Tiffany Michelle Cox v. Ryan Michael Upchurch

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2019-CA-00851-COA

TIFFANY MICHELLE COX APPELLANT

v.

RYAN MICHAEL UPCHURCH APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/14/2019
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY JR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: GRENADA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JERRY WESLEY HISAW
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LUTHER PUTNAM CRULL JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/21/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Tiffany Cox (Cox) and Ryan Upchurch (Upchurch) were never married but are the

natural parents of A.R.,1 a daughter, who was born in September 2014. After a custody trial,

the court awarded sole physical custody of A.R. to the father, Upchurch. Aggrieved, Cox

appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Cox and Upchurch began dating in 2011. Cox and her two children moved in with

Upchurch at his residence in Grenada County, Mississippi in 2014. At the time Cox moved

in with Upchurch, she was pregnant with A.R., who was born in 2014 at a hospital in

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We use initials to protect identities in this opinion.
Mississippi. Upchurch is listed as A.R.’s father on the birth certificate.

¶3. After A.R.’s birth, Cox and Upchurch became engaged. Upchurch gave Cox an

engagement ring, but the two were never married. At A.R.’s second birthday party, Cox

wanted to leave the party early, and according to testimony in the record, she and Upchurch

got into an argument because Upchurch said she was leaving to drink with friends. After the

argument about Cox’s intended plans, she threw the engagement ring at Upchurch, and the

relationship ended.

¶4. On July 5, 2017, Upchurch filed a complaint to establish paternity, for custody, and

for other relief (including a request for a temporary restraining order). A Rule 81 summons

was issued on July 14, 2017, for a hearing set to take place on July 25, 2017.2 On July 18,

2017, a temporary restraining order was entered, awarding immediate physical and legal

custody of A.R. to Upchurch. On July 24, 2017, Cox filed her answer to Upchurch’s

complaint, as well as a motion to set aside the temporary restraining order.

¶5. After a hearing on July 25, 2017, the court conducted an Albright3 analysis and ruled

that A.R.’s best interests would be served by awarding temporary physical custody to

Upchurch and joint legal custody to both parents.

¶6. On August 1, 2017, Upchurch filed a motion to “re-open proof on temporary matters”

on the basis that Cox had perjured herself in giving testimony to the court regarding her

employment. On August 2, 2017, the court filed its order regarding temporary custody

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M.R.C.P. 81.
3
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).

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stemming from the July 25 hearing. The court sent a letter to the parties, stating that the order

was prepared and filed prior to receipt of Upchurch’s motion to re-open proof.

¶7. Cox filed a motion for modification of the temporary custody order on August 18,

2017. On December 18, 2017, the court entered an order modifying temporary custody,

which awarded specific holiday and weekend visitation to Cox. However, physical custody

remained with Upchurch. On January 15, 2018, Cox filed a motion for appointment of a

guardian ad litem. An agreed order appointing Ginger Miller as the guardian ad litem was

entered on January 23, 2018.

¶8. On March 28, 2018, the court entered an order setting the custody dispute for trial on

July 25, 2018. The trial took place on July 25-26, 2018, and an additional day on October 3,

2018, as well as a partial day on November 27, 2018. The court heard testimony from dozens

of witnesses provided by Cox and Upchurch, as well as Ginger Miller, the guardian ad litem

(GAL), and accepted evidence in open court.

¶9. The GAL participated in and testified at trial. The GAL’s sixty-nine page report was

admitted into evidence. In preparing her report, the GAL interviewed twenty-three witnesses

who had information relevant to custody. Through the report and her testimony at trial, the

GAL recommended that Upchurch receive physical custody of A.R., both parties share legal

custody, and that Cox receive liberal periods of visitation.

¶10. At the conclusion of trial, the chancellor entered his written opinion, judgment, and

amended judgment, awarding physical custody of A.R. to Upchurch, joint legal custody to

the parties, and liberal visitation to Cox. The chancellor’s conclusion was consistent with the

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previous orders of the court: (1) the temporary restraining order filed on July 18, 2017; and

(2) the temporary custody order filed on August 2, 2017. On January 3, 2019, the chancellor

issued his findings of facts, and on February 26, 2019, a judgment was entered, which

incorporated the previous findings of fact.

¶11. The chancellor’s decision was based upon the testimony of witnesses, the evidence

presented and arguments made at trial, the testimony and report of the GAL, and an Albright

analysis with specific findings for each factor. The chancellor’s Albright analysis is

summarized as follows:

1. Continuity of Care: The chancellor found this factor favored neither
party.
2. Parenting Skills: The chancellor found this factor favored neither party.
3. Willingness and Capacity to provide primary care: The chancellor
found that while both Upchurch and Cox had the willingness to provide
care, capacity to provide care favored Upchurch.
4. Employment: The chancellor found this factor favored neither party.
5. Physical and Mental Health and Age of Parents: The chancellor found
this factor favored neither party.
6. Emotional Ties: The chancellor found this factor favored neither party.
7. Home, School and Community Record: The chancellor found this
factor favored Upchurch.
8. Preference of Child: This factor was not applicable due to the age of the
child.
9. Moral Fitness: The chancellor found this factor favored neither party.
10. Stability: The chancellor found this factor favored Upchurch.

The chancellor heard from dozens of witnesses and caretakers as well as a detailed report

from the GAL. Additionally, the chancellor heard from the parties and their attorneys during

trial. After consideration of all facts and information presented by the parties, the chancellor

found that three factors favored Upchurch: willingness and capacity to provide primary care;

home, school, and community record; and stability. The chancellor found that no factors

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favored Cox. The remaining factors favored neither parent over the other (i.e., they were

neutral).

¶12. On March 6, 2019, Cox filed a motion for reconsideration, correction of judgment,

or, in the alternative, a new trial. The motion did not set forth a request to re-open proof.

Upchurch responded to Cox’s motion on March 14, 2019. A hearing was held on April 30,

2019, and the chancellor entered his amended judgment on May 14, 2019. Disagreeing with

the chancellor’s award of physical custody of the parties’ child to Upchurch, Cox appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13. “A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or

clearly erroneous. This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported

by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly

wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Sanderson v.

Sanderson, 824 So. 2d 623, 625-26 (¶8) (Miss. 2002). “This Court does not re[-]evaluate the

evidence, re[-]test the credibility of witnesses, nor otherwise act as a second fact-finder.

Unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal

standard, we will affirm.” Belding v. Belding, 736 So. 2d 425, 427 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)

(citing Wright v. Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274, 280 (Miss. 1997)). “If there is substantial evidence

in the record to support fact-findings, no matter what contrary evidence there may also be,

the appellate court will uphold the chancellor.” Id. (citing Smith v. Jones, 654 So. 2d 480,

485 (Miss. 1995)). “The chancellor, by his presence in the courtroom, is best equipped to

listen to the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine their credibility and what

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weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those witnesses.” Rogers v. Morin, 791

So. 2d 816, 826 (¶39) (Miss. 2001).

DISCUSSION

¶14. The single issue Cox raises is whether the chancellor erred in awarding sole physical

custody to Upchurch. “[T]he Chancery Court enjoys a large amount of discretion in making

its determination of what is in the best interests of the child.” Id. at 820 (¶9). “[T]he polestar

consideration in child custody cases is the best interest and welfare of the child.” Albright,

437 So. 2d at 1005. “The Albright factors are a guide. They are not ‘the equivalent of a

mathematical formula.’” Lawrence v. Lawrence, 956 So. 2d 251, 258 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App.

2006) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 798 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (¶15) (Miss. 2001)).

¶15. “While it is necessary for the chancellor to make specific findings of fact under each

applicable Albright factor, it is not necessary for her to state who prevails under each factor.”

Weeks v. Weeks, 989 So. 2d 408, 411 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). “The Mississippi Supreme

Court has held that when the chancellor’s findings of facts are supported by substantial

evidence in the record, even when contrary evidence exists, we will uphold the chancellor’s

decision.” Id. at 412 (¶18) (citing Bower v. Bower, 758 So. 2d 405, 412 (¶31) (Miss. 2000)).

Further, the supreme court specifically held that because it found “evidence in the record to

support the chancellor’s analysis related to the [Albright] factors, [the supreme court found]

no error with the chancellor’s determination.” Id.

¶16. Looking at the record in the case before us, there is substantial evidence to support

the chancellor’s decision to award physical custody of A.R. to Upchurch. The chancellor

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made specific findings under each and every Albright factor. Further, the chancellor stated

specifically whether a factor favored Cox or Upchurch or was neutral. The chancellor’s

decision was based upon witnesses who testified at trial on behalf of both parties, the

testimony and report of the GAL, and the testimony at trial.

¶17. Ultimately, the chancellor found that Upchurch was more positioned to provide a

stable home and provide for A.R. in a consistent manner. Put another way, the chancellor

found Upchurch to have more favorable capacity to provide primary care for A.R. The

chancellor also found that Upchurch was in a better position to provide care for A.R. based

upon a review of the home, school, and community record. The chancellor’s conclusions

were consistent with the lengthy report submitted by the GAL. The chancellor’s decision, and

subsequent order, was based on the evidence and a detailed Albright analysis.

¶18. With regard to the factors favoring Upchurch, the chancellor made specific findings

explaining the decision. For willingness and capacity, the chancellor said both parents

exhibited a genuine willingness to provide primary care. In favoring Upchurch over Cox, the

chancellor stated that “because of the responsibilities that Tiffany has in spreading her

‘capacity’ between three children, especially two teenagers (in different schools and levels

of maturity), and Ryan having only A.R. and the benefit of close family assistance this

‘capacity’ weighs out in favor of Ryan. This factor favors him.” In favoring Upchurch over

Cox regarding the community record, the chancellor stated that “[b]ased upon the fact that

A.R. has lived predominately in Grenada County and is a happy child attending Miss Mary’s

with the owner of same saying that she’s doing well, along with the other members of the

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community testifying as to A.R.’s happiness, this factor favors Ryan.” And finally, regarding

stability, the chancellor stated that “[t]his factor favors Ryan as he is gainfully employed in

a family business that is certainly stable and he has been so employed for several years.

Coupled with the fact that he and A.R. reside in the home she was brought home from the

hospital to and is surrounded in close proximity to extended family, this factor favors Ryan.”

¶19. Both parties presented evidence and made arguments at trial. It is clear from the

record that the chancellor heard each and every argument made. Ultimately, the chancellor

made a decision based upon substantial evidence. Our supreme court has stated, “[W]hen

‘there is conflicting testimony, the chancellor, as the trier of fact, is the judge of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, as well as the interpretation of

evidence where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.’” Mayton v. Oliver,

247 So. 3d 312, 322 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 982 So. 2d 385,

395 (¶42) (Miss. 2008)).

¶20. Upon review, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong, was clearly

erroneous, or applied an incorrect legal standard in his Albright analysis. Substantial

evidence supported the chancellor’s findings. We therefore affirm the chancellor’s judgment

granting physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Upchurch.

¶21. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR.

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