Walter Haralson a/k/a Walter Jeton Haralson v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CP-01309-COA

WALTER HARALSON A/K/A WALTER JETON APPELLANT
HARALSON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/09/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEWEY KEY ARTHUR
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WALTER HARALSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/01/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McCARTY AND ST. PÉ, JJ.

ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Madison County Circuit Court revoked Walter Haralson’s post-release

supervision (PRS) after Haralson failed to report to his probation officer for more than two

years. Haralson filed a motion challenging the revocation, which the circuit court treated as

a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). The circuit court summarily dismissed

the motion, and Haralson appealed. On appeal, Haralson does not challenge the circuit

court’s finding that he absconded; instead, he argues that revocation subjects him to a

sentence beyond that to which he was originally sentenced. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 2016, Haralson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and was sentenced
to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with five years

suspended and five to serve, and five years of PRS. In January 2020, Haralson was released

and began serving PRS. In November 2021, Haralson’s supervising officer filed for an arrest

warrant, claiming that Haralson had violated the terms of his PRS by failing to report since

March 2020, that he failed to complete a sober-living program as ordered, and that he had

not paid court costs.

¶3. At a revocation hearing, Haralson’s supervising officer Zerial Kitchens testified that

he received a call from Lauderdale County that Haralson may have absconded from PRS.

Officer Kitchens pulled Haralson’s records to confirm the timing and sought a warrant for

Haralson for revocation proceedings. After Haralson was arrested on a misdemeanor charge

in Hinds County, Officer Kitchens was able to serve Haralson with the petition to revoke his

PRS. Haralson refused to sign the paper to acknowledge its receipt.

¶4. At the hearing, Haralson told the court that he had been kicked out of the sober-living

facility in Lauderdale County in April 2020 after being told by the director that he was no

longer on probation. Haralson claimed that he tried to meet with his PRS officer even after

he left the sober-living facility, but at some point he left Lauderdale County and moved to

Hinds County. Haralson claimed he tried to meet with probation and parole employees in

Hinds County, but these employees told him they had no paperwork or record of him. He was

unable to present any witnesses or documentation to support these claims. Haralson denied

trying to abscond or avoid supervision. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court

found it was “more likely than not” that Haralson violated the terms of his probation by

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failing to report since March 30, 2020, and fully revoked his suspended sentence.

¶5. Haralson filed a timely “Motion to Amend, Petition to Clarify Sentence,” arguing that

his PRS was unlawfully revoked because his sentence had expired. He also argued that his

hearing was held more than twenty-one days after his arrest.1 The circuit court treated

Haralson’s filing as a motion for post-conviction relief and summarily dismissed it.

¶6. Haralson appealed, designating three issues, which he wrote as:

(1) Whether the Court Erred in Resentencing Appleant [sic] after he was
already convicted and begun [his] (10) year Sentence;

(2) Whether the Court Erred to Not “Fact Find” to calculate correct amount of
Remainder of Suspended Sentence Appleant [sic] should’ve been Fully (Never
to Return) Revocated to serve;

(3) Whether on PCR motion Court denied PCR in ERROR causing an
Eronious sentence. [10 year Sentence taking the Course of 12 years] time sheet
shown.

ANALYSIS

¶7. The circuit court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion “[i]f it plainly appears from

the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the

movant is not entitled to any relief.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2020). Summary

dismissal “is proper where it appears beyond a doubt that the [movant] can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” State v. Santiago, 773 So. 2d

921, 924 (¶11) (Miss. 2000). We review de novo the circuit court’s summary dismissal of a

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Though Haralson does not raise this as an issue on appeal, we note that the petition
Haralson was served with was filed on September 8, 2022, and the revocation hearing was
held on September 26, 2022, satisfying the twenty-one-day requirement of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 47-7-37(3) (Supp. 2018).

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PCR motion, as it is a question of law. McConn v. State, 355 So. 3d 779, 782-83 (¶9) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2023).

¶8. Haralson’s argument on his first and third issues can be boiled down to this: he was

sentenced to ten years in 2015 for possessing a firearm as a felon, and his sentence has been

completed; thus, the sentence imposed following his revocation hearing is illegal. He notes

throughout his brief that the sentence following his revocation hearing was a “resentencing,”

and he notes that his discharge papers from MDOC show that his sentence would not go

beyond 2025. Because the revocation order, as imposed in September 2022, would extend

his time served beyond 2025, Haralson argues that the resulting sentence is illegal.

¶9. The circuit court dismissed Haralson’s petition, finding that Haralson had violated the

terms of his PRS and was sentenced to the remainder of his original ten-year sentence and

that the sentence did not exceed ten years total.

¶10. Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-37.1 (Rev. 2015) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, if a court finds by
a preponderance of the evidence, that a probationer or a person under [PRS]
has committed a felony or absconded, the court may revoke his probation and
impose any or all of the sentence. For purposes of this section, “absconding
from supervision” means the failure of a probationer to report to his
supervising officer for six (6) or more consecutive months.

The language of section 47-7-37.1 permitted the court’s revocation of Haralson’s five-year

suspended sentence. In his original sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon, Haralson

was sentenced to ten years, with five years suspended and five years to serve, followed by

five years of PRS. After serving five of the ten years, Haralson was released and began his

five years of PRS. He failed to report under the terms of his PRS for over two years (which

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he does not deny), clearly meeting the statutory definition of “absconding from supervision.”2

Section 47-7-37.1 empowers the circuit court to impose any or all of the remaining sentence,

and the court did so, ordering that Haralson serve the remainder of his original ten-year

sentence that had been suspended. We find no error.

¶11. As to Haralson’s claim that the circuit court should have calculated the “correct”

amount of time remaining on his sentence, it is unclear what Haralson thinks the circuit court

should have done to correct his sentence. To the extent Haralson argues facts to support his

claims that he was kicked out of the sober-living facility or that he tried to report to probation

officers in Jackson, he presented nothing more than his statements at the hearing to support

these claims. The circuit court was under no duty to find evidence to support Haralson’s

claims. And on post-conviction matters, the petitioner bears the burden of proving he is

entitled to relief and must provide proof beyond mere assertions in his brief. Fluker v. State,

334 So. 3d 160, 162 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

¶12. To the extent that Haralson claims he is due to serve less than five years because of

“earned time” programs, the application of those credits falls under MDOC’s purview, not

the circuit court. See Easterling v. State, 283 So. 3d 1198, 1200 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

If Haralson is claiming that his two years on PRS should count toward time served, this Court

has already rejected similar claims. See Fluker v. State, 2 So. 3d 717, 719 (¶9) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2008); Hicks v. State, 185 So. 3d 426, 428 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). The circuit

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Haralson does not challenge the circuit court’s finding at his revocation hearing that
he had absconded from supervision, which is supported by Haralson’s statements at the
hearing and Officer Kitchens’s testimony.

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court’s order stated that Haralson was to serve the remainder of his original sentence; it is up

to MDOC to determine the remainder.

CONCLUSION

¶13. Because Haralson did not report to his probation officer for more than six months—a

finding he does not challenge—his probationary status was revoked, and he was ordered to

serve the remainder of his original ten-year sentence. His total sentence does not exceed ten

years and is not otherwise illegal. Haralson was not entitled to post-conviction relief.

¶14. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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