COA 373486 PEOPLE OF MI V ZANETA SONJA MURPHY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2026
12:05 PM
v No. 373486
Oakland Circuit Court
ZANETA SONJA MURPHY, LC No. 2024-289082-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Zaneta Murphy (hereinafter “defendant”) appeals as of right her jury-trial convictions of
assaulting or resisting a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and refusing fingerprinting, MCL
28.243a. Defendant was sentenced to time served. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from defendant’s conviction for assaulting a police officer during an
arrest on warrants issued following her failure to appear for arraignment in a separate criminal
proceeding. Defendant, who was homeless at all relevant times, had previously been arrested for
assault and for resisting or obstructing a police officer. On that prior occasion, she was issued two
citations specifying the charges but omitting the date of her scheduled arraignment. Law
enforcement officers informed defendant that a future court date would be provided. Defendant
subsequently discarded the citations in a trash receptacle as she exited the police station. A
summons was mailed to defendant’s last known address but was returned as undeliverable due to
her homelessness. Defendant failed to appear for arraignment, resulting in the issuance of two
arrest warrants.
Three months later, police were called because it was reported defendant was walking in a
busy roadway and was almost struck by a vehicle. Officers Robert Ronk and Joel Perry were
dispatched, and defendant was arrested on the outstanding warrants. Defendant was uncooperative
and kicked Officer Ronk in the genitals. After defendant was placed in a cell, she refused to be

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fingerprinted. Defendant was charged with assaulting or resisting a police officer and refusing
fingerprinting. The charges related to the original warrants were dismissed after defendant’s arrest.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced as stated above. This appeal then ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant asserts that her convictions must be vacated on two grounds: (1) that the
issuance of warrants for her arrest was predicated upon a violation of her procedural due process
rights due to insufficient notice of the arraignment, and (2) that she lawfully resisted an unlawful
arrest.
A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Defendant maintains that notice of the arraignment provided by mail was constitutionally
deficient and thereby violated her due process rights. Issues of constitutional and statutory
interpretation, as well as other questions of law, are reviewed de novo. People v Gayheart, 285
Mich App 202, 207, 776 NW2d 330 (2009). De novo review requires independent consideration
without deference to the trial court’s decision. People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939 NW2d 213
(2019).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Const 1963, art 1,
§ 17 of the Michigan Constitution, collectively prohibit the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. People v Sierb, 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998). In the
context of criminal proceedings, procedural due process generally requires that a defendant be
afforded reasonable notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard and present a defense.
People v Mysliwiec, 315 Mich App 414, 420; 890 NW2d 691 (2016). Fundamental to our
jurisprudence is the right of a criminal defendant to reasonable notice of the charges and an
opportunity to be heard in defense—the right to one’s day in court. These core rights include, at
minimum, the ability to confront adverse witnesses, to present evidence, and to have the assistance
of counsel. People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 699; 672 NW2d 191 (2003). A deprivation of
adequate notice constitutes a violation of due process and, accordingly, mandates reversal. Id.
However, the constitutional requirement of notice is not a mere technicality; rather, it
operates as a substantive safeguard to ensure a defendant’s ability to understand and respond to
the charges. Accordingly, to prevail on a due process claim premised on lack of notice, a defendant
must demonstrate prejudice to the defense:
Defendant has not established actual prejudice, or explained what different defense
would have presented. In sum, defendant has not established that she had an
inadequate opportunity to prepare her defense. Defendant’s due process claim must
fail because she has not established prejudice resulting from inadequate notice and
opportunity to defend the charges. Id. at 702. (internal citations omitted).
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, this Court has held that the determination of whether due process has been
afforded is fact specific. Id. at 699-700.

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Here, defendant was charged with two misdemeanors. In such cases, MCR 6.615(A)(2)
permits a citation to serve as both a sworn complaint and a summons to secure the defendant’s
initial appearance. Under MCR 6.102(C)(2)(c), service of a summons is effectuated by mailing a
copy to the individual’s last known address. Should a defendant fail to appear in response to a
summons, the court is authorized to issue a bench warrant pursuant to MCR 6.103.
Defendant contends that her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution were infringed upon due to purportedly insufficient notice of the
scheduled arraignment, which ultimately led to the issuance of arrest warrants. Upon review of
the record, it is evident that defendant was personally served with two citations, each of which
expressly set forth the nature of the charges pending against her and her obligation to appear in
court. Service of these citations satisfied the requirements of due process by providing notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. “Personal service of written
notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of
proceeding.” Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313; 70 S Ct 652; 94
L Ed 865 (1950). Additionally, defendant’s decision to discard her citations in the police
department’s trash receptacle upon her departure does not vitiate the sufficiency of service or the
adequacy of the notice provided. The law does not require actual receipt or subjective awareness
of the information to establish proper notice; rather, the focus is on whether the method of service
was reasonably calculated to inform. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170; 122 S
Ct 694; 151 L Ed2d 597 (2002).
Moreover, defendant was afforded an opportunity, at the scheduled arraignment, to be
heard and to present any defenses, thereby fulfilling the fundamental requirements of procedural
due process. The citations themselves served as both sworn complaints and summonses pursuant
to MCR 6.615(A)(2). In addition, law enforcement officers made further efforts to ensure notice
by mailing a summons to the defendant’s last known address, consistent with the procedures set
forth in MCR 6.102(C)(2)(c). Although this mailing was returned as undeliverable, such
additional efforts further demonstrate the reasonableness of the attempts to notify the defendant.
Defendant contests the applicability of People v Darden,1 230 Mich App 597, 602-603;
585 NW2d 27 (1998), which requires a showing of prejudice to establish a due process violation.
While Darden considered whether a defendant in a first-degree murder prosecution received
adequate notice to defend against a lesser-included offense, the requirement of prejudice
articulated therein remains dispositive. Id. at 602 n 6. Defendant’s reliance on Jones v Flowers,
547 US 220, 220; 126 S Ct 1708; 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006)—a non-criminal property tax case from
Arkansas—is unavailing. Defendant posits that Jones eliminates the need to show prejudice,
referencing its holding that, when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must
take additional reasonable steps to notify the property owner if practicable. This factual and legal
context, however, is inapposite to the present criminal matter.
1 This Court expressly referenced Darden in its analysis as set forth in the quotation from
McGee, supra.

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Jones does not address, nor displace, the necessity of demonstrating prejudice; in contrast,
the Darden requirement is both directly applicable and persuasive in the present circumstances.
Whereas Jones implicates civil property interests, the case at bar is criminal, and defendant
received personal service of citations apprising her of the charges. Darden expressly conditions
any claim of inadequate notice on a showing of prejudice. Darden, 230 Mich App at 602 n 6,
citing People v Traughber, 432 Mich 208, 215; 439 NW2d 231 (1989). Defendant has not
identified any cognizable prejudice arising from the alleged notice deficiency, and her failure to
cite supporting legal authority constitutes abandonment of the issue. See People v Ackerman, 257
Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Accordingly, defendant’s due process claim is devoid
of merit.
Even assuming, arguendo, that a showing of prejudice is not a prerequisite, the record does
not support a finding of a due process violation under these circumstances. Defendant was
properly served with a summons and complaint, which clearly delineated the nature of the charges
against her. She was explicitly notified that the court would subsequently communicate the date
for her required appearance. Rather than respond appropriately, defendant disregarded this official
notification and willfully discarded the summons and complaint.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Dowdy, 489 Mich 373, 376; 802 NW2d 239
(2011), is particularly instructive in assessing the obligations imposed upon individuals to comply
with statutory requirements, irrespective of personal circumstances such as homelessness. In
Dowdy, the Court rejected the argument that lack of a fixed address excuses compliance,
emphasizing that the responsibility to update law enforcement with current contact information
persists regardless of housing status. Although Dowdy addressed the requirements of the Sex
Offender Registration Act (SORA), the underlying rationale—that statutory obligations are not
abrogated by individual circumstances—applies with equal force here.
In the instant matter, defendant was unequivocally informed that a subsequent arraignment
date would be provided, yet she failed to undertake any reasonable efforts to ascertain the status
of her case, update her address, or otherwise remain apprised of her legal obligations, all while
continuing to reside within the court’s jurisdiction. Her contention that the dismissal of prior
charges should bear on the present analysis is unconvincing, as those dismissals occurred only
after her reapprehension on outstanding warrants, not due to any procedural deficiencies
attributable to the prosecution or the court. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this
issue.
B. RIGHT TO RESIST UNLAWFUL ARREST AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant asserts that her resistance to arrest was lawful on the grounds that the warrants
issued for her arrest were obtained in violation of her due process rights. She contends that, as a
result, she retained a lawful right to resist an illegal arrest. We acknowledge that a defendant may,
under certain circumstances, lawfully resist an unlawful arrest. However, in the present case, as
stated above, the record demonstrates that defendant’s arrest was conducted pursuant to valid legal
process. Therefore, no lawful right to resist the arrest existed at the time it occurred.
“We review constitutional issues de novo.” People v Pennington, 240 Mich App 188, 191;
610 NW2d 608 (2000) (citation omitted). Also, “[t]his Court reviews de novo a challenge to the

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sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction.” People v Parkinson, 348 Mich App 565,
573; 19 NW3d 174 (2023). “On appeal, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that the prosecution proved
each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Anderson, 331 Mich
App 552, 557-558; 953 NW2d 451 (2020) (citation omitted). “[T]he standard of review is
deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility
choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he right to resist unlawful arrests, and other unlawful invasions of private rights, is
well established in our state’s common law.” People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 46-47; 814 NW2d
624 (2012) (citation and emphasis omitted).
In explaining the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest, this
Court has stated that one may use such reasonable force as is
necessary to prevent an illegal attachment and to resist an illegal
arrest and that the basis for such preventive or resistive action is the
illegality of an officer’s action, to which a defendant immediately
reacts. [Id. at 47.]
Our Supreme Court has made clear that MCL 750.81d, which criminalizes resisting or
obstructing a police officer, does not eliminate the longstanding common-law right of an individual
to resist an unlawful arrest. People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 57 (2012). The lawfulness of an arrest
is typically a question of law for judicial determination; however, when the lawfulness of an arrest
constitutes an element of the charged offense, that question is properly reserved for the
factfinder—here, the jury. People v Quinn, 305 Mich App 484, 494; 853 NW2d 383 (2014). In
accordance with the common law, the prosecution bears the burden of proving—beyond a
reasonable doubt—that law enforcement officers acted lawfully in the course of an arrest under
MCL 750.81d. Moreno, 491 Mich at 51-52. Further, the Fourth Amendment requires that
seizures, including arrests, are reasonable only when supported by probable cause. Quinn, 305
Mich App at 492. Pursuant to MCL 764.15(e), a peace officer is authorized to effectuate an arrest
upon receiving positive information from any authoritative source, whether written, electronic, or
otherwise, indicating that a warrant for the individual’s arrest exists.
As previously discussed, there is no merit to the assertion that defendant’s due process
rights were infringed. The record reflects that the warrants underlying defendant’s arrest were
valid and operative at the time of apprehension. Officer Ronk executed the arrest solely on the
basis of these outstanding warrants. Under the authority of MCL 764.15(e), Officer Ronk
possessed probable cause, derived directly from the existence of the warrants, and accordingly, the
arrest was lawful. Had the arrest lacked legal justification, the defendant’s resistance could have
been excused under Michigan law. See People v Murawski, 349 Mich App 296, 316; 27 NW3d
673 (2023) (recognizing an individual’s right to use reasonable force, including physical
resistance, to oppose an unlawful arrest). Nevertheless, the prosecution introduced ample evidence
demonstrating that the arrest was lawful. When a defendant is prosecuted for resisting arrest, the
question of the lawfulness of that arrest—ordinarily one of law for the court—becomes a factual
matter for jury resolution. People v Dalton, 155 Mich App 591, 598; 400 NW2d 689 (1986).
Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to uphold defendant’s

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convictions. The standard for sufficiency is well-established: a conviction must stand if, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Tennyson,
487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d 354 (2010). Both direct and circumstantial evidence, together with
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, may constitute adequate proof of the elements of an
offense. People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016). It is not the province
of this Court to disturb the factfinder’s assessment of the weight of the evidence or the credibility
of witnesses; such determinations are vested uniquely in the trier of fact. People v Parkinson, 348
Mich App 568, 574; 803 NW2d 304 (2014).
Defendant was charged and found guilty of assaulting or resisting a police officer, MCL
750.81d(1), and refusing fingerprinting, MCL 28.243a2. Specifically, to convict defendant for
resisting and obstructing a police officer, the prosecution was required to show that:
the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or
endangered a police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know
that the person that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted,
obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer performing his or her
duties. [People v Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 68; 859 NW2d 229 (2014),
quoting Quinn, 305 Mich App at 491 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
“In addition, the prosecution must establish that the officers’ actions were lawful.” Id. (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
The prosecution’s proofs in this case satisfy the requisite elements of resisting or
obstructing a police officer. Officer Ronk testified that defendant kicked him in the groin, a fact
corroborated by the body-worn camera footage presented to the jury, in which Officer Ronk is
heard stating, “Don’t kick me in the nuts.” Officer Perry’s testimony confirmed the assault on
Officer Ronk. Additional evidence established that defendant was uncooperative and actively
resisted Officer Ronk, who was clearly identifiable as a police officer by virtue of his uniform and
marked police vehicle with activated emergency lights. Furthermore, Officer Ronk testified that
his knowledge of two outstanding warrants for defendant’s arrest was the basis for the
apprehension. These facts, viewed collectively, provided the jury with a sufficient evidentiary
foundation to conclude that defendant knowingly assaulted or resisted a police officer in the
performance of their official duties. Accordingly, a jury could conclude sufficient evidence was
presented to establish defendant assaulted or resisted a police officer.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
2 Defendant did not contest or reference her conviction of refusing fingerprinting, hence this issue
is not addressed.

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