MSC 166654 PEOPLE OF MI V ANDREW MICHAEL CZARNECKI Opinion on Application - Remand to TC 4/10/2025

PEOPLE v TAYLOR
PEOPLE v CZARNECKI
Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654. Argued on application for leave to appeal January 22,
2025. Decided April 10, 2025.
In Docket No. 166654, Andrew M. Czarnecki was convicted following a jury trial in the
Wayne Circuit Court of having committed, among other offenses, first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), when he was 19 years old. As required by MCL 750.316, the court,
Michael M. Hathaway, J., sentenced Czarnecki to mandatory life in prison without the possibility
of parole (LWOP) for the murder conviction. Czarnecki appealed, and in an unpublished per
curiam opinion issued on June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732), the Court of Appeals, O’B RIEN,
P.J., and S TEPHENS and B OONSTRA , JJ., affirmed Czarnecki’s sentences and convictions.
Czarnecki sought leave to appeal. While the application was pending, the Supreme Court granted
Czarnecki’s motion to add as an issue to the application the question of whether his LWOP
sentence was constitutional, and the Court held the appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme
Court’s decision in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022). Thereafter, the Supreme Court held in
Parks that a statute subjecting 18-year-old offenders to mandatory LWOP constitutes
unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution and
that while a judge can still sentence an 18-year-old to LWOP, 18-year-old defendants convicted
of first-degree murder are entitled to the full protections that exist within the individualized
sentencing procedure of MCL 769.25 prior to that determination. After Parks was decided, the
Supreme Court denied Czarnecki’s application in part but remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration in light of Parks. 510 Mich 1093 (2022). On remand and on
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed Czarnecki’s sentence, reasoning that Parks did not
expressly apply to anyone older than age 18 and that Parks did not expressly overrule People v
Hall, 396 Mich 650 (1978), which held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder did not violate
Const 1963, art 1, § 16. ___ Mich App ___ (December 14, 2023) (Docket No. 348732).
In Docket No. 166428, Montario M. Taylor was convicted following a jury trial in the
Genesee Circuit Court of having committed first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, when he was 20 years old. The court, Richard
B. Yuille, J., sentenced Taylor to mandatory LWOP for the first-degree murder conviction and to
a consecutive term of two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. Taylor appealed,
raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. In
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice:
Elizabeth T. Clement
Justices:
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

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an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349544), the Court of
Appeals, S HAPIRO , P.J., and B ORRELLO and O’B RIEN, JJ., affirmed Taylor’s convictions and
sentences and specifically rejected Taylor’s argument that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a
defendant who committed first-degree murder as a 20-year-old violates US Const, Am VIII or
Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Taylor sought leave to appeal. After Parks was decided, the Supreme
Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the constitutionality of
Taylor’s LWOP sentence, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light
of Parks, and denied leave in all other respects. 511 Mich 901 (2023). On remand, in an
unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 5, 2023, the Court of Appeals, S HAPIRO , P.J.,
and B ORRELLO and O’B RIEN, JJ., affirmed Taylor’s sentence, noting (1) the “self-limited scope of
the Parks opinion”; (2) the binding decision in People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346
Mich App 213 (2023), which held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the 21-year-old
defendant convicted of first-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16; and (3) the
continuing binding nature of Hall.
Czarnecki and Taylor separately sought leave to appeal. In Czarnecki’s case, the Supreme
Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address whether the holding
in Parks should be extended to individuals who commit first-degree murder when they are 19 years
old. In addition, Czarnecki was ordered to address whether such an extension required overruling
Hall, which upheld as constitutional a mandatory term of LWOP for a felony murder committed
by a 17-year-old defendant. 513 Mich 1146 (2024). In Taylor’s case, after initially holding the
case in abeyance, the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties
to address whether Parks should be extended to individuals who commit first-degree murder when
they are 20 years old, as well as whether such an extension required overruling Hall. ___ Mich
___ (October 30, 2024) (Docket No. 166428).
In an opinion by Justice WELCH, joined by Justices B ERNSTEIN, C AVANAGH , B OLDEN, and
THOMAS , the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
The Court’s decision in Parks was extended to individuals who were 19 or 20 years old at
the time of the crime for which they were convicted. Mandatorily subjecting 19- and 20-year-old
defendants convicted of first-degree murder to an LWOP sentence violates the principle of
proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution and constitutes unconstitutionally cruel
punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s automatic LWOP sentences
were unconstitutional. While a judge can still sentence 19- or 20-year-olds to LWOP, Czarnecki,
Taylor, and other 19- or 20-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder are entitled to the
full protections that exist within the individualized sentencing procedures of MCL 769.25 or MCL
769.25a before that determination. This rule applies retroactively to criminal cases on collateral
review. It was unnecessary to overrule Hall at this time, and its holding remained viable so long
as the defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the offense.
1. Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s Constitution provides that “cruel or unusual punishment
shall not be inflicted[.]” The state’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment is broader and
more protective than that of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. To determine what constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment, courts must consider evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

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maturing society. Article 1, § 16 also requires that criminal sentences be proportional to the
circumstances of the offense and of the offender such that excessive imprisonment is prohibited.
As set forth in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167 (1972), and reaffirmed in People v Bullock, 440
Mich 15 (1992), and Parks, when evaluating whether a sentence is proportional under Const 1963,
art 1, § 16, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the
offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and
preference for rehabilitation. Courts have an obligation to consider objective, undisputed scientific
evidence when determining whether a punishment is cruel or unusual as to a certain class of
defendants. In Parks, the Supreme Court held that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants
to LWOP violates the principle of proportionality and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel
punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and that such defendants are entitled to an individualized
resentencing hearing under MCL 769.25. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted the United
States Supreme Court’s recognition in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v
Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), that a defendant’s youth at the time of committing a crime is
relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the punishment imposed. The Parks decision was
also motivated by a concern for the severity of mandatory punishment given that a lifetime in
prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children. As required by Parks, when
a prosecutor files a motion under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a to seek LWOP for a defendant
who was 18 years old when they committed the sentencing offense, there is a rebuttable
presumption against LWOP that the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence
at a hearing. During such hearings, the sentencing court must consider any relevant attributes of
youth associated with the defendant as a mitigating factor.
2. To resolve whether Parks should be extended to 19- and 20-year-olds, the Court looked
to objective, undisputed scientific research regarding the late-adolescent brain, the legal rights of
late adolescents, and the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for late adolescents. Modern and
unrebutted developments in such research established that characteristics that are intrinsic to the
cognitive and social development of juveniles, such as an increased susceptibility to peer pressure,
result in their having both diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, and thus make
them less deserving of the most severe punishments. Because 19- and 20-year-olds are more
similar to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults, the scientific research relied
on by the Parks Court applied equally to 19- and 20-year-old individuals. While some state and
federal laws provide 18-year-olds with new legal rights and privileges, society generally does not
recognize these individuals as full adults until the age of 21, as indicated by laws applying to the
right or privilege to serve as an elected state legislator, consume or possess alcohol or recreational
cannabis, obtain a concealed pistol license, or open a credit card without a cosigner. To determine
the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-old defendants, the four-factor
Lorentzen-Bullock test was applied. Considering the first factor, while first-degree murder is one
of the most severe and heinous crimes an individual can commit, mandatory LWOP is the most
severe punishment that can be imposed. Imposing an LWOP sentence on late adolescents will
result in them inevitably serving more time and a greater percentage of their life in prison as
compared to older adult offenders. However, the impulsivity of the late-adolescent brain is
transient and capable of change, making imposition of mandatory LWOP on this class of
individuals particularly cruel; it also prevents trial courts from tailoring the sentence imposed to
the defendant. The second factor, comparing the punishment for first-degree murder to that of

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other crimes in Michigan, mandatory LWOP is the harshest sentence and can only be imposed for
a limited number of convictions that are highly dangerous offenses and reflect a high degree of
moral guilt. As is true for 18-year-olds, late-adolescent defendants who are convicted and
sentenced to LWOP will often serve more time in prison than older individuals convicted of the
identical crime. Relevant to the third factor, which is comparing punishments imposed in other
jurisdictions for the same offense, is that Michigan is among a minority of states that legislatively
mandate LWOP for all individuals convicted of first-degree murder. Further, the United Kingdom
prohibits LWOP sentences for anyone under the age of 21, and in Canada all sentences of life
without a realistic possibility of parole are unconstitutional for all convicted offenders, regardless
of age. These national and international trends illustrate that the evolving standards of decency
are trending away from imposing mandatory LWOP on late adolescents. With regard to the fourth
and final factor, as evidenced by historical practices in Michigan, this state has a longstanding goal
of and preference for punishments that allow for rehabilitation, and it is undisputed that this goal
is not accomplished when a mandatory LWOP sentence is imposed. Accordingly, all four factors
weighed in favor of requiring individualized sentencing before a trial court may impose a sentence
of LWOP on a 19- or 20-year-old. In People v Poole, ___ Mich ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No.
166813), the Court held that Parks applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review.
The Poole retroactivity analysis applied equally in this case; therefore, this holding applied
retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review.
3. The continued viability of Hall was questionable given the evolution of federal and state
precedent interpreting US Const, Am XIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, since the case was decided.
However, it was unnecessary to overrule Hall because when the Hall Court rejected the
defendant’s facial challenge, it did not address the issue of sentencing a juvenile to an LWOP
sentence. Thus, Hall was inapplicable to the as-applied challenge brought by Czarnecki and
Taylor in these cases, and the holding in Hall remained viable so long as the defendant was at least
21 years old at the time of the offense.
4. In this case, Czarnecki and Taylor were 19 years old and 20 years old, respectively,
when they committed the premeditated murders for which they were convicted. Both were
sentenced to mandatory LWOP as required by MCL 750.316, but neither defendant received the
specialized procedures mandated by MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a before those sentences were
imposed, despite being members of a class presumptively neurologically indistinguishable from
either a teenage juvenile offender or an 18-year-old offender. Czarnecki and Taylor were entitled
to be resentenced in accordance with MCL 769.25, this opinion, and relevant caselaw because the
procedures used at their sentencing hearings violated Michigan’s Constitution. The Supreme
Court denied leave in all other respects for failure to persuade the Court of the need for review.
Court of Appeals’ opinion on remand in each case reversed, each defendant’s sentence for
first-degree murder vacated, and each case remanded to the appropriate circuit court for
resentencing.
Justice B ERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely agreed with the
majority’s analysis and with the conclusion that the imposition of mandatory LWOP on 19- and
20-year-old offenders violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. He wrote separately to note his
disagreement with a bright-line rule drawn at age 21, explaining that bright-line rules are

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problematic because they are underinclusive. However, if drawing any line were necessary,
Justice B ERNSTEIN would have drawn the line at 25 to be in line with the relevant scientific studies
regarding late-adolescent brain development. The better approach would be to allow for a shifting
age-based presumption that could consider individual characteristics of diminished culpability, but
these cases did not present the Court with the opportunity to consider such an option.
Chief Justice C LEMENT, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would not have extended
Parks’s rule to offenders who were 19 and 20 years old when they committed first-degree
premeditated murder because Const 1963, art 1, § 16 did not compel that result. When applying
the first factor considered in the Lorentzen-Bullock proportionality test, the gravity of the offense
as opposed to the severity of the punishment, first-degree premeditated murder is arguably the
gravest offense under Michigan law, and it deserves the most severe sentence in Michigan. The
majority overemphasized the characteristics of the offender who committed the offense by
focusing on the length of time a young defendant will spend in prison as compared with an older
offender, rather than focusing on the offense committed. By doing so, the majority downplayed
the gravity of first-degree murder and instead erroneously focused on the actuarial life expectancy
of the offender in its constitutional analysis. Chief Justice C LEMENT agreed that young offenders
are still developing neurologically but stated that it was up to the Legislature to prohibit LWOP
for 19- and 20-year-old offenders, not the judiciary. Thus, the first factor weighed in favor of
constitutionality. The second factor, the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties
imposed on other offenders in Michigan, also weighed in favor of finding the penalty
constitutional. The Legislature exercised its judgment that some crimes are so severe, and those
who commit them so culpable, that LWOP is the only appropriate punishment. That mandatory
LWOP applies to other homicide offenses, as well as to the nonhomicide offense of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, underscores that Michigan law recognizes that the most serious crimes—
whether or not they involve the taking of life—are so severe that parole should never be an option.
The third factor, the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed
for the same offense in other states, weighed in favor of finding the penalty constitutional.
Michigan’s sentencing scheme is consistent with those in a substantial portion of the country,
which distinguished these cases from pre-Parks precedent such as Bullock and Lorentzen. The
majority’s use of selective and nonbinding out-of-state court decisions and foreign law was
unpersuasive. Finally, although the fourth factor, whether the penalty imposed advances the
penological goal of rehabilitation, did not weigh in favor of the penalty’s constitutionality given
that a defendant sentenced to mandatory LWOP has little realistic chance for parole, rehabilitation
is only one of several sentencing goals. Nevertheless, given that the first three factors strongly
favored a finding of constitutionality as applied to 19- and 20-year-old offenders, Chief Justice
C LEMENT would have held that mandatory LWOP is constitutional as applied to this class of
offenders. The majority’s reliance on neuroscience to reach its conclusion demonstrated that its
decision was based in large part on policy, and policy decisions should be left to the Legislature.
Finally, the majority’s further extension of Miller’s protections to 19- and 20-year-old offenders
had no logical stopping point and opened the door to other related claims.

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FILED April 10, 2025
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 166428
MONTARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 166654
ANDREW MICHAEL CZARNECKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
W ELCH , J.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION Chief Justice:
Elizabeth T. Clement
Justices:
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas

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2
Following separate and unrelated jury trials, defendants were each convicted of
first-degree murder. Defendant Andrew Czarnecki was 19 years old at the time of his
offense, while defendant Montario Taylor was 20 years old at the time of his. Each
defendant was sentenced to a legislatively mandated punishment of life in prison without
the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendants argue that the mandatory nature of their
sentences violates Michigan’s prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment,” Const
1963, art 1, § 16, and they ask us to extend our decision in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225,
268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), where we held that, under our state Constitution, mandatory
LWOP sentences are cruel or unusual when applied to 18-year-olds.
We agree with defendants and extend Parks to individuals who were 19 or 20 years
old at the time of the crime for which they were convicted. Our Constitution and caselaw
interpreting it requires us to evaluate the proportionality of defendants’ sentences. To do
so, we use the factors laid out in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972),
and People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), which incorporate evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized society. Late adolescents who
are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating
characteristics of late-adolescent brain development. The same considerations that were
discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents. Accordingly,
as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory
LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or
the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of
Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Czarnecki and Taylor are, therefore, entitled to be resentenced in
the manner set forth in MCL 769.25 and our relevant caselaw.

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3
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PEOPLE v CZARNECKI
Andrew Czarnecki is serving a mandatory LWOP sentence for his role in the
premediated murder of Gavino Rodriguez. Czarnecki was 19 years old when he
participated in the murder. Czarnecki was charged with first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(a); first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); armed robbery,
MCL 750.529; carjacking, MCL 750.529a; and mutilating a dead body, MCL 750.160.
During the five-day jury trial in late 2018, the prosecution presented various forms of
evidence to support its theory that Czarnecki and Hameer Alkotiat jointly participated in
the murder of Rodriguez.1
The jury acquitted Czarnecki of carjacking but otherwise found him guilty as
charged. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the first-degree felony-murder conviction
and imposed a mandatory sentence of LWOP for first-degree premeditated murder, 11 to
20 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, and 4 1 /2 to 10 years’ imprisonment for
mutilation of a dead body.
Czarnecki appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Czarnecki’s
conviction. People v Czarnecki, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732). Czarnecki sought leave to appeal in this Court,
1 Although Alkotiat was scheduled to be tried jointly with Czarnecki, he was granted a last-
minute adjournment because his attorney experienced an unexpected medical issue.
Alkotiat later pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and was sentenced
to a minimum term of 18 years’ imprisonment. People v Czarnecki, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732), p 2
n 2. According to the Michigan Department of Corrections’ Offender Tracking
Information System, Alkotiat was 18 years old when he participated in the murder.

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4
raising many of the issues argued below. Czarnecki also asserted that a mandatory sentence
of LWOP for a murder committed when he was 19 years old is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VIII, or the analogous
provision of Michigan’s Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. After first holding
Czarnecki’s application in abeyance to await this Court’s decision in Parks, 510 Mich 225,
we remanded to the Court of Appeals “for consideration of whether the defendant’s
mandatory sentence of life without parole for a murder committed at the age of 19 is cruel
or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Czarnecki, 510 Mich 1093,
1093 (2022). We denied leave to appeal in all other respects. Id.
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed Czarnecki’s sentence of LWOP in a
unanimous published decision. People v Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration),
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 14, 2023) (Docket No. 348732). The panel
noted that Parks did not expressly apply to anyone older than age 18 and that Parks
expressly did not overrule People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1978),
which held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1,
§ 16. Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.
The panel also observed that this Court denied the defendant’s application for leave to
appeal from the decision in People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213,
219; 12 NW3d 35 (2023),2 which held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the 21-
year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.
2 See People v Adamowicz, 513 Mich 869 (2023).

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5
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Hall remained binding precedent for
defendants older than 18 and that Czarnecki’s mandatory sentence of LWOP was therefore
not unconstitutional. Id. at ___; slip op at 3.
B. PEOPLE v TAYLOR
Montario Taylor is serving a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the premeditated
murder of Montel Wright inside Wright’s home in Flint, Michigan on October 24, 2016.
Taylor was 20 years old when he committed the murder. Taylor’s first trial resulted in a
hung jury. Following the second trial, a jury convicted Taylor of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced
Taylor to a mandatory term of LWOP for the murder conviction, plus a mandatory
consecutive two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction.
Taylor appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising various alleged errors, including a
challenge to the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. The Court rejected each of these
arguments and affirmed Taylor’s convictions and sentences. People v Taylor, unpublished
per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349544).
The panel specifically rejected Taylor’s argument that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a
20-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder violates US Const, Am VIII, or
Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Id. at 12-13.
Taylor sought leave to appeal in this Court. After we issued our decision in Parks,
we vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision concerning the constitutionality
of Taylor’s sentence and remanded to that Court for reconsideration in light of Parks.
People v Taylor, 511 Mich 901 (2023). We denied leave to appeal in all other respects.

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6
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed Taylor’s sentence. People v Taylor (On
Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 5, 2023
(Docket No. 349544). The panel noted the “self-limited scope of the Parks opinion,” the
recent binding decision in Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213, and the
continued binding nature of Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658. Taylor (On Remand), unpub op at
2-3. The Court determined that it was bound by Hall and Adamowicz (On Second Remand),
and on that basis, it rejected Taylor’s argument that his mandatory sentence of LWOP
violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Taylor (On Remand), unpub op at 3.
C. THE CURRENT APPEALS BEFORE THIS COURT
Both Czarnecki and Taylor sought leave to appeal to this Court. In Czarnecki’s
case, we ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address
whether our holding in Parks regarding mandatory LWOP should be extended to a 19-
year-old defendant, whether such an extension requires overruling Hall, and if so, whether
Hall should be overruled. People v Czarnecki, 513 Mich 1146, 1146 (2024). While
initially held in abeyance, we ordered oral argument on the application in Taylor’s case
and directed the parties to address the same questions posed in our order for Czarnecki, but
with a focus on 20-year-old defendants. People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; 12 NW3d
444 (2024).3 Arguments on Taylor’s application took place during the same session as the
arguments in Czarnecki’s case and in People v Poole (Docket No. 166813), which
concerned the retroactivity of our decision in Parks.
3 We also vacated our previous order directing oral argument in People v Bouie (Docket
No. 166232) and placed the application in that case in abeyance pending resolution of
Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s appeals. People v Bouie, ___ Mich ___; 12 NW3d 437 (2024).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a legislatively imposed mandatory punishment violates Const 1963, art 1,
§ 16 is a question of law. This Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.
Parks, 510 Mich at 245. “ ‘[T]he ultimate authority with regard to the meaning and
application of’ ” Michigan’s Constitution rests solely with this Court. Id., quoting Bullock,
440 Mich at 27.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Michigan’s Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall
witnesses be unreasonably detained.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis added).
Determining what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is guided by “ ‘evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ”4 Parks, 510 Mich at
241, quoting Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179. As we recently reaffirmed, “[t]he definition of
this standard is ‘progressive and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’ ” Id., quoting Lorentzen, 387
4 The United States Supreme Court has also traditionally read the Eighth Amendment
through the lens of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society . . . .” Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 561; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “By protecting even those convicted of heinous
crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity
of all persons.” Id. at 560. “The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the
imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.” Graham v
Florida, 560 US 48, 59; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010). We reject the Wayne
County Prosecutor’s invitation to abandon our longstanding use of the evolving-standards-
of-decency lens for analysis of punishments under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

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Mich at 179. Inherent in this standard is the understanding that as society progresses,
punishments that were once acceptable can later be considered cruel or unusual. By
necessity, the test “looks to comparative law for guidelines in determining what penalties
are widely regarded as proper for the offense in question.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179.
In Bullock, 440 Mich at 30-35, we held that the state prohibition on “ ‘cruel or
unusual punishment,’ ” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis added), is broader and more
protective than the prohibition against “ ‘cruel and unusual’ ” punishment contained in US
Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). We were compelled to reach this conclusion based on
textual differences, historical factors, and longstanding Michigan precedent.5 Bullock, 440
Mich at 30-35. Additionally, Const 1963, art 1, § 16 requires that criminal sentences be
proportional to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender such that excessive
imprisonment is prohibited. Id. at 33-34. These constitutional mandates can require the
“analytically difficult and politically unpopular” step of “overrid[ing] a democratically
expressed judgment of the Legislature.” Id. at 41. After all, “[t]he very purpose of a
constitution is to subject the passing judgments of temporary legislative or political
majorities to the deeper, more profound judgment of the people reflected in the
constitution, the enforcement of which is entrusted to our judgment.” Id.
Accordingly, to evaluate the proportionality of a punishment under Michigan’s
Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the
punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same
5 We reject the invitation of the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan to abandon
our 33-year-old precedent in Bullock that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 is broader and more
protective than the Eighth Amendment.

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jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same
offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation. Parks,
510 Mich at 242, citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34; Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181. In
Parks, we concluded that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of
first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of
proportionality derived from” Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Parks, 510 Mich at 268.
B. PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR LATE
ADOLESCENTS
Our decision in Parks drew from several sources, including the United States
Supreme Court’s admonishment regarding the constitutional sentencing of youth,
Michigan’s constitutional text and caselaw, and scientific consensus concerning late-
adolescent development. We recognized that when applying the Eighth Amendment, the
United States Supreme Court had already recognized that a defendant’s youth at the time
of committing a crime was relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the punishment
imposed. Parks, 510 Mich at 234-241. Youth was a key factor in that Court’s decision to
abolish the death penalty for juvenile offenders, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551; 125 S Ct
1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005); to abolish all LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses
committed by juveniles, Graham v Florida, 560 US 48; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825
(2010); and to abolish mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, Miller v Alabama, 567
US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012).6
6 In each case, the United States Supreme Court defined “juvenile” as an individual under
the age of 18 at the time the sentencing offense was committed. See Roper, 543 US at 555-
556; Graham, 560 US at 52-53, 74-75, 81; Miller, 567 US at 465.

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Like the United States Supreme Court, we recognized that because characteristics
that are intrinsic to the cognitive and social development of juveniles mean that they have
both diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, they are thus “ ‘less deserving
of the most severe punishments.’ ” Parks, 510 Mich at 235, quoting Miller, 567 US at 471.
Miller was later clarified as providing not merely a procedural protection but, instead, a
substantive federal constitutional protection in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190; 136
S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). Although that holding was potentially limited by Jones
v Mississippi, 593 US 98, 110 n 4; 141 S Ct 1307; 209 L Ed 2d 390 (2021), “Miller,
Montgomery, and Jones did not question or reform the bright [age-based] line drawn in
Roper.” Parks, 510 Mich at 246. Nor did the Jones Court overturn precedent holding that
youth matters in sentencing, as we recognized in People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 193; 987
NW2d 58 (2022). While Michiganders cannot receive less constitutional protection than
that provided under the federal Constitution, we noted that Michigan’s broader
constitutional prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” under Const 1963, art 1,
§ 16, did not require us to draw the same line as federal courts when determining which
class of adolescents receives constitutional protection. See id. at 247-248.
The United States Supreme Court has also warned against mandatorily imposing the
harshest punishment available. See Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 292-293; 96
S Ct 2978; 49 L Ed 2d 944 (1976) (opinion by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
(invalidating mandatory death penalty statutes as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”).
We share this concern and have previously found that our state Constitution provides
greater protection than the federal Constitution against extreme mandatory punishments.
Compare Bullock, 440 Mich at 21, 30, 37-41 (invalidating as cruel or unusual a mandatory

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LWOP sentence for the conviction of possession of 650 grams or more of any mixture
containing cocaine), with Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957; 111 S Ct 2680; 115 L Ed 2d
836 (1991) (refusing to invalidate a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for the conviction of possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine on the grounds
that it was not unusual). Although we did not cite Woodson or Harmelin, our decision in
Parks was similarly motivated by this concern for mandatory punishment, as we noted that
“a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children[.]”
Parks 510 Mich at 240 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 195, in
turn quoting Miller, 567 US at 195, in turn quoting Roper, 543 US at 573.
Parks also relied on modern developments in scientific and social-science research
concerning the “characteristics of the late-adolescent 18-year-old brain.” Id. at 248. These
considerations were consistent with the approach used by the United States Supreme Court
when applying the Eighth Amendment and were required by our Constitution given our
responsibility to “consider objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining
whether a punishment is unconstitutional as to a certain class of defendants.” Parks, 510
Mich at 249. We noted the consensus that the late-adolescent brain carries exceptional
neuroplasticity during this crucial stage of cognitive development, which has “significant
consequences for young adults’ behavior.” Id. at 250. We adopted the unrefuted
conclusion that, in terms of neurological development, “there is no meaningful distinction
between” a 17-year-old and an 18-year-old, and we observed that this stage of
neuroplasticity “blurs the already thin societal line between childhood and young
adulthood.” Id. at 252.

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Applying the four-factor test outlined in Bullock and Lorentzen, we concluded that
imposition of mandatory LWOP for an 18-year-old individual without consideration of
their relevant attributes of youth or potential for rehabilitation resulted in “unusually
excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or
unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255.
We therefore held that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to LWOP was
unconstitutional and that such defendants are entitled to an individualized resentencing
hearing. Id. at 267-268. We also made clear that other decisions of this Court providing
juvenile offenders additional legal protections even when convicted of heinous crimes,
including “all protections afforded by MCL 769.25,” applied to 18-year-old defendants.7
Parks, 510 Mich at 267. The default term-of-years sentence for an 18-year-old defendant
is therefore a minimum of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of at least 60
years’ imprisonment. Id. at 267 n 19, citing MCL 769.25(9). And when a prosecutor files
7 The Legislature enacted MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a after the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller. The enactment of MCL 769.25 eliminated mandatory sentences
of LWOP for juveniles affected by Miller, and MCL 769.25a created a resentencing
scheme that would apply if Miller was given retroactive application. People v Boykin, 510
Mich 171, 180 n 2; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). The statutes did not eliminate the possibility of
LWOP for first-degree murder for affected defendants, but it eliminated mandatory
sentences by creating a procedure through which a prosecutor could seek an LWOP
sentence. Id. The statutes further specified the procedures and findings required of
sentencing and resentencing hearings for affected defendants, whether life imprisonment
was sought or not. Id. These sentencing procedures are colloquially known as “Miller
hearings.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 122; 987 NW2d 132 (2022). After the statutes
were enacted, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller applied retroactively.
Montgomery, 577 US 190. Thus, these statutes set forth the sentencing and resentencing
procedures for when a prosecutor seeks an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender. In
Parks, we extended the same procedures to 18-year-old defendants. Parks, 510 Mich at
267.

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a motion under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a to seek LWOP for a defendant who was 18
years old when they committed the sentencing offense, there is a rebuttable presumption
against LWOP that the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence at a
hearing. Parks, 510 Mich at 267 n 19, citing People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 130-132; 987
NW2d 132 (2022). During such hearings, the sentencing court must consider any relevant
attributes of youth associated with the defendant as a mitigating factor. Parks, 510 Mich
at 267 n 19, citing People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 189; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). However,
a sentencing court only needs to articulate such considerations on the record if sentencing
a youthful offender to LWOP. Boykin, 510 Mich at 190-194.
IV. ANALYSIS
Today we extend Parks and its holdings to offenders who were 19 or 20 years old
when they committed the offense for which they were convicted. Mandatorily condemning
such offenders to die in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth that late
adolescents and juveniles share, no longer comports with the “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179
(quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not foreclose the possibility that LWOP
could be an appropriate punishment under rare circumstances, but as in Parks, “our
Constitution compels us to make . . . difficult decisions.” Parks, 510 Mich at 245.
Article 1, § 16 of our state Constitution does not permit the imposition of such punishment
against this class of late adolescents without individualized sentencing.8 Accordingly,
8 The dissent notes that our holding in People v Carp, 496 Mich 440, 521; 852 NW2d 801
(2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated on other grounds sub nom Carp v Michigan, 577 US
1186 (2016)—that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 does not categorically prohibit the imposition
of LWOP as a punishment against juvenile offenders—survives this Court’s decision in

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individuals convicted of first-degree murder for conduct occurring when they are 19 or 20
years old must receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25,
and our related decisions, as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder.9 See
Parks, 510 Mich at 267 n 19.
Our holding is premised on an application of the test that was first articulated in
Lorentzen and later reaffirmed in Bullock and Parks to a mandatory punishment imposed
on a class of late-adolescent defendants. As in Parks, our application of the law includes
consideration of the well-established scientific consensus concerning late-adolescent brain
development and the neuroplasticity associated with that stage of development. Our
analysis in Parks also evaluated the correlation between a person’s age and the legal rights
and responsibilities granted to them by society. We provide some background as to these
considerations before applying the governing legal test.
People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No. 166813). We
question what weight, if any, that part of Carp retains after the vacatur of the decision as
to other threshold legal issues and this Court’s failure to readopt on remand the holding
that the dissent now relies on. But that part of Carp is also irrelevant. The analysis from
Carp was focused on a facial constitutional challenge to LWOP as punishment for
juveniles, not an as-applied constitutional challenge to the imposition of mandatory LWOP
to a class of offenders sharing an age-based characteristic.
9 We do not dispute the dissent’s point that some of the mitigating characteristics discussed
in the scientific research relied on in Parks and submitted by defendants and amici in these
cases are relevant up to at least age 25. Considering that defendants here were age 19 and
20 at the time they committed their crimes, resolution of the issues before the Court does
not require us to consider whether Const 1963, art 1, § 16 would require granting the same
relief to late adolescents who were 21 or older at the time of their offense.

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A. THE LATE-ADOLESCENT BRAIN
We have previously recognized the scientific consensus that late adolescents, as a
class, “are hampered in their ability to make decisions, exercise self-control, appreciate
risks or consequences, feel fear, and plan ahead,” and are more prone to impulsive,
reckless, and risk-taking behavior. Id. at 250. Defendants and amici agree that the
scientific research relied on in Parks applies equally to 19- and 20-year-old individuals.
The prosecutors do not dispute this research but oppose the expansion of Parks despite the
Court’s reliance on scientific research more broadly in other contexts.
Late adolescents are widely recognized as being more “susceptible to negative
outside influences, including peer pressure,” and tending to give less consideration to the
costs or consequences of a decision. Id. at 251. In fact, “the prefrontal cortex—the last
region of the brain to develop, and the region responsible for risk-weighing and
understanding consequences—is not fully developed until age 25.” Id., citing National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Promise of Adolescence:
Realizing Opportunity for All Youth (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,
2019), p 51; Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 Neuropsychiatric Disease
& Treatment 449, 449-450, 453-454 (2013). Research emphasizes that the “susceptibility
to peer pressure exacerbates late adolescents’ predisposition to risk-taking and deficiencies
in decision-making.” Parks, 510 Mich at 251, citing Gardner & Steinberg, Peer Influence
on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and
Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 Dev Psychol 625, 629-634 (2005).
Additionally, it is well established that the hallmarks of these late stages of
neurological development mean that late adolescents remain “susceptible to change” as

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they age, giving this class a heightened capacity for reformation and rehabilitation. Parks,
510 Mich at 251-252, citing Aoki, Romeo, & Smith, Adolescence as a Critical Period for
Developmental Plasticity, 1654 Brain Res 85 (2017); Tanner & Arnett, The Emergence of
“Emerging Adulthood”: The New Life Stage Between Adolescence and Young Adulthood,
in Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New Perspectives and Agendas (New York:
Routledge, 2009), pp 39-42.
This point has been illustrated through analysis of data demonstrating that the
likelihood of an individual committing violent or property crimes decreases during their
twenties and continues to decline significantly as they age. See Casey et al, Making the
Sentencing Case: Psychological and Neuroscientific Evidence for Expanding the Age of
Youthful Offenders, 5 Ann Rev Criminology 321, 331-332 (2022) (stating that there is “a
transient pattern in criminal behavior that peaks during adolescence and subsides by the
mid-twenties” and providing an illustrative age-crime curve graph); The Sentencing
Project, No End in Sight: America’s Enduring Reliance on Life Imprisonment (2021), p 25
(observing that the likelihood of engaging in or being arrested for violent activity follows
a “downward slope” during one’s mid-twenties and drops off significantly as people
continue to age); Insel et al, White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for
Judges, Attorneys, and Policy Makers, Center For Law, Brain & Behavior (2022), p 37 &
n 210 (citing several scientific studies to make the same point). There has long been a
scientific consensus that, in terms of neurological development, there is “no meaningful
distinction” between a 17-year-old and 18-year-old individual. Parks, 510 Mich at 252.
But the lack of meaningful distinction does not stop at age 18. As one study concluded,
“[d]istinguishing the [cognitive] capacity of a 17-year-old from an 18-, 19-, 20-, or 21-

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year-old would be impossible for a single individual or even group of individuals, but this
distinction in performance becomes more obvious by the mid-twenties.” Making the
Sentencing Case, 5 Ann Rev Criminology at 327-328. “Thus, the age at which cognitive
ability matures depends on several factors, including the socio-emotional context and
cognitive demands of the task.” Id. at 328.
Stated differently, as a class, 19- and 20-year-old late adolescents are more similar
to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults. Although the dissent
criticizes our reliance on “a parade of neuroscientific studies,” we continue to have an
obligation to “consider objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining
whether a punishment is unconstitutional as to a certain class of defendants.” Parks, 510
Mich at 249. An assessment of the proportionality of our state’s harshest punishment
imposed on a class of late-adolescent offenders would be incomplete without
acknowledgment of the unrebutted scientific consensus that has been presented to the
Court.10 As in Parks, our approach in considering such information remains analogous to
that of the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
10 Of course, scientific evidence is regularly presented in trial court proceedings through
qualified expert witnesses. See MRE 701 to MRE 707. In criminal proceedings, we have
held that the use of science-based expert testimony is appropriate when the matter at issue
is beyond the understanding of the average lay juror. See, e.g., People v Kowalski, 492
Mich 106, 128-131; 821 NW2d 14 (2012) (opinion by MARY BETH K ELLY , J.) (holding
that expert testimony regarding the psychological factors that might cause an individual to
falsely confess to a crime is admissible if the requirements of MRE 702 are met). This is
also true in the civil context, particularly in medical malpractice litigation where trials often
focus on the competing testimony of medical experts. See, e.g., Stokes v Swofford, ___
Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (July 25, 2024) (Docket Nos. 162302 and 163226) (analyzing
the requirement that a plaintiff’s physician-standard-of-care expert must have the same
relevant specialty as the physician accused of committing medical malpractice). Nothing
in MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a prevents a prosecutor or a defendant from presenting

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B. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF LATE ADOLESCENTS
Although late adolescents obtain new legal rights upon their eighteenth birthday, in
many regards, our society does not recognize these individuals as full adults until age 21.
Age-based legal rights are a social and civic recognition that age and maturity generally
correlate and that as an adolescent matures, they are expected to take on more social and
legal responsibilities. Various laws demonstrate that late adolescents between the ages of
18 and 21 exist within a unique transient phase during which society has decided they are
mature enough to hold some but not all of the rights and privileges of full adulthood.
There are several examples in Michigan. The people of Michigan have determined
that someone cannot serve as an elected state legislator until reaching “21 years of age.”
Const 1963, art 4, § 7.11 People under the age of 21 are also legally prohibited from
engaging in many risky or potentially dangerous or addictive activities. State law prevents
a person from lawfully purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol or recreational
cannabis until the age of 21. MCL 436.1109(6); MCL 436.1703(1); MCL 333.27954(1);
MCL 333.27955. State law also requires that a person be 21 to obtain a concealed pistol
expert testimony during an individualized sentencing hearing or challenging an expert put
forward by the opposing party.
11 One cannot serve as our state’s elected governor or lieutenant governor until age 30.
Const 1963, art 5, § 22. Article 2, § 1 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution and § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution historically granted voting rights
to only individuals aged 21 or older, but these limitations were superseded by the
ratification of the 26th Amendment of the United States Constitution in 1971 in response
to young adults being drafted and serving in the Vietnam War. See US Const, Am XXVI,
§ 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.”).

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license. MCL 28.425b(7)(a).12 In Michigan, the right to engage in online gambling, sports
betting, and gambling in physical facilities licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control
Board is not granted until age 21. See MCL 432.209(9); MCL 432.403(e). Nor can a
person be appointed as an officer of the Michigan State Police until age 21. MCL 28.4(4).
Michigan’s Legislature has also extended eligibility for the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act
(HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq., to encompass adolescents between the ages of 18 and 26,
when it previously was limited to ages 17 to 24. See Parks, 510 Mich at 253. HYTA
requires the additional condition of prosecutor consent for eligible individuals who were
21 or older at the time of their offense. MCL 762.11(1) and (2).
Various federal laws also treat late adolescents as less than a fully mature adult. For
example, among other qualifications, one must be at least age 25 to serve as a member of
the House of Representatives, US Const, art I, § 2; at least age 30 to be a member of the
Senate, US Const, art I, § 3; and at least age 35 to serve as President or Vice President, US
Const, art II, § 1. A person generally cannot open a credit card until age 21 without a
cosigner, 15 USC 1637(c)(8),13 or obtain an airline pilot transport certificate under certain
aeronautical experience requirements, 14 CFR 61.153(a)(1), until age 23. Additionally,
federal firearm licensees are not permitted to sell or transfer a handgun or handgun
12 Although state law generally allows someone to possess a pistol at age 18, their ability
to obtain a license to purchase a pistol from a federally licensed seller is restricted to those
who are at least 21 years old. See MCL 28.422(3)(b); 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1); 18
USC 923.
13 The cosigner requirement can be waived if the applicant submits documentation
“indicating an independent means of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed
extension of credit in connection with the account.” 15 USC 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii).

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ammunition to a person younger than 21. 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1).14 Thus, federal
law also recognizes that despite having achieved the age of majority, there are numerous
rights and privileges that we do not entrust to an 18-year-old.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY LWOP FOR LATE
ADOLESCENTS
We apply the Lorentzen test, as reaffirmed by Bullock and Parks, to determine
whether mandatory LWOP is grossly disproportionate and thus “cruel or unusual” when
applied to late adolescents under the age of 21. Again, the relevant factors are: (1) the
severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed
in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions
for the same offense; and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for
rehabilitation. Parks, 510 Mich at 242, citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34; Lorentzen, 387
Mich at 176-181. Application of the Lorentzen-Bullock test leads us to conclude that
mandatorily sentencing 19- and 20-year-old defendants to die in prison is unusually
excessive and constitutionally disproportionate. We therefore extend our holdings from
Parks and related precedents to this class of late-adolescent defendants.
1. SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT AND GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE
Examining the first Lorentzen-Bullock factor, there is no dispute that first-degree
premeditated murder is one of the most severe and heinous crimes that a person can
14 A federal court of appeals recently held that this restriction violates the Second
Amendment rights of 18-year-old individuals. See Reese v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, & Explosives, 127 F4th 583 (CA 5, 2025). The ruling in Reese conflicts with
the judgment of a different federal appellate court upholding a state law prohibiting any
person under the age of 21 from purchasing a firearm. See Rocky Mountain Gun Owners
v Polis, 121 F4th 96 (CA 10, 2024). This circuit split has not been resolved.

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commit.15 Unlike in Parks, these defendants were not convicted as aiders and abettors to
murder but as the principal offender of each crime. In Czarnecki’s case, the prosecution
presented evidence that he and his codefendant jointly participated in the robbery and
killing of the victim and the later burning of the body. In Taylor’s case, the prosecution
presented evidence that he entered the victim’s home and shot the victim to death without
the assistance of others. A jury convicted each defendant, and there is no doubt that a
lengthy term of imprisonment is warranted for these heinous crimes. But our analysis does
not end here.
We must also assess the severity of the punishment through a lens of proportionality.
See Parks, 510 Mich at 256-257; Bullock, 440 Mich at 40-41. In Michigan—the first state
to abolish the death penalty, Parks, 510 Mich at 257 n 10—mandatory LWOP is the most
severe punishment that can be imposed. As we recognized in Parks, when LWOP is
imposed on late adolescents, “they will inevitably serve more time and spend a greater
15 The immorality of an intentional, unjustified killing of another human being should not
be minimized. But contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, only one form of first-degree
murder requires that the killing be intentional and premeditated. Compare MCL
750.316(1)(a) (describing premeditated murder) with MCL 750.316(1)(b) and MCL
750.316(1)(c). First-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), is “a general intent crime,
requiring evidence of one of the three intents necessary to prove second-degree murder,”
which are “an intent to kill, an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or an intent to create a
very high risk of death with knowledge that the act probably will cause death or great
bodily harm.” People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 386; 633 NW2d 376 (2001) (citation
omitted). First-degree murder under MCL 750.316(1)(c) is premised on the killing of a
police or correctional officer and requires proof of one of the three intents necessary to
prove second-degree murder. Id. at 387. Both offenses can exist without a specific intent
to kill or premeditation. Rather, state law elevates the crime and the punishment due to
other circumstances. Accordingly, a person can be convicted of first-degree murder under
MCL 750.316(1)(b) and (c) and thus be subjected to mandatory LWOP under
circumstances in which no fact-finder has found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a
specific intent to kill or premeditation.

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percentage of their lives behind prison walls than similarly situated older adult offenders.”
Id. at 257.
As compared to older offenders, the neuroplasticity of the late-adolescent brain
makes this class of defendants uniquely prone to impulsive and reckless decision-making.
See Part IV(A) of this opinion; Parks, 510 Mich at 258-259. But this is transient. As
previously discussed, there is scientific consensus that the late-adolescent brain completes
rewiring and maturation during one’s mid-twenties. As late adolescents mature into fully
developed adults, they become less prone to reckless decision-making, more likely to
consider and appreciate consequences, and less susceptible to peer pressure. Like 18-year-
olds and their juvenile counterparts, late adolescents are “capable of significant change and
a turn toward rational behavior that conforms to societal expectations as their cognitive
abilities” fully mature. Parks, 510 Mich at 258. See also Part IV(A) of this opinion.
The incredible capacity for change and potential rehabilitation of this class of
individuals makes the infliction of mandatory LWOP on adolescent offenders particularly
cruel. There are no meaningful differences between relevant brain development of late
adolescents at age 18, taken as a class, as compared to age 19 or 20. The current
“sentencing scheme fails to consider whether any” 19- or 20-year-old defendants “are
irreparably corrupt, whether they have the capacity to positively reform as they age, and
whether they committed their crime” when they “lacked the capability to fully understand
the consequences of their actions.” Id. at 259. This scheme forecloses a sentencing court
from ensuring that the punishment imposed is “tailored to a defendant’s personal
responsibility and moral guilt.” Bullock, 440 Mich at 39 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “ ‘[I]t would be profoundly unfair to impute full personal responsibility and

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moral guilt’ to those who are likely to be biologically incapable of full culpability.” Parks,
510 Mich at 259, quoting Bullock, 440 Mich at 39. Accordingly, this factor strongly favors
holding that the mandatory imposition of LWOP on 19- and 20-year-old defendants
without consideration of mitigating factors inherent in one’s youth is excessive and
disproportionate punishment.
2. PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES
The second Lorentzen-Bullock factor requires that we compare the punishment for
the crime at issue to the punishment for other crimes. Mandatory LWOP is the harshest
punishment in Michigan and can only be imposed for a very limited number of criminal
convictions. Michigan law mandates LWOP for adult offenders only if they are convicted
of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1); habitual repeated sexual assaults of children
under age 13, MCL 750.520b(2)(c) and MCL 791.234(6)(e);16 and a handful of other
highly dangerous offenses that endanger many people and result in a death, MCL
791.234(6)(b), (c), (d), and (f).17 “These crimes all reflect a high degree of moral guilt,”
Parks, 510 Mich at 260, but it is notable that most violent crimes and other forms of
homicide are not on this list. For example, MCL 791.234(6) does not include second-
16 MCL 791.234 was amended by 2024 PA 111, effective March 19, 2025, but Subsection
(6) remains unchanged.
17 This last class includes conduct that results in a death following the adulteration or
misbranding of drugs with an intent to kill or cause serious bodily impairment, MCL
750.16(5); MCL 750.18(7), and the transport of explosives with an intent to intimidate,
injure, or kill, MCL 750.210(e).

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degree murder, MCL 750.317; assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; or most
forms of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520b.18
We observed in Parks that when an 18-year-old is sentenced to LWOP, “it is highly
probable that” they “will spend more time behind prison bars than any other adult
defendant convicted of the same crime or similarly severe crimes” and that this result was
“disproportionate to other offenders in this state.” Parks, 510 Mich at 260. This conclusion
also holds true for 19- and 20-year-old offenders like Czarnecki and Taylor, who are only
slightly older than the defendant in Parks. Because of the natural limitations imposed by
one’s biological lifespan, the actual time served by late-adolescent defendants who are
convicted and sentenced to LWOP will often be decades longer than what is served by an
older individual convicted of the identical crime.
Given the legal effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery,
under MCL 769.25 and 769.25a, all offenders who will receive or have received a
mandatory sentence of LWOP for a crime committed before they turned 18 are entitled to
a Miller hearing. At such hearings, the prosecution is required to overcome a presumption
against imposition of LWOP by clear and convincing evidence under our decision in
Taylor, 510 Mich 112. If the prosecution does not meet its burden, then a term-of-years
18 As previously discussed, several state statutes and constitutional provisions unrelated to
criminal punishment establish a social standard that recognizes full adulthood later than
age 18. See Part IV(B) of this opinion. Well-known examples include age restrictions
related to purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol or recreational cannabis, MCL
436.1109(6); MCL 436.1703(1); MCL 333.27954(1); MCL 333.27955, gambling, MCL
432.209(9); MCL 432.403(e), and obtaining a concealed pistol license, MCL
28.425b(7)(a).

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sentence must be imposed, for which the minimum will be 25 to 40 years, and the
maximum will be not less than 60 years.19 MCL 769.25(9); MCL 769.25a(4)(c).
Under the current scheme post-Parks, Czarnecki and Taylor would spend more time
in prison than many equally culpable older offenders. A late adolescent who is sentenced
to LWOP and lives to be 70 would serve approximately five decades in prison, but an
equally culpable individual who receives LWOP for a crime committed in their forties or
fifties would serve a fraction of that time if they live to the same hypothetical age.
Czarnecki and Taylor would also spend significantly more time in prison than most equally
culpable juvenile and 18-year-old offenders under the current scheme. Most juvenile and
18-year-old offenders who are convicted of first-degree murder will receive the minimum
sentence between 25 and 40 years, after which they will become eligible for parole
consideration.20
19 Our decision in Parks, 510 Mich 225, extended these requirements to all future
convictions of 18-year-old offenders. And given our holding in Poole, ___ Mich at ___;
slip op at 1, 17—that Parks applies retroactively to cases on collateral review—all 18-year-
old offenders who were previously convicted and sentenced to mandatory LWOP will also
be entitled to a Miller hearing if a prosecutor seeks reimposition of an LWOP sentence.
20 Additional disparities in actual time served can arise from the plea-bargain process. For
example, Czarnecki’s codefendant, who appears to have been equally culpable under the
evidence presented by the prosecution, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and
received a minimum sentence of 18 years. See note 1 of this opinion; Czarnecki, unpub
op at 2 n 2. We note that a 2021 report found that from 1999 to 2012, the median minimum
sentence imposed for second-degree murder within the sample group was 20 years for
nonhabitual offenders and 31 1 /2 years for habitual offenders. Levin, Mahar & Smith, Do
Michigan’s Sentencing Guidelines Meet the Legislature’s Goals?, p 50, Table 4, Safe &
Just Michigan (Nov 2021) <https://safeandjustmi.org/2021/12/10/sjm-report-do-
michigans-sentencing-guidelines-meet-the-legislatures-goals-a-historical-and-empirical-
analysis-of-prison-terms-for-life-maximum-offenses/> (accessed March 31, 2025)
[https://perma.cc/Y3DB-5J3Y]; see also id. at 104, Table 17.

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26
The second Lorentzen-Bullock factor favors a finding that imposition of mandatory
LWOP on 19- and 20-year-olds without an individualized assessment is constitutionally
defective.
3. PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE
The third Lorentzen-Bullock factor, which requires that we examine punishments
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, also weighs in favor of requiring
individualized sentencing before a sentence of LWOP can be imposed on a 19- or 20-year-
old defendant. When we decided Parks, “25 states and the District of Columbia [did] not
legislatively mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder, regardless of
the age of the offender,” Parks, 510 Mich at 262 & n 15, and six other states mandated
LWOP for equivalent first-degree murder only “when there [were] proven aggravated
circumstances,” id. at 263 & n 16. We also noted that the Washington Supreme Court had
recently held that its state constitution required individualized sentencing protections
before LWOP could be imposed against anyone convicted of a crime before age 21. Id. at
263, citing In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305; 482 P3d 276 (2021).21
21 Washington’s constitution prohibits “cruel punishment.” Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14.
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that
no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18 or,
as relevant here, between age 17 on the one hand, and ages 19 and 20 on the
other hand. Thus, sentencing courts must have discretion to take the
mitigating qualities of youth—those qualities emphasized in Miller[, 567 US
460,] and [State v] Houston-Sconiers[, 188 Wash 2d 1; 391 P3d 409
(2017)]—into account for defendants younger and older than 18. Not every
19- and 20-year-old will exhibit these mitigating characteristics, just as not
every 17-year-old will. We leave it up to sentencing courts to determine
which individual defendants merit leniency for these characteristics. Our
aggravated murder statute’s requirement of LWOP for all defendants 18 and

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27
Soon after Parks was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that its
state constitution prohibited application of mandatory LWOP to anyone under the age of
21 at the time of their criminal offense.22
In Parks we noted that Michigan was among a “minority of states that legislatively
mandate[d]” LWOP for all individuals convicted of a first-degree murder committed after
reaching the age of 17, Parks, 510 Mich at 263 (emphasis added), and we abolished
mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old offenders convicted of first-degree murder. The
previously summarized statistics are the same as applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants
convicted of first-degree murder.23 In addition to the Mattis decision, after Parks was
older, regardless of individual characteristics, violates the state constitution.
[In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 326 (emphasis
added).]
22 Massachusetts’s constitution prohibits courts from inflicting “cruel or unusual
punishments.” Mass Const, art 26. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
concluded:
Life without parole for emerging adults violates art. 26 [of the
Massachusetts constitution]. Our comprehensive review informs us that
Supreme Court precedent, as well as our own, dictates that youthful
characteristics must be considered in sentencing, that the brains of emerging
adults [i.e., those from 18 to 20 years of age] are not fully developed and are
more similar to those of juveniles than older adults, and that our
contemporary standards of decency in the Commonwealth and elsewhere
disfavor imposing the Commonwealth’s harshest sentence on this cohort.
Consequently, we conclude that a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for emerging adult offenders violates art. 26. [Mattis, 493 Mass at
234-235.]
23 We note that there is a distinction between the 25 states listed in Parks and the 22 states
listed in Mattis. The Mattis decision omitted New Jersey, West Virginia, and Virginia. In
Parks, we discussed “equivalent first-degree murder,” Parks, 510 Mich at 263, whereas
the Mattis court was focused on states that never mandated LWOP “in any circumstance,”
Mattis, 493 Mass at 233. There are some circumstances in which LWOP is mandated under
New Jersey law, NJ Stat Ann 2C:11-3(b)(1) to (4), and Virginia law, VA Code Ann 18.2-31;

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28
issued, the Illinois Legislature substantially revised its parole-eligibility statutes. Under
the current version of 730 Ill Comp Stat 5/5-4.5-115(b), most individuals serving a sentence
for first-degree murder committed before the age of 21 are eligible for parole consideration
after 20 years. Those who were sentenced to a “term of natural life imprisonment” are
eligible for parole review after 40 years. Id.
When Parks was decided, only Michigan, 17 other states, and the federal
government mandated LWOP as the punishment for equivalent premeditated first-degree
murder committed by a person who was 18 or older. Parks, 510 Mich at 263-264, 263
n 17, 264 n 18. These legislatively mandated punishments remain intact except as to
Massachusetts. Given the ruling in Mattis, 493 Mass at 234-235 (invalidating mandatory
LWOP for defendants under the age of 21), only 16 other states now mandate LWOP for
equivalent first-degree murder.24 Michigan thus remains a notable outlier at a national
level when it comes to the imposition of mandatory LWOP as a punishment.25
VA Code Ann 18.2-10(a). However, the premeditated killings at issue in Parks and in
these cases would not fall under those limited groupings. Additionally, although life
imprisonment is mandatory for first-degree murder under West Virginia law, W Va Code,
61-2-1; W Va Code, 61-2-2, the possibility of parole is generally available under W Va
Code, 62-12-13(c).
24 We also note that Hawaii obligates the parole board to submit an application to its
governor to commute an LWOP sentence to one permitting parole after 20 years. Haw
Rev Stat 706-656. As in Michigan, Const 1963, art 5, § 14, Iowa law allows the governor
to commute the sentence to a term of years. Iowa Code 902.2.
25 The dissent criticizes our focus on Michigan’s outlier status because, unlike in Bullock
and Lorentzen, our state was “alone—or nearly alone—in imposing a uniquely harsh
penalty,” but that simply suggests that those were easier cases. At what point does being
among a significant minority of jurisdictions that impose a punishment make the
punishment unusually harsh for constitutional purposes? We find it significant that 66%
of states do not mandate LWOP as a punishment for equivalent first-degree murder.

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29
As the United States Supreme Court has done before, see Graham, 560 US at 80,
we also find it relevant to look beyond the borders of the United States when considering
whether a punishment is cruel or unusual. In the United Kingdom, the imposition of LWOP
for anyone under the age for 21 at the time of the offense has been unlawful since at least
2020. Sentencing Act 2020, c 17, § 322, sch 21, ¶¶ 2 to 3 (UK) (providing a 30-year
minimum term for individuals between the age of 18 and 21 at the time a serious offense
was committed). In 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada held that all sentences of
imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole were unconstitutional for all
convicted offenders, regardless of their age. R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 (Can).26 These
legislative and judicial decisions suggest that the United States is becoming more of an
26 The Supreme Court of Canada specifically held that “[a] sentence of imprisonment for
life without a realistic possibility of parole is intrinsically incompatible with human
dignity,” that its Charter requires Parliament to allow for rehabilitation, and that such
punishment is cruel and unusual. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 (Can), ¶¶ 7 to 9, 81.
The United States’ use of LWOP as a punishment also remains an outlier when
compared with other United Nations members. As of fall 2022, 155 of the 193 United
Nations member states prohibited LWOP sentences. Law, Prisoner Advocates Turn to the
UN to End Extreme Prison Sentences, The Nation (September 15, 2022)
<https://www.thenation.com/article/society/extreme-prison-sentences-united-nations/>
(accessed February 28, 2025) [https://perma.cc/DUZ8-LY72]. “In Europe, only 10
countries permit sentences of life without parole; in Latin America, only four countries still
mete out life without parole.” Id. In 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
reaffirmed its previous recommendation that the United States “prohibit and abolish
sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles” and further recommended
“establishing a moratorium on the imposition of sentences of life imprisonment without
parole.” United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United
States of America (December 7, 2023), p 12 (bold typeface omitted), available at
<https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/USA/CO/5>.

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30
outlier among the developed world in its use of mandatory imprisonment for life as a
punishment.
The national and international trends concerning the punishment of late adolescents
convicted of heinous crimes illustrate that the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society,” Lorentzen, 387 Mich 179, are trending away from the
imposition of mandatory LWOP for late adolescents.27 Mandatory LWOP is “an
irrevocable sentence, offering no hope of release, for a group of defendants that are
neurologically less culpable than others serving the same or, oftentimes, less-severe
sentences for the same crimes.” Parks, 510 Mich at 264. The imposition of such
punishment on late adolescents who were 19- or 20-years-old at the time of their offense
does not comport with our Constitution’s mandatory prohibition on excessively harsh, and
thus cruel or unusual, punishment.28 Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
4. MICHIGAN’S TRADITIONAL GOAL OF AND PREFERENCE FOR
REHABILITATION
The final proportionality factor we must consider under Lorentzen-Bullock is
Michigan’s longstanding goal of and preference for punishments that allow for
27 As discussed in Part IV(B) of this opinion, various federal laws also grant late
adolescents less than the full rights of adulthood. For example, federal firearm licensees
are not permitted to sell or transfer a handgun or handgun ammunition to a person under 21.
18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1).
28 We recognized in Parks that this factor is “more neutral than the first two,” but that it
“slightly weighs in favor of an individualized sentencing procedure . . . .” Parks, 510 Mich
at 262. We continue to acknowledge that this factor is less clear than the other factors.
However, considering judicial decisions in other jurisdictions that predated Parks and that
have been issued after Parks, we find this factor now more strongly supports our holding
that the punishment at issue is cruel or unusual.

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31
rehabilitation. “[I]t cannot be disputed that the goal of rehabilitation is not accomplished
by mandatorily sentencing an individual to life behind prison walls without any hope of
release.” Parks, 510 Mich at 264-265. As we have previously noted, rehabilitation “is the
only penological goal enshrined in our proportionality test as a ‘criterion rooted in
Michigan’s legal traditions.’ ” Id. at 265, quoting Bullock, 440 Mich at 34.
The evolution of Michigan’s constitutional text illustrates the point. Michigan’s
first Constitution, adopted in 1835, provided that “cruel and unjust punishments shall not
be inflicted.” Const 1835, art 1, § 18. Fifteen years later, not only was “unjust” replaced
with “unusual,” but the broader disjunctive “or” replaced the conjunctive “and.” Const
1850, art 6, § 31.29 This change was introduced by Judge (later Justice) Benjamin
Witherell, and while there was not detailed debate, much can be gleaned as to the prevailing
views on rehabilitation from the vigorous debates surrounding a proposed
disenfranchisement clause, which would have prohibited citizens convicted of crimes from
voting.
29 This amendment came a mere three years after Michigan’s abolition of the death penalty
except in cases of treason, and that exception was never used. Shapiro & Bernstein, The
Meaning of Life, In Michigan: Mercy from Life Sentences Under the State Constitution,
unpublished manuscript (November 22, 2024), p 4, available at
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4993230>, citing Galliher et al,
America Without the Death Penalty, Northeastern University Press (2005), p 5. When the
legislative abolition of the death penalty was later constitutionalized, Delegate T. Jefferson
Hoxie, as chairman of the committee on legislative powers, argued on behalf of the
committee that it was “fitting and opportune for Michigan to step forward in the tradition
which we began over 115 years ago” as the “first American state and the first governmental
jurisdiction in the English speaking world to legislate against capital punishment.”
1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 595.

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32
Witherell explained that “there were two reasons for inflicting punishment—
warning to the community and reformation of the offender.” Report of the Proceedings
and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of Michigan 1850,
p 298. Numerous other delegates agreed. While the historical record lacks explicit debate
on the convention’s adoption of “cruel or unusual” language, delegate statements on the
disenfranchisement provision show that the potential for reformation following criminal
conviction was a foundational concern among state leaders. See Shapiro & Bernstein, The
Meaning of Life, In Michigan: Mercy from Life Sentences Under the State Constitution,
unpublished manuscript (November 22, 2024), pp 5-6, available at
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4993230>.
Historical practices in Michigan demonstrate a firm commitment to rehabilitation.
From 1840 to 1865, the Governor’s pardon power was exercised regularly and “served as
a sentence-review mechanism that prioritized rehabilitation over finality,” even for life
sentences, with data suggesting that the power was often exercised to release the elderly or
infirm. Id. at 7-12. Michigan was one of the first states in the country to formally create a
parole board, 1895 PA 218, §§ 1 and 2, which was based on the systematic use of the
pardon power by the Governor. The Meaning of Life, In Michigan, p 7.
As early as 1888, this Court “foreshadowed modern constitutional proportionality
analysis,” Bullock, 440 Mich at 36 n 18, when it held in People v Murray, 72 Mich 10, 17;
40 NW 29 (1888), that a term-of-years sentence should “never be made to extend beyond
the average period of persons in prison life, which [at that time] seldom exceed[ed] 25
years.” Then, in 1902, voters approved a ballot proposal to constitutionalize the
Legislature’s authority to enact an indeterminate sentencing system and to provide for

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33
parole. See Const 1850, art 4, § 47. This Court soon observed that the indeterminate
amendment was designed “to reform criminals and to convert bad citizens into good
citizens, and thus protect society.” People v Cook, 147 Mich 127, 132; 110 NW 514
(1907). “In order to accomplish this result, the theory is that, when the prisoner has shown
by his conduct that he may turn from his criminal career, he should have an opportunity,
under favorable circumstances, to make the test.” Id.
From 1900 to 1969, 57% “of all people sentenced to life without parole for first-
degree murder convictions were released after an average of fewer than twenty-four years
in prison.” The Meaning of Life, In Michigan, p 17. Across that same period, “sentences
of life with the possibility of parole typically led to about sixteen years of incarceration.”
Id. Some of this was due to the widespread application of good-time credits, at least until
those credits were effectively eliminated in 1978. See 1978 IL B, effective December 12,
1978; MCL 800.33, as amended by 1982 PA 442.
The historical record demonstrates that a person’s potential for rehabilitation and
reentry into society has long played a unique and heighted role in Michigan.30 Mandatorily
30 Although we acknowledge that other goals of criminal punishment include deterrence,
public safety, and retribution, the goal of rehabilitation has heightened importance in
Michigan as it is the only penological aim expressly incorporated into our test for
constitutional proportionality. Individualized lengthy criminal sentences for heinous
crimes can promote public safety and achieve retribution. We also note that “[s]tudy after
study . . . has shown that people do not order their unlawful behavior around the harshness
of sentences they may face, but around their perceived likelihood of being caught and
facing any sentence.” Nelson, Feineh, & Mapolski, A New Paradigm for Sentencing in the
United States, p 23, Vera Institute of Justice (Feb 2023) <https://vera-
institute.files.svdcdn.com/production/downloads/publications/Vera-Sentencing-Report-
2023.pdf> (accessed March 25, 2025) [https://perma.cc/JS9H-UVHS]; see also Nagin,
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 Crime & Just 199, 199 (2013) (noting that
“lengthy prison sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on
deterrence”). Given these findings and the known impulsivity of late adolescents, one

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34
eliminating the possibility of rehabilitation and reentry into society is exceptionally cruel
when applied to late adolescents whose “rehabilitative potential is quite probable” given
the stage of their cognitive development. Parks, 510 Mich at 265. As in Parks, we
conclude that it would be “antithetical to our Constitution’s professed goal of rehabilitative
sentences” to deny all 19- and 20-year-old individuals who commit first-degree murder
any possible opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and reenter society without requiring
an individualized sentencing proceeding at which relevant mitigating characteristics of
youth can be evaluated by the sentencing court. Id. See also MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a.
D. THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF PEOPLE v HALL
We also directed the parties to address whether extending Parks to the class of 19-
and 20-year-old offenders required us to overrule Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658, and if so,
whether we should do so. The defendant in Hall was sentenced to a mandatory term of
LWOP for a felony murder committed when he was 17 years old. Hall rejected the
defendant’s argument that imposition of LWOP was unconstitutional under either US
Const, Am VIII, or Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658.
There are numerous reasons to question the continued viability of Hall as binding
precedent concerning constitutionally permissible punishments. We note that the Hall
opinion did not refer to the defendant’s age and that the defendant did not appear to argue
his age as a foundation for his argument that automatic LWOP constituted “cruel and
unusual” punishment, US Const, Am VIII, or “cruel or unusual” punishment, Const 1963,
art 1, § 16. The defendant in Hall made a facial constitutional challenge to the validity of
cannot reasonably know how effective the length of possible punishment is in deterring
youthful criminal conduct.

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35
LWOP as a punishment for felony murder regardless of one’s age. However, given Hall’s
age (17), any federal constitutional basis for the Eighth Amendment ruling in Hall has been
effectively repudiated by Miller and Montgomery.31
Given that Hall was issued in 1976, it also predated decades of significant changes
in state and federal law concerning the constitutionality of punishments that can be
constitutionally imposed on juveniles and late adolescents. See Roper, 543 US at 560, 578-
579; Graham, 560 US at 74-75, 82; Miller, 567 US at 479-480, 489; Montgomery, 577 US
at 212-213; Parks, 510 Mich at 268. The Hall Court had neither the benefit of these later
decisions nor access to the more recent scientific understanding of how the adolescent brain
functions.
As an additional matter, Hall was based, in part, on the notion that the Governor
could potentially commute an LWOP sentence. Hall, 396 Mich at 658. But shortly after
Hall was issued, the United States Supreme Court rejected this idea, noting that “the
possibility of executive clemency that exists in every case” is not significant for purposes
of an Eighth Amendment analysis because it would make such judicial review
“meaningless.” Solem v Helm, 463 US 277, 303; 103 S Ct 3001; 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983).
Solem thus calls into question the reliance in Hall on the potential for a commutation by
Michigan’s Governor as a part of this Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.
In terms of purely state law, the Hall decision included an analysis of the Lorenzten
factors. However, the truncated analysis provided in Hall would not pass current judicial
31 In fact, Hall himself has since been resentenced to serve a term-of-years sentence. See
Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan, Register of Actions (Case No. 67-134610), available at
<https://cmspublic.3rdcc.org> (search under “John Sam Hall”) (accessed March 13, 2025).

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36
muster. The Hall Court performed its analysis through the lens of a “shock the conscience”
standard that we later abandoned in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 634-635;
461 NW2d 1 (1990). Hall was also decided before we affirmatively held in Bullock, 440
Mich at 27-36, that the “cruel or unusual” punishment clause in Const 1963, art 1, § 16,
was more protective than the Eighth Amendment and that all criminal sentences must be
reasonable and proportionate to the offense and the offender, id. at 37-40.
We question how much of Hall’s analysis remains viable given the sea change of
federal and state precedent interpreting US Const, Am VIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16,
since Hall was decided. But we need not overrule that decision today. As we noted in
Parks, 510 Mich at 255 n 9, when rejecting the facial challenge in Hall, the Court “did not
address the issue of sentencing a juvenile to life without parole”; “Hall was decided before
the United States Supreme Court decided Miller and its progeny”; and “the Hall Court did
not have the benefit of the scientific literature cited in [Parks].” We found Hall
inapplicable to an “as applied” constitutional challenge to the imposition of mandatory
LWOP on a juvenile. For the same reasons, Hall is also inapplicable to an as-applied
challenge brought by the class of 19- and 20-year-old defendants who have been sentenced
to a mandatory term of LWOP. We do not disturb, at this time, Hall’s holding that Const
1963, art 1, § 16 permits a mandatory punishment of LWOP for defendants convicted of
first-degree murder, so long as the defendant was at least 21 years of age at the time of the
offense.

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37
V. APPLICATION
Czarnecki was 19 years old when he committed the premediated murder for which
he was convicted. Taylor was 20 years old when he committed the premeditated murder
for which he was convicted. Both defendants were subject to the mandatory sentence of
LWOP that attaches to first-degree murder under MCL 750.316. Neither defendant was
provided the benefit and protections of the specialized procedures mandated by MCL
769.25 or MCL 769.25a despite being members of a class who are presumptively
neurologically indistinguishable from either a teenage juvenile offender or an 18-year-old
offender. Nor did either defendant receive the benefits of our decisions in Taylor, 510
Mich at 138-139, and Boykin, 510 Mich at 189, 190-194. Accordingly, the procedures
used at Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s sentencing hearings violated our Constitution, and both
are entitled to resentencing.
In People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No.
166813); slip op at ___, we held that Parks applies retroactively to criminal cases on
collateral review. Although these cases are before the Court on direct review, the Poole
retroactivity analysis applies with equal force to this decision. There is no logical
justification for applying Parks retroactively to cases on collateral review and not doing
the same for the holding reached in these cases involving 19- and 20-year-olds. Therefore,
our decision in these cases applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.
VI. CONCLUSION
We hold that the application of a mandatory sentence of LWOP under MCL 750.316
to Czarnecki and Taylor constitutes unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate
punishment and thus “cruel” punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See Parks,

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38
510 Mich at 268; Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181; Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34. This
renders Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s automatic and mandatory sentences of LWOP
unconstitutional, and both defendants are entitled to resentencing.
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion on remand in each case, vacate
each defendant’s sentence for first-degree murder, and remand each case to the appropriate
circuit court for resentencing in accordance with MCL 769.25, this opinion, and our
relevant caselaw. If the prosecutor in either case intends to move for the imposition of an
LWOP sentence, then the prosecutor shall have 90 days from the date of this opinion to
file such a motion. MCL 769.25(3). Otherwise, each defendant will be resentenced to a
term of years, pursuant to MCL 769.25(9). We deny leave to appeal in all other respects
for failure to persuade the Court of need for review.32
This decision also applies retroactively to all relevant criminal cases on collateral
review.
Elizabeth M. Welch
Richard H. Bernstein
Megan K. Cavanagh
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
32 Czarnecki filed a Standard 4 brief pursuant to Administrative Order 2004-6, 471 Mich c
(2005), in which he sought to raise numerous additional legal challenges. Most, if not all,
of these issues are not properly before the Court because defendant raised them before the
previous remand and this Court has already denied leave to appeal. See People v
Czarnecki, 510 Mich 1093 (2022). To the extent Czarnecki presents new legal challenges,
we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 166428
MONTARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 166654
ANDREW MICHAEL CZARNECKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
BERNSTEIN , J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This Court once again draws a bright line in determining when the imposition of a
mandatory life without possibility of parole sentence is unconstitutional under our state
Constitution’s “cruel or unusual punishment” provision, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. In People
v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), we drew the line at 18, and today we
extend that holding to include those under the age of 21 at the time they committed their
offenses.
I write separately to express my reasons for disagreeing with a bright-line rule drawn
at age 21: first, I once again highlight the problem of underinclusiveness that is associated

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2
with drawing a bright-line rule; and second, if drawing any line were necessary, I would
instead follow the consensus of the relevant scientific studies and draw such a line at age 25.
In Parks, I wrote separately to note that “having a line in place does not mean that
such a line should represent both the floor and ceiling of constitutional protections,
especially when we already understand that such a line might not be sufficiently
protective.” Parks, 510 Mich at 275 (B ERNSTEIN , J., concurring).
To avoid these downfalls, we could instead consider that all offenders
ages 18 and younger have an irrebuttable presumption of youth and
diminished capacity, as recognized by the majority opinion. Because the
presumption is irrebuttable, all offenders within this class [would] be
afforded the processes outlined in MCL 769.25 before they [could] be
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. However,
we could enable defendants who are older than 18 to assert that they possess
some qualities—such as an intellectual disability or other mitigating
circumstances—that render their brains more like someone who is age 18 or
younger. In other words, once offenders reach the age of 19, the irrebuttable
presumption of youthfulness would transform into a rebuttable presumption
of maturity and a defendant over the age of 18 would bear the burden of
demonstrating the need for a hearing to ensure that a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole was proportionate. I believe that the additional
process associated with a shifting presumption rather than a bright line would
help to alleviate the problem associated with drawing a line that we know
will be, at least in part, underinclusive. [Id. at 276-277.]
I continue to believe that the better approach to the difficult problems posed in these cases
is one that would allow for a shifting age-based presumption that could consider individual
characteristics of diminished culpability. Because these cases do not present us with the
opportunity to consider such an option, I largely concur with the majority’s analysis and
conclusion, as I did in Parks.
However, the scientific studies that serve as the foundation for our holdings both in
these cases and in Parks indicate that they would apply to a group larger than those under

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3
the age of 21, as the majority opinion recognizes. Parks, 510 Mich at 250-251 (opinion of
the Court) (“This process of brain rewiring means that young adults have yet to reach full
social and emotional maturity, given that the prefrontal cortex—the last region of the brain
to develop, and the region responsible for risk-weighing and understanding
consequences—is not fully developed until age 25.”).
The majority here nonetheless draws the line at 21, reasoning that because the
defendants in the cases before us were age 19 and 20 at the time they committed their
crimes, “resolution of the issues before the Court does not require us to consider whether
Const 1963, art 1, § 16 would require granting the same relief to late adolescents who were
21 or older at the time of their offense.” However, this Court recently denied leave in a
case involving a defendant who was 21 at the time he committed his crime. People v
Adamowicz, 513 Mich 869 (2023). In light of our decision to limit the class of defendants
before us in these cases, it is difficult to read our holding today as anything but closing the
door on extending Parks relief to other late adolescents. I would instead follow the
thoughtful conclusions of the many scientific studies presented before us and relied upon
in both Parks and these cases, and hold that the turning point for any test, be it a bright-
line rule or a shifting age-based presumption, starts at age 25 and not age 21.
Richard H. Bernstein

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 166428
MONTARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No 166654
ANDREW MICHAEL CZARNECKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
CLEMENT , C.J. (dissenting).
In my dissent in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 298-299; 987 NW2d 161 (2022)
(C LEMENT , J., dissenting), I cautioned that this Court’s decision to extend Miller v
Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), beyond its constitutional
bounds would not be the last step in its march. Today, the Court takes another two steps,
pushing Parks past 18-year-olds to 19- and 20-year-olds. The Michigan Constitution’s
prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” does not compel this result. Therefore, I
dissent.

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2
The facts are not in dispute. Defendants Andrew Czarnecki and Montario Taylor
committed first-degree murders when they were 19 and 20 years old, respectively.
Czarnecki and an accomplice killed a man before burning his body, while Taylor killed a
man by shooting him eight times. They were both sentenced to mandatory life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole (LWOP), as is required under MCL 750.316.1
They now contend that Parks, which held that mandatory LWOP was unconstitutional as
applied to defendants who were 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
Parks, 510 Mich at 268 (opinion of the Court), should be extended to defendants who were
19 and 20 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
I. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids “cruel and unusual
punishments.” US Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan
Constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis
added). That the Michigan Constitution uses “or” rather than “and” has led this Court to
interpret Michigan’s provision as offering broader protection. People v Bullock, 440 Mich
15, 30-33; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).
Even so, we start from the presumption that a statute is constitutional “unless the
contrary clearly appears[.]” Cady v Detroit, 289 Mich 499, 505; 286 NW 805 (1939).
Furthermore, “every possible presumption” must favor the statute’s constitutionality so
long as that presumption is not “clearly inconsistent” with the law itself. Id. That principle
1 MCL 750.316(1) (“[A] person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree
murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole . . . .”).

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3
carries special weight when it comes to sentencing. As Michigan courts have long held,
“[l]egislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively
valid.” People v Brown, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011), citing People v
Williams, 189 Mich App 400, 404; 473 NW2d 727 (1991).
In People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972), and later in Bullock,
440 Mich at 33-34, this Court set out a four-part test for determining whether a sentence
violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. That test requires us to consider: (1) the severity of the
sentence compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty for the offense compared
to penalties for other offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty for the offense in Michigan
compared to the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty serves the
penological goal of rehabilitation. People v Carp, 496 Mich 440, 520; 852 NW2d 801
(2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated on other grounds sub nom Carp v Michigan, 577 US
1186 (2016), citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34, and Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181. If
most of the factors support a finding of constitutionality, the punishment is upheld. See
Carp, 496 Mich at 521. I address each factor in turn.
A. THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE VERSUS THE SEVERITY OF THE
PUNISHMENT
First, we look to the gravity of the offense and compare it to the severity of the
punishment. Id. at 520. First-degree murder is arguably the gravest offense under
Michigan law. The premeditated taking of a life is an act of the highest moral and legal
consequence. A punishment of great severity is therefore proportionate. Mandatory

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4
LWOP is precisely that: the most severe sentence Michigan law allows. And as this Court
explained in Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515:2
[F]irst-degree murder is almost certainly the gravest and most serious offense
that an individual can commit under the laws of Michigan—the premeditated
taking of an innocent human life. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the people
of this state, through the Legislature, would have chosen to impose the most
severe punishment authorized by the laws of Michigan for this offense.
See also People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976) (stating that
mandatory LWOP for felony murder was proportionate to the crime). Because the gravity
of the punishment fits the gravity of the offense, the sentence is commensurate.
The majority goes on to note though that younger offenders will spend more time
in prison than older offenders.3 Additionally, the majority states that younger offenders
are still neurologically developing and, thus, more impulsive, but that they will eventually
mature; therefore, the majority argues that it is particularly cruel to impose mandatory
LWOP on younger adults. In other words, the majority does not analyze this first
proportionality factor based primarily on the offense committed, but on the offender who
committed it. While I recognize that it makes some sense to consider characteristics of the
2 Though in People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No.
166813), the Court overruled Carp’s analysis regarding the retroactivity of Miller under
state law, Carp’s holding that the imposition of LWOP on a juvenile offender does not
violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16 still stands. While that holding does not specifically address
mandatory LWOP for young adults, I find that much of Carp’s reasoning is generally
applicable to the similar issue here.
3 Ante at 21-22 (“As we recognized in Parks, when LWOP is imposed on late adolescents,
‘they will inevitably serve more time and spend a greater percentage of their lives behind
prison walls than similarly situated older adult offenders.’ ”), quoting Parks, 510 Mich at
257 (opinion of the Court).

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5
offender in an as-applied challenge, such as that here, I believe the majority unjustifiably
allows such considerations to loom so large in its analysis that the majority downplays the
gravity of first-degree murder.4
Outside of simply overemphasizing the characteristics of the offender, I take further
issue with the majority’s additional considerations. First, regarding the majority’s point
that younger offenders, as a practical matter, will spend more time in prison than older
offenders, prior to Parks, this Court had never before used such reasoning to invalidate life
sentences. In Parks, I rejected this argument outright:
When appellants fairly frequently contend that their term-of-years sentence
is a de facto life sentence because of their more advanced age, our Court and
the Court of Appeals routinely reject such arguments. I see no reason why,
in that scenario, we would refuse to consider that a term-of-years sentence is
a de facto life sentence but, in the instant case, we would consider—relatedly
but in reverse—that a particular life sentence is a de facto longer term-of-
years sentence than other life sentences. [Parks, 510 Mich at 286 (CLEMENT ,
J., dissenting).]
In other words, a 70-year-old sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment will almost certainly
die in prison. Yet courts have consistently rejected the argument that such a sentence
constitutes de facto LWOP, refusing to substitute actuarial projections for the Legislature’s
4 I also question whether focusing more on the characteristics of the offender rather than
the gravity of the offense itself is inconsistent with how this Court had traditionally
analyzed the first factor prior to Parks. Compare Commonwealth v Mattis, 493 Mass 216,
274-275; 224 NE3d 410 (2024) (Lowy, J., dissenting) (recounting that under
Massachusetts’ common law, courts consider similar challenges to the constitutionality of
punishments under a “tripartite analysis,” the first factor of which “requires . . . an ‘inquiry
into the nature of the offense and the offender in light of the degree of harm to society’ ”)
(emphasis added; quotation marks and citation omitted), quoting Commonwealth v
Sharma, 488 Mass 85, 89; 171 NE3d 1076 (2021). In Carp, for instance, though the Court
recognized the characteristics of youth, the Court still focused primarily on the serious
nature of the offense. See Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515.

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6
judgment.5 But now, the majority seemingly reverses course, treating realities that turn on
actuarial life expectancy as a constitutional bar to mandatory LWOP.
Regarding the majority’s second point that younger offenders are still developing
neurologically, I do not disagree. It is common sense that 20-year-olds have not reached
full maturity. For this reason, it is up to the Legislature to amend the relevant statutes to
prohibit mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-old offenders. However, it is one thing for
scientific evidence to justify a change in policy from the Legislature, and another thing for
that same evidence to support a judicial finding that mandatory LWOP violates our
Constitution. The bar for the latter is much higher, and I do not believe it has been met.
For the judiciary’s purposes, the question is not just whether young adults differ in some
ways from their older counterparts. The question is whether those differences are so
constitutionally significant that they render mandatory LWOP categorically
disproportionate. And the answer, as I explained in Parks, is no: “Even if 18-year-olds are
not so well-developed neurologically as 27-year-olds, they are sufficiently neurologically
developed to make major decisions about their lives.” See id. at 283-284 (CLEMENT , J.,
dissenting). The same is, of course, true for 19- and 20-year-olds.
It is especially true regarding the choice to commit first-degree murder. To return
to my initial comment regarding the severity of the crime, first-degree murder is not
impulsive; it generally requires, by definition, premeditation and intent.6 A 19- or 20-year-
5 Parks, 510 Mich at 286 (C LEMENT , J., dissenting) (“[W]e do not generally consider how
long a defendant will, as a practical matter, serve a sentence given his or her life
expectancy.”).
6 The majority points out that felony murder and the killing of a police officer, MCL
750.316(1)(b) and (c), are also examples of first-degree murder that are punishable by

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7
old capable of planning and executing a murder is capable of understanding its
consequences. And if they understand those consequences, then they can constitutionally
bear the full weight of the law’s most severe punishment.7
Finally, the majority confuses the first- and fourth-factor analyses. As stated, the
majority focuses on characteristics of the offender, particularly that younger offenders have
greater room for neurological growth and thus a better chance at rehabilitation; however,
the majority points out that mandatory LWOP fails to consider this possibility of
rehabilitation. That may be true, but that analysis should be considered under the fourth
factor of our Lorentzen test, which considers whether the penalty serves the penological
goal of rehabilitation. Carp, 496 Mich at 520. The majority is essentially double-dipping
by counting the fact that mandatory LWOP does not facilitate rehabilitation under both the
fourth and first factors.
In sum, focusing on the gravity of the offense and the severity of the punishment, I
believe mandatory LWOP is proportionate for first-degree murder, even when that crime
is committed by 19- or 20-year-olds. The first factor weighs in favor of constitutionality.
mandatory LWOP, yet do not require premeditation. These cases do not involve those
crimes, however, so I see no reason to comment on them. I find it strange that the majority
should mention them when they are not at issue.
7 Even taking the majority’s statements regarding the scientific evidence on their face and
assuming that 19- and 20-year-olds generally cannot appreciate the consequences even of
their deliberate actions, the other factors of the Lorentzen test would need to weigh against
the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for these defendants in order to strike down the
punishment. For the reasons expressed later, I do not believe the other factors lead to this
conclusion.

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8
B. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES
Next, we consider the sentences imposed for other offenses under Michigan law.
Id. This factor, too, supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-
year-olds. Michigan’s sentencing scheme reflects the Legislature’s considered judgment
that some crimes are so severe, and some offenders so culpable, that LWOP is the only
appropriate punishment. And that judgment is not confined to first-degree murder alone.
Several other offenses are punished with mandatory LWOP, demonstrating that Michigan
law does not treat this sentence as an anomaly. See, e.g., MCL 791.234(6) (listing various
offenses subject to mandatory LWOP); MCL 750.316 (first-degree murder); MCL
750.520b (first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I)); MCL 750.16(5) (adulteration of
drugs with intent to kill causing death); MCL 750.18(7) (mixing drugs improperly with
intent to kill causing death); MCL 750.211a(2)(f) (possession with intent to unlawfully use
an explosive device causing death); MCL 333.17764(7) (mislabeling drugs with intent to
kill and causing death); MCL 750.200i(2)(e) (possession of a harmful biological, chemical,
radioactive, or electronic device resulting in death). That mandatory LWOP applies to
other homicide offenses as well as to the nonhomicide offense of CSC-I underscores a
fundamental point: Michigan law recognizes that the most serious crimes—whether or not
they involve the taking of life—are so severe that parole should never be an option. Yet
the majority now declares that first-degree murder, arguably the most serious crime in
Michigan law, should be treated more leniently than some of these nonhomicide offenses.
The majority points to the seeming unfairness of defendants being automatically
sentenced to LWOP and, as a result, likely spending more time in prison than offenders
who were 18 at the time they committed first-degree murder. Per Parks, 18-year-old

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9
offenders are entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing before the imposition of
LWOP and, as a result, may be sentenced to a shorter term of years of imprisonment.
However, this problem arises no matter where the line is drawn. Now, 21-year-old
offenders will receive mandatory LWOP sentences whereas 20-year-old offenders will
receive individualized sentencing hearings and possibly shorter sentences. There will
always be a sense of possible unfairness about such bright-line rules, but as the United
States Supreme Court has said, “a line must be drawn.” Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551,
574; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005).
Mandatory LWOP is not excessive when measured against Michigan’s sentences
for other crimes. The Legislature has imposed mandatory LWOP for multiple offenses,
including nonhomicide crimes. While it may be unfortunate for defendants that they would
be entitled to individualized sentencing and possibly shorter sentences had they committed
first-degree murder when they were slightly younger, that will always be true for some
offenders, no matter where courts draw the line. For these reasons, this second factor
supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP.
C. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
For the third factor, we consider the penalties that other jurisdictions impose for
first-degree murder. Carp, 496 Mich at 520. The majority claims that Michigan is an
outlier in mandating LWOP for 19-year-olds. But the national data contradicts that claim.
Michigan’s sentencing scheme remains consistent with a substantial portion of the country,
and evolving standards of decency do not show that mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-
olds is unconstitutional.

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10
As the majority notes, 16 states and the federal government impose mandatory
LWOP for first-degree murder. That alone distinguishes these cases from pre-Parks cases,
notably Bullock, 440 Mich 15, and Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167, where Michigan stood
alone—or nearly alone—in imposing a uniquely harsh penalty. In Bullock, this Court
struck down Michigan’s mandatory life sentence for drug offenses after noting that “no
other state in the nation imposes a penalty even remotely as severe as Michigan’s . . . .”
Bullock, 440 Mich at 40. Similarly, in Lorentzen, we found Michigan’s minimum sentence
for marijuana distribution unconstitutional because “[o]nly one state . . . has as severe a
minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana as Michigan.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179.
That is not the case here.8 Michigan’s sentencing scheme is well within the mainstream of
United States law.9
8 The majority contends that Bullock and Lorentzen were simply easier to decide given the
facts involved. It is certainly true that the third factor of our test much more clearly
weighed against a finding of constitutionality in Bullock and Lorentzen. I believe the
differences between, on the one hand, Bullock and Lorentzen, and, on the other hand, the
instant cases should yield different results. Given that a third of states still impose
mandatory LWOP on young adult offenders convicted of first-degree murder, Michigan is
hardly an outlier. And I am not aware of another Michigan decision finding that the third
factor of our test weighs against a punishment’s constitutionality when so many other
jurisdictions impose the same punishment for the same crime.
9 The majority also relies on decisions by the Washington Supreme Court and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, see In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d
305; 482 P3d 276 (2021), and Mattis, 493 Mass 216 (opinion of the court), in which they
held that mandatory LWOP for young offenders violated their state constitutions. But as I
explained in Parks, Monschke is not persuasive because it applied an entirely different
constitutional framework. See Parks, 510 Mich at 289-290 (CLEMENT , J., dissenting)
(discussing the legal tests employed in Washington generally and Monschke specifically,
and noting how those tests differ from ours). Washington’s constitutional test for cruel
punishment is broader than Michigan’s, see Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14 (prohibiting cruel
punishment), making its reasoning inapplicable here. As for Mattis, the Massachusetts
court split four to three in that case. Much of the reasoning in the two dissents is similar

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11
The majority further supports its reasoning by citing sentencing practices in the
United Kingdom and Canada. But constitutional law is not a referendum on global
criminal-justice trends. Foreign jurisdictions structure their sentencing laws differently,
often under entirely different constitutional frameworks. The majority, however, does not
heed that lesson. Instead, it cherry-picks foreign jurisdictions to suggest that Michigan’s
law is outdated. And in any case, even if engaging in a comparative review of international
law were a useful and important endeavor, two countries hardly create a trend.
In sum, Michigan’s mandatory LWOP sentence for first-degree murder is not an
outlier. It aligns with a substantial portion of the country, distinguishing these cases from
pre-Parks precedent such as Bullock and Lorentzen. The majority’s use of nonbinding out-
of-state court decisions and foreign law is selective and unpersuasive. For these reasons,
this factor supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP.
D. REHABILITATION
Finally, we consider whether the punishment serves the goal of rehabilitation. Carp,
496 Mich at 520. The majority places great weight on this factor. Admittedly, mandatory
LWOP does not allow much opportunity for rehabilitation, with the only possibility for
to my reasoning in Parks and in these cases. See Mattis, 493 Mass at 256 (Lowy, J.,
dissenting) (“Rather, the Legislature has definitively drawn the line between childhood and
adulthood at eighteen, and objective indicia of contemporary standards of decency in the
Commonwealth demonstrate support for, rather than objection to, treating individuals
within this age range as adults in our criminal justice system when they commit the crime
of murder in the first degree.”); id. at 291 (Cypher, J., dissenting) (“Imposed by judicial
fiat, twenty-one minus a day is not tethered to hard science, nor is it joined to
‘contemporary standards of decency’ as reflected in our criminal statutes.”) (citation
omitted). Suffice it to say, I find the dissenting opinions much more persuasive than that
of the majority in Mattis.

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12
release being executive clemency.10 Yet, although Michigan has emphasized the
importance of rehabilitation, rehabilitation is still only one of several sentencing goals.11
The goal of rehabilitation does not subsume the goals of deterrence, public safety, or
retribution—particularly for the most serious offenses.
Nevertheless, with the first three factors of the Lorentzen test strongly favoring a
finding of constitutionality, I would hold that mandatory LWOP is constitutional as applied
to 19- and 20-year-old offenders. I believe that the majority misapplies Lorentzen, which
unfortunately leads to disregarding the Legislature’s judgment.
II. RELIANCE ON NEUROSCIENCE
Just as I set out in my dissent in Parks, I continue to view the majority’s reliance on
neuroscience as a symptom that the question before us is not one suited for the judiciary
but rather one that must be considered by the Legislature or the people of this state. The
Court today extends its holding in Parks beyond 18-year-old offenders, declaring that
individuals under 21 must be treated as juveniles for sentencing purposes. It does so not
10 Parks, 510 Mich at 292 (C LEMENT , J., dissenting) (“ ‘[R]ehabilitation and release are
still possible, since defendant still has available to him commutation of sentence by the
Governor to a parolable offense or outright pardon.’ ”), quoting Hall, 396 Mich at 658.
Contra Carp, 496 Mich at 521 (noting that LWOP “ ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal’ ”), quoting Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 74; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825
(2010).
11 Parks, 510 Mich at 291 (C LEMENT , J., dissenting) (“[T]here are other valid penological
goals, such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.”), citing Lorentzen, 387 Mich at
180; People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 350; 408 NW2d 789 (1987) (“[A]mong the proper
criteria for determining an appropriate sentence are: (1) the disciplining of the wrongdoer,
(2) the protection of society, (3) the potential for reformation of the offender, and (4) the
deterring of others from committing like offenses.”).

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13
so much by reference to constitutional text or established legal principles, but by invoking
a parade of neuroscientific studies that suggest that young adults are generally less culpable
because of incomplete brain development. Indeed, the opinion reads less like a judicial
decision interpreting our Constitution and more like an amicus brief from a behavioral-
science institute. Courts should not reshape the law with every shift in scientific consensus,
especially when it is the Michigan Constitution that is the subject of reshaping.
Similarly, that courts consider “evolving standards of decency”12 when deciding
claims under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 should not be taken as a license for judges to impose
their own policy preferences. If anything, that the particular constitutional provision here
allows for the consideration of “evolving standards of decency” is all the more reason to
be sure that the Court applies the Lorentzen factors very carefully and avoids creating
sudden, disruptive shifts in the law. If “evolving standards of decency” is interpreted too
loosely, it risks serving as an excuse for the judiciary to substitute its own policy
preferences for those of the Legislature by striking down constitutional statutes. I fear that
is exactly what is happening here. A legislatively mandated punishment that, in my
opinion, passes constitutional muster is struck down. This looks less like constitutional
interpretation and more like judicial legislation.
12 See Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179. I take no position here on whether I agree with the
“evolving standards of decency” inquiry. Our Court has looked to evolving standards of
decency in the past, e.g., through the second and third factors of the Lorentzen test, and we
have not been asked to reconsider that decision.

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14
Moreover, I cautioned in Parks that our decision there would invite more claims
that we should extend Miller’s protections further.13 The majority itself concedes that
“some of the mitigating characteristics discussed in the scientific research relied on in
Parks and submitted by defendants and amici in these cases are relevant up to at least
age 25.” In addition to cases regarding the extension of Miller’s protections to older
defendants, there are several other related claims to which the majority opens the door. If
suboptimal brain development makes an offender less culpable, then should any cognitive
disabilities or mental illnesses, even those far short of the already recognized insanity
defense,14 serve as a constitutional barrier to mandatory LWOP? Similarly, does cognitive
decline in the elderly also preclude mandatory LWOP for them? If mandatory LWOP is
unconstitutional for 19- and 20-year-old defendants who are convicted of first-degree
murder, why should it be constitutional for such defendants who are convicted of other
crimes? The majority’s logic has no natural stopping point.
13 In particular, I stated:
[I]nsofar as the majority’s holding is a policy decision, it is one for which
there is no clear limiting principle. I would not be surprised if the Court
extends its current line in the near future. The science defendant offers
indicates that there is significant neurological development until age 25, and
while the majority acknowledges this science, the majority today extends
Miller’s and Montgomery’s holdings only to offenders who are 18 years old.
I assume that in the coming years we will hear cases arguing that we should
extend Miller’s protection to those in their early twenties as well. [Parks,
510 Mich at 298 (CLEMENT , J., dissenting).]
14 MCL 768.21a.

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15
III. CONCLUSION
The Court today extends Parks though the Constitution does not require it. Just as
I did in Parks, I once again disagree with the majority’s analysis of the Lorentzen factors
and do not believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory LWOP for 19-
and 20-year-olds violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Therefore, I dissent.
Elizabeth T. Clement
Brian K. Zahra

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