RENTAL AT EASE LLC V DOOR AND WINDOW GUARD SYSTEMS INC

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Megan K. Cavanagh,
Chief Justice
Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood,
Justices
Order
April 10, 2026
169129
RENTAL AT EASE LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v SC: 169129
COA: 370671
Wayne CC: 22-009116-CB
DOOR AND WINDOW GUARD SYSTEMS,
INC., Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 25, 2025 judgment
of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded
that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
WELCH, J. (dissenting).
The question in this case is whether a contractual provision limiting a lessor’s
“liability for any failure of the leased equipment” applies when the lessor fails to deliver
or install the equipment in question. It plainly does not. However, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. Because I would have reversed the
lower courts’ judgments, I respectfully dissent from the denial of plaintiff’s application for
leave to appeal.
Plaintiff Rental at Ease LLC owns a rental home in Detroit. It contracted with
defendant Door and Window Guard Systems, Inc. to rent and install window guards on the
house. Vandals broke into the house and set a fire, causing significant damage to the
premises. Plaintiff claims that the break-in was possible because defendant had failed to
install a guard on one of the rear windows.
Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence in the Wayne Circuit Court. Defendant
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(10). It argued that a
provision in the rental agreement limited plaintiff’s recovery to one month’s rent ($600)
and that, accordingly, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The provision in
question reads:

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2
7. Inspection and Warranties. [Defendant] agrees to take all
reasonable steps to ensure that the Leased Equipment is in working condition
as of the date of its delivery to [plaintiff]. Nevertheless, [plaintiff] is
responsible for inspecting the Leased Equipment and satisfying itself as to
its fitness for the particular purpose in which it is employed.
[DEFENDANT] MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF THE LEASED EQUIPMENT OTHER
THAN THOSE CONTAINED HEREIN AND [PLAINTIFF] AGREES
THAT [DEFENDANT’S] LIABILITY FOR ANY FAILURE OF THE
LEASED EQUIPMENT, RESULTING IN LOSS DAMAGE OR INJURY
DIRECT OR INDIRECT FROM DEFECTIVE MATERIAL FAULTY
WORKMANSHIP OR OTHERWISE HOWSOEVER ARISING AND
WHETHER OR NOT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE SHALL BE LIMITED
TO AND NOT EXCEED ONE MONTHS RENTAL FOR ALL SAID
LEASED EQUIPMENT. [Emphasis added.]
The trial court agreed with defendant’s reading, granted its motion for summary
disposition, and transferred the case to the district court. See MCL 600.8301(1) (“The
district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount in controversy
does not exceed $25,000.00.”). Plaintiff appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Rental at Ease LLC v Door & Window Guard Sys Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued July 25, 2025 (Docket No. 370671). It agreed with the trial
court’s finding that “ ‘the terms in paragraph seven are unambiguous and broad and the
language is inclusive and not limited to the leased equipment, but the implementation of
the agreement.’ ” Id. at 4. The panel also concluded that the term “leased equipment”
extended to equipment not delivered, relying on the rental agreement’s definition of that
term as “the security doors, screens, lights and materials to be supplied on rental.” It
explained:
The term “to be supplied” expands the paragraph’s scope because the term
necessarily encompasses performance obligations that extend beyond
warranty provisions. Put differently, because defendant’s installation
obligations are addressed within paragraph seven as “leased equipment,” the
limitation of damages applies comprehensively to both warranties claims and
breach of contract claims. Consequently, to the extent that plaintiff argues
that defendant was contractually obligated to install certain equipment and
that it failed to do so, that failure and that equipment would be covered by
the provision in question. [Id.]
I disagree with the panel’s reading of the lease. First, by its plain terms, the damage-
capping provision applies to liability for “failure of the leased equipment.” It goes on to

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I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 10, 2026
p0323
3
Clerk
name several types and vectors of harm—“loss damage or injury direct or indirect from
defective material faulty workmanship or otherwise howsoever arising and whether or not
caused by negligence”—but those harms must “result[]” from the leased equipment for the
provision to apply. Because the provision limits liability for equipment failures, it does
not extend to the failure to install equipment.
Second, the definition of “leased equipment” as “the security doors, screens, lights
and materials to be supplied on rental” does not, as the panel claimed, “encompass[]
performance obligations.” Id. It simply refers to the specific equipment being leased.
Other provisions recognize this when they provide that “[a]ll Leased Equipment remains
the property of [defendant]” and “[w]here [plaintiff] fails to pay . . . , [defendant] may
recover the Leased Equipment . . . .” The reference to equipment “to be supplied” is
unremarkable, when taken in context. The agreement does not rent particular equipment
for a particular term; rather, it contemplates that plaintiff will complete separate “orders”
specifying equipment, rates, and terms.
Careful parsing of the contract only confirms what was apparent at first glance.
Damages that result from defendant’s failure to install a window guard do not result from
the failure of the window guard. Because the lower courts held otherwise, I would reverse.
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
HOOD, J., joins the statement of WELCH, J.

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