Carlos Roncali a/k/a Carlos James Roncali v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-KA-00173-COA

CARLOS RONCALI A/K/A CARLOS JAMES APPELLANT
RONCALI

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/20/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARK SHELDON DUNCAN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: ZAKIA BUTLER CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: STEVEN SIMEON KILGORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 02/20/2025
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In the Circuit Court of Newton County, Mississippi, Carlos Roncali (Roncali) was

convicted of capital murder for the death of his wife, Marian Chaney Roncali (Marian). He

was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections without the eligibility of parole. Roncali appeals his conviction

and sentence. As discussed below, after our review of the issues presented, we reverse and

remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the morning of Sunday, September 6, 2020, Investigator Freddie Gentry of the
Newton County Sheriff’s Office responded to a dispatch call regarding a female victim,

Marian, who had been found deceased in her home in Newton County. Marian and Roncali

lived in the home with their son, Elijah (Eli), and Roncali’s parents, James and Sherry

Roncali. Investigator Gentry learned that foul play—possibly murder—was suspected.

¶3. When Investigator Gentry arrived at the Roncali residence, first responders and other

officers were already on the scene. Eli, James, and Sherry Roncali were also at the house.

As Investigator Gentry approached the residence, he observed Roncali standing outside the

front door. Investigator Gentry explained that he knew both Marian and Roncali from

growing up in the same area. Investigator Gentry testified that he greeted Roncali, but

Roncali did not respond and seemed “kind of like he was out of it.”

¶4. When Investigator Gentry entered the house, he saw Marian’s body lying just inside

the front door. Investigator Gentry testified that Marian appeared to have bruises on her face,

arms, and legs. Upon seeing her body, Investigator Gentry walked back outside and asked

a deputy to detain Roncali as a person of interest. Investigator Gentry then went back inside

the house and photographed Marian’s body as well as other evidence inside the house. These

photographs were admitted into evidence at trial.

¶5. Investigator Gentry testified that when he entered Marian and Roncali’s bedroom, he

observed evidence indicating that a fight or disturbance had occurred. He also saw blood on

the floor, three cut zip ties, and a cell phone charger cord tied in a knot. Investigator Gentry

further testified that upon closer inspection of Marian’s body, he noticed ligature marks on

her wrists and ankles that were consistent with the zip ties he found in her bedroom. He also

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testified that Marian had bruising around both of her eyes and down the side of her face,

nose, and lips.

¶6. Because of Marian’s prior service as a police dispatcher, Investigator Gentry called

the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation (MBI) to assist in the investigation. Three MBI

officers, including Lieutenant Brad Edmondson, arrived at the scene and took the lead on the

investigation.

¶7. Lieutenant Edmondson testified that upon observing Marian’s body, he noted that her

clothing was disturbed and that her shirt was rolled up her back. He also saw numerous

bruises along her arms, legs, and face, with injuries to her nose, lip, cheek, and forehead.

Lieutenant Edmondson testified that the zip ties found inside Roncali and Marian’s bedroom

seemed to have made the marks on Marian’s wrists and ankles. Based on his observations

and the information he received from Investigator Gentry, Lieutenant Edmondson believed

that the case involved “a homicide and/or a kidnapping.”

¶8. Lieutenant Edmondson testified that by the time he arrived at the scene, Roncali had

been taken into custody. Because officers believed Roncali “may be impaired,” they detained

him for at least twenty-four hours to allow him to “sober up” prior to talking with

investigators.

¶9. Lieutenant Edmondson and MBI agent Rodney Williams met with Roncali at the

Newton County Sheriff’s Office. After waiving his Miranda1 rights, Roncali submitted to

a nearly two-hour interview with the MBI officers. Roncali was indicted in September 2021

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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for the capital murder of Marian, with the underlying felony of kidnapping.

¶10. Roncali’s trial was held in December 2022. At trial, the jury heard testimony from

Investigator Gentry; Lieutenant Edmondson; Eli; John Thompson, the Roncalis’ neighbor;

Dr. Mark LeVaughn, a forensic pathologist; and Dr. Chris Long, a toxicologist. The trial

court admitted the recording of Roncali’s interview with the MBI officers into evidence, and

the entire recording was played for the jury.

¶11. During the interview, Roncali initially denied having any issues or fights with Marian

in the days leading up to her death. Roncali stated that he woke up early on Friday or

Saturday morning2 and went outside. When he returned to the house, he noticed that his and

Marian’s bedroom was destroyed. Roncali claimed that Marian was “hollering” and

throwing items around the room, and he could not calm her down.

¶12. When the officers asked Roncali why Marian was hollering, Roncali launched into

a lengthy discussion about their twenty-year marriage. Roncali described Marian as his

“right hand man” and stated that they took care of each other. Unprompted, Roncali

mentioned that he had previously served a five-year jail sentence for having a cell phone in

jail. Roncali stated that upon his release, he discovered that Marian had been unfaithful to

him while he was incarcerated. Roncali claimed that Marian had cheated on him with at least

twenty people, one of whom was JoJo Logan, the son of Marian’s employer. Roncali said

that they tried to move past it, but just before Marian died, he suspected that she had cheated

again, and he questioned her about it. Marian admitted to Roncali that she had been

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Roncali told investigators that the events occurred on Saturday and then later
corrected himself and said they occurred on Friday.

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unfaithful. Roncali told the investigators that he “lost his shit” when he found out she was

cheating.

¶13. The officers asked Roncali about a prior incident of domestic abuse that resulted in

an injury to Marian’s spleen. Roncali initially stated that Marian told him she fell at a store.

Upon further questioning, Roncali eventually told the officers that “many years ago,” he had

a bad headache, and Marian came over and shook him. In response, Roncali hit Marian,

which resulted in an injury to her spleen. Roncali clarified that the incident occurred twenty

years ago.

¶14. During his interview, Roncali repeatedly told the officers that he would not kill his

wife, and he denied hitting or hurting Marian. However, Roncali eventually admitted that

he and Marian had used methamphetamine on the weekend she died. Roncali explained that

he became hooked on methamphetamine decades ago, but he hid it from Marian for a long

time. Eventually, he and Marian started using methamphetamine together. On the weekend

of Marian’s death, Roncali explained that he “fixed [Marian’s] needle” for her because that

was their typical routine when ingesting methamphetamine. Roncali stated that he and

Marian took the same “hit” of methamphetamine.

¶15. Roncali described Marian’s initial behavior after ingesting methamphetamine on the

Friday before her death as “crazy.” Roncali admitted to tying Marian up, but he repeatedly

claimed that he only did it so she would quit hurting herself. Roncali initially denied hitting

Marian while she was tied up, but he eventually admitted to hitting her in an attempt to get

her to settle down. Roncali also stated that he “smacked” her when she called out the names

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of men with whom she had been unfaithful. Roncali stated that when Marian continued to

call out the names, he gagged her with a bandana.

¶16. Roncali described Marian’s condition later that weekend as “out of it.” Roncali stated

that he put cold water on Marian on Saturday to “see if she’d come back right.” On Sunday,

he put her in the bathtub to see if that would help improve her condition. Roncali said that

after he bathed Marian, he and his son, Eli, took her into the living room where Roncali lay

on the couch, and Marian lay on the floor. Roncali admitted that he and Eli had to help

Marian move around. Roncali told officers that Marian had reacted to methamphetamine in

a similar way one other time, but he stated that Marian might have had a reaction to her

medication.

¶17. Roncali admitted that during the entire weekend, he never called 911. Roncali

claimed that he told Eli to call 911, but Roncali later admitted he had not wanted anyone to

call 911 because of the “pills and stuff” he had inside the house. Roncali told the officers

that he tried to call his niece who worked as an EMT, but she did not answer his call.

Roncali stated that Eli eventually called 911 on Sunday while Roncali was asleep. Roncali

claimed Marian had been awake and talking just before he fell asleep. Roncali told officers

that the “only thing [he] did wrong [that weekend] was tie her up.”

¶18. Eli was nineteen years old at the time of Marian’s death.3 Eli testified that for the two

years preceding his mother’s death, he, his brother, and his parents lived with Roncali’s

3
Due to his age, Investigator Gentry arranged for Eli to be interviewed by a juvenile
forensic interviewer. Investigator Gentry and Lieutenant Edmondson attended the interview.
This interview was not offered into evidence.

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parents in Newton County. Eli testified that he was at home on the weekend Marian died.

Eli stated that on Friday evening, both Marian and Roncali seemed “a little off,” describing

them as “hyper” and “excited” but still able to hold a conversation. Eli testified that he had

seen his parents behave in this manner on prior occasions.

¶19. Eli fell asleep at around 9 or 10 p.m. on Friday, and the next morning, his grandmother

(Sherry) woke him up and told him that something was wrong with Marian. When Eli woke

up, he heard his mother yelling and talking loudly. Eli went into his parents’ bedroom to see

what was happening. When he walked in, he observed that their room was in disarray,

explaining that he saw clothes, broken lamps, and glass on the floor. Eli testified that Marian

was on the floor, naked, and Roncali was on top of her, holding her down. According to Eli,

Marian was making noises and trying to talk, but she was not making sense. Eli testified that

Marian kept saying, “You want to know something?” and then she listed off the names:

“Carlos, Ms. Mary, JoJo.” Eli described Marian as “in a trance,” but Roncali was in the same

“excited” state he had been in on Friday night. Eli testified that his mother could not

recognize him, and she remained in the same incoherent state throughout the day on

Saturday.

¶20. Eli noticed that Marian had bruises “all over her [body]—head, arms, legs, chest, stuff

like that. All over.” Eli testified that Roncali also had scratches on his face, arms, and legs.

Roncali told Eli that Marian got the bruises from “hitting the floor.” Eli testified that while

he was in his parents’ room, Marian kept throwing her legs up in the air and dropping them

down on her heels.

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¶21. Eli testified that when he saw his mother’s condition, he asked Roncali if he could call

911. Roncali responded, “I don’t know,” and just stood there looking at Marian as if he were

trying to assess what was happening. Eli later clarified that Roncali “didn’t want to call”

911. Eli testified that he and Roncali stayed with his mother for a while, and then Roncali

left. Eli stated that Sherry also approached Roncali and asked him what to do, not

understanding what was going on.

¶22. Roncali eventually returned to the bedroom with zip ties. Roncali told Eli that he did

not want Marian to hurt herself, so he planned to tie her arms together. Eli testified that he

tried to comfort Marian by holding her head while Roncali bound her arms and legs. Roncali

ultimately hog-tied Marian, and Eli testified that Marian remained tied up for approximately

two hours. Eli testified that during this time, Marian was naked but covered with a blanket.

¶23. Eli told the jury that Marian never asked to be untied. Eli observed that Marian was

dirty from being on the floor, so he eventually asked Roncali if he could untie her so that

Marian could shower. Eli testified he was also concerned that the zip ties were too tight

because they caused “markings” to form on Marian’s body. Eli testified that Roncali agreed

to undo the zip ties, and Roncali cut them off with scissors. Roncali and Eli then took

Marian outside and used a hose to wash her. Roncali then took Marian to the shed behind

the house, and Eli brought out clothes for her to put on. Roncali and Eli then helped Marian

back into the house, and they sat her on a chair in the living room. Eli stated that Marian

could not walk by herself, so he and Roncali helped her move around the house.

¶24. Eli testified that he thought Marian was the most comfortable in the living room, so

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she remained there for most of Saturday afternoon. Eli testified that the Roncalis’ neighbor

John came over to the house on Saturday afternoon for a few hours. Eli observed that over

the course of the day, Marian’s bruises became more pronounced. Eli testified that he tried

to give his mother something to drink throughout the day, but she would not drink anything.

Eli fell asleep around 11 p.m. on Saturday night, and he testified that he did not hear any

disturbances during the night.

¶25. On Sunday morning, Eli woke up around 6 or 7 a.m. and found Marian in her room

again. Eli testified that Roncali had straightened up the bedroom on Saturday night, but

when Eli went into the room on Sunday morning, the room was in a state of disarray again.

Eli testified that his mother was still moaning, and she was lying on the floor again like she

had been the previous morning. Marian had clothes on, but they were disheveled. Eli

testified that in addition to the bruises on Marian’s arms, legs, and face, he also observed a

little bit of blood on her. Eli testified that Marian still did not appear to recognize him.

¶26. Eli asked Roncali again about calling 911, but Roncali told Eli that he wanted to “get

the room right.” Eli then asked his grandparents about calling 911, and they responded that

Roncali might go back to jail if they called.

¶27. Eli suggested that they give Marian another shower. Roncali agreed, so he and Eli

helped Marian into the bathroom, where Roncali cleaned and washed her. Eli testified that

Roncali kept Marian’s clothes on her while he gave her a shower. After this second shower,

Roncali carried Marian into the living room and laid her on the floor. Roncali lay on the

couch and fell asleep. Eli testified that at this point, Marian was still unable to walk on her

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own. Eli went to his room for about fifteen to twenty minutes. When he could not hear any

noise in the living room, he went to check on his mother. Eli realized Marian was not

moving or breathing. Eli testified that he tried to wake Roncali, and when Roncali would not

wake up, Eli ran to their neighbor John Thompson’s house and called 911.

¶28. Eli also testified about his parents’ relationship, describing it as “good at times, bad

at others.” Eli stated that he had witnessed Roncali physically abuse Marian a few times in

the past and that Marian would get bruises from the abuse. Eli testified that the most recent

incident of physical abuse occurred a few months prior to Marian’s death. As for the bruises

on Marian’s body from the weekend of her death, Eli testified that it did not appear that

Marian had caused the bruises herself.

¶29. John testified that he had been at the Roncalis’ home on Saturday afternoon for a

couple of hours. John testified that when he saw Marian that day, Marian was “acting weird

. . . like she was high on something.” John described Marian’s behavior as “obnoxious” and

“erratic.” John testified that other than her being high, he did not observe any signs that

Marian was in medical distress. However, John later testified that he had been concerned

about Marian and wanted to call 911. John explained that his cell phone did not work, and

he did not know that he could still use it to call 911. John testified that no one prevented him

from calling 911. John also testified that while he was at the Roncali residence, Marian was

not tied up, and he saw no indication that she was not allowed to leave. John further stated

that he did not see Roncali hit Marian, and he did not observe any bruises on her. However,

John told the jury that he regretted not calling 911 that evening.

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¶30. Dr. Mark LeVaughn, a forensic pathologist, performed Marian’s autopsy on

September 17, 2020. Dr. LeVaughn testified that Marian suffered multiple blunt injuries or

bruises on her body, with internal bruising on her scalp on the right side of her head. Marian

also had pressure indentions and ligature marks that encircled her arms and legs, indicating

that she had been bound. Dr. LeVaughn observed two distinct abrasions between the ligature

marks on Marian’s left ankle, and he testified the abrasions looked like they were caused by

a fingernail. Dr. LeVaughn stated that these fingernail abrasions would have occurred near

the time of death. He testified that none of Marian’s blunt injuries caused her death.

¶31. Dr. LeVaughn also testified that he did not observe any evidence of disease in

Marian’s organs. A toxicology analysis of Marian’s blood revealed the presence of several

compounds: caffeine, Gabapentin, and Diphenhydramine (Benadryl) within normal ranges,

as well as methamphetamine and amphetamine, a break-down product of methamphetamine.

The reported level of methamphetamine in Marian’s blood at the time of her autopsy was 990

nanograms per milliliter. Dr. LeVaughn testified that in his opinion, this was a high level of

methamphetamine. Based on his autopsy and the results of Marian’s toxicology report, Dr.

LeVaughn concluded that Marian’s cause of death was a methamphetamine overdose.

¶32. Dr. LeVaughn testified that Marian’s manner of death was homicide. Dr. LeVaughn

explained that in reaching his conclusion as to Marian’s manner of death, he relied on

Marian’s autopsy and toxicology results, as well as information obtained throughout the

investigation. Dr. LeVaughn specified that he received information that zip ties were found

at the scene where Marian died and that someone else administered methamphetamine to

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Marian.

¶33. Dr. LeVaughn testified that although he performed the autopsy, another pathologist,

Dr. Erin Barnhart, wrote the autopsy report due to the backlog at the Medical Examiner’s

Office. Dr. LeVaughn noted that in Dr. Barnhart’s report, she opined that Marian’s cause

and manner of death were undetermined. Dr. LeVaughn explained that he reached a different

conclusion because the autopsy showed no natural disease and no lethal traumatic injury. He

also considered that the toxicology report showed a high level of methamphetamine, which

caused her death. Dr. LeVaughn testified that this evidence, coupled with the information

he received from the investigation, led him to conclude that Marian’s manner of death was

homicide.

¶34. Dr. Chris Long, an expert toxicologist, performed Marian’s toxicology analysis. Dr.

Long testified that the postmortem toxicology analysis of the blood that was taken from

Marian eight days after her death demonstrated 990 nanograms per milliliter with 83 or 87

nanograms of amphetamine. Dr. Long testified that the amphetamine amount showed that

the drug had been in her blood for a while, allowing for time to metabolize. Dr. Long

testified that generally, a single use of methamphetamine is one-tenth of a gram, and the

amount of methamphetamine in Marian’s blood was between three to four times that amount.

Dr. Long explained, however, that the amount of methamphetamine in Marian’s blood was

less than a lethal dose. Dr. Long stated that a lethal dose of methamphetamine would cause

a person to die anywhere from six to twelve hours after ingestion.

¶35. Dr. Long opined that based on the toxicology results and the amount of

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methamphetamine in her blood, Marian would have needed to consume additional

methamphetamine after Friday. Dr. Long testified that Marian “could have” ingested

additional methamphetamine within twelve or twenty-four hours of her death.

¶36. After the State rested its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict. After hearing

arguments, the trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict.

¶37. The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding Roncali guilty of capital murder. The

trial court sentenced Roncali to serve life imprisonment without eligibility for parole in the

custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

¶38. Roncali filed a post-trial motion to set aside the judgment of conviction and to order

a new trial, which the trial court denied upon finding sufficient evidence to convict and no

other errors. This appeal followed in which Roncali challenges the admission and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the refusal to strike a member of the jury.

ANALYSIS

Admission of Dr. Mark LeVaughn’s Testimony

¶39. At trial, Dr. Mark LeVaughn testified for the State as an expert in the field of forensic

science. Before and during Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony, Roncali objected to the trial court for

allowing Dr. LeVaughn to testify that in his opinion, the manner of death was homicide. On

appeal, Roncali first contends that the trial court erred by allowing this testimony.

¶40. The trial court acts “as gatekeeper on questions of admissibility of expert testimony.”

See Chisholm v. State, 365 So. 3d 229, 24 (¶43) (Miss. 2023). In discussing the trial court’s

role as “gatekeeper,” this Court recently described the process to be used to determine the

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admissibility of expert testimony at trial and the standard of review of an appellate court in

Howell v. State, No. 2023-KM-00265-COA, 2024 WL 3872637, at *4-5 (¶¶15-16) (Miss.

Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2024), reh’g denied (Jan. 7, 2025):

“This Court reviews the trial court’s admissibility determination for abuse of
discretion.” Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 295 (¶28) (Miss. 2014)
(citing Anderson v. State, 62 So. 3d 927, 936 (Miss. 2011)). “A trial judge’s
determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is
given the widest possible discretion and that decision will only be disturbed
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Denham v.
Holmes ex rel. Holmes, 60 So. 3d 773, 783 (¶34) (Miss. 2011)). Experts are
permitted to testify if

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is a product of reliable principles and
methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.

Queen v. State, 325 So. 3d 656, 661 (¶17) (Miss. 2021) (quoting MRE 702).
“This rule emphasizes that it is the gate-keeping responsibility of the trial
court to determine whether the expert testimony is relevant and reliable.”
Denham, 60 So. 3d at 784 (¶35) (citing MRE 702 cmt.).

“This Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court’s standard for
judging the admissibility of expert testimony.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brent, 133
So. 3d 760, 781 (¶50) (Miss. 2013) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-96 (1993)). It is the task of the trial court to make a
“preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Clark v. State, 315
So. 3d 987, 996 (¶17) (Miss. 2021) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93).
“Expert testimony admitted at trial must be based on scientific methods
and procedures, not on unsupported speculation or subjective belief.”

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Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. McDonald’s Corp., 41 So. 3d 670, 675 (¶16)
(Miss. 2010) (citing Miss. Dep’t of Mental Health v. Hall, 936 So. 2d 917,
928 (¶31) (Miss. 2006)).

(Emphasis added).

¶41. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury on Roncali’s objection to Dr. LeVaughn’s

testimony concerning the manner of death, Dr. LeVaughn testified that when speaking with

investigators in this case, he was “informed that the methamphetamine was administered to

her,” and he said that he relied upon that information in forming his opinion. He further

testified that when “homicide” was used to describe the manner of death in forensic cases,

it meant that the “person’s death results from the actions of another.” At the conclusion of

the hearing, the defense argued Dr. LeVaughn’s opinion that the death was “caused by

someone else’s actions [was] a leap that needs to be based on more than what has been said

so far.” The trial judge ruled as follows:

Apparently, there’s no way to tell – I don’t know how this methamphetamine
was placed into the body of the victim. I don’t know if it was taken orally,
injected or some other way. There’s been no testimony about that, and
apparently Dr. LeVaughn wasn’t able to tell because he hadn’t testified to it.
But it had to get inside of her somehow, and that’s where the outside
information comes relevant to whatever opinion that he’s going to reach. So
my opinion is that he’s perfectly entitled to form his opinion based on
everything that he knows about this case, whether it’s from his own personal
observation or information that he gained from other sources. So your
objection is overruled.

¶42. For purposes of this opinion, the relevant portions of Dr. LeVaughn’s subsequent

testimony on direct examination before the jury follow:

Q. Were you made aware of any facts in this case from investigators or
coroners or otherwise that help form your opinions?

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A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What were those?

Your Honor, an objection as to hearsay.

The Court: Overruled.

A. I don’t remember exactly the timing of the information but in coming
to my conclusion, the information from the coroner was relied upon,
certainly the autopsy findings and toxicology result. And then there’s
additional information that the methamphetamine was actually
administered to her by someone else, not her.

Q. Okay. Given the totality of all of this information, based on your
training, experience, the autopsy exam and all this information that was
provided, do you have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, as to the manner of death of Marian Roncali?

A. Yes, sir. I do.

Q. What is that opinion?

A. In my opinion, the manner of death of Marian Roncali is homicide. . . .

And below are portions of his testimony on cross examination:

Q. In your conclusion of – after you personally did the autopsy – you came
to the result that the meth overdose was the only thing that could have
caused her death; is that correct – within a reasonable degree of medical
certain[t]y?

A. Well, it wasn’t my conclusion after I did the autopsy because I didn’t
write the report. But aside from that, it is my conclusion, after
reviewing information, that the cause of death is methamphetamine
toxicity or overdose and manner of death is homicide.

Q. And was there any physical evidence that the autopsy unveiled that
suggested to you how the meth was ingested by the victim?

A. No, sir.

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Q. So you can’t tell us whether or not it was taken orally, smoked, injected
or snorted?

A. From the autopsy no.

Q. At the time of the autopsy, did you have the toxicologist report?

A. No. The toxicology report comes later once we obtain samples and
send them off to a laboratory, and there’s a turn around time – and it
varies on the workload – but roughly a month or two.

Q. And so whenever you were doing the autopsy, would you ordinarily
look for evidence or something like drug injection without having a
toxicologist report that said that was how it was?

A. Sure. We look at the skin. That’s part of the external exam. We look
at the skin of the entire body, and we look for any type of abnormality.

Q. Did you do any inquiry into the victim here’s past drug use, drug
history?

A. I did not. No.

Q. So you’ve concluded homicide, which in your word, means based on
the actions of another – death based on actions of another. How can
you conclude that in light of the fact that – the only thing we have is she
had, in your words, a lot of meth in her system. How can we say
definitively that she did not ingest this on her own?

A. Well, like I said, the way that was ingested, I can’t determine from the
autopsy. My opinion is based on the toxicology result, the autopsy
findings and results and the investigative information that someone
provided this to her.

¶43. Dr. LeVaughn did not identify the officer who told him that someone injected the

methamphetamine into the victim. Dr. LeVaughn did not know the basis upon which the

officer reached that conclusion, or if he did know, he did not provide that information to the

court. There was nothing about the post-mortem examination Dr. LeVaughn performed that

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supported or confirmed a finding that the methamphetamine was injected as opposed to

having been ingested. Dr. LeVaughn specifically testified that he found no injection sites on

the victim’s body. It is apparent that Dr. LeVaughn’s opinion that the manner of Marian’s

death was homicide is based primarily, if not totally, upon the unsubstantiated statement by

an unidentified investigator. In Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So. 3d 742, 751-52 (¶35) (Miss. 2011),

the supreme court stated:

This Court, however, has held that “the sufficiency of foundational facts
or evidence on which to base an opinion is a question of law.” Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31, 60 (Miss. 2004) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). As part of the trial court’s gatekeeping role, it must
“examine the reliability” of the expert’s opinion and must determine whether
the facts “afford a ‘reasonably accurate basis’ for the expert’s conclusion.” Id.
(citations omitted).

(Emphasis added).

¶44. We find that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. LeVaughn to testify

that the manner of death was homicide, in that the death resulted from the acts of a third

person injecting methamphetamine into the victim. The trial court, as a part of its

gatekeeping role, must consider the reliability of the foundational facts upon which an expert

bases an opinion. The sufficiency of this information is a question of law. The statement by

an unidentified investigator was “unsupported speculation or subjective belief” and was

not a “reasonably accurate basis” to support Dr. LeVaughn’s expressed expert opinion that

the manner of death was homicide. Howell, 2024 WL 3872637, at *4-5 (¶¶15-16); Patterson,

60 So. 3d at 751-52 (¶35). Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting such testimony, and we must reverse Roncali’s conviction.

18
Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶45. Roncali also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of

capital murder. He contends that there was no evidence, beyond Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony,

to support a finding that he administered the methamphetamine to his wife. Further, he

contends that there was no evidence that he prevented Marian from leaving the residence.

While he acknowledges that he temporarily restrained her for her own safety, he argues that

any such “kidnapping” ended when the restraints were removed.

¶46. In McClung v. State, 294 So. 3d 1216, 1232 n.16 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), we discussed

our need to review this issue under similar circumstances:

We address McClung’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in the light of
Newell v. State, 175 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2015), a case in which the Mississippi
Supreme Court explained that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
should be addressed on appeal even when the appellate court determines that
reversal and remand is warranted based upon an evidentiary error in the trial
court because there is potential to render a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 1267
(¶5).

In McClung, we further explained,

We may consider the erroneously admitted evidence (i.e., Keys’s statement)
in addressing McClung’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. See Lockhart
v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988); accord Hillard v. State, 950 So. 2d 224, 230
(¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Taking into account Keys’s statement and the
other evidence against McClung presented at trial, we find that the State
presented sufficient evidence to sustain McClung’s aggravated-assault
convictions. We find, therefore, that the proper procedure is to reverse and
remand under these circumstances. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40 (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause allows re-trial when a reviewing court determines that
a conviction must be reversed because evidence was erroneously admitted
against defendant, even when, without the inadmissible evidence, there was
insufficient evidence to support a conviction); Hillard, 950 So. 2d at 230 (¶28)
(“We find that, discounting the inadmissible evidence, there was quite meager
evidence to sustain [defendant’s] conviction. However, all the evidence

19
admitted at trial was sufficient to sustain [it]. . . . Where we, on review, find
the circumstances as we do, the proper result is to reverse and remand.”).

Id. at (¶64) (footnote omitted).

¶47. Our standard of review was stated in Perkins v. State, 392 So. 3d 690, 695 (¶7) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2024):

We explained our analysis of sufficiency and weight of the evidence in Jones
v. State, 380 So. 3d 974, 980-81 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024):

We review a challenge to “the legal sufficiency of the evidence”
de novo, but the evidence must be “viewed in a light most
favorable to the State.” Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 162, 166
(¶7) (Miss. 2005). This means that “all credible evidence
supporting a defendant’s guilt should be accepted as true, and all
favorable inferences drawn from the evidence must be
reconciled in the prosecution’s favor.” Id. “We determine if any
rational juror could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 285 So. 3d
156, 159 (¶11) (Miss. 2019). “We are not required to
decide—and in fact we must refrain from
deciding—whether we think the State proved the elements.”
Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293-94 (¶20) (Miss. 2010).
Rather, we must affirm the conviction as long as there is
sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the State
proved all the elements of the offense. Id.

(Emphasis added). We must also disregard all evidence favorable to the defendant. See

Parish v. State, 176 So. 3d 781, 786 (¶17) (Miss. 2015); Moore v. State, 996 So. 2d 756,

760-61 (¶12) (Miss. 2008); Withers v. State, 907 So. 2d 342, 352 (¶29) (Miss. 2005); White

v. State, 722 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (¶21) (Miss. 1998).

¶48. Our de novo review of the evidence in this case reveals Roncali admitted that before

Marian died, she confessed to him that she had been involved in several extra-marital affairs.

This angered him greatly. Roncali admitted to, at a minimum, providing Marian with

20
methamphetamine. He told law enforcement that he prepared a needle for her to take

methamphetamine on Friday, and said that was their preferred way to take the drug. Roncali

took an injection himself, but he denied injecting Marian. He knew Marian was experiencing

an adverse reaction to the injection of methamphetamine and that she had experienced a

similar reaction in the past. He said he did not call 911, and there was testimony that he was

concerned he would go to jail if the police were called to the residence due to illegal

substances in the residence. Roncali says that he placed zip ties around Marian’s hands and

ankles for some period of time in an effort to keep her from hurting herself. However, he

also admitted to striking her while she was restrained. The evidence from the autopsy and

testimony of law enforcement showed numerous bruises to Marian’s arms, legs, and face, as

well as injuries to her nose, lip, cheek, and forehead. The events leading to Marian’s death

began on Friday and she was found dead by her son, Eli, on Sunday. According to Roncali’s

statement to law enforcement and Eli’s testimony, Marian was acting crazy and incapacitated

all weekend. A toxicologist testified for the defense that Marian had to have had additional

methamphetamine after Friday based on the amount of amphetamine in her system at the time

of her death on Sunday. Dr. LeVaughn gave the jury his expert opinion that Marian died as

a result of an overdose of methamphetamine and that Marian’s death was caused by a third

person injecting her with methamphetamine.

¶49. Roncali does not challenge the jury instructions as to the elements of capital murder

and kidnapping on appeal. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, as we must, we find that there was sufficient evidence for rational jurors to find beyond

21
a reasonable doubt that Marion’s death was caused by Roncali during the course of her

kidnapping.

CONCLUSION

¶50. We find that the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to support finding

Roncali guilty of capital murder. However, as discussed above, we find that the trial court

erred by admitting the testimony of Dr. LeVaughn that the manner of death was homicide.

Therefore, we reverse Roncali’s conviction of capital murder and remand the case to the

circuit court for a new trial. Because we find reversible error warranting a new trial and

sufficient evidence for a conviction, we reverse Roncali’s conviction and remand for a new

trial and decline to address the remaining issues that Roncali raised on appeal.

¶51. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WILSON, P.J., McCARTY AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION, JOINED BY BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND ST. PÉ, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED
BY McDONALD, J.; McCARTY, J., JOINS IN PART.

CARLTON, P.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

¶52. I agree with Judge Emfinger’s finding that there was sufficient evidence for rational

jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Marian’s death was caused by Roncali during

the course of her kidnapping. However, I disagree that the trial court abused its discretion

by allowing Dr. LeVaughn to testify that the manner of death was homicide in that Marian’s

death resulted from the acts of a third person injecting methamphetamine into her. Because

I would affirm Roncali’s conviction and sentence, I respectfully concur in part and dissent

in part.

22
¶53. As Judge Emfinger’s opinion acknowledges, we review a trial court’s decision to

admit evidence, including expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion. Inv. Res. Servs. Inc.

v. Cato, 15 So. 3d 412, 416 (¶2) (Miss. 2009). Expert testimony should be admitted only if

it satisfies Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Id. at (¶3) (quoting MRE 702). “Expert testimony is admissible, pursuant to Rule 702, if it

is relevant and reliable.” Id. at (¶4). “The trial judge is the gatekeeper who assesses the

value of the testimony.” Id. “A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the

relevancy and admissibility of evidence,” and “reversal is proper only where such discretion

has been abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected.” Flaggs v. State, 999

So. 2d 393, 401 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

¶54. The trial court accepted Dr. LeVaughn as an expert witness in the field of forensic

science. At trial, Dr. LeVaughn testified that his duties as a forensic pathologist include

performing autopsies and determining the cause and manner of a victim’s death. Dr.

LeVaughn testified that to reach a conclusion as to a victim’s cause and manner of death, he

performs an autopsy and also relies on medical records, toxicology results, coroner reports,

and information received from law enforcement. Dr. LeVaughn explained that pathologists

“like to have as much [outside information] as possible in coming to our conclusions” about

a victim’s cause and manner of death.

23
¶55. Dr. LeVaughn testified that in the present case, he performed Marian’s autopsy. Dr.

LeVaughn opined that Marian’s cause of death was methamphetamine overdose and that her

manner of death was homicide. Dr. LeVaughn explained that he uses the term homicide

“when someone died because of the actions of another person.” Dr. LeVaughn testified that

in concluding that Marian’s manner of death was homicide, he relied on the information from

the coroner’s report, Marian’s toxicology results, as well as information from law

enforcement “that the methamphetamine was actually administered to her by someone else,

not her.”

¶56. At trial, Roncali’s counsel objected to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony regarding Marian’s

manner of death, arguing that Dr. LeVaughn’s determination was based on facts not in

evidence and was outside the scope of his expertise. After hearing arguments from counsel,

the trial court ultimately overruled Roncali’s objection, stating, “[O]f course Dr. Levaughn

is qualified to give his opinion on what the manner of death is in this case. . . . [T]hat’s what

. . . he does every day. He’s qualified to do that.”

¶57. As to Roncali’s argument that Dr. LeVaughn improperly relied on what he was told

by law enforcement in reaching his determination as to Marian’s manner of death, the trial

court explained that “[a]ny expert witness, in giving their opinion in court, is entitled to rely

on their education, training and experience, any observations that they made themselves, and

also information from outside sources and they put all of this together and form their

opinion.” The trial court found that Dr. LeVaughn considered all the information available

to him, including toxicology results and reports from law enforcement, in reaching his

24
opinion as to the manner of Marian’s death.

¶58. This Court has held that “it is the duty of a forensic pathologist to answer two basic

questions: what was the cause of death, and what was the manner of death?” Brown v. State,

33 So. 3d 1134, 1138 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “A forensic pathologist may testify as to

what caused the victim’s injuries and what trauma the injuries would produce.” Id. “A

forensic pathologist may also testify concerning the victim’s wounds, suffering, and the

means of infliction if the injury falls within the bounds of his expertise.” Id. (internal

quotation mark omitted). In the recent opinion Smith v. State, No. 2021-KA-01003-COA,

2023 WL 2884723, at *13 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2023), aff’d, 387 So. 3d 994 (Miss.

June 13, 2024), this Court held that “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing

Dr. LeVaughn to testify as to the cause and manner of [the victim’s] death[,]” explaining that

“Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony was within the scope of his expertise as an expert in forensic

pathology.”

¶59. Furthermore, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 703 “permits an expert witness to base an

opinion on facts, data, or opinions presented to the expert outside of court, without regard

to whether such information has been or will be admitted, or whether a court would rule it

inadmissible if counsel offered it into evidence.” Darnell v. Darnell, 167 So. 3d 195, 206

(¶30) (Miss. 2014) (citing MRE 703). “However, such information must be of a type

reasonably relied upon by experts in their discipline in forming opinions or inferences upon

the subject.” Id. As Dr. LeVaughn testified, pathologists rely on outside information such

as coroner reports, toxicology results, and investigation reports in reaching their opinion as

25
to a victim’s cause and manner of death. See Alexander v. State, 759 So. 2d 411, 420 (¶31)

(Miss. 2000) (stating that “reports, records, and documents prepared by others[,]” including

autopsy results, “are sources that expert witnesses normally rely on” to form opinions as to

cause of death); Morrison v. State, 332 So. 3d 396, 406 (¶55) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (finding

that “[i]t was well within [Dr. LeVaughn’s] expertise . . . to review photographs made

contemporaneously at the [crime] scene”).

¶60. In support of his argument that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. LeVaughn to

testify that Marian’s manner of death was homicide, Roncali cites Edmonds v. State, 955 So.

2d 787 (Miss. 2007). In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the trial court

erroneously allowed the forensic pathologist to provide expert testimony based on opinion

rather than scientific methods and procedures. Id. at 792 (¶8). The supreme court also found

that “[t]he error was magnified when [the forensic pathologist’s] testimony was the only

evidence—other than [the defendant]’s contested confession—to support the State’s theory

of the case[.]” Id. at (¶9).

¶61. Unlike Edmonds, however, the testimony in the present case clearly shows that Dr.

LeVaughn reached his conclusion regarding Marian’s manner of death by relying on “facts,

data, or opinions presented to the expert outside of court” that are “of a type reasonably relied

upon by experts in their discipline in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.”

Darnell, 167 So. 3d at 206 (¶30) (citing MRE 703).4 Furthermore, the jury heard additional

evidence that supported the State’s theory that someone else administered the

4
I find that Edmonds is distinguishable from the present case. Any error in allowing
Dr. LeVaughn to testify as to Marian’s manner of death was certainly harmless.

26
methamphetamine to Marian. Dr. Long, the toxicologist, testified that at the time of her

autopsy, the amount of methamphetamine in Marian’s body was approximately three times

more than a standard dose of methamphetamine. Dr. Long also opined that based on the

amount of methamphetamine in Marian’s blood, she would have needed to consume

additional methamphetamine after Friday, and the additional methamphetamine could have

been ingested within twelve or twenty-four hours before her death. Eli testified at length as

to Marian’s condition on Saturday and Sunday morning before her death, describing her as

unable to communicate or walk without assistance. Eli’s testimony supported the State’s

theory that Marian was in no condition to inject herself with additional methamphetamine

on Saturday or Sunday.

¶62. Based on the above, I find that Dr. LeVaughn, as an expert witness and a forensic

pathologist, was allowed to rely upon information and reports prepared by coroners,

toxicologists, and law enforcement in forming his opinion and conclusion as to Marian’s

cause and manner of death. See MRE 702 & 703; Alexander, 759 So. 2d at 420 (¶31).

¶63. Because I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr.

LeVaughn to testify that Marian’s manner of death was homicide and because I find that

there is sufficient evidence to support Roncali’s conviction, I respectfully concur in part and

dissent in part.

BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTING:

¶64. I agree with Judge Emfinger that Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony in this matter was subpar

27
and fell below the standards of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702. However, because of that

and the State’s failure to present sufficient evidence that a murder occurred during or as a

result of a kidnapping, which is required to prove a capital murder conviction, this case must

be reversed and rendered. Accordingly, I dissent.

¶65. “When reviewing a challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must

determine whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Naylor v. State, 248 So. 3d 793, 796 (¶8) (Miss. 2018) (quoting Ambrose

v. State, 133 So. 3d 786, 791 (¶16) (Miss. 2013)). “The prosecution must be given the

benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss.

1993)).

¶66. “A capital murder conviction under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) must be

supported by evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction of both the murder and the

underlying felony, had either been charged alone.” Hughes v. State, 90 So. 3d 613, 629-30

(¶48) (Miss. 2012). The elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt

by the evidence and not mere “guesswork, speculation and conjecture.” Edwards v. State,

469 So. 2d 68, 69 (Miss. 1985). “It is not open to reasonable debate that the right—not to

be convicted of an offense unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt each and every

element of the offense—is a fundamental right anchored in our constitution and the

jurisprudence of this state.” Evans v. State, 919 So. 2d 231, 235 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

28
¶67. “[C]onviction[s] in criminal cases must rest upon finite evidence and not probabilities

or surmise.” Sisk v. State, 294 So. 2d 472, 475 (Miss. 1974). “All the proof need not be

direct[,] and the jury may draw any reasonable inferences from all the evidence in the case.”

Fontenot v. State, 287 So. 3d 322, 326-27 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added)

(quoting Campbell v. State, 278 So. 2d 420, 423 (Miss. 1973)). “[I]f the facts and inferences

favor the defendant with such force that reasonable jurors could not find him guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt,” the defendant’s conviction must be reversed and rendered. Melendez v.

State, 354 So. 3d 944, 952 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

¶68. The State convicted Roncali of capital murder with the underlying felony of

kidnapping. However, the State did not sufficiently prove the necessary elements to find

Roncali guilty of capital murder.

¶69. First, the State did not sufficiently prove that Roncali murdered Marian. Capital

murder is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any

means or in any manner shall be capital murder . . . [w]hen done with or without any design

to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of . . . kidnapping . . .

or in any attempt to commit such [felony].” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2020).

At trial, Dr. LeVaughn stated that in his expert opinion as the forensic pathologist who

conducted Marian’s autopsy, the bruising and marks he identified on Marian’s body were not

the cause of her death, and none of the markings proved to be fatal. Dr. LeVaughn testified

that Marian’s cause of death was an overdose of methamphetamine.

¶70. In the initial autopsy report, Marian’s manner of death (which is different than the

29
cause of death) was listed as undetermined, yet since the autopsy was conducted, the report

was changed to list the manner of death as homicide. Outside the presence of the jury, the

court heard Dr. LeVaughn testify that in preparation for trial, he spoke with some of the law

enforcement officers involved in the case. One of the pieces of information the investigators

told him was that the methamphetamine had been administered to Marian by someone else.

Dr. LeVaughn testified that ultimately, this information is why he changed the manner of

death on the autopsy report from undetermined to homicide. At trial, Roncali objected to this

testimony, arguing that it was based on facts not in evidence. The trial court overruled this

objection and stated that Dr. LeVaughn was qualified to give his opinion on the manner of

death.

¶71. In the presence of the jury, Dr. LeVaughn testified on cross-examination as follows:

Q. Now, in this case, what doctor assisted with the report?

A. Dr. Erin Barnhart is the physician that actually authored the report.

....

Q. Well, what materials of yours would you have made available to Erin
Barnhart – Dr. Barnhart so that she could do that report?

A. Right. To the best of my knowledge, the entire case file -- of this
particular case or any case -- is duplicated and then sent to another
physician or, in this case, Dr. Barnhart. So she has everything in the
case file to review.

Q. Okay. And Dr. Barnhart, did she come to a different conclusion than
the conclusion you presented here today?

A. She did.

Q. All right. What was her conclusion?

30
A. As to what?

Q. As to cause and manner of death.

A. In her opinion, the cause and manner of death were both undetermined.

Q. Okay. And have you -- did you at any point speak to Dr. Barnhart about
her report?

A. No.

Q. What prompted you to revise her report?

A. I did not revise her report. Her report stands. I am not changing her
report. I just came to a different conclusion based on information that
was provided to me by the district attorney’s office.

....

Q. In your conclusion of -- after you personally did the autopsy -- you
came to the result that the meth overdose was the only thing that could
have caused her death; is that correct -- within a reasonable degree of
medical certainly?

A. Well, it wasn’t my conclusion after I did the autopsy because I didn’t
write the report. But aside from that, it is my conclusion, after
reviewing information, that the cause of death is methamphetamine
toxicity or overdose and manner of death is homicide.

Q. And was there any physical evidence that the autopsy unveiled that
suggested to you how the meth was ingested by the victim?

A. No, sir.

Q. So you can’t tell us whether or not it was taken orally, smoked, injected
or snorted?

A. From the autopsy, no.

¶72. I do not contest that experts are permitted to use outside information in order to testify

at trial. However, “[t]he admissibility of expert testimony is evaluated in light of M.R.E.

31
702, which holds that such testimony may be introduced when it is found to be relevant and

reliable.” Flaggs v. State, 999 So. 2d 393, 401(¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).

¶73. As this Court stated in Flaggs, “To meet the requirement of reliability, an expert’s

testimony must be based on the methods and procedures of science, and not merely on

subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation.” Id. at 401-02 (¶27) (emphasis added).

“‘Indefinite’ expert opinions, or those ‘expressed in terms of mere possibilities,’ are not

admissible.” Parvin v. State, 113 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (¶14) (Miss. 2013) (quoting West v.

State, 553 So. 2d 8, 20 (Miss. 1989)).

¶74. In the case sub judice, no methods or procedures of science were used to support this

part of Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony. I acknowledge that “a forensic pathologist’s testimony

concerning the victim’s wounds, suffering, and the means of infliction of injury falls within

the bounds of his expertise.” McGowen v. State, 859 So. 2d 320, 335 (¶53) (Miss. 2003)

(citing Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 341 (¶127) (Miss. 1997)). However, Dr. LeVaughn

specifically testified in this instance that Dr. Barnhart’s report could not determine the cause

or the manner of death, and he could not testify as to how the meth was ingested. Anything

beyond that was purely speculative.

¶75. In Flaggs we also stated that

Rule 702 expressly allows expert testimony regarding non-scientific matters,
so long as the witness’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
qualify him as an expert in a given field, and (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.

Flaggs, 999 So. 2d at 402 (¶27). Law enforcement or the district attorney’s office simply

32
telling Dr. LeVaughn that someone administered the methamphetamine to Marian without

any proof is insufficient and inadequate evidence based on facts or data. Therefore, Dr.

LeVaughn’s testimony that the methamphetamine was administered to Marian by someone

else was speculative and not based upon sufficient facts or data; thus, it would automatically

fail the test by not meeting the first requirement. Further, the testimony was not the product

of reliable principles and methods, nor did Dr. LeVaughn apply reliable principles and

methods to these facts of the case.

¶76. While it is true Dr. LeVaughn could testify to the manner of death, here, Dr.

LeVaughn ultimately changed a key determination of this case based on a statement given

to him by law enforcement and/or the district attorney’s office with no actual evidence to

support such statement. Under Rule 702, this part of Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony about the

manner of death would not be considered reliable, and the trial court erred in allowing it to

be admitted.

¶77. Dr. Long (the toxicologist) mirrored the idea that the methamphetamine may have

been administered to Marian by someone other than herself. Dr. Long testified that Marian’s

toxicology results from the autopsy reported “990 nanograms per milliliter” of

methamphetamine in her system. Dr. Long explained that 990 nanograms is less than the

lethal amount, which is around 2,000 nanograms. Certain factors, such as tolerance, can

cause what is considered to be a lethal amount to vary depending on the person ingesting the

methamphetamine. Dr. Long opined that Marian would have to have consumed additional

methamphetamine beyond Friday because methamphetamine has what Dr. Long called

33
“half-life elimination.” This term means that approximately every twelve hours, the amount

of methamphetamine in someone’s system reduces by half. Dr. Long stated that for Marian’s

levels to be at 990 nanograms at the time of her autopsy, she would have to have ingested

almost 5,000 nanograms on Friday, which is over twice the lethal amount. Thus, Dr. Long

testified that “[i]t is virtually impossible to get that from a Friday night dose unless she’s a

heavy duty addict taking massive amounts.”

¶78. Even with Dr. Long’s testimony on Marian’s levels of methamphetamine, the jury

could not reasonably infer that Roncali administered additional methamphetamine to Marian.

Dr. Long testified that “intoxication depends on how much they’ve used methamphetamine.”

Dr. Long also testified, “You can take a large dose on Friday and walk around for a week or

two and then die from it. It happens acutely to the time of administration.” Evidence

suggested that Roncali and Marian were long-time drug users. Roncali stated that it was their

common practice for him to “fix the needle” for Marian, and they would take the same “hit”

of methamphetamine, but Marian would administer the methamphetamine to herself.

Roncali admitted that he fixed the needle for Marian on Friday but made it clear that he took

the same amount and did not administer the methamphetamine to Marian on Friday or any

other time throughout the weekend.

¶79. At trial, the jury was given a lesser-included offense instruction for manslaughter.

The manslaughter jury instruction read as follows:

The Court instructs the Jury that if you fail to find the Defendant guilty of the
crimes of capital murder or Murder 2nd Degree, then you should continue your
deliberations to consider the elements of the felony crime of manslaughter.

34
If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that on
or between September 5, 2020 and September 6, 2020, in Newton County,
Mississippi, that the defendant, Carlos James Roncali, unlawfully and with
culpable negligence killed Marian Chaney Roncali, a human being, then you
should find the Defendant guilty of manslaughter.

The Court instructs the Jury that culpable negligence is negligence of a degree
so great as to be equal to a complete disregard or indifference for the safety of
human life. Negligence is doing something that a reasonably careful person
would not do under similar circumstances or failing to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do under similar circumstances.

¶80. Even though the jury was given a lesser-included offense jury instruction for

manslaughter, they still found Roncali guilty of capital murder. In a recent case before this

Court, we stated that “[a] conviction of culpable-negligence manslaughter can only stand if

sufficient credible evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in

such a grossly negligent manner as to show a wanton disregard or utter indifference to the

safety of human life.” Fox v. State, 378 So. 3d 1007, 1023 (¶50) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)

(citing Brown v. State, 304 So. 3d 692, 696 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). Black’s Law

Dictionary defines “credible evidence” as “[e]vidence that is worthy of belief; trustworthy

evidence.” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary 697 (12th ed. 2024).

¶81. Given the circumstances of the case at hand, I believe there is insufficient credible

evidence to support a finding that Roncali took any action that demonstrated “negligence of

a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the

safety of [Marian’s] life.” Brown, 304 So. 3d at 697 (¶22). When reviewing the sufficiency

of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh the evidence. Rather, we look at the credible

evidence to determine whether a jury could make a rational decision that the elements of the

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crime were proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. “While we take the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, we are not required to ignore the defense’s evidence

or accept incredible testimony as true.” Fox, 378 So. 3d at 1023 (¶51) (citing Hodges v.

State, 743 So. 2d 319, 325 (¶38) (Miss. 1999)). If a witness’s testimony is necessary to

support the jury’s verdict and “is so implausible or so substantially impeached as to be

unworthy of belief,” it is not required to be credited by this Court. Jones v. State, 281 So.

3d 137, 147 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).

¶82. As stated above, no credible evidence was provided to show that Roncali acted with

negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter

indifference to, the safety of Marian’s life. He admitted that in hindsight, he regretted not

calling authorities to come check on Marian; however, he explained how he acted at the time

in a manner he believed was reasonable. He was worried that calling authorities would lead

to his returning to prison due to the drugs and pills that were inside the home. Nothing was

presented in the record to show that the reason Roncali did not call 911 was due to a fear of

being arrested for the condition his wife was in.

¶83. Further, Roncali could not have said with any certainty that he knew Marian’s death

was imminent. Roncali informed the MBI agents that he had witnessed Marian react how

she did that weekend one time before while using methamphetamine, but he said that on the

prior occasion, Marian was taking Neurontin. In that one prior similar occurrence, nothing

deadly resulted. Roncali also admitted he took the same hit of methamphetamine as Marian

that weekend, and he was not having the same reaction to it that she was. I believe this is an

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important factor, considering that Roncali stated he had seen Marian behave like this once

before while they were using methamphetamine, and Marian’s toxicology report showed that

she was also taking Neurontin leading up to the weekend when all the events in question

occurred.

¶84. In O’Kelly v. State, 267 So. 3d 282 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018), this Court reversed and

rendered a depraved-heart murder conviction where a culpable-negligence-manslaughter jury

instruction was also given, finding that

the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish either depraved-heart murder
or culpable-negligence manslaughter. As discussed above, O’Kelly testified
that he and Rodenbaugh had taken NBOMe together previously.
Rodenbaugh’s roommates also testified that they knew that Rodenbaugh had
taken “acid” on prior occasions. In addition, O’Kelly testified that, prior to
August 9, 2014, he and Daylin had both taken hits from the same sheets at
issue in this case. There is no evidence that O’Kelly, Rodenbaugh, or Daylin
had experienced any adverse effects when using NBOMe previously, and
O’Kelly testified that he did not know that NBOMe was dangerous. Indeed, on
the night in question, O’Kelly himself took the same number of hits as
Rodenbaugh.

Dr. Funte testified at trial that “NBOMe is incredibly potent” and “has been
linked to death at very, very low levels of the drug.” She also testified that the
drug is highly unpredictable so that a single dose can cause death in a short
period of time. She further testified that a person cannot “develop a tolerance”
to NBOMe, so a person’s past experience with the drug is not a good indicator
of its potential to cause harm.

Id. at 291 (¶¶32-33). We reached our conclusion based on the fact that “O’Kelly and

Rodenbaugh had both taken NBOMe and similar drugs on prior occasions without any

adverse effects. Moreover, O’Kelly ‘himself[] ingested the same [number of hits] as

[Rodenbaugh] on the same occasion, yet remained coherent.’” Id. at 293 (¶39) (quoting

Lofthouse v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 236, 241-42 (Ky. 2000)). “O’Kelly’s own use of

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NBOMe shows that he did not perceive that it posed any substantial or imminent risk of

death.” Id.

¶85. In the capital murder case sub judice, Roncali and Marian took the same hit of

methamphetamine. According to Eli, Roncali was still coherent, but Marian was not.

Furthermore, methamphetamine is not a new substance like NBOMe was at the time of our

decision in O’Kelly. There is more knowledge of the effects of methamphetamine, and even

as Dr. Long testified, a person can develop tolerance for methamphetamine depending on

how often, how long, and how much of the substance is taken. Roncali and Marian had taken

methamphetamine together on countless occasions over the course of many years without

adverse effects like these. While failing to seek medical aid in instances of an overdose can

amount to murder or manslaughter, Roncali’s own use of the methamphetamine shows he

did not believe it posed any substantial or imminent risk of death. Even though Roncali

admitted he neglected to call 911 once he noticed something was wrong with Marian, he had

seen her act like this one time before, and in that instance, the result was not deadly. Thus,

Roncali’s case is similar to O’Kelly because Roncali took the same dose as Marian, as they

had frequently done together, and Roncali was not having a similar reaction. For these

reasons, the State did not sufficiently prove each element of capital murder because Roncali’s

actions did not even amount to manslaughter, much less murder.

¶86. The next element that the State failed to sufficiently prove for Roncali’s capital

murder conviction was kidnapping. In his motion for a directed verdict, Roncali argued that

the State failed to prove this was a kidnapping and that the State “left several of the essential

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elements unproven.” Judge Emfinger writes that “there was sufficient evidence for rational

jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Marian’s death was caused by Roncali during

the course of her kidnapping.” However, Judge Emfinger does not cite any authority

supporting the position that a conviction of kidnapping was sufficiently proved. Kidnapping

occurs when “[a]ny person who, without lawful authority and with or without intent to

secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap

any other person with intent to cause such person to be confined or imprisoned against his

or her will . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (Rev. 2020).

¶87. In a case previously before this Court, the defendant claimed there was insufficient

evidence to support his kidnapping conviction, and he argued the verdict was a result of

“speculation, guesswork, and conjecture.” Van Wagner v. State, 116 So. 3d 138, 142 (¶10)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2012). In that case, the victim (Brasher) was found at the scene of a car

incident “with unlocked chains wrapped around her legs, from her ankles to her knees.” Id.

at 141 (¶5). Van Wagner argued that the State never developed the kidnapping charge

against him and that there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence of a kidnapping.

Id. Van Wagner argued that “[e]ven when giving all reasonable inferences to the

prosecution, the evidence presented d[id] not show that on the following day Brasher was

‘imprisoned against her will.’” Id. at (¶14). Van Wagner also argued that a reasonable juror

could have found other reasons for the chains to be wrapped around Brasher’s legs. Id. at

142-43 (¶15).

¶88. In that instance, we found that “[t]he State did not offer any evidence to show that

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Van Wagner had seized Brasher or that he had confined Brasher against her will. An

eyewitness to the accident and Trooper Westbrook both testified that there were no weapons

found at the scene of the accident or locks of any kind.” Id. at 143 (¶16). “At the close of

the State’s case-in-chief, the State failed to establish the elements for kidnapping beyond a

reasonable doubt; therefore, Van Wagner was entitled to a directed verdict. Accordingly, his

kidnapping conviction and sentence [wa]s reversed and rendered.” Id. at (¶17).

¶89. In the instant case, the elements of kidnapping have not been proved. While Roncali

did admit to restraining Marian with zip ties, Roncali and Eli adamantly testified that they

only restrained Marian briefly for her own safety. As soon as Eli realized the zip ties were

leaving marks on Marian’s skin, Roncali willfully removed the zip ties. Eli made it clear in

his testimony that Marian had the free will to leave at any time had she chosen to do so. The

door was unlocked, and no one was stopping her from leaving. At one point during the

weekend, Roncali left the house entirely while going to the store. While Roncali was gone,

Marian was at home with the free will to leave because she was not zip-tied during his

absence. Eli testified that Marian did not leave the house because the condition she was in

made her physically unable to leave, not because anyone was stopping her.

¶90. To conclude, there was no dispute that Marian willingly ingested methamphetamine

on Friday, but the record simply does not provide how the methamphetamine was ingested.

After ingesting the methamphetamine on Friday, Marian began having adverse effects that

incapacitated her, but the record does not support that Roncali administered the

methamphetamine to Marian, nor does it support that Marian died during or as a result of a

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kidnapping. The record also does not support the finding of intent required by the

kidnapping statute and caselaw, and the record does not support a finding that Roncali

forcibly confined or imprisoned Marian against her will. Therefore, like in Van Wagner, the

State did not satisfy the requirements to prove the underlying felony of kidnapping.

¶91. For these reasons, I believe there was insufficient evidence to convict Roncali of

capital murder; therefore, this case should be reversed and rendered. Thus, I respectfully

dissent.

McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. McCARTY, J., JOINS THIS
OPINION IN PART.

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