now wished to move her nutrition

business back into the subject property “and own it with [Michael].” Alternatively, she

wished to buy the property; yet she had been unable to get the money to do so. As a last

resort, Julie asked the chancellor to order the subject property sold to the highest bidder but

admitted she had not received any written offers for purchase of the building. Noting Julie’s

realtor had testified that the subject property’s “realistic” value was “more in line with

200,000,” the chancellor issued a bench ruling that Michael contribute an additional $10,000

into the court’s registry for the personal property (medical equipment) and that Julie execute

a quitclaim deed within ten days. The chancellor ordered Michael to reimburse Julie for the

2020 taxes already paid on the property and to pay the 2021 taxes. The marital home was

ordered to be partitioned and “sold at the courthouse steps.” The chancellor declined to

award those attorney’s fees Julie requested after looking at the information provided and her

former 2020 order finding Michael in contempt. On August 11, 2022, the chancery court

entered its final judgment, ordering (1) Michael to “buy out” Julie’s interest in the subject

property (by submitting $110,000 into the court’s registry); (2) Michael to reimburse Julie

7
for the 2020 property taxes she had paid ($3,200.82); (3) Julie to execute the quitclaim deed

on the subject property; (4) the marital home property to be partitioned; (5) Julie’s request

for attorney’s fees related to its 2020 order to be denied; and (6) Michael to pay Julie

$6,000.00 for her attorney’s fees related to the current proceedings. The court declined to

award Julie any further reimbursement for expenses she had incurred selling the subject

property.

¶15. Julie filed a “Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(a)(2) of the

Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure” on August 22, 2022,5 challenging the court’s ruling

denying her attorney’s fees for the 2020 contempt motion and arguing the court erroneously

modified its prior judgment of divorce “by denying Julie reimbursement for property

expenses.” She also requested the chancery court reconsider its ruling “that Julie would not

be allowed to recover rent or a share of the fair market value of the commercial building

from Michael” during his occupancy. Approximately one week later, Michael filed a motion

for contempt, stating that although he had complied with the court’s order to deposit the

additional funds into the court’s registry, Julie had refused to sign the quitclaim deed.

¶16. The chancery court held a motion hearing on October 31, 2022. It was noted that Julie

had signed the quitclaim deed the week prior to the hearing. When asked for the reason for

the two-month delay, Julie’s attorney said it was because Michael had failed to pay the 2021

5
Rule 59(e) requires motions to alter or amend to be filed within ten days of entry of
a judgment. M.R.C.P. 59(e). Although Julie’s motion was filed on the eleventh day, it is
considered a timely motion because the tenth day was Sunday. See Taylor v. Morris, 609
So. 2d 405, 407 n.1 (Miss. 1992) (finding a Rule 59(e) motion filed eleven days after the
final judgment was timely only because the tenth day fell on a Sunday).

8
taxes on the subject property until recently. Michael’s attorney noted that the marital home

had still not been sold and that Julie had “refused to do anything unless she forces us to do

it.” Julie’s attorney also asserted that Michael had failed to provide the required notice of

the contempt motion and that Julie had filed a motion for rehearing, “so she should not be

held in contempt.” With regard to Julie’s motion for rehearing, the chancellor noted that it

had not been set for a hearing but the court nevertheless decided to address all the issues

raised at the hearing.

¶17. On November 21, 2022, the chancery court entered its order, finding Julie in contempt

“for her failure to timely sign the deed to the [subject] property” and ordering her to pay

Michael $2,500 in sanctions “for her failure to do this until the week before this hearing.”

The court denied “[a]ll other requests for relief” in Julie’s Rule 59 motion for rehearing or

reconsideration.6 On December 8, 2022, Michael filed another contempt motion because

Julie had not yet paid him the court-ordered sanction of $2,500.

¶18. Julie appeals from the chancery court’s August 2022 judgment and all subsequent

orders, arguing that the court erred (I) by citing Julie for contempt; (II) by modifying its 2019

final judgment and division of marital property; and (III) by refusing to award Julie

attorney’s fees related to her 2020 contempt motion and the subsequent judgment of

contempt against Michael.7

6
The chancery court modified its prior judgment upon receiving information from
the county tax assessor that the marital property was “not subject to partition.”
7
Julie has filed an application for a stay of the judgment pending the appeal under
Rule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure and deposited $3,125 (125% of the
judgment sum of $2,500) into the court’s registry as a supersedeas bond.

9
STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶19. Our standard of review in domestic relations cases is limited. McGovern v.

McGovern, 372 So. 3d 138, 144 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). “We will affirm the

chancellor’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused

[her] discretion, clearly erred, or applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. Questions of law are

reviewed de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the chancery court erred by citing Julie for contempt in
the November 2022 judgment.

¶20. Julie contends that Michael’s failure to issue a summons under Rule 81 of the

Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure robbed the chancery court of jurisdiction to address

Michael’s contempt motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held, “Because contempt

proceedings are distinct actions, they require notice consistent with Mississippi Rule of Civil

Procedure 81(d).” Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So. 3d 143, 146 (¶9) (Miss. 2011). As we

recently clarified, “Although contempt proceedings in divorce cases often are filed in the

same cause number and proceed with the underlying divorce case, they are held to be

separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi Rules of Civil

Procedure 81.” Bolivar v. Bolivar, 378 So. 3d 433, 440 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting

Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So. 2d 397, 402 (¶25) (Miss. 2008)). “An opposing party’s failure

to issue a Rule 81 summons may result in the chancery court losing its personal jurisdiction.”

Id. at (¶26) (quoting Harrison v. Howard, 356 So. 3d 1232, 1241 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App.

2023)).

10
¶21. Michael argues that “Julie waived any objection to proper service whe[n] she

appeared ready to defend the suit.” Indeed, “a party ‘may waive the requirements of Rule

81 by appearing at a hearing on the issue of contempt and defending the charge on its merits

without raising any objection related to service of process.’” Britt v. Orrison, 323 So. 3d

1135, 1147 (¶46) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 309

So. 3d 104, 113 (¶40) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). In this instance, however, Julie’s attorney

expressly argued at the October 2022 hearing, “This Motion for Contempt was filed. It was

not served on Julie. It was not noticed with any notice to me.” (Emphasis added).

Therefore, we find that Julie did not waive the challenge to a proper summons under Rule

81 and that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the contempt motion.

¶22. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s ruling from its November 2022 judgment, finding

Julie in contempt. Although neither party addressed the corresponding sanction award

($2,500) in their briefs, the court’s lack of jurisdiction requires us to vacate the court’s award

as well. Because the notice issue is dispositive as to the appeal of the court’s contempt

ruling, we need not address Julie’s other argument (Issue I from her brief) that the court’s

August 2022 judgment “had been stayed pending a ruling” on Julie’s Rule 59 motion. See

M.R.C.P. 62(a).8

8
In reviewing the content of Julie’s motion, we do find it questionable whether
Julie’s motion was a motion for a new trial (Rule 59(a)), requiring an automatic stay under
Rule 62(a); or a motion for reconsideration (Rule 59(e)), allowing the trial court discretion
to stay the judgment under Rule 62(b). See McNeese v. McNeese, 119 So. 3d 264, 275 (¶33)
(Miss. 2013) (finding that because the content of the Rule 59 motion revealed it was actually
a motion for reconsideration, it was not subject to an automatic stay under Rule 62(a)); see
also M.R.C.P. Rule 62(b) (authorizing a trial court discretion to grant a stay for a motion to
alter or amend the judgment) (emphasis added).

11
II. Whether the chancery court erred in ordering the buyout of the
subject property and, thus, modifying its 2019 final judgment and
division of marital property.

¶23. Because the court’s 2019 final judgment ordered Julie to sell the marital properties,

Julie argues that the chancery court’s August 2022 judgment—ordering Michael to buy out

her interest in the subject property—erroneously modified the equitable division of marital

property from the 2019 judgment. She claims that this “creat[ed] an inequitable situation that

deprived one party but not the other of the use of the property, while saddling that same

excluded party with all of the financial responsibility for the expenses of the marital

property.” Julie also asserts the court’s August 2022 judgment deprived her “of receiving

a price determined by the free and fair market.” Finally, Julie challenges the chancery court’s

changing of the valuation method (from “open market” to “using appraisals”) and “limit[ing]

the amount Julie could recover for her expenses in maintaining and selling the properties,

when those expenses were not limited” in the prior judgment.

¶24. Our court affords chancellors “wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in

domestic-relations matters.” Roley v. Roley, 329 So. 3d 473, 491 (¶49) (Miss. Ct. App.

2021); see also Bell v. Stevenson, 158 So. 3d 1229, 1236-37 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)

(recognizing a chancery court’s “broad discretion over equitable remedies” in domestic

matters). A trial court may also “fashion an equitable remedy if unforeseen circumstances

frustrate the purpose of property division.” Shaw v. Shaw, 985 So. 2d 346, 352 n.3 (Miss.

Ct. App. 2007) (citing Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 6.12[3] (1st ed.

2005)); see also Morgan v. Morgan, 744 So. 2d 321, 324 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).

12
Although not precisely on point to the facts of the present case, we find our holding in Archie

v. Archie, 337 So. 3d 698 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), instructive to our analysis.9 The chancellor

in Archie granted Debbie Archie ownership of the marital home and ordered her to pay her

ex-husband Amos $20,000 for his equity in the domicile. Id. at 700 (¶3). Because the home

had been “paid off,” and she could not obtain a personal loan, Debbie did not have the funds

to comply with the court’s order; so Debbie filed a petition to amend the judgment. Id. at

(¶4). The chancellor then ordered that the marital home be sold “and that Amos be paid his

equity out of the proceeds.” Id. at 701 (¶7). Debbie challenged the court’s modification of

its original judgment and argued that the relief granted (the sale of the home) had not been

pled. Id. at 701-02 (¶¶9-10). Because Debbie had requested that the chancellor “make it

possible for her to adhere to the dictates of the chancery court[,] . . . her petition placed the

entire matter of the equitable distribution of the marital estate before the chancellor.” Id. at

702 (¶¶11-12). Finding “the chancery court had the same authority it had in the original

equitable distribution,” we concluded that the court “was not manifestly wrong or clearly

9
The cases Julie cites to support her claim that the 2019 judgment was non-
modifiable are distinguishable because they involve property settlement agreements. See
Stone v. Stone, 385 So. 2d 610, 614 (Miss. 1980) (holding that the parties’ property
settlement agreement pertaining to the conveyance, maintenance, and occupancy of land
were “not subject to modification because they [were] permissible subjects of contractual
agreements between a husband and wife”); Wilson v. Wilson, 53 So. 3d 865, 869 (¶13)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that once a couple’s property settlement agreement is
incorporated into a court’s divorce judgment, it is “not modifiable absent fraud, duress, or
a contract provision allowing for modification”). We have found one case in which the
supreme court held that “an order of equitable division is a nonmodifiable judgment.” Lewis
v. Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 175 (¶27) (Miss. 2015) (citing East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931
(Miss. 1986)). However, we are reluctant to rely on Lewis as authority that a judgment of
equitable division cannot be modified, as the case cited for this authority in Lewis concerned
an alimony award and a property settlement agreement. See East, 493 So. 2d at 931-33.

13
erroneous” in “fashion[ing] an equitable remedy” for Amos to obtain his equity in the marital

property. Id. at 702-03 (¶¶14, 16).

¶25. Here, the chancery court noted that when the original judgment was entered, “the

building had been unused,” and the parties “thought it could sell.” Since that time, however,

“[Julie] took the building over. [Michael] showed up[,] threw her out[,] and it’s been a tug-

of-war since then.” After Michael returned to Mississippi, the court reasoned that “the

practical thing to do would be to allow him to set up a practice, and then the parties work

towards hi[s] buying her out of that building[;] that makes sense.” Julie’s attorney agreed

and proposed that Michael “go ahead and pay her her half of the equity in the building then

he can have it.” He also noted that Julie had attempted to sell the property for $200,000, but

“[i]t did not sell.” When Julie informed the chancellor that she had obtained credentials for

“other mid-level practitioners under my contract to practice out of that building as well,” the

chancellor admonished her:

The Court ordered you-all to get rid of the property. You said you couldn’t
work; [Michael] said he couldn’t work. I ordered that it be sold. Neither one
of you had any authority to start taking possession without coming back to this
Court. Nobody did that.

The chancellor then asked Julie if she wanted to “buy [Michael] out.” She replied that she

“would prefer” for Michael to “buy [her] out and [she] go somewhere else.” Julie had also

asked the chancery court “to require Michael to pay her $75,000.00 . . . one-half of the

current asking price for the building, at which time she will convey her interest[.]”

¶26. At a subsequent hearing in November 2021, the chancellor noted that this Court had

affirmed the court’s ruling that the properties be sold. See Pace, 324 So. 3d at 381 (¶40).

14
Julie’s (new) attorney claimed that Julie had “worked her tail off getting realtors involved,”

but Michael had taken down the realty signs. The chancellor told the parties, “Get the

property sold,” and she appointed an appraiser agreed upon by the parties.

¶27. At the May 2022 hearing on custody, Julie’s attorney mentioned that the subject

property “has been listed with contracted sellers continuously.” Julie asked the chancery

court to order Michael to vacate the premises so she could sell the building. Recalling the

discussion from the 2020 hearing, the chancellor noted Julie had expressed a willingness for

Michael to buy out her interest. Although the chancery court provided Julie an opportunity

to produce a buyer for the property, she failed to do so.

¶28. We find the record demonstrates that the chancery court made every attempt to

enforce its 2019 judgment, ordering the parties to “[g]et [it] sold.” The court also told the

parties on more than one occasion that if they would not sell the marital property or come to

an agreement for a buyout, then the court would “order that it be sold at the courthouse steps”

for fair market value. While Michael’s occupancy of the subject property may have been a

hindrance at times, Julie had the property listed for almost three years without entertaining

any serious offers. Furthermore, as noted, Julie had requested a buyout of her interest in the

subject property as a possible alternative option in her 2020 motion. In consideration of

these changes in circumstances since the chancery court’s original 2019 judgment and the

parties’ protracted and contentious arguments over this issue, we find that the chancery

court’s modification of its prior judgment was an appropriate equitable remedy in this

instance.

15
¶29. Julie also claims that the court’s “changing the method of valuation for these

properties from using the open market, to using appraisals,” was an erroneous modification

of the 2019 judgment.10 “The valuation of property is a question of fact.” Brown v. Brown,

350 So. 3d 1169, 1179 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). This Court has specifically held, “The

fair market value of a business is a question for the trier of fact,” and “we defer to the

chancellor’s findings of fact when supported by the evidence and not manifestly wrong.”

Smith v. Smith, 379 So. 3d 954, 967 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 61 So.

3d 927, 936 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). The record does not indicate that the chancery

court had assigned any value to the subject property in its prior judgment. At the July 2020

hearing, Julie’s attorney admitted that the realtor had difficulty selling the subject property

and had reduced the listing to $150,000; so her attorney requested “a fair market of what the

actual appraisal would be for that building.” Both parties later agreed to appoint an

appraiser. The appraisal stated that the fee simple market value of the clinic was $186,000.

At a subsequent hearing, Julie’s realtor suggested that the value of the building was between

$200,000 and $250,000. The chancellor concluded that the “realistic value is the 200,000.”

Deferring to the chancellor as the trier of fact, we find no error in her valuation of the subject

property.

¶30. Julie also asks this Court to reverse and remand the chancery court’s August 2022

judgment for a hearing because there was no “inventory or appraisal of the value of the

medical equipment.” The court determined the value of the equipment was $20,000 based

10
The record from the prior appeal indicates that Julie assigned no value to the
subject property in her Rule 8.05 financial statement. See UCCR 8.05.

16
on the county tax records, minus depreciation. Julie acknowledges, however, that neither

party provided the court with “a firm value” for the medical equipment. Julie’s attorney did

note at the May 2022 hearing that the county had it “appraised at around $24,000.” This

Court has held, “It is incumbent upon the parties, not the chancery court, to prepare the

evidence needed to clearly make a valuation judgment.” Martin v. Martin, 282 So. 3d 703,

707 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). “If a party fails to provide accurate or sufficient

information or cooperate in the valuation of an asset, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on

the best information available to him or her.” Lageman v. Lageman, 313 So. 3d 1075, 1080

(¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). We find no error in the court’s valuation of this asset.

¶31. Lastly, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancery court’s ruling to deny Julie’s

request for reimbursement of expenses, which Julie argued in her Rule 59 motion. See

Johnson v. Smith, 328 So. 3d 145, 150 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that our Court

“review[s] a chancellor’s denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion”). At the July

2022 hearing, the chancellor noted:

In August of 2019, I ordered that [Julie] keep $120,000 for monies for upkeep
on both properties. I also put in that order that there be an accounting. The
best way to proceed to me today is to give me a list of all these expenses that
have been incurred, so I can subtract and see if it went over, order [Michael]
to pay his part. . . . [D]o I have receipts for the $120,000 that I ordered three
years ago? No. Now, just give me the receipts for what she is asking for now,
for the yard work, for the whatever, just give me that and let me get a
calculator and get this case over.

Julie’s counsel said the expenses for the subject property were “in evidence,” but she did not

“have an accounting for the [c]ourt today on the house” because the house had not sold yet.

In its August 2022 ruling, the court “considered the expenses submitted by [Julie] for

17
reimbursement from the defendant” and found “that since the sums do not come up to the

$120,000, the [c]ourt does not order any additional sums to be paid for reimbursement of

expenses.” The chancery court again denied the request for reimbursement at the hearing on

Julie’s Rule 59 motion. These itemized expenses are not in the record, and we find no error

in the court’s judgment denying Julie’s Rule 59 motion.

¶32. Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s decisions to order Michael to buy out

Julie’s interest in the subject property and to deny Julie the relief requested in her Rule 59

motion.

III. Whether the chancery court erred by failing to award Julie
attorney’s fees for her 2020 contempt order seeking payment of
back child support.

¶33. In Julie’s July 2020 contempt motion for Michael’s failure to pay child support, she

requested attorney’s fees “in having to defend and pursuing this action.” At the motion

hearing, the chancery court ordered Michael to pay $14,400, but the court made no ruling as

to attorney’s fees either at the hearing or in its order of contempt. When Julie later raised this

issue, the court denied her request for fees related to that motion.

¶34. “Attorney’s fees are awarded to make the plaintiff whole in contempt actions.” Riley

v. Riley, 196 So. 3d 1159, 1163 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Wilson v. Stewart, 171

So. 3d 522, 529 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)). That said, “chancellors have broad discretion

to determine attorney fees[;] . . . [so] [w]e are reluctant to disturb a chancellor’s discretionary

determination whether or not to award attorney fees and of the amount of any award.” Chism

v. Chism, 285 So. 3d 656, 667 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Huseth v. Huseth, 135

18
So. 3d 846, 859 (¶41) (Miss. 2014)). At the July 2022 hearing, the chancellor noted that

“[t]here’s no way in the world I would not have awarded attorney’s fees if [Julie’s attorney]

had asked for them when I found the defendant to be in contempt.” The chancellor

determined that Julie’s former counsel had “prepared the [2020] judgment, presented it to the

Court,” but there was “no reference whatsoever to a request for attorney’s fees, a court’s

ruling on attorney’s fees or a court holding that [issue] in abeyance.” The chancellor

therefore ruled:

The Court finds that now almost two years later, to hand me receipts from
prior attorneys, $1500 of which was paid based on some work in justice court,
5,000 was based on legal services -- it appeared to have been paid on July
28th, 2020.[11] The Court has no knowledge as to whether or not this was for
the contempt matter, which was not addressed in this order, and the Court is
going to decline that she be reimbursed $1500 for justice court representation
nor $5,000 for legal fees that I don’t know what they were for.

We find no error in the chancery court’s reasoning, and we affirm its decision to deny Julie’s

request for attorney’s fees.

¶35. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD,
LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

11
The receipts in the record were small paper receipts for payment, which were not
itemized.

19