Alvin Johnson, Sr. v. Anna Johnson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2021-CA-01080-COA

CONSOLIDATED WITH

NO. 2018-CA-01416-COA

ALVIN JOHNSON, SR. APPELLANT

v.

ANNA JOHNSON APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/27/2021
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DENISE OWENS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARK A. CHINN
JANEAH RAY SAKALAUKUS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: FELECIA PERKINS
JESSICA NICOLE AYERS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
RENDERED IN PART - 04/18/2023
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.

GREENLEE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This matter was previously before this Court in appellate case number 2018-CA-

01416-COA. We affirmed the irreconcilable differences divorce of Anna and Alvin Johnson

and other issues but reversed and remanded the case for the chancery court to apply the

Ferguson factors to its provision for equitable distribution and for any award of lump-sum
alimony.1 Johnson v. Johnson, 297 So. 3d 342 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). On remand, the

chancery court applied the factors and awarded Alvin possession and ownership of the

marital domicile. The court required Alvin to pay Anna 45% of his military pension

retroactive to the chancery court’s 2018 order. The chancery court ordered Alvin to pay an

additional $67,685 in lump-sum alimony as part of the equitable distribution. The chancery

court also awarded Anna 45% of Alvin’s military survivors benefits.

¶2. On appeal, Alvin alleges that (1) the chancery court erred by awarding Anna lump-

sum alimony, (2) the chancery court erred by awarding Anna 45% of his military pension,

and (3) the chancery court did not have the authority to retroactively award Anna 45% of

Alvin’s military pension. We affirm the chancery court’s rulings as to these issues; however,

we reverse and render the percentage of Alvin’s survivors benefits awarded to Anna.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. The facts and procedural history of this case are found in our previous opinion in

Johnson, 297 So. 3d at 343-45 (¶¶2-10):

Alvin and Anna met in 1990 and married in 1992. Anna resided in
Alvin’s home from 1990 until they were officially divorced in 2018. At the
time of marriage, Alvin and Anna worked at the Delphi Packard Electric plant.
Alvin retired from the plant in 2006 after thirty-one years of service. Anna
continued to work there until the plant closed in 2009. Alvin and Anna had
two children during their marriage, but Alvin also had four children prior to
their marriage.

Alvin opened a joint checking account with his mother in 1976. Anna
was added to that account sometime after they married in 1992. With this
account, Alvin purchased his first home at the age of twenty-four and owned
the home for approximately eleven years prior to his marriage. The home was

1
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).

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refinanced shortly after Alvin and Anna’s marriage. The refinance resulted in
a ten-year mortgage, which was paid off using the joint checking account.
Improvements made to the home also were paid from the joint checking
account, but it is disputed how much each individual paid for the additions to
the home. The parties also dispute the amount paid by each individual
regarding the home’s general upkeep.

In 2004, Alvin’s brother purchased a rental home near Alvin and Anna's
marital home. Two years after that, Alvin’s brother executed a quitclaim deed
conveying the rental home to himself and Alvin. The chancellor found, but the
parties dispute, that Alvin used marital funds to make repairs to the rental
home and pay for its upkeep. Alvin concedes that he received rental income
from the property in 2013 and 2014.

In addition to these two homes, Alvin and Anna possess various
retirement accounts. Both Alvin and Anna received a severance and pension
after they departed from Delphi Electric Packard. Alvin also receives military
benefits from his time spent in the National Guard. He also has an additional
401(k) plan that he claims he started in 1981, and he receives a second pension
from time spent working at General Motors (before his marriage). Anna has
an individual retirement account, which she rolled over from her personal
savings after she left Delphi Packard Electric. After the plant’s closure, Anna
started to work for the Department of Public Safety and accumulated funds in
a Public Employment Retirement System account. In 2014, Anna moved from
her position with the State and began working at the Nissan plant. At Nissan,
Anna accumulates funds into a 401(k) plan.

Alvin and Anna separated in 2013. Alvin claims that Anna was the
cause of the separation. He accuses Anna of having an affair.

In 2014, Alvin’s family friend passed away. The friend named Alvin as
her personal representative and left a portion of her estate to him. The parties
also dispute the assets that Alvin acquired as a result of that estate.

On September 6, 2016, Anna filed a complaint for divorce with a
request for temporary relief. Alvin answered and counterclaimed for divorce
on the grounds of adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. In the
alternative, Alvin requested a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable
differences. The chancery court held a hearing on October 18, 2016, to
determine whether Anna was entitled to temporary relief as she sought
exclusive use and possession of the marital home, temporary child support, and
child custody. A temporary order was entered on August 29, 2017.

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On May 2, 2018, Alvin and Anna filed a “Joint Motion And Consent
To Trial And Divorce On The Ground of Irreconcilable Differences” pursuant
to Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3) (Rev. 2013). The chancellor
thereafter signed an order granting that motion on May 3, 2018. In the motion,
the parties stipulated to the division of various personal properties. They also
submitted the following issues to the court for its determination: (1) “the
disposition of the marital domicile”; (2) “the value of the marital domicile”;
(3) “the percentage of equity . . . awarded to each party from the marital
domicile”; (4) “should both parties continue to reside in the marital domicile
until it is sold”; (5) “whether the rental home is a marital asset”; (6) “the value
of the rental home”; (7) “the disposition of the rental home and what
percentage of equity awarded to each party”; (8) “the division of the parties’
pensions and retirement accounts, including Alvin’s military benefits”; (9)
“whether Anna is entitled to Alvin’s military survivors’ benefits”; (10)
“whether Alvin owes Anna for their daughter’s educational costs”; (11)
alimony, if any; (12) attorney’s fees; and (13) rights to a laptop.

The trial began on May 3, 2018. At trial, the chancery court noted that
two “additional stipulations” were reached by the parties. The first concerned
the value of the marital home (issue 2), which the parties “agreed to stipulate”
was valued at $130,000. The second stipulation regarded educational costs
owed by Alvin (issue 10). In that stipulation, the parties “agreed” that Alvin
would pay $20,000 to Anna for their daughter’s educational costs. The parties
re-appeared on May 14, 2018, and again via telephonic conference on June 12,
2018. On July 9, 2018, the chancellor entered an order distributing the marital
estate. Alvin then timely filed a motion to amend the judgment or for a new
trial, and Anna filed a motion for clarification. As a result, the chancery court
entered a second order on September 28, 2018, amending its July 9 order.

(Paragraph numbering omitted). Alvin appealed the September 2018 order. Id. This Court

affirmed the chancery court in part and reversed and remanded in part, remanding for the

chancellor to conduct a Ferguson analysis on the issues submitted for equitable distribution

and address the question of lump-sum alimony. Id. at 347, 349 (¶¶18, 28).

¶4. On remand, the chancery court ordered three modifications on December 7, 2020;

May 6, 2021; and August 27, 2021. In the December 7 order, the chancery court made its

findings under Ferguson for the issues submitted for equitable distribution:

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(1) The Disposition of the Marital Domicile

¶5. The chancery court found that the marital domicile was a marital asset. The house and

its upkeep were paid for by Alvin and Anna’s joint checking account. Both parties lived in

the home for twenty-eight years with their children. Anna made direct economic

contributions to the acquisition of the house through money she put into the joint checking

account. However, when she left the marital home to live with her mother, her desire to

retain the domicile was put in question. Accordingly, the chancery court found that Anna

was due equity in the home but Alvin would retain use, possession, and ownership of the

home. Anna was to convey her interest to Alvin after Alvin’s payment of the amounts

awarded to her in the order.

(2) Value of the Marital Domicile

¶6. The chancery court determined that the market value of the marital domicile was

$130,000. Though finding that both Alvin and Anna had significant emotional value in the

home, the court found that Alvin had the greater claim as it was his first home that he

purchased as a young adult and that he lived there for thirty-seven years after its purchase.

The chancery court awarded him possession and use of the domicile.

(3) Percentage of Equity Awarded to Each Party from the Marital
Domicile

¶7. The chancery court determined that Alvin should retain more equity in the home than

Anna because he lived in the home alone for nine years. Accordingly, the chancery court

found that Alvin shall retain $30,919 of the equity. That left $99,081 remaining to be divided

between the two parties. Therefore, the chancery court found Alvin owes Anna her equity

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share of $49,540.50.

(4) Domicile, Utilities, and Other Household Bills

¶8. The chancery court stated that the domicile shall not be sold. Anna was ordered to

vacate the home “as soon as practicable after entry of this amended judgment.” All bills,

utilities, and other expenses would be Alvin’s sole responsibility once Anna vacated the

domicile.

(5) Rental House as a Marital Asset

¶9. The chancery court found that the rental house was a marital asset. Alvin owned one-

half of the rental with his brother and was responsible for the upkeep of the rental. He made

repairs and used marital funds to do so. Anna made indirect economic contributions to

acquire the property. Therefore, the court granted Anna one-half of Alvin’s one-half share,

or one-fourth of the value of the rental house.

(6) Value of Rental House

¶10. The chancery court determined the market value of the rental house as $93,500.

(7) Disposition of the Rental House and Percentage of Equity Awarded
to Each Party

¶11. The chancery court found that Anna was entitled to receive $23,375 as one-fourth of

the total market value of the house.

(8) Division of the Parties’ Pensions and Retirement Accounts

¶12. The chancery court denied both parties an interest in the other’s 401(k) retirement

plans. “Neither party presented sufficient evidence to establish how much was contributed

to Alvin’s pension and retirement prior to the marriage (a time period of approximately nine

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(9) years).” The court also found that Alvin was eight years older than Anna and suffered

from several medical conditions that do not allow him to work. Meanwhile, the court noted

that Anna is still employed and earning $73,000 per year while contributing to her retirement.

¶13. However, the chancery court did determine that Anna was entitled to 45% of Alvin’s

military pension. The chancery court found that Anna had been the steward of the home and

caretaker for the children for twenty-five out of twenty-eight years of Alvin’s service. That

twenty-five years amounted to 89.29% of his time in service. The chancery court found that

Anna was entitled to half of 89.29%, being 44.65%, which the chancery court rounded up

to 45%. Alvin was ordered to sign whatever documentation necessary to ensure Anna

received 45% of his military pension.

(9) Alvin’s Military Survivors Benefits

¶14. The chancery court found that Anna is entitled to 45% of the 55% of the annuity

payable upon Alvin’s death. The chancery court ordered the remaining 10% shall go to

Alvin’s current designated beneficiary, his sister. Alvin was ordered to continue to elect the

survivors benefit plan that pays 55% of his annuity base amount. Alvin was ordered to sign

whatever documentation was necessary to ensure this happened.

(10) Ashley Johnson’s Educational Costs

¶15. The parties stipulated that Alvin pay $20,000 toward their daughter Ashley’s

educational costs and this Court previously upheld the stipulation. Johnson, 297 So. 3d at

349 (¶25).

(11) Alimony

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¶16. The chancery court found that neither party was entitled to alimony. During the trial,

the chancellor stated, “[t]he [c]ourt is denying alimony. There was a request. Each party

requested the other pay alimony. Based on their separate estates and their work history, the

[c]ourt would deny alimony.” The chancery court clarified this finding in its May 6 order by

stating that neither party is entitled to periodic, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony.

(12) Attorney’s Fees

¶17. The chancery court determined both parties are responsible for their own attorney’s

fees.

(13) Anna’s Laptop

¶18. The chancery court found that Alvin made an inter vivos gift of the laptop to Anna,

meaning it is not subject to distribution under Ferguson. Anna had possession of the laptop.

Therefore, the chancery court found that Anna shall retain possession and ownership of the

laptop.

¶19. Alvin filed his “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for a New Trial” in December

2020. After Anna filed her response, the court entered another order on May 6, 2021,

clarifying its ruling and denying Alvin’s request for a new trial. In this order, the chancery

court included an additional award of $67,685 of lump-sum alimony to Anna to address the

disparities in the parties’ total estates. Anna filed a motion asking for reconsideration or

clarification of the May 6 order, to which Alvin responded. The chancery court entered its

final order on August 27, 2021, clarifying the May 6, 2021 order. In addition, this order

awarded Anna the 45% of Alvin’s military pension retroactive to the date of the original

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order in September 2018. Alvin appealed. Subsequently, Alvin filed a motion to consolidate

this appeal with his previous one in appellate case number 2018-CA-01416-COA for record

purposes, as the financial statements in the previous record are integral to the chancery

court’s final judgment, which is the subject of the new appeal. The Mississippi Supreme

Court granted the motion consolidating the two appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶20. “It is well settled that appellate courts are bound by a limited standard of review in

domestic-relations matters.” White v. White, 208 So. 3d 587, 592 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.

2016). “This Court will not disturb the chancellor’s opinion when supported by substantial

evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly

erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Stroh v. Stroh, 221 So. 3d 399, 406

(¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). However, we review questions of law de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Lump-Sum Alimony

¶21. Alvin alleges that the chancery court committed reversible error by awarding Anna

an additional $67,685 in lump sum alimony as part of the property distribution. Specifically,

he argues that the chancery court should have made the determination under an Armstrong

analysis instead of Ferguson.2 Furthermore, he argues that the court erred by determining

that there was a disparity between the estates following the equitable division of marital

assets.

2
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).

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¶22. “[T]he seminal Mississippi case regarding equitable division of marital property is

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).” Guy v. Guy, 736 So. 2d 1042,

1043 (¶7) (Miss. 1999). The non-exclusive list of factors in Ferguson includes:

(1) Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors
to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:

a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the
acquisition of the property;

b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital
and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time
spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and

c. Contribution to the education, training or other
accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse
accumulating the assets.

(2) The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn, or
otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets
by agreement, decree, or otherwise

(3) The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to
distribution.

(4) The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the
contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage
by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to
an individual spouse;

(5) Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal
consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;

(6) The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties,
be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future
friction between the parties;

(7) The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the
combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and

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(8) Any other factor which in equity should be considered.

Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928. “If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably

divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson

factors.” Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (¶34) (Miss. 2014). “However, if

the alimony, lump-sum or otherwise, is awarded subsequent to the equitable distribution of

the marital assets, then chancellors must conduct their analysis under the Armstrong factors.”

Id.

¶23. The chancery court explained in its May 6 order that it used “lump sum alimony” as

a tool to assist in the distribution of the marital assets. Alvin’s individual retirement,

checking, and savings accounts were much greater than Anna’s accounts, with Alvin’s total

assets equaling about $576,000, and Anna’s total assets equaling about $294,400. In

addition, Alvin was granted ownership and possession of the marital domicile while Anna

was awarded her equity in the home and ordered to vacate. The chancery court took into

account that the marital property would likely hold or even increase in value, while Alvin

would get the benefit of using the property as he sees fit. Alvin specifically requested to

retain ownership of the home, and the chancery court granted it, in part, because of Alvin’s

sentimental value in the property. We find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to

support the chancery court’s decision on this issue.

¶24. Alvin argues that the chancery court did not use lump-sum alimony as a tool for

equitable distribution but rather as an award of genuine alimony. This claim rests on the

contention that the award was subsequent to the property distribution. Yet, upon review,

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such is not the case. A typical award of alimony comes after the estate has been equitably

divided and one party has a deficit. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.

1994). The chancery court awarded the additional $67,685 in the same order as the division

of property using the Ferguson factors, prior to finishing its balancing of the parties’ total

estates. According to the chancery court, the additional award of $67,685 was necessary to

make the distribution equitable.

¶25. The chancery court could have approached this balancing in a different way. For

instance, the court could have ordered the sale of the home and awarded Anna the $67,685

out of those funds. It is accepted practice, however, to use lump-sum alimony in the

equitable division of a marital estate. Davenport, 156 So. 3d at 241 (¶34). Because this

award was a part of the equitable distribution, the chancery court was not required to address

the Armstrong factors in its decision. Id. Furthermore, there was no need to find a disparity

between the estates in the way that Alvin argues. Alvin’s citations all deal with genuine

alimony, while the lump-sum alimony in question is properly analyzed under Ferguson and

other equitable distribution caselaw.

¶26. We find that the chancery court properly awarded the additional $67,685 in lump-sum

alimony as a tool in the equitable distribution of property. Therefore, an Armstrong analysis

was not necessary. Accordingly, we do not find that the chancery court committed reversible

error on this issue.

II. Military Pension

¶27. Alvin argues that the chancery court erred by awarding Anna 45% of his military

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pension. Specifically, he claims the record does not support the finding that Anna was

entitled to a share as a steward of the family home and that the award was inequitable.

Finally, he claims the chancery court did not have the authority to retroactively award Anna

the military pension to the date of the original order in September 2018.

¶28. “Assets acquired or accumulated during the course of a marriage are subject to

equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of

the parties’ separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage.” Hemsley v.

Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss. 1994). “The chancery court’s authority to divide

marital assets is born from principles of fairness which are rooted in the court’s inherent

powers of equity.” Black v. Black, 741 So. 2d 299, 301 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing

Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 927).

¶29. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the chancery court’s decision to

award Anna a portion of the military pension. The chancery court found that Anna was a

steward of the family home and caretaker of their children while Alvin was serving in the

military and that Anna was married to Alvin for twenty-five of the twenty-eight years of

Alvin’s service. Alvin argues that this finding is unsupported by the record because the

chancery court also found that both parties were full-time workers and equally shared the

family duties. However, this one finding does not negate the other. Property is presumed

to be marital, and the burden of rebutting the presumption rests with the spouse claiming the

property is non-marital. Brown v. Brown, 350 So. 3d 1169, 1178-79 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App.

2022). Alvin offers no evidence to rebut the presumption that this asset is a marital one.

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Therefore the chancery court did not commit manifest error in classifying Alvin’s military

pension as a marital asset.

¶30. On appeal, Alvin’s main argument is that the record, as construed as a whole, does not

support the chancery court’s decision to award Anna 45% of Alvin’s military pension. He

compares the facts in his case to Love v. Love, 687 So. 2d 1229, 1232 (Miss. 1997), and King

v. King, 130 So. 3d 166, 168 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). In Love, the Mississippi Supreme

Court affirmed the chancery court when it did not award an equal share in the parties’

retirement accounts, leaving one party with his retirement accounts untouched. Love, 687

So. 2d at 1232. Likewise, in King, this Court affirmed a chancery court decision that failed

to award one party with a share of the other’s military pension. King, 130 So. 3d at 168 (¶5).

¶31. The impact from both cases, as it relates to our present case, is that the respective

chancery courts applied the Ferguson factors and had substantial evidence to support their

conclusions. While the record in the present case may have supported a decision more

favorable to Alvin, our standard of review is limited. “This Court will not substitute its

judgment for that of the chancellor ‘[e]ven if this Court disagree[s] with the lower court on

the finding of fact and might arrive at a different conclusion.’” Owen v. Owen, 798 So. 2d

394, 397-98 (¶10) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Riley, 355 So. 2d 667, 668 (Miss.

1978)). The chancery court had evidence to support its award and applied the Ferguson

factors, even awarding Anna less than 50% of Alvin’s military pension to address the years

Alvin was serving before he was married to Anna. We find that the chancery court did not

abuse its discretion by awarding Anna 45% of Alvin’s military pension.

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¶32. Finally, Alvin contends that the chancery court had no authority to retroactively award

Anna the 45% of Alvin’s military pension to the date of the first order in September 2018.

Alvin provides no caselaw to support his position. He improperly includes one citation that

allegedly deals with a retroactive award of child support and alimony in the context of a

“serious financial hardship.” That case resulted in a supreme court opinion that issued in

August 1998 but was not designated for publication, and “[o]pinions in cases decided prior

to [November 1, 1998,] which have not been designated for publication shall not be cited,

quoted or referred to by any court or in any . . . brief . . . .” M.R.A.P. 35-A(b) & cmt.

Nonetheless, the record here does not support the contention that Alvin is suffering from

“serious financial hardship.” While we have found no case that specifically deals with

retroactive awards for division of assets, there is precedent for awards of alimony that are

retroactive to the original divorce decree. Monroe v. Monroe, 745 So. 2d 249, 253 (¶16)

(Miss. 1999); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 12 So. 3d 572, 576 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)

(finding that a chancellor has the authority to decide to terminate alimony retroactive to the

date the party filed his petition). Therefore, we find that the chancery court did not abuse its

discretion by retroactively awarding Anna 45% of Alvin’s military pension to the original

order in September 2018.

III. Military Survivors Benefits

¶33. Though not one briefed by either Alvin or Anna, this Court finds a mistake in the

chancery court’s award of survivors benefits through the military’s Survivor Benefits

Program. The court awarded Anna “forty-five percent (45%) of the fifty-five percent (55%)

15
of the annuity payable upon Alvin’s death,” known as military survivors benefits. However,

the chancery court then stated “the remaining 10% of Alvin’s annuity” would be payable to

Alvin’s other designated beneficiary, his sister. Based on the language and analysis of the

chancery court, awarding 10% to the designated beneficiary would be incorrect. Although

unexplained, it apparently is the product of subtracting 45% from 55%. That does not

comport with the chancery court’s analysis and logic used in making that determination.

Therefore, we reverse and render on this issue, awarding Anna 45% of the 55% survivors

benefits (or 24.75% of the total), therefore leaving the remaining 55% of the 55% survivors

benefits (30.25% of the total) available to Alvin’s other designated beneficiaries.

CONCLUSION

¶34. The chancery court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Anna the lump-sum

alimony or 45% of Alvin’s military pension retroactive to the September 2018 order. The

chancery court properly addressed the issues following the Ferguson factors, and there was

substantial evidence in the record to support its findings. The lump-sum alimony award was

properly awarded using Ferguson as a method of equitable distribution rather than genuine

alimony. Finally, the chancery court had the authority to retroactively award Anna 45% of

Alvin’s military pension. Therefore, we affirm the chancery court’s order in part, but we

reverse and render the order in part as to the percentage of military survivors benefits to

Anna.

¶35. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

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