State of Mississippi v. Verina Childs a/k/a Verina M. Childs a/k/a Verina Marie Childs

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-CA-00263-COA

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLANT

v.

VERINA CHILDS A/K/A VERINA M. CHILDS APPELLEE
A/K/A VERINA MARIE CHILDS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/05/2018
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE J. HOWARD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: SCOTT W. COLOM
MARC D. AMOS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW W. KITCHENS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 05/12/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND C. WILSON, JJ.

C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. An Oktibbeha County Circuit Court jury convicted Verina Childs of murdering her

husband, Doug Childs, in 2011. Verina was sentenced to serve life in prison in the custody

of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The supreme court affirmed

Verina’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Childs v. State, 133 So. 3d 348, 352 (¶19)

(Miss. 2013). Thereafter, Verina sought leave from the supreme court to file a motion for

post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) in the circuit court, which the supreme court granted

in part and denied in part. After filing her PCR motion in the circuit court, Verina moved to

amend her PCR motion to assert a new claim based on the State’s failure to instruct the jury
on venue—an essential element of the crime. After allowing the amendment, the circuit

court adjudicated Verina’s new claim, finding that the State’s failure to instruct the jury on

venue constituted reversible error. The State appealed. Because Verina did not first seek

leave from the supreme court to assert her newly-raised venue claim, the circuit court lacked

jurisdiction to consider the claim and thus abused its discretion in granting Verina’s motion

to amend her PCR petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the morning of November 22, 2009, Verina and her husband Doug went deer

hunting together. According to Verina, her stomach started hurting shortly after settling into

their separate hunting locations. Childs, 133 So. 3d at 349 (¶4). Verina sent Doug a text

message informing him that she was going back home. Id. Once she got home, she unloaded

her rifle, changed out of her hunting clothes, and sent Doug another text message stating that

she was going to stay home and clean around the house. Id. But Doug apparently never

received Verina’s text messages. Just after daybreak, Danny Fly, another local hunter, found

Doug’s lifeless body at the edge of the woods. Id. at (¶3). Officers searched Verina’s house

and found several loaded guns and a gun-cleaning kit next to Verina’s unloaded Marlin 30/30

rifle, which she had taken hunting. Id. at 350 (¶5). An autopsy later confirmed that Doug

died from a single gunshot wound in the back.

¶3. In January 2010, a grand jury indicted Verina for murder. Verina’s trial began on

August 1, 2011. The State’s prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence. At trial,

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Investigator Brett Watson testified that the “slug taken from Doug’s body matched the 30/30

[rifle] [Verina] had carried that day.” Id. at (¶8). Investigator Watson stated that “[t]he

30/30 was the rifle [Verina] admitted to carrying that day as well as the rifle that was found

. . . on their bed after Doug’s body was found on the hunting ground.” Id. at (¶9).

¶4. Pertinent to Verina’s present appeal, Investigator Watson established venue at trial,

as did Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Deputy William Ford, who had initially interviewed

Verina near the scene of the murder. Both testified that the murder occurred in Oktibbeha

County, Mississippi. Verina did not dispute venue at trial.

¶5. Prior to the jury’s deliberations, both the State and Verina offered instructions

covering the essential elements of murder. Verina’s proposed instruction included the

element of venue. However, Verina’s counsel withdrew the instruction because it was a

“direct evidence” instruction, not a “circumstantial evidence” one. Verina’s counsel did not

offer an alternative instruction and raised no objection to the State’s proposed instruction,

which contained circumstantial-evidence language but did not address venue, i.e., that the

jury was required to find that the murder took place in Oktibbeha County. The circuit court

gave the State’s instruction. The jury found Verina guilty of murder, and the circuit court

sentenced her to serve life in prison in the custody of the MDOC.

¶6. On September 30, 2011, Verina filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial.” The circuit court denied Verina’s

motion on October 11, 2011. Verina appealed, raising a number of issues. Id. at 349 (¶2).

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But Verina did not raise the lack-of-a-venue jury instruction or otherwise raise the venue of

the crime as an issue on direct appeal. The supreme court affirmed Verina’s conviction and

sentence. Id. at 352 (¶19).

¶7. Verina subsequently filed an application with the supreme court for leave to proceed

with a PCR motion alleging the following grounds: “(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) the

State withholding and/or knowingly destroying exculpatory evidence; (3) the existence of

biological evidence which warrants further testing; (4) an intervening decision of [the

supreme court] (i.e., Reith v. State, 135 So. 3d 862 (Miss. 2014)); and (5) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.” On February 11, 2015, the supreme court partially granted

Verina’s application, finding “that Verina’s intervening-decision claim lack[ed] an arguable

basis. But as to Verina’s remaining claims, the [supreme court] [found] that her application

[was] well-taken and should be granted.”

¶8. On March 2, 2015, Verina filed her PCR motion in the circuit court, asserting that

(1) there [was] a substantial likelihood that evidence discovered and/or
developed since her trial would have had an effect on the jury’s verdict; (2)
that biological evidence was gathered and either not tested or should be tested
again, and that such testing will show she should not have been convicted; (3)
her attorney rendered ineffective of counsel by . . . not investigating her case,
not preparing for trial, and/or not effectively representing her at trial; and (4)
the [S]tate withheld and/or knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence.

The circuit court ordered the State to respond. The Attorney General’s Office responded on

October 22, 2015, acknowledging that Verina was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The

Oktibbeha County District Attorney’s Office also filed a response on June 2, 2016, opposing

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any relief and contending that Verina was “not entitled to a second bite at the apple.”

¶9. The circuit court initially scheduled an evidentiary hearing but continued that hearing

so Verina could obtain additional discovery, including a forensic analysis of Doug’s cell

phone. Meanwhile, this Court issued a decision in Wordlaw v. State, 218 So. 3d 768 (Miss.

Ct. App. 2017). In Wordlaw, we held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on

venue constituted reversible error because venue was an essential element of the charged

crime in that case. Id. at 769, 771 (¶¶8, 15-16). Because the State failed to instruct the jury

on venue, we reversed and remanded Wordlaw’s conviction for a new trial. Id. at 768 (¶2).

¶10. Relying on Wordlaw, Verina filed a “Motion to Amend and Supplement Motion for

Post-Conviction Relief” in the circuit court on August 31, 2017. Verina asserted that the

State’s failure to include venue in the jury instructions in Verina’s case likewise amounted

to reversible error because venue was an essential element of murder. Verina argued that her

new claim arose out of the “same conduct, transactions and occurrences alleged in the

original PCR.” She also asserted that she raised the sufficiency of the jury instructions

(though not the State’s failure to offer a venue instruction) as part of her ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim in her original PCR motion. After hearing argument, the circuit

court granted Verina’s motion to amend and found that the amended pleading related back

to her original PCR motion. Verina then filed her amended PCR motion, asserting her new

venue claim.

¶11. On February 5, 2018, the circuit court granted Verina’s amended PCR motion. In its

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order, the circuit court stated that it “fe[lt] that since venue is considered an essential element

of the criminal process (Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantees the

right of a defendant to have ‘a public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the

offense was committed.’), [venue] should [have been] included as an essential element in

[the] jury instructions.” Based on this finding, the circuit court ordered a new trial. Because

the circuit court granted relief on this issue, it did not reach the merits of the other issues

raised by Verina in her original PCR motion.

¶12. The State timely appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in granting Verina’s

amended PCR motion. Specifically, the State asserts that (1) venue cannot be raised for the

first time in PCR proceedings; (2) Rooks v. State,1 rather than Wordlaw, is controlling; and

(3) the State’s failure to instruct the jury on venue did not constitute reversible error because

venue was not an issue at trial. However, though not raised by the parties, we find that the

circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Verina’s new claim because she did not obtain

leave from the supreme court to assert it. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked discretion to

grant Verina’s motion to amend her PCR motion, and we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13. In reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of a PCR motion, “we will only disturb the

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Rooks v. State, 529 So. 2d 546, 556-57 (Miss. 1988) (holding that defendants were
not entitled to a venue instruction unless some evidence was adduced that venue was not
proper in the particular county).

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trial court’s decision if it is clearly erroneous . . . .” Smith v. State, 270 So. 3d 1066, 1069

(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). “A trial court’s [grant or] denial of a motion to amend a

complaint is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Faye v. State, 859 So. 2d

393, 394 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). However, “[w]e apply a de novo

standard of review to questions of law, legal conclusions, and jurisdictional questions.” Allen

v. State, 288 So. 3d 358, 360 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Aladdin Constr. Co. v. John

Hancock Life Ins. Co., 914 So. 2d 169, 174 (¶8) (Miss. 2005)), cert. denied, 287 So. 3d 217

(Miss. 2020).

DISCUSSION

¶14. The circuit court granted Verina’s motion for leave to amend her PCR motion to assert

her new venue-instruction claim pursuant to Rule 15 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil

Procedure.2 Generally, under Rule 15, such “leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” M.R.C.P. 15(a). “But the PCR statutes do not provide an unfettered right to

present claims not alleged in the PCR motion.” Brandon v. State, 108 So. 3d 999, 1007 (¶25)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act

(UPCCRA),

[w]here [a petitioner’s] conviction and sentence have been affirmed on appeal
or the appeal has been dismissed, the motion under this article shall not be
filed in the trial court until the motion shall have first been presented to a
quorum of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi . . . and an order

2
Civil Rule 15 is applicable because PCR proceedings are civil, not criminal, in
nature.

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granted allowing the filing of such motion in the trial court.

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7. “When a case is affirmed on direct appeal, permission from the

Mississippi Supreme Court must be obtained in order to seek post-conviction relief in the

circuit court.” Doss v. State, 126 So. 3d 1026, 1028 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis

added) (quoting Campbell v. State, 75 So. 3d 1160, 1161-62 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)).

“This procedure is not merely advisory, but jurisdictional.” Chandler v. State, 190 So. 3d

509, 511 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Dunaway v. State, 111 So. 3d 117, 118 (¶6)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2013)).

¶15. “Subject matter jurisdiction, which is succinctly defined as the authority of a court to

hear and decide a particular case, depends on the type of case at issue, and [a court] ha[s] the

primary duty, sua sponte, to determine whether a particular case lies within [its] jurisdiction.”

Common Cause of Miss. v. Smith, 548 So. 2d 412, 414 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted). As

applied to claims asserted under the UPCCRA, a circuit court lacks authority to adjudicate

a PCR motion whenever the petitioner fails first to obtain permission from the supreme court

to file her motion in circuit court. Forkner v. State, 227 So. 3d 404, 405-06 (¶5) (Miss.

2017)); see also Allen, 288 So. 3d at 361 (¶11) (finding that because petitioner failed to

obtain permission from the supreme court to file a PCR motion, “the circuit court lacked

authority to adjudicate [it]”); Cortez v. State, 9 So. 3d 445, 446 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)

(finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear PCR motion because petitioner “failed

to obtain the required permission from the supreme court”).

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¶16. Here, while Verina sought and was granted leave to file a PCR motion by the supreme

court, she failed to raise any venue-instruction claim in her application for leave to proceed.

Specifically, her application sought leave to assert PCR claims based on

(1) newly discovered evidence; (2) the State withholding and/or knowingly
destroying exculpatory evidence; (3) the existence of biological evidence
which warrants further testing; (4) an intervening decision of [the supreme
court] (i.e., Reith v. State, 135 So. 3d 862 (Miss. 2014)); and (5) ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.

The supreme court granted Verina’s request for leave to proceed as to four of her five claims,

finding that “[Verina’s] intervening-decision claims lack[ed] an arguable basis.” Verina then

filed her initial PCR motion in the circuit court, asserting those claims for which the supreme

court had granted leave to proceed.

¶17. However, the fact that the supreme court granted Verina leave to proceed did not give

Verina “an unfettered right to present claims not alleged in the PCR motion.” Brandon, 108

So. 3d at 1007 (¶25); see Howard v. State, 171 So. 3d 566, 568 (¶¶9-11) (Miss. Ct. App.

2015) (affirming circuit court’s denial of leave to amend PCR motion because court “had no

authority to go beyond the supreme court’s order and consider [the movant’s] additional

issues”). Likewise, the circuit court’s discretion to grant Verina leave to amend her PCR

motion to assert a new claim was circumscribed by the jurisdictional requirements set forth

in the UPCCRA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7; Chandler, 190 So. 3d at 511 (¶6);

Howard, 171 So. 3d at 568 (¶11); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev. 2015)

(stating that UPCCRA provides “an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral

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review of convictions and sentences”). Because Verina did not first obtain leave from the

supreme court to challenge the State’s failure to instruct the jury as to the venue of the

murder, “the circuit court lacked authority to adjudicate [the amended motion].” Allen, 288

So. 3d at 361 (¶11).

¶18. We acknowledge that Verina’s initial PCR claims were already pending in circuit

court when we handed down our decision in Wordlaw v. State, the intervening decision on

which Verina bases her venue-instruction claim in her amended PCR motion. See Wordlaw,

218 So. 3d at 770 (¶15) (holding that trial court’s failure to instruct jury on essential element

of venue constituted reversible error); but see Rooks, 529 So. 2d at 556 (Miss. 1988) (holding

that defendants were not entitled to a venue instruction unless they presented some evidence

that venue was not proper). Regardless of the merits of Verina’s reliance on Wordlaw, we

are aware of no exception from the jurisdictional procedure set forth in section 99-39-7

applicable to a PCR claim based on an intervening appellate decision. Cf. Order, Smith v.

State, 2013-M-00205, at 1 (Miss. Dec. 13, 2018) (denying petitioner’s application to file

PCR motion in circuit court because court “will not consider venue questions raised for the

first time in post-conviction proceedings”) (citing Order, Page v. State, 2013-M-01645

(Miss. Dec. 17, 2015)); Order, Mason v. State, 2015-M-00423, at 1-2 (Miss. Oct. 22, 2015)

(citing Moreno v. State, 79 So. 3d 508 (Miss. 2012)) (same).

¶19. Put differently, a petitioner whose conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct

appeal cannot accomplish indirectly (via a motion to amend a pending PCR motion in the

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circuit court) what she could not do directly under the UPCCRA—namely, assert new PCR

claims in the circuit court without first obtaining leave from the supreme court to do so.

Under the UPCCRA’s statutory framework, Verina was required first to seek leave from the

supreme court to assert her venue-instruction claim based on Wordlaw, and Verina could

proceed only if such leave was granted. Because Verina’s venue-instruction claim was not

first considered by the supreme court, the circuit court lacked authority to adjudicate it. See

Howard, 171 So. 3d at 568 (¶11). It follows that the circuit court lacked discretion to allow

Verina to amend her PCR motion to assert the new claim. We therefore reverse the circuit

court’s order granting Verina’s amended PCR motion and remand for further proceedings

as to the claims asserted in Verina’s initial PCR motion.3

¶20. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,
WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.
McCARTY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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Our determination that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Verina’s
venue-instruction claim is without prejudice to the merits of that claim or to Verina’s ability
to petition the supreme court for leave to proceed consistent with section 99-39-7.

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