COA 375374 PEOPLE OF MI V REYNALDO VILLARREAL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2026
1:19 PM
v No. 375374
Ottawa Circuit Court
REYNALDO VILLARREAL, LC No. 2024-047202-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and MALDONADO and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Reynaldo Villarreal, is charged with assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a
police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). After the preliminary examination, the district court bound
defendant over to the circuit court for trial. He moved to quash the bindover, and the circuit court
denied the motion. He now appeals that decision by leave granted.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At the preliminary examination, Ottawa County Sheriff’s Deputy Eric Zaragosa testified
that he was dispatched regarding a reported retail fraud at a Walgreens store in the early morning
hours of August 12, 2024. He responded to a nearby gas station where other officers had located
the suspect vehicle. When he arrived, another officer had already removed the driver—the
suspected shoplifter—from the car. As Deputy Zaragosa approached, he saw defendant and a
female passenger in the backseat of the car “frantically” covering their faces and forearms with
clothing. He also saw a lighter fall from defendant’s person.
The deputy’s partner informed him that syringes had been found on the driver and that the
car was going to be impounded, so Deputy Zaragosa ordered defendant and the other passenger to
exit the backseat. After defendant unsuccessfully attempted to lock the car door, the deputy opened
1 People v Villarreal, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 13, 2025 (Docket
No. 375374).

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the door and again ordered defendant to exit. Defendant and the female passenger then began
yelling at the deputy. Defendant exited the vehicle only after the deputy gave several additional
commands and threatened to remove defendant if he did not comply.
Defendant continued to yell and behave erratically after exiting the vehicle. Because of
his behavior, Deputy Zaragosa handcuffed defendant and placed him in the backseat of the
deputy’s police cruiser. The deputy suspected narcotic use and asked for defendant’s name.
Defendant initially refused to provide his name and then provided a false name and date of birth.
At some point during the interaction, the deputy asked defendant to remove the t-shirt covering his
face, and defendant refused, asserting that his Islamic faith required him to keep his face covered.
The deputy eventually identified defendant, who was arrested for resisting or obstructing.
Following the deputy’s preliminary-examination testimony, the district court identified
three potential instances of resisting: defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle upon request, his refusal
to remove his face covering, and his providing a false name and date of birth when asked to identify
himself. The court found that neither defendant’s refusal to exit the vehicle nor his failure to
remove his face covering constituted resisting or obstructing, and it declined to bind defendant
over on those theories. Concerning the false identification, the district court found that, assuming
the command to identify himself was lawful, the evidence was sufficient to bind defendant over
for resisting or obstructing.
Defendant then moved the circuit to quash the information and bindover, arguing that the
district court erred by assuming that the command to identify himself was lawful. The circuit court
concluded that the district court erred by assuming the command was lawful but ultimately found
that the assumption was correct: because there was reasonably articulable suspicion regarding
defendant’s involvement in drug activity, the deputy could temporarily detain defendant and could
lawfully command defendant to identify himself. The circuit court thus denied the motion to
quash. Defendant now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In the context of reviewing a district court’s bindover decision, the order on appeal is the
circuit court’s decision denying the motion to quash, which we review de novo (i.e., with no
deference) because the dispositive question is whether the district court abused its discretion in
binding over defendants.” People v Crumbley, 346 Mich App 144, 166; 11 NW3d 576 (2023). A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes or when it makes an error of law. Id. at 167. In reviewing a bindover
decision, a reviewing court “must consider the entire record of the preliminary examination and
may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court.” People v Henderson, 282 Mich App
307, 312-313; 765 NW2d 619 (2009). We review de novo questions of law, such as the
interpretation and application of a statute. People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 44; 814 NW2d 624
(2012).
III. DISCUSSION
“In general terms, the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether a crime
was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it.”

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Crumbley, 346 Mich App at 167 (cleaned up). “More specifically, in order to bind a defendant
over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause that the defendant
committed a felony based on there being evidence of each element of the crime charged or
evidence from which the elements may be inferred.” Id. (cleaned up). “Probable cause requires
enough evidence to cause a person of ordinary caution and prudence to conscientiously entertain
a reasonable belief of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence can be sufficient.”
Henderson, 282 Mich App at 313. “If the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt, the
defendant should be bound over for trial, where the questions can be resolved by the trier of fact.”
Id. Further, “[i]t is not the function of the district court to discharge the accused when the evidence
is conflicting or raises a reasonable doubt with regard to guilt. Such questions are for the trier of
fact.” People v Selwa, 214 Mich App 451, 469; 543 NW2d 321 (1995).
The elements of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer in violation of
MCL 750.81d(1) are “(1) the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed,
opposed, or endangered a police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that
the person . . . was a police officer performing his or her duties.” People v Quinn, 305 Mich App
484, 491; 853 NW2d 383 (2014) (citation omitted). And because the enactment of MCL 750.81d
did not abrogate the common-law rule that a person may resist an unlawful arrest, the prosecution
also “must establish that the officers acted lawfully as an element of the crime of resisting or
obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d.” Id. at 491-492.
The statute defines the term “obstruct” as including “the use or threatened use of physical
interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.”
MCL 750.81d(7)(a). “[O]bstructing an officer through a ‘knowing failure to comply with a lawful
command’ requires some physical refusal to comply with a command, as opposed to a mere verbal
statement of disagreement.” People v Morris, 314 Mich App 399, 409 n 6; 886 NW2d 910 (2016).
“Additionally, the duration of the resistance or the mental state of defendant at the time is of no
import, as resistance can occur in even the briefest of moments, and the statute does not require
that defendant be found to be free of any mitigating motivation.” Id. at 414-415.
In this case, the district court identified three potential instances of resisting or obstructing:
defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle upon request, his refusal to remove his face covering, and
his failure to provide his true name and date of birth when asked to identify himself. It found that
the first two instances did not constitute resisting or obstructing and declined to bind defendant
over on those theories. But the court concluded that, assuming the command to identify himself
was lawful, there was probable cause to bind defendant over for resisting or obstructing on that
basis. We address each finding in turn.
A. FAILURE TO REMOVE FACE COVERING
As an initial matter, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to bind
defendant over on the theory that he resisted or obstructed by failing to remove his face covering
when asked.
According to the deputy’s testimony, he asked defendant to remove his face covering after
defendant was handcuffed and detained in the deputy’s cruiser. The district court found that,

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assuming defendant was handcuffed behind his back, he could not have complied with the request
to remove his face covering. We see no error in that finding. The prosecution did not present
evidence establishing whether defendant’s hands were cuffed behind his back or in front of his
person. If defendant’s hands were cuffed behind his back, he could not have complied with the
deputy’s command to remove his face covering. If defendant’s hands were cuffed in front of him
such that he could have complied, the prosecution failed to present evidence to that effect. In
either case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to bind defendant over on
that theory.
B. FAILURE TO EXIT VEHICLE
Concerning defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle upon command, the district court found
that the command was lawful but that defendant’s initial failure to comply did not rise to resisting
or obstructing because he ultimately exited the vehicle voluntarily.
Regarding the seizure of a passenger, “the United States Supreme Court held that when a
police officer makes a traffic stop, ‘a passenger is seized as well’ as the driver within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” People v Lyons, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 370840); slip op at 3, quoting Brendlin v California, 551 US 249, 251; 127 S Ct 2400;
168 L Ed 2d 132 (2007). The Brendlin Court “also noted that it is ‘reasonable for passengers to
expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move
around in ways that could jeopardize his safety.’ ” Lyons, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3,
quoting Brendlin, 551 US at 258. A police officer may therefore lawfully order passengers to exit
a vehicle during a traffic stop. Lyons, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.
In this case, Deputy Zaragosa testified that the driver had already been removed from the
vehicle and detained by other officers on suspicion of retail fraud when the deputy arrived. He
was informed that the vehicle was going to be impounded, so he ordered defendant and the female
passenger to exit the vehicle. Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to lock the car door and refused
to exit the vehicle despite repeated commands. One to two minutes after the deputy first ordered
defendant to exit, defendant complied.
The district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that this did not provide a basis
for bindover because defendant ultimately voluntarily complied. The deputy’s command to exit
the vehicle was lawful under Lyons, and the prosecution presented evidence that defendant refused
to comply for one to two minutes before acquiescing. It is immaterial that defendant eventually
complied because “the duration of the resistance . . . is of no import, as resistance can occur in
even the briefest of moments.” Morris, 314 Mich App at 414-415. The prosecution therefore
presented evidence at the preliminary examination sufficient to satisfy the elements of resisting or
obstructing under the probable-cause standard with respect to defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle
upon command. The district court thus abused its discretion by declining to bind defendant over
on that theory of resisting or obstructing. See People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50, 61; 780 NW2d 280
(2010) (“A bindover is required when probable cause exists to support each of the elements of a
crime.”).

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C. PROVISION OF FALSE IDENTIFICATION
Concerning the theory of resisting or obstructing for which the district court did bind
defendant over—his provision of false identifying information—defendant contends that he was
not legally required to identify himself, and the district court thus abused its discretion by binding
him over on that basis.
“Failing to provide identification upon request by a police officer is not itself a crime or
statutory offense in Michigan.” People v Murawski, 349 Mich App 296, 313; 27 NW3d 673
(2023). But an officer may lawfully command a subject to produce identification when the officer
has “reasonably articulable suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot.” Quinn, 305 Mich App
at 493; see also Murawski, 349 Mich App at 313 (holding that the defendant’s arrest for resisting
or obstructing based upon his failure to provide identification was not lawful when the officers
lacked “proof that defendant had either engaged in a crime or was imminently going to commit a
crime”).
Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “is determined case by
case, on the basis of an analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances” and “must be based
on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Quinn, 305 Mich App at 492
(citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an inchoate or
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable
cause.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). An officer “must have had
a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 98-99. “Whether
this standard is met in a particular case is fact-specific and requires an analysis of the totality of
the circumstances known by the officer . . . .” People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 387; 15 NW3d 249
(2024).
To begin, we agree with defendant that the district court erred by basing its probable-cause
finding on an assumption that the deputy’s command to defendant to identify himself was lawful.
To warrant bindover, the prosecution was required to present some evidence of each element of
resisting or obstructing, Crumbley, 346 Mich App at 167, and that includes the element “that the
officer[] acted lawfully,” Quinn, 305 Mich App at 492. A finding of probable cause must be based
on the evidence and reasonable inferences arising from it; it cannot rest on a mere assumption.
See, e.g., People v Simon, 339 Mich App 568, 585; 984 NW2d 800 (2021). A bindover decision
therefore cannot rest on an assumption that an element has been satisfied and must instead be based
on the evidence.
Nevertheless, the record supports the conclusion that the deputy’s command was lawful.
Based on the syringes found on the driver, the driver’s connection to the shoplifting incident,
defendant’s frantic covering of his arms and face, the lighter found on defendant’s person, and
defendant’s erratic behavior, Deputy Zaragosa had a particularized and objective basis to suspect
that defendant was engaged in the possession or use of narcotics. The deputy therefore had
reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity and could lawfully command
defendant to identify himself. See Quinn, 305 Mich App at 493; Murawski, 349 Mich App at 313.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in binding defendant over for trial on the basis of his
failure to comply with that lawful command.2
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the prosecution presented evidence satisfying the elements of resisting or
obstructing under the probable-cause standard with respect to defendant’s failure to exit the vehicle
and his failure to identify himself, we affirm the district court’s bindover decision.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
2 We assume, without deciding, that defendant’s failure to verbally provide identification and his
provision of a false name and date of birth constitute obstruction, which requires “some physical
refusal to comply with a command, as opposed to a mere verbal statement of disagreement.”
Morris, 314 Mich App at 409 n 6.

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