Shannon Hinton a/k/a Shannon Rochele Hinton v. State of Mississippi;

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-KA-01052-COA

SHANNON HINTON A/K/A SHANNON APPELLANT
ROCHELE HINTON

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/03/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JON MARK WEATHERS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/15/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Shannon Hinton and Natalie Lett were indicted in separate cases for sex crimes

against Hinton’s niece, “Amy.”1 Lett was charged with sexual battery of the minor, and

Hinton was charged as an accessory before the fact and for permitting the continuing sexual

abuse of the minor child. Both Hinton and Lett were represented by the Forrest County

Public Defender’s Office. Prior to trial, Lett entered into a plea agreement in exchange for

her testimony against Hinton. Hinton was tried and convicted. The court sentenced Hinton

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This fictitious name is used to protect the minor victim’s identity.
to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with fifteen years

suspended and fifteen years to serve, and placed her on five years of post-release supervision.

¶2. Hinton appealed, arguing that her Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated

when public defenders from the same office represented both her and Lett.

Facts

¶3. The details of the abuse of the minor child, Amy, are not necessary for the resolution

of this appeal. There is no dispute about the events that occurred in October and November

of 2017; there is no issue raised on appeal concerning Hinton’s culpability for her role in the

matter.

¶4. Hinton was indicted as accessory before the fact on November 20, 2018, in the Forrest

County Circuit Court. On December 7, 2018, Hinton was found indigent and qualified for

representation by the Forrest County Public Defender’s Office. Alex Ignatiev was appointed

as her lawyer that same day. Lett also qualified for a public defender’s representation in her

separately-numbered case, and the Forrest County Public Defender’s Office appointed

Andrew Williams to represent her.

¶5. Prior to trial, Hinton’s attorney filed a motion for discovery to compel the State to

provide a copy of a detailed statement Lett had given to the FBI concerning the events or, in

the alternative, asked the court to bar Lett from testifying at trial. He also subpoenaed a

witness for Hinton, submitted proposed jury instructions, and tried the case. Hinton was

aware that Lett had entered into a plea agreement and would testify against her. But Hinton

raised no objection throughout the process to her attorney’s continued representation of her

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or any concern about a possible conflict of interest.

¶6. On February 26, 2019, Lett entered a guilty plea to the charge of sexual battery in her

separate case. The circuit court accepted her plea that same day and sentenced her

accordingly.

¶7. Hinton was tried on March 27-28, 2019. At trial, Hinton was represented by Ignatiev

and Lindsay Slawson, who also worked for the public defender’s office. Witnesses who

testified included Amy, Amy’s mother, Lett, and Lieutenant Latosha Myers-Mitchell of the

Hattiesburg Police Department. Through Officer Mitchell, Hinton’s written confession was

admitted into evidence. Lett’s guilty plea was admitted into evidence as well. After the State

rested its case, Hinton’s attorneys moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court

denied. The court explained to Hinton her right not to testify, which Hinton said she

understood. Hinton chose to testify, and was questioned by Slawson. She was able to

explain to the jury her relationship to Amy over the years and tell her side of the events that

transpired. But on cross-examination by the State, Hinton admitted that she was aware of the

abuse, that she aided in providing Lett with access to the minor child, and that she

transported the child to stay with Lett. After the court gave instructions, the jury deliberated

and found Hinton guilty of being an accessory before the fact.

¶8. Ignatiev filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative,

a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion on June 4, 2019, and on June 24, 2019,

Hinton’s attorney filed her notice of appeal. At that point, the Office of State Public

Defender, Indigent Appeals Division, took over Hinton’s representation. On appeal, the only

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issue raised was not raised to the trial court below: was Hinton denied her Sixth Amendment

right to counsel?

Discussion

¶9. Hinton contends, for the first time on appeal, that she was denied her Constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel. However,

when a party claims ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on
direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “the proper
resolution is to deny relief without prejudice to the defendant’s right to assert
the same claim in a post-conviction relief proceeding,” because there is usually
inadequate evidence in the trial record to support the claim.

Colburn v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 214 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Willis v. State,

811 So. 2d 450, 454 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). Additionally, we would decide such an

issue on direct appeal only if

(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional
dimensions, or (2) the parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the
appellate court to make the finding without consideration of the findings of
fact of the trial judge.

Colenburg v. State, 735 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App.1999).

¶10. In this case, the parties have not stipulated that the record is adequate to allow the

appellate court to make a finding on Hinton’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Moreover, our review of the record as it stands before us does not affirmatively

show that Hinton’s representation was ineffective. However, Hinton ought to be given the

opportunity to make a record on this issue in a properly filed application for leave to file a

motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-7

(Rev. 2015), if she so chooses. As we stated in Brisco v. State, 295 So. 3d 498 (Miss. Ct.

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App. 2019),

because appellate courts are limited to the trial record on direct appeal,
generally ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more appropriately
brought during post-conviction proceedings. Pace v. State, 242 So. 3d 107,
118 (¶28) (Miss. 2018). We believe that Brisco’s claims would be better
developed through a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Accordingly,
Brisco’s claims to ineffective counsel are dismissed without prejudice to her
right to raise the issues in a properly filed PCR petition.

Id. at 521 (¶63).

¶11. Accordingly, because the only challenge Hinton raises to her conviction is the claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we decline to address, we affirm her conviction

and sentence and we dismiss Hinton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without

prejudice to her right to raise it in a motion for post-conviction collateral relief.

¶12. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR.

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