Joshua Allen Murry a/k/a Joshua Murry v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-KA-01363-COA

JOSHUA ALLEN MURRY A/K/A JOSHUA APPELLANT
MURRY

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2020
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALEXANDRA RODU ROSENBLATT
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: SCOTT WINSTON COLOM
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/16/2022
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. After a Lowndes County jury convicted Joshua Murry of the first-degree murder of

Jarrell Ward, the Lowndes County Circuit Court sentenced Murry to life imprisonment in the

custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). On appeal, Murry asserts

the following arguments: (1) the circuit court committed plain error by allowing the State to

make improper comments during cross-examination and closing arguments; (2) the circuit

court committed plain error by admitting into evidence certain photographs of the victim; and

(3) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm Murry’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

¶2. On the evening of July 25, 2018, Murry attended a party in Columbus, Mississippi.

After arriving at the party, Murry joined two Columbus acquaintances, Tremarcus Monroe

and Greg Morris, in gambling that was taking place. During the course of the gambling,

Murry, Monroe, and Morris (the Columbus group) began competing and betting against

Ward, Emmanuel Dudley Jr., Jaylen Jernagin, and Corey Higgins from Starkville, Mississippi

(the Starkville group). Murry testified at trial that by the time the party ended around 1 a.m.

on July 26, 2018, he had lost about $300 to the Starkville group. After leaving the party, the

Columbus group learned that the Starkville group planned to continue gambling at Dudley’s

apartment in Starkville. The Columbus group arranged to join the gambling at Dudley’s

apartment. Murry had driven to the party in his white Dodge Challenger, which had an

Arkansas license plate, and he offered Monroe and Morris a ride to Starkville. Murry

testified that the three men stopped by his residence, where he went inside and grabbed about

$700 in cash, and then the Columbus group drove to Starkville.

¶3. After everyone arrived at his apartment, Dudley went to sleep while the other men

continued to gamble. Murry testified that by about 6 a.m., he had lost all the money he had

with him. Ward’s friend, Jernagin, testified that Murry claimed he had more cash at his

Columbus residence and that he could use the cash to cover his losses if Ward and Jernagin

would allow him to continue gambling with them. Informing the others that he did not

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“gambl[e] on air,” Jernagin left Dudley’s apartment and went home. Murry and Ward

continued to gamble until about 8:30 a.m. Murry testified that he had probably lost a total

of $1,100 to Ward but only still owed Ward about $600 or $700 when they finished

gambling. By contrast, Monroe and Morris both testified that to the best of their knowledge,

Murry still owed Ward about $1,300 when the gambling finished. Regardless of the exact

amount Murry still owed Ward, Murry promised to pay Ward the remaining balance if Ward

accompanied Murry to his Columbus residence.

¶4. On the drive back to Columbus, Murry stopped at a gas station, and he and Ward went

inside. Video footage from the gas station’s surveillance system showed that Murry wore

a black shirt with a white logo while Ward wore a white shirt with a logo, a black belt, blue

jeans, and red and white tennis shoes. Monroe and Morris also rode back to Columbus in

Murry’s vehicle, and later they would both testify that they did not observe any blood or

bullet holes while riding in Murry’s vehicle. Although Monroe and Morris fell asleep on the

way to Columbus, they stated that as far as they knew, nothing occurred during the drive that

would have resulted in Ward’s blood or bullet holes later being found inside the vehicle.

¶5. Monroe and Morris both awoke as Murry’s vehicle neared Columbus. Upon reaching

Columbus, Murry first stopped at Monroe’s residence. After Monroe exited the vehicle,

Morris remained in the back seat while Ward moved from the back of the vehicle to the front

passenger seat beside Murry. Murry then dropped off Morris. According to Murry, he and

Ward proceeded to Murry’s residence, where Murry gave Ward the money he owed him.

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Murry testified that Ward “mentioned something about getting a room,” so Murry suggested

a hotel. Murry stated that he dropped Ward off in a parking lot behind the Donut Factory in

Columbus and that Ward got into a red vehicle driven by an unknown woman.

¶6. Contrary to Murry’s testimony, Morris stated that he never heard Ward mention

anything about wanting to be dropped off at the Donut Factory to meet a woman in a red

vehicle. Instead, Monroe and Morris both testified that they heard Ward say he needed to

rent a car. Monroe further testified that Ward did not have his driver’s license with him and

asked to use Murry’s driver’s license to rent the car. Morris stated that as far as he knew

when he exited Murry’s vehicle, Ward planned to collect his money from Murry and then

rent a car. Both Monroe and Morris testified that they never saw or heard from Ward again

after they exited Murry’s vehicle.

¶7. Ward’s friends Dudley and Jernagin also testified that they had no knowledge of a

female driver in a red vehicle and that Ward had never mentioned any such woman to them.

Dudley and Jernagin further testified that Ward did not have his cell phone with him on the

evening of July 25, 2018, while they were gambling. Based on Dudley’s and Jernagin’s

testimony, the State questioned Murry on cross-examination about how Ward had arranged

to meet the unknown female driver if Ward did not have his cell phone with him. The State

asked whether Murry had seen Ward in possession of his cell phone during the drive back

to Columbus or whether Murry had seen Ward use his cell phone to call or text the unknown

female driver. Murry testified that he did not recall whether Ward had his cell phone with

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him on the drive to Columbus, and Murry stated that he did not recall Ward using either his

own or anyone else’s cell phone to arrange to meet the woman in the Donut Factory parking

lot.

¶8. According to Murry, he returned home after dropping Ward off in the Donut Factory’s

parking lot. Although Murry stated he had made plans to meet with Ward later in the week

to continue gambling, Murry testified that he never again saw or heard from Ward. Murry

further testified that the following morning, on July 27, 2018, he discovered one of the

windows in his vehicle had been broken. Murry stated he had attributed the damage to a

woman he had been dating at the time.

¶9. Murry testified that he called Glass Doctor in Starkville about repairing the broken

window. Sandra Gilmore, the office manager at Glass Doctor, testified that Murry had

informed her that he would need “[t]he passenger door glass and the passenger quarter glass,

which would be the right side of the vehicle” replaced on his Dodge Challenger. After

beginning the work on Murry’s vehicle, technician Joshua Smith informed Gilmore that there

were bullet holes in the vehicle. When Gilmore inspected Murry’s vehicle with Smith, she

observed “[t]hat there was a bullet hole[,] and the bullet was coming from inside the vehicle

to the outside.” Smith confirmed during his own testimony that the bullet holes he and

Gilmore observed started from inside the vehicle and proceeded toward the outside of the

vehicle. Gilmore and Smith further testified that they observed a bullet hole in the vehicle’s

window trim.

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¶10. When questioned at trial about the bullet holes inside his vehicle, Murry testified that

he had purchased the vehicle used and had not paid attention to the many defects at the time

of purchase. Murry further claimed he did not know the source of either the bullet fragments

or the blood that law enforcement later found inside his vehicle. After observing the bullet

holes in Murry’s vehicle, Gilmore reported the finding to the Starkville Police Department.

Once police officers documented the bullet holes and released the vehicle for repairs, Smith

replaced the broken glass on Murry’s vehicle.

¶11. Officer John Compton, who worked with the Columbus Police Department at the time

of Ward’s death, testified that he received a dispatch call on July 27, 2018, about a missing

person. After speaking with Ward’s parents, John and Betty Ward, Officer Compton called

Murry. Murry told Officer Compton that he had dropped Ward off at the Donut Factory in

Columbus and that Ward had gotten into a red car driven by an unknown woman. At the

time of their phone conversation, Murry told Officer Compton that he was in Jackson,

Mississippi. After his initial inquiries, Officer Compton turned the case over to Investigator

Reginald Adams.

¶12. Investigator Adams also spoke to Ward’s parents and then contacted Murry. Ward’s

father John had informed Investigator Adams that Ward’s cell phone was still in Starkville.

Therefore, when he spoke to Murry, Investigator Adams asked how Ward had been able to

communicate with the unknown female driver if he did not have his cell phone. In response,

Murry stated that he did not know. Investigator Adams asked whether Murry could come to

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the Columbus Police Department for further questioning, but he recalled Murry stating that

he was in Southaven, Mississippi, for a family reunion.

¶13. Based on Murry’s statement to both officers that he had dropped off Ward at a

specific location, Investigator Adams went to the only Donut Factory in Columbus and

reviewed several hours of video footage from the time period in question.1 He testified that

he never observed either a red car or Murry’s white Dodge Challenger on the video footage.

After Investigator Adams began coordinating with the Starkville Police Department, he

learned about the glass repair to Murry’s vehicle windows and the bullet holes Gilmore had

observed and reported. Law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant to determine the

location of Murry’s vehicle through the vehicle’s GPS.

¶14. Because Murry’s vehicle had an Arkansas license plate, Mississippi law-enforcement

officers contacted the police department in Wynn, Arkansas, where Murry’s vehicle was

registered, and asked that the Wynn police officers be on the lookout for Murry’s Dodge

Challenger. After discovering Murry’s vehicle at a residence in Wynn, local law-

enforcement officers arrested Murry pursuant to a Mississippi warrant. Investigator Adams

and Sergeant Michael Lay from the Starkville Police Department drove to Arkansas and

transported Murry back to Columbus.

¶15. While being transported back to Mississippi, Murry told Investigator Adams and

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Although Investigator Adams’s trial testimony varied about whether he watched the
Donut Factory’s video footage from July 26, 2018, or July 27, 2018, the video footage
admitted into evidence reflected the date of July 26, 2018.

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Sergeant Lay that the window on his Dodge Challenger had been broken while he was inside

a club in Starkville. At trial, following Murry’s testimony that a disgruntled former girlfriend

had broken his vehicle window while the vehicle was parked outside his home, the State

introduced the audio recording of Murry’s prior statement to Investigator Adams and

Sergeant Lay to impeach his trial testimony. After playing the audio recording for the jury,

the State questioned Murry about the prior explanation he had given for his broken vehicle

window. In response, the only explanation Murry provided was that when “you get involved

with the police, you . . . will tell them anything, whatever. That wasn’t my original

statement.”

¶16. The same day that Investigator Adams and Sergeant Lay transported Murry back to

Columbus, local law-enforcement officers discovered Ward’s dead body in Lowndes County

(within the jurisdiction of the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Office). Sergeant Lay received a

phone call that evening and went to the scene. Sergeant Lay testified that he previously had

reviewed the gas-station video footage, and he confirmed that the clothing Ward wore in the

video footage matched the clothing found on Ward’s body at the scene. Because Ward’s

body was discovered outside the jurisdiction of both the Starkville and Columbus Police

Departments, the case and all investigative materials were transferred to Detective Joshua

McCain with the Lowndes County Sheriff’s Office.

¶17. Consistent with Sergeant Lay’s testimony, Detective McCain stated that when found,

Ward’s body was clothed in a white shirt with a logo, blue jeans, a black belt, and red and

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white tennis shoes. Detective McCain also testified that the pocket of Ward’s jeans had been

pulled out and emptied. Detective McCain observed several pieces of broken glass in the

road near Ward’s body. Also near Ward’s body, Detective McCain observed what appeared

to be the window from a passenger door. According to Detective McCain, there appeared

to be a bullet hole visible in the passenger-door glass. The final item law enforcement

officers discovered near Ward’s body was a black Tommy Hilfiger shirt. Murry later

admitted during his cross-examination that the black Tommy Hilfiger shirt found at the crime

scene appeared to be similar to the one he had worn in the gas station’s video footage from

July 26, 2018. Murry claimed, however, that he had no knowledge of how the shirt ended

up next to Ward’s body, and he denied that the shirt was the same one he had worn on the

day in question.

¶18. Detective McCain sent the broken glass from the crime scene and samples of broken

glass found inside Murry’s passenger-side door to the FBI for comparison. While retrieving

the glass shards from inside the passenger door, law-enforcement officers also discovered

bullet fragments. After requesting help from a contact at the United States Department of

Justice (DOJ), Detective McCain and his colleagues obtained mapping information for

Murry’s cell phone for the estimated time of Ward’s death.

¶19. Austin Shepherd, the director of the Columbus Forensic Laboratory, helped process

Murry’s Dodge Challenger as part of the investigation into Ward’s death. The circuit court

accepted Shepherd as an expert in crime-scene investigation. During his examination of the

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exterior of Murry’s vehicle, Shepherd observed a defect in the bottom seal of the passenger-

side window as well as a red stain underneath the passenger-side door handle. Upon

examining the vehicle’s interior, Shepherd observed additional defects in the surface of the

passenger-side material and the seal of the passenger-side window. Underneath the front

passenger seat, Shepherd observed a small piece of glass and stains that appeared to be

consistent with blood. Using an alternate light source, Shepherd discovered additional blood-

like stains on the side and backrest of the front passenger seat, on the front passenger-side

floorboard, above the rear passenger-side window, and on the sunroof’s shade. When

Shepherd performed an initial analysis, the stains tested presumptively positive for human

blood.

¶20. Inside the trunk of Murry’s vehicle, Shepherd found a shirt, a bottle of carpet cleaner,

and a bottle of hydrogen peroxide. When subjected to the alternate light source, the shirt

appeared to have stains consistent with blood. Shepherd testified that he also found a white

residue concentrated on the inside of the passenger-side door and on the floorboard.

Shepherd did not test the white residue, however, and therefore could not confirm whether

the residue was hydrogen peroxide from the bottle found inside Murry’s trunk. Shepherd did

confirm, though, that he found no similar white residue or blood-like stains on the driver’s

side of Murry’s vehicle.

¶21. Detective McCain testified that he had sent for further analysis the shirt collected from

the trunk of Murry’s vehicle and two of the samples of presumptive human blood collected

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from the passenger side of Murry’s vehicle. For comparisons to these items, Detective

McCain sent DNA swabs collected from Ward’s parents. George Schiro, the laboratory

director at Scales Biological Laboratory, stated that his laboratory analyzed and compared

the items. The circuit court accepted Schiro as an expert in DNA analysis. Schiro testified

that the shirt and vehicle samples tested positive for human blood from a single individual.

Schiro further stated that testing revealed a 99.9 percent probability of paternity between

Ward’s father, John, and the single source of the DNA collected from the shirt and vehicle

samples. In other words, Schiro explained, a 99.9 percent probability existed that John was

the biological father of the person whose blood was collected from the items inside Murry’s

vehicle.

¶22. Ian Saginor with the FBI testified as an expert in forensic geology. Saginor explained

that as part of his duties, he examines geologically derived materials such as glass. Saginor

testified that not all glass is the same and that different pieces of glass can be compared to

determine if they “share a common origin” with each other. Saginor examined and compared

the side window found at the crime scene near Ward’s body and the glass fragments

recovered from the interior of Murry’s passenger-side door. Saginor randomly selected ten

of the twenty-four glass fragments collected from the interior of Murry’s passenger-side door

to compare to the passenger-side window. Saginor’s tests showed that the measured

properties of eight of the randomly selected glass fragments were indistinguishable from

those of the passenger-side window recovered from the crime scene. As a result, Saginor

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concluded those eight glass fragments “either came from the same broken glass source” as

the passenger-side window or came from “another glass source that’s indistinguishable [in]

all the measured physical, optical[,] and elemental properties.” Saginor testified that the

ninth randomly selected glass fragment he tested was different from the window recovered

at the crime scene and that the tenth glass fragment was not tested for elemental composition

but shared the same physical properties and refractive index as the window.

¶23. The State also called Paul Rowlett to testify about Murry’s movements from July 25

to 27, 2018, based on Murry’s cell phone data. At the time of Ward’s murder, Rowlett

worked for the DOJ, and without any objection from the defense, the circuit court accepted

Rowlett as an expert in intelligence analysis. Because Monroe and Murry testified they had

been together until Murry dropped Monroe off at his residence the morning of July 26, 2018,

Rowlett examined both Murry’s and Monroe’s cell phone records. Rowlett explained that

he used the information to track and compare the men’s movements during the time in

question. Rowlett stated he put the cell-site data he received into a federal database that

maps out the general location of a cell phone at the time of an outgoing or incoming call.

Based on the data, Rowlett found nothing to contradict Monroe’s statement regarding his

movements during the time in question. As Monroe testified, the data showed that he and

Murry traveled together from Starkville to Columbus on the morning of July 26, 2018.

Monroe’s cell phone data then showed that from about 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on July 26, 2018,

Monroe remained near his residence in Columbus. Rowlett further testified, however, that

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there was nothing in Murry’s cell-site data to corroborate his testimony that he drove Ward

to the Donut Factory after dropping off Monroe. Instead, at about 9:30 a.m., Murry’s cell

phone data indicated he was east of Columbus in the opposite direction from the Donut

Factory. At 10:43 a.m., Murry’s cell phone data placed him in a sector that covered the area

where law enforcement discovered Ward’s body. For the next hour and a half, Murry did not

make or receive a phone call while in the sector where law enforcement found Ward’s body.

After this period of cellular inactivity, Murry made phone calls at 12:08 p.m. and 12:10 p.m.

to Monroe and Morris, respectively. These two phone calls placed Murry back near his

residence in Columbus.

¶24. Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Mark LeVaughn testified by video deposition about the

autopsy he performed on Ward’s body. Dr. LeVaughn confirmed that Ward’s body was

severely decomposed by the time law enforcement discovered it, and he stated the level of

decomposition was consistent with Ward dying sometime around July 26, 2018. Dr.

LeVaughn observed a significant amount of trauma to Ward’s skull, mainly on the right side.

Further examination showed the trauma was caused by a gunshot wound above Ward’s right

eye. Other than the gunshot wound to the right forehead area of the skull, Dr. LeVaughn was

unable to identify any other traumatic injuries to Ward’s body that would have contributed

to his death. Based on his findings, Dr. LeVaughn concluded that Ward was murdered by

a gunshot wound to his head.

¶25. Following its deliberations, the jury found Murry guilty of first-degree murder, and

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the circuit court sentenced Murry to life imprisonment in MDOC’s custody. Murry filed an

unsuccessful motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial.

Aggrieved, Murry appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶26. On appeal, Murry asserts that improper comments made during his cross-examination

and the State’s closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Murry acknowledges

that his failure to contemporaneously object to the State’s comments and arguments at trial

procedurally bars the issue on appeal. See Brisco v. State, 295 So. 3d 498, 509 (¶23) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2019) (“The failure to object at trial waives any assignment of error on appeal

absent plain error.”). Due to his failure to object at trial, Murry asks this Court to review the

issue for plain error. We will only find plain error “when a defendant’s substantive or

fundamental rights are affected.” Id. For plain error to occur, there must be a trial error that

“results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Wilson v. State, 276 So. 3d 1241, 1253 (¶27)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Beasley v. State, 136 So. 3d 393, 399-400 (¶20) (Miss.

2014)).

¶27. Attorneys customarily receive wide latitude in making their closing arguments.

Miskell v. State, 270 So. 3d 23, 33 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). “Any alleged improper

prosecutorial comments must be considered in the context of the circumstances of the case.”

Id. Relevant to Murry’s claims on appeal, our caselaw holds the following:

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Even when the State makes improper comments, we have recognized that not
every improper comment rises to the level of reversible error. See Randall v.
State, 806 So. 2d 185, 212 (¶67) (Miss. 2001) (“Although error, the question
of whether the comment constitutes reversible error is a separate and distinct
question.”). Reversal is required only when “the natural and probable effect
of the improper argument of the prosecuting attorney is to create such an
unjust prejudice against the accused as to result in a decision influenced by the
prejudice so created.” Id.

Hearns v. State, 313 So. 3d 533, 537 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

a. Murry’s Cross-Examination

¶28. In beginning Murry’s cross-examination, the district attorney stated, “I’m going to

give you a chance to get right with God. I’m going to ask you again. I want you to look at

the Ward family[,] and I want you to admit to them, tell them the truth, you killed their son[,]

and ask for their forgiveness.” In response to this line of cross-examination, Murry repeated

his denial that he had not killed Ward. On appeal, Murry argues the district attorney erred

by “invok[ing] religion” and “demanding [that] Murry confess.”

¶29. In Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 671 (Miss. 1990), the Mississippi Supreme Court

addressed a similar assertion that the district attorney improperly invoked religion during the

defendant’s questioning and in closing arguments. Like Murry, Turner was charged with

murder, and on cross-examination, the district attorney asked, “Did the thought of [the

victim] having a Christian burial ever cross your mind?” Id. The circuit court overruled the

defense’s objection to the question, and on appeal, the supreme court held there was no error.

Id. In so holding, the Turner court distinguished the matter from Brewer v. Williams, 430

U.S. 387 (1977), where the United States Supreme Court condemned a police officer’s

15
Christian burial speech made to a custodial pretrial suspect to entice the suspect to confess

and provide information regarding the location of the victim’s body. Brewer, 430 U.S. at

399-401. Moreover, the Turner court recognized that besides the State’s use of religion at

trial, Turner’s own attorneys “made numerous references to scriptures in the Bible and

quoted them to the jury in an attempt to obtain mercy for [Turner].” Turner, 573 So. 2d at

671.

¶30. Here, even though Murry did not “invoke religion” during his trial like the defense

did in Turner, we conclude that the district attorney’s words to Murry were more similar to

the circumstances presented in Turner than in Brewer. As in Turner, Murry asserts that the

district attorney improperly injected religion into his cross-examination. Unlike in Turner,

however, Murry raised no contemporaneous trial objection to the district attorney’s remark,

and on appeal, he asserts prosecutorial impropriety without providing any further analysis or

relevant authority to support his claim. As our caselaw firmly establishes, the “[f]ailure to

cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Cork

v. State, 329 So. 3d 1183, 1190 (¶21) (Miss. 2021) (quoting Arrington v. State, 267 So. 3d

753, 756 (¶9) (Miss. 2019)). Further, as noted, Murry failed to object to the district

attorney’s question at trial, and upon review, we cannot find that “the natural and probable

effect” of the district attorney’s isolated cross-examination remark was “to create such an

unjust prejudice against [Murry so] as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so

created.” Hearns, 313 So. 3d at 537 (¶12) (quoting Randall, 806 So. 2d at 212 (¶67)). Based

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on these circumstances, we find that no plain error resulted that would require the reversal

of Murry’s conviction.

b. The State’s Closing Argument

¶31. Murry also alleges that the district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct

during the State’s closing argument by improperly shifting the burden of proof to Murry and

by making a send-a-message argument. As with the previous alleged error, Murry failed to

raise any objections to the remarks at trial, so we review for plain error.

i. Burden of Proof

¶32. During closing arguments, the district attorney stated the following:

[Murry’s version of events is] not possible. It’s too much. It’s too much with
no explanation. Zero. He gave you nothing. It has to be to the exclusion of
every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. He gave you no
reasonable scenario for any of that to happen to prove he’s innocent. Zero.
The only thing he gave you is, [“]I don’t know. It’s a coincidence.[”]

He also fell for my trap when I crossed him. I do this every time. I cross the
Defendant—I do it quite often as [district attorney]. Every time the guilty
people—that’s the only people I try—they always get in an argument with me.
It’s temptation because they know they did it, they get in an argument with me.

¶33. With regard to Murry’s contention that the district attorney’s remarks improperly

shifted the burden of proof to the defense, we note that the circuit court instructed the jury

as follows prior to closing arguments:

A defendant is presumed innocent. This presumption of innocence requires
that the State must prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and to the exclusion of any reasonable explanation of the defendant’s
innocence. This presumption of innocence stays with the defendant
throughout the trial or until the evidence convinces the jury of the defendant’s

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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any reasonable
explanation of the defendant’s innocence. The defendant is not required to
prove his innocence.

¶34. In addition to properly instructing the jury as to the presumption of Murry’s innocence

and the State’s burden of proof, the circuit court explained that the attorneys’ arguments,

statements, and remarks did not amount to evidence and were only intended to help the jury

understand the actual evidence and apply the law. Moreover, the circuit court specifically

instructed the jury to disregard any argument, statement, or remark that lacked a basis in the

evidence presented at trial. A strong presumption exists that jurors follow the instructions

the trial court gives to them. Lyons v. State, 237 So. 3d 763, 772 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App.

2017). And after reviewing the record, we find that the circuit court properly instructed the

jury as to the presumption of Murry’s innocence and the State’s burden of proof.

¶35. We further find that the circuit court’s proper instruction to the jury cured any

subsequent erroneous remark the district attorney made about these matters during closing

arguments. We find this point especially pertinent in light of the district attorney’s comment

that he only tries guilty people. Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(e) specifically

prohibits attorneys from “stat[ing] a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the

credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant[,] or the guilt or innocence of an

accused . . . .” (Emphasis added). As we have previously explained, it is never proper for

an attorney to “assume the role of the jury and exchange his opinions as to guilt or innocence

as currency in the deliberative process of the jury.” Abram v. State, 309 So. 3d 579, 586

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(¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). Although improper, we conclude that in light of the circuit

court’s proper instruction to the jury, the district attorney’s single remark about only trying

cases against guilty people failed “to create such an unjust prejudice against [Murry so] as

to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.” Hearns, 313 So. 3d at 537

(¶12) (quoting Randall, 806 So. 2d at 212 (¶67)). We therefore find no reversible error.

ii. Send-a-Message Argument

¶36. Murry also asserts that the circuit court plainly erred by allowing the district attorney

to employ a send-a-message argument during the State’s closing argument. In relevant part,

the district attorney stated the following:

Because [the Wards] trusted the process, we got to this point where you all
[(the jury)] can do what you gotta do because we did what we had to do.

....

In Columbus, Mississippi, we hold people accountable for that [(murder)].
You don’t get away with that in Columbus. That’s why you [(the jury)] gotta
do your duty. You gotta find the Defendant guilty of murder. You gotta give
[Ward’s] family justice. You gotta uphold the law[,] and you gotta make sure
. . . everybody knows [that] when the evidence is there in Columbus,
Mississippi, when the law enforcement [officers] do[] their job[s], when the
prosecutor presents the evidence in Columbus, Mississippi, we find people
guilty of murder.

¶37. Send-a-message arguments “encourage[] juries to use their verdict to send-a-message

to the public or to other potential criminals, instead of rendering a verdict based solely on the

evidence introduced at the trial of that case.” Dille v. State, 334 So. 3d 1162, 1196 (¶106)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Coleman v. State, 289 So. 3d 1221, 1225 (¶11) (Miss. Ct.

19
App. 2020)). We have held that “only when counsel departs entirely from the evidence,

makes statements intended solely to excite the passions or prejudices of the jury, or makes

inflammatory and damaging statements of fact not found in the evidence” should a “trial

judge . . . intervene to prevent unfair argument . . . .” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted)

(quoting Coleman, 289 So. 3d at 1224 (¶9)).

¶38. In considering Murry’s allegations, we use “[t]wo threshold questions . . . to determine

whether a send-a-message argument constitutes reversible error.” Miskell, 270 So. 3d at 35

(¶43) (quoting Jackson v. State, 174 So. 3d 232, 238 (¶17) (Miss. 2015)). We “first look[]

at whether the argument is procedurally barred because defense counsel failed to object to

the statement at trial.” Id. As previously discussed, Murry made no contemporaneous

objection to the district attorney’s closing-argument remarks. “[E]ven in the absence of a

contemporaneous objection” by the defendant, however, “we will review on appeal a claim

that a prosecutor made an improper send-a-message argument if the argument is so

inflammatory that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion.” Id. (quoting

Jackson, 174 So. 3d at 238 (¶17)). We next “consider[] whether the defense counsel

provoked the prosecution to make the challenged statement. After considering the two

threshold questions, the Court . . . must determine (1) whether the remarks were improper,

and (2) if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.” Id.

¶39. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that Murry’s attorney in any way

provoked the district attorney’s alleged send-a-message or do-your-duty argument. As a

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result, we next look at the specific remarks made by the district attorney and determine

whether they were, in fact, improper. See id. In so doing, we conclude that the district

attorney’s collective statements to the jury were impermissible and closely akin to the

arguments declared improper in both United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985), and

Jackson. In those cases, the United States Supreme Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court

recognized that “encourag[ing] the jury to ‘do its job’” amounts to error, and such

“prosecutorial pressure [does] not belong in the administration of criminal justice.” Jackson,

174 So. 3d at 237 (¶15) (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 18). The courts further noted that

“[u]rging the jury to finish what the prosecution started was improper . . . .” Id. at 238 (¶18).

¶40. Without question, the comments at issue in the case before us run afoul of the clear

direction given by the highest appellate courts in our state and nation. Despite the

impropriety of the district attorney’s statements, however, “we must [still] determine

‘whether the remark[s] prejudicially affected the accused’s rights.’” Miskell, 270 So. 3d at

35 (¶44) (quoting Jackson, 174 So. 3d at 238 (¶17)); see also Ford v. State, 333 So. 3d 896,

919-20 (¶¶70-71) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (“Even if a prosecutor has made an impermissible

comment, there must be a showing of prejudice to warrant reversal.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). To hold any error harmless, “it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt

that, absent the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments, the jury would have found the

defendant guilty.” Miskell, 270 So. 3d at 35 (¶44) (quoting Brown v. State, 986 So. 2d 270,

276 (¶16) (Miss. 2008)).

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¶41. Here, the State presented more than substantial evidence over the course of the trial

to establish Murry’s guilt. We therefore find “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that,

absent the prosecutor’s comment[s] . . . , the jury would have found [Murry] guilty” of

Ward’s murder. Id. As a result, “it cannot be said that the natural and probable effect of the

prosecutor[’s] comment[s] was to create unjust prejudice against [Murry] which resulted in

a verdict influenced by this prejudice.” Jackson, 174 So. 3d at 238 (¶18). Accordingly, we

decline to find that the district attorney’s improper closing-argument remarks amounted to

reversible error.

II. Admission of Photographs

¶42. Murry next argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to admit into

evidence multiple photographs of Ward’s decomposing body. According to Murry, the

photographs were unnecessary, were extremely gruesome, failed to resolve any fact issue in

the case, and were intended to arouse the jury’s passion and prejudice. Because he failed to

object to the photographs at trial, Murry’s arguments on appeal are procedurally barred. See

Wilson, 276 So. 3d at 1253 (¶25) (holding that a defendant’s failure to object to the

admission of photographs at trial waives the matter on appeal).

¶43. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find no error in the admission of the

photographs at issue. We ordinarily review the trial court’s admission of photographs for

abuse of discretion. Id. at (¶26). As stated, though, Murry failed to object to the subject

photographs’ admission into evidence at trial. We therefore review his argument for plain

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error. See id. at (¶27) (“The plain-error doctrine is implicated when an error occurs at trial

which affects substantial rights and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (quoting

Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 399-400 (¶20)).

¶44. The photographs to which Murry now objects on appeal provided relevant evidence

that clarified witnesses’ testimony regarding where Ward’s body was discovered, how his

identity was confirmed, and how his date of death and cause of death were determined. For

instance, following the admission of multiple crime-scene and autopsy photographs, Dr.

LeVaughn testified in depth as to how the state of a body’s decomposition enables the

determination of when the murder occurred. In this case, where the final sequence of

interactions between Murry and Ward were vigorously contested, the State offered the

subject photographs and Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony to corroborate the timeline of events that

other witnesses provided regarding Ward’s last contact with Murry on July 26, 2018.

Further, Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony and the photographs admitted during his direct

examination assisted the State’s presentation of information regarding the path of the gunshot

through Ward’s skull, the injury Ward sustained from the gunshot, and the identification of

his body. These issues also proved to be the defense’s focus during Dr. LeVaughn’s cross-

examination, which further demonstrates the relevance and probative value of the

photographs.

¶45. Our caselaw recognizes that “[e]ven if [a] photograph is gruesome, grisly, unpleasant,

or even inflammatory, it still may be admitted so long as it has probative value and its

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introduction serves a meaningful evidentiary purpose.” Mosley v. State, 307 So. 3d 1261,

1268 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 400 (¶21)). Mississippi

appellate courts have found that a meaningful evidentiary purpose exists where the subject

photograph “describes the circumstances of the killing, its location, or the cause of death[,]

or supplements a witness’s testimony.” Id. at 1268-69 (¶26). As this Court has recognized,

“the bar is low for admission, and some probative value is the only requirement needed . . .

to support a trial judge’s decision to admit photographs into evidence.” Id. at 1269 (¶27)

(citations and internal quotation mark omitted). Because the photographs at issue here

possessed probative value and several meaningful evidentiary purposes, we find that their

admission neither resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice nor constituted plain error.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶46. In his final assignment of error, Murry contends his trial attorney rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel by “failing to object to any of the gruesome photographs of Ward’s

body[,] failing to object to the State’s improper closing argument[,]” and “fail[ing] to

adequately advise [Murry] about the potential pitfalls of testifying on his own behalf.”

¶47. “Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims generally are reserved for post-conviction

relief.” Ford, 333 So. 3d at 912 (¶41). We address ineffective-assistance claims on direct

appeal, however, if “[1] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional

dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines

that the finding of facts by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of the witnesses, etc.,

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are not needed.” Id. (quoting Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020)). We

also review ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal where “the record affirmatively

shows the claims [lack] merit.” Id. at 912-13 (quoting Ross, 288 So. 3d at 324 (¶29)). Here,

the record does not affirmatively show either ineffective assistance or that Murry’s claims

lack merit. In addition, the State did not stipulate to the adequacy of the record for this Court

to review Murry’s claims on the matter. We therefore decline to further address Murry’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument and recognize that the claim is preserved for post-

conviction relief. See Lyons, 237 So. 3d at 774 (¶43) (“The Mississippi Supreme Court has

stated that, where the record cannot support an ineffective[-]assistance[-]of[-]counsel claim

on direct appeal, the appropriate conclusion is to deny relief, preserving the defendant’s right

to argue the same issue through a petition for post-conviction relief.” (quoting Wilcher v.

State, 863 So. 2d 719, 761 (¶162) (Miss. 2003))).

CONCLUSION

¶48. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm Murry’s conviction and sentence for

first-degree murder.

¶49. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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