COA 368236 KIRK JON BUSH V LORI LYNN BUSH Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/19/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
KIRK JON BUSH,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2025
11:14 AM
v No. 368236
Ottawa Circuit Court
LORI LYNN BUSH, LC No. 15-079651-DO
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee.
KIRK JON BUSH,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v No. 368343
Ottawa Circuit Court
LORI LYNN BUSH, LC No. 15-079651-DO
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: RICK, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 368236, plaintiff/counterdefendant-appellant Kirk John Bush (plaintiff)
appeals as of right an order modifying spousal support and granting his request for attorney fees
in part. In Docket No. 368343, defendant/counterplaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant Lori Lynn

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Bush (defendant) appeals by delayed leave granted1 the same spousal support order. We vacate in
part and remand.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties in this matter were married on September 19, 1987. The marriage lasted until
the entry of a judgment of divorce in April 2016. During the marriage, the parties raised three
children, who are all now adults. The parties’ marriage was relatively traditional, with plaintiff
acting as the primary income producer and defendant acting as a stay-at-home mother, although
she was intermittently employed throughout the marriage. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court
awarded defendant rehabilitative spousal support as part of the judgment of divorce. The trial
court considered all of the relevant spousal support factors, including the relationship between the
parties, their ability to earn income, and their personal needs, among other factors. Defendant’s
fault in causing the divorce—namely that she engaged in an affair in 2003, which damaged the
marriage—was also considered, but the court found it was outweighed by other factors supporting
spousal support. The trial court imputed $40,000 in annual income to defendant based on her
education and work history. As part of the spousal award, the court ordered:
To protect both parties, they will be required to provide notice to the
opposing party of any increase in income of 10% or more in any calendar year.
Failure to provide this information to the other party will expose that party to the
payment of attorney fees and expenses generated by the opposing party’s effort to
gather the withheld information.
Ultimately, plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant $7,500 monthly for three years, which would
then be reduced to $6,000 for next three years, then $4,500 for the final six years.
On August 30, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion to terminate the parties’ uniform spousal
support order (USSO). Plaintiff explained that defendant married John Kaminski on August 12,
2022, a person with whom she allegedly had an extramarital relationship that contributed to the
breakdown of the marriage. Plaintiff stated that he was employed as Vice President of a company
called Metal Flow and maintained consistent income. He further stated that, although defendant
was unemployed when the judgment of divorce was entered, she had gone on to own multiple
properties, including a home purchased for $435,000 in January 2021 and another parcel purchased
for $67,500 in January 2022. Additionally, plaintiff stated that defendant sold a previous home
for $985,000 in December 2020 after purchasing it for $258,000, realizing a $727,000 gain.
Plaintiff also noted that defendant co-owned a company with Kaminski called Retirement
Financial Group, LLC (RFG).
Plaintiff continued that the trial court awarded defendant spousal support primarily because
it found that defendant could not support herself financially and only had the capacity to earn
approximately $40,000 per year. He argued that the trial court discounted evidence of defendant’s
1 Bush v Bush, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 11, 2023 (Docket
No. 358343). This Court consolidated the appeals in Docket No. 368236 and 368343 in the same
order.

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alleged infidelity. However, plaintiff claimed that defendant and Kaminski had an ongoing
relationship before and during the divorce proceedings, which they denied during trial testimony.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff argued that the USSO should be terminated. Plaintiff stated that
MCL 552.13(2) provides that courts may terminate spousal support when a recipient remarries,
and that Michigan caselaw additionally supported modification when the recipient concealed a
relationship or delayed marriage to continue receiving support. Plaintiff also argued that
defendant’s improved financial circumstances eliminated the need for ongoing spousal support.
Defendant responded that plaintiff’s motion was primarily based on defendant’s
remarriage, but that her remarriage did not constitute an automatic termination event under the
USSO. Defendant argued that she followed the Court’s expectations by returning to the workforce
and establishing a financial consulting business in 2017. Defendant stated that she had generated
income averaging $77,078 over the past three years and that she also received income from interest
and dividends on separate assets. Defendant pointed out that plaintiff’s income remained
approximately $330,000 annually plus rental property income, suggesting that he was more than
capable of paying spousal support. Defendant contended that, while her income has increased
since 2016, the change was not significant enough to justify termination or modification of spousal
support. Defendant thus asked the court to deny the motion to terminate the USSO.
A hearing on the motion to terminate the USSO was held in April 2023. Plaintiff called
Eric Larson as an expert witness. Larson testified that he is a shareholder at Doeren Mayhew,
working in the valuation and litigation support services group. Larson testified that he was retained
by plaintiff to offer an opinion on defendant’s income. To evaluate defendant’s income, he relied
primarily on her tax returns, financial statements for her business, and related documentation. He
used adjusted gross income (AGI) from tax returns as a starting point, then adjusted defendant’s
income to reflect “historical income”—meaning income available to meet household obligations—
which he considered more appropriate for spousal support purposes. The adjustments also
included accounting for pass-through income from defendant’s 50% ownership interest in RFG,
noting that such income may not reflect actual cash received. Larson additionally adjusted
defendant’s income by adding back discretionary business expenses and backing out alimony
received, basis adjustments for capital gains on stock awarded in the divorce, and trust income that
was deemed separate property.
Larson noted that distributions and guaranteed payments from RFG were split
approximately 60/40 between Kaminski and Bush over four years, despite equal ownership, with
no clear explanation in the tax returns for the disparity. He also testified that depreciation
deductions reduce taxable income but do not create cash, and that such deductions are typically
added back for support calculations. Larson additionally testified that the most plaintiff made in
income was in 2020, when she earned more than $500,000, which included $342,000 of long-term
capital gains for the sale of stock. However, on cross-examination, Larson acknowledged that
some income reported, including the 2020 capital gains, resulted from the sale of stock with a very
low basis. Larson also agreed that some items, including IRA conversions, may not have been
available as cash for support. He maintained, however, that certain expenses, such as health
insurance paid by the business, were discretionary expenses that benefited defendant and should
be considered in her income for support purposes. Larson stated that the resulting “historical
income” figure is the most appropriate measure for the court to consider. Larson did not directly

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opine on defendant’s need for continuing spousal support, but asserted that his calculation of her
income was “a reasonable estimate” for the purposes of calculating spousal support.
Defendant testified extensively about her personal, professional, and financial
circumstances. She stated that she is a certified financial planner and confirmed that she owns
50% of RFG, with Kaminski owning the other half of the business. Defendant explained the
history of her home ownership, including the purchase and sale of properties, and clarified that
proceeds from the sale of her previous home were used for renovations and the purchase of her
current residence. She additionally acknowledged that Kaminski contributed to household
expenses such as utilities and groceries but did not contribute to equity payments on the home.
Defendant also stated that she solely owns the home and placed the home in a trust to keep her
assets separate following her previous divorce from plaintiff. Defendant testified that she also
owned another property, held in an LLC for liability reasons, which was occupied by a friend with
cancer.
Regarding her business, defendant testified that she and Kaminski work full-time at RFG,
and that their business commissions were pooled without internal tracking of which partner
generated which commission. She acknowledged that in some years, Kaminski received higher
guaranteed payments, but claimed this was to address his personal debt. Defendant asserted that
in 2022, her income from RFG consisted of a guaranteed payment of $50,000, plus health
insurance and a health savings account. Defendant disputed Larson’s analysis of her income,
particularly objecting to the inclusion of capital gains from stock sales and IRA distributions,
neither of which resulted in cash income. Defendant also questioned the amount attributed to
health insurance as a discretionary expense, stating that the actual cost per employee was lower
than what was reported in Larson’s analysis.
Defendant admitted that she did not notify plaintiff when her income exceeded the
threshold set in the judgment of divorce, explaining that she forgot due to ongoing litigation and
did not revisit the judgment’s requirements. She maintained that her income had not increased
significantly due to rising business expenses, and that any increases in company revenue had not
translated into higher personal income. Defendant also described her charitable giving, retirement
contributions, and the structure of her business and personal finances, emphasizing that she did
not believe her spousal support should be reduced based solely on fluctuations in her reported
income.
Plaintiff testified regarding his employment, income, and financial circumstances since the
divorce. He stated that he has been employed as Vice President in charge of engineering and
tooling at Metal Flow since 2014. Plaintiff asserted that his job responsibilities and compensation
had not changed significantly since the parties’ April 2016 divorce. He confirmed that his annual
W-2 income for the years 2017 through 2022 ranged from approximately $307,000 to $325,000.
Plaintiff additionally testified that he participated in a 401(k) plan with employee contributions but
received no employer match. Plaintiff explained that he also owned two rental properties. He
described the income and expenses associated with these properties, noting that the net rental
income was modest and that he claimed depreciation on the properties as a deduction on his tax
returns. Plaintiff asserted that he had no other significant sources of income or dividends, and that
any investment income was reinvested, rather than taken as cash. He also agreed that he never

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notified defendant that his income exceeded the 10% threshold above the amount stated in the
judgment of divorce, as his income had not changed substantially since that time.
In June 2023, plaintiff filed a closing argument in support of the motion to terminate the
USSO. Plaintiff stated that defendant admitted she never reported notice of an increase in her
income by more than 10% in a calendar year, as required by the judgment of divorce. Plaintiff
argued that defendant’s actions and a lack of cooperation in discovery showed an intent to conceal
her income. Plaintiff additionally argued that ample evidence showed an increase in defendant’s
annual income, suggesting that she no longer needed spousal support. Plaintiff pointed out that
expert analysis of defendant’s tax returns and business records showed her income had consistently
exceeded the imputed $40,000, with significant additional benefits and capital gains. Defendant
admitted to income of $99,547 in 2020 and $90,581 in 2021, and made substantial charitable
contributions, which plaintiff contended was evidence of financial stability. On the other hand,
plaintiff maintained that his income had remained stable since the divorce with no significant
increase or new benefits.
Plaintiff argued that defendant’s circumstances changed significantly since the original
award, meaning that she was no longer entitled to spousal support. Plaintiff additionally contended
that he was entitled to reimbursement for attorney fees related to defendant’s failure to provide
required financial information. He also requested that spousal support be retroactively modified
to reflect defendant’s actual income since 2018, arguing that her failure to report income increases
justified requiring her to reimburse him for overpayment of spousal support.
Defendant filed a closing argument opposing the motion to terminate the USSO in July
2023. Defendant argued that the spousal support obligation did not end upon her remarriage and
that plaintiff’s claims about her financial improvement were unsupported. Additionally, defendant
contended that Larson overstated her income by including gains from her separate estate, IRA
rollovers, and business expenses. Defendant explained that her actual average K-1 distributions
over four years were about $39,539, which aligned with what the court anticipated at the time the
judgment of divorce was entered. She also noted that no evidence was presented to show that her
marriage to Kaminski changed her financial status, pointing out that she elected to keep her
finances separate to preserve her estate.
Defendant further argued that plaintiff’s income increased since the divorce and that he
also surpassed the 10% increase threshold, but never reported it. Comparatively, defendant argued
that plaintiff’s income remained much higher than hers: if only employment income was
considered, plaintiff earned $329,882, while defendant earned $39,552. If all income and
depreciation were considered, plaintiff earned $347,401, and defendant earned $71,498. Either
way, defendant argued that plaintiff remained more than capable of paying spousal support.
Regarding the retroactive modification of spousal support, defendant briefly contended that
her income fluctuated and averaged below the 10% threshold, and that plaintiff himself failed to
report his own 10% increase in income, suggesting that retroactive modification was unwarranted.
Finally, regarding attorney fees, defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to fees, noting that
both parties incurred substantial fees as a result of plaintiff’s motion to terminate the USSO.

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In August 2023, the trial court issued an opinion modifying the USSO. The court found
two changes justifying modification: (1) defendant’s remarriage to a financially capable partner,
and (2) defendant’s successful business, both of which were acknowledged by defendant. The
court found that these changes warranted modification of the USSO, rather than termination. The
court additionally observed that the judgment of divorce required the parties to notify each other
of any income increase of 10% or more, with failure exposing the non-reporting party to attorney
fees and sanctions. The court found that defendant admitted she forgot to comply. The court noted
that it considered this in deciding whether to modify support and impose sanctions.
Turning to the spousal support factors, the court found that several factors warranted
modifying the USSO. Specifically, the court found that (1) both parties were working and
financially stable; (2) defendant’s remarriage and business success increased her financial
flexibility; (3) plaintiff could still afford to pay spousal support, but defendant’s changed
circumstances justified a reduction; and (4) defendant’s prior standard of living and the effect of
cohabitation supported modification, rather than termination. The court additionally explained
that, while remarriage is a significant change, the original judgment of divorce did not provide for
automatic termination of the USSO upon defendant’s remarriage. The court found that a
significant income disparity remained between the parties, meaning that complete termination of
the USSO would not be equitable.
Regarding plaintiff’s request for retroactive modification of support and attorney fees, the
trial court found that defendant’s failure to report her income increase was unintentional. Rather
than order attorney fees or a retroactive modification of support, the court decided the most
efficient resolution was to reduce support and incorporate all of the issues into one revised USSO.
Accordingly, the court reduced plaintiff’s spousal support obligation to $3,000 per month, with an
additional $500 reduction (to $2,500 per month) to account for plaintiff’s request for retroactive
modification of spousal support and attorney fees. In September 2023, the trial court entered a
revised USSO reflecting these changes.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for reconsideration of the revised USSO. Relevant to this appeal,
plaintiff argued that the revised USSO was made retroactive to August 30, 2022. Plaintiff
explained that this retroactive application resulted in plaintiff overpaying spousal support by
$26,000 through September 30, 2023. The court’s opinion did not address how this overpayment
should be repaid to plaintiff. Plaintiff maintained that this issue had not yet been decided, making
reconsideration appropriate under MCR 2.119(F).
Defendant also moved for reconsideration of the revised USSO. Defendant argued that the
spousal support guidelines used by the court assumed taxability, but if the support were not taxable,
the recommended amount would have been higher than what the court ordered. She requested that
the court reconsider the tax treatment of the support payments. She also contended that the court
incorrectly compared her income to plaintiff’s by including her dividend income, but only
considering defendant’s income, not his dividend or rental income. Defendant likewise argued
that the court confused her business’s gross revenue with net income, leading to an inaccurate
assessment of her financial situation. Defendant continued that, after taxes, the net spousal support
she received was insufficient to meet her needs, and the additional $500 monthly reduction was
also taxed, further reducing her net benefit. Regarding the $500 reduction to account for plaintiff’s
attorney fees, defendant contended that the total offset over the support period exceeded the actual

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attorney fees claimed. She stated that it was inappropriate to award all of plaintiff’s attorney fees,
especially those incurred for the hearing, which would have occurred regardless of her actions.
Regarding retroactivity, defendant noted that both parties failed to report increases in
income as required by the judgment, and stated that she should not be penalized with further
retroactive support adjustments. Defendant also raised concerns about the practical and tax
implications of repaying retroactive support, suggesting that a lump sum repayment would require
her to liquidate assets and incur additional taxes, while a payment schedule would strain her
finances. Defendant thus asked the court to reconsider the foregoing issues.
In October 2023, the trial court entered an order denying both motions for summary
disposition. Regarding plaintiff’s motion, the court clarified that the $26,000 overpayment of
spousal support would be credited over the remaining 54 months of the obligation, resulting in a
monthly credit of $481.48. The court rounded this up to $500 per month to also account for
attorney fees associated with discovery, as provided in the judgment of divorce. The court noted
that ongoing litigation over spousal support was likely, but that it could only act on the information
currently available to it.
Regarding defendant’s motion, the court stated that it considered taxability and did not
modify the taxability provision in the USSO. The court acknowledged an error in stating
defendant’s income as $200,000, but found that both parties have complex finances that would
require forensic accounting to fully analyze. The court reiterated that the $500 monthly credit to
plaintiff included a portion for attorney fees. The court concluded that neither party provided
convincing evidence of a palpable error that would require modifying its previous opinion and
order.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying his spousal support
obligation, rather than terminating it. He further contends that the court abused its discretion by
failing to retroactively modify spousal support and by failing to award him an appropriate amount
of attorney fees. On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by finding that a change
in circumstances existed to justify the modification of spousal support. She additionally contends
that the court abused its discretion by failing to make adequate factual findings regarding the
parties’ income for spousal support purposes.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A trial court’s factual findings relating to the modification of spousal support are reviewed
for clear error. Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990); Loutts v Loutts, 298
Mich App 21, 25; 826 NW2d 152 (2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court,
on all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Beason, 435 Mich at 805. If the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court then
reviews the trial court’s ruling regarding spousal support for an abuse of discretion. Woodington
v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 355; 792 NW2d 63 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s ruling falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Id. A trial

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court’s spousal support ruling must be affirmed unless this Court determines that it was
inequitable. Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26.
We review the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.
Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 303 Mich App 441, 451; 844 NW2d
727 (2013). Questions of law related to the award of attorney fees are reviewed de novo, while
questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. Additionally, to the extent that this case concerns
questions of statutory and contractual interpretation, we likewise review such issues de novo.
Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 529; 740 NW2d 503 (2007).
B. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
MCL 552.28 authorizes the modification of spousal support awards. It states, in relevant
part:
On petition of either party . . . the court may revise and alter the judgment,
respecting the amount or payment of the alimony . . . and may make any judgment
respecting any of the matters that the court might have made in the original action.
A spousal support award is subject to modification only after a showing of changed circumstances.
Lemmen v Lemmen, 481 Mich 164, 166; 749 NW2d 255 (2008). “If the court finds that a party
has established a change in circumstances, it must then make factual findings from which to
conclude whether the alimony should be modified and, if so, by what amount.” Luckow v Luckow,
291 Mich App 417, 424; 805 NW2d 453 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
After the moving party has established a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant
modifying a spousal support award, the court must determine whether and how to modify the
award using the following factors:
(1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the
marriage, (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of
property awarded to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties
to pay alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties,
(9) the parties’ health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether
either is responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to
the joint estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of
cohabitation on a party’s financial status, and (14) general principles of equity.
[Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 726-727; 747 NW2d 336 (2008) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).]
The trial court must then “make specific factual findings regarding the factors that are relevant to
the particular case.” Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 289; 662 NW2d 111 (2003) (citation
omitted).
1. CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
As an initial matter, defendant argues on cross-appeal that the trial court improperly found
that a change in circumstances warranted modification of spousal support because her increased

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earnings were anticipated and accounted for in the original judgment of divorce. In the judgment
of divorce, the trial court imputed $40,000 in income to defendant for spousal support purposes,
based on her education and work history. The trial court went on to state:
As pointed out by the plaintiff, the defendant’s annualized income at her
last place of business was $72,000.00 per year. She will have some work to do to
find similar employment and get any necessary certification, but she will be able to
command that level of income in the future if she appropriately applies herself.
The court also stated:
The plaintiff is likely to be making in excess of $300,000 for the foreseeable future.
As pointed out by the plaintiff, defendant likely has the ability to make $72,000 or
more per year. However, due to her absence from the work force for several years,
it is unlikely that she would make that immediately or in the near future. Even if
she were to make $72,000.00, this factor, when considered with others as
previously noted, supports a property award favoring defendant. This could also
be achieved through a generous spousal support award.
“By definition, changed circumstances cannot involve facts and circumstances that existed
at the time the court originally entered a judgment.” Laffin v Laffin, 280 Mich App 513, 519; 760
NW2d 738 (2008). Instead, “[a]ny modification of spousal support must be based on new facts or
changed circumstances arising after the judgment of divorce, and requires an evaluation of the
circumstances as they exist at the time modification is sought.” Id. Defendant is correct that her
increase in income was anticipated at the time of the divorce. The trial court expressly noted that
defendant’s likely future income would be between her own estimate of $35,000 after a couple of
years, and plaintiff’s estimate of $72,000, as annualized from her employment history. The trial
court estimated that defendant’s take-home income at the time that plaintiff moved to terminate
the USSO was approximately $74,078. Thus, an increase in the defendant’s income—especially
given that her estimated income fell so close to the range anticipated by the court—does not, by
itself, constitute an unanticipated change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal
support.
However, it bears noting that the trial court also determined that defendant’s remarriage
constituted a change in circumstances warranting review of spousal support, given that she
“remarried to a person capable of earning income to assist in her support and desire to maintain a
certain lifestyle.” Defendant’s remarriage was not anticipated at the time of the divorce and clearly
constituted a change in circumstances. See MCL 552.13(2) (“An award of alimony may be
terminated by the court as of the date the party receiving alimony remarries unless a contrary
agreement is specifically stated in the judgment of divorce.”); Elahham v Al-Jabban, 319 Mich
App 112, 134; 899 NW2d 768 (2017) (finding that it was equitable to terminate spousal support
one year after the recipient remarried, after reducing spousal support by 50% immediately
following the remarriage). Here, the court clarified that, while remarriage can be a basis for
modifying spousal support, it is not an automatic ground for termination unless the parties had
agreed to such a term in their judgment of divorce, which the parties had not in this case.
Ultimately, even if the trial court erred by finding that defendant’s increased income was a change
in circumstances, the error was harmless, since plaintiff’s remarriage constituted a change in

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circumstances warranting review of the spousal support order. See In re Moriconi, 337 Mich App
515, 522; 977 NW2d 583 (2021) (“An error is harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the
proceeding.”).
2. THE COURT’S REVISED USSO
Regarding the trial court’s decision to revise the USSO, plaintiff contends on direct appeal
that the court did not properly consider the “vast income, significant assets, or any other income-
generating resources” that defendant accrued since the divorce. He further argues that the court
“had conflicting findings regarding [plaintiff]’s ability to pay spousal support and his prior
standard of living.”
The trial court reduced plaintiff’s spousal support obligation to $3,000 per month.2 This
Court’s first task on appeal is to determine whether any of the trial court’s factual findings were
clearly erroneous. Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26. “If the trial court’s findings are not clearly
erroneous, we must determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable under the
circumstances of the case.” Id.
In its opinion modifying the USSO, the trial court discussed defendant’s business activities,
specifically her role as part-owner of RFG, which she operates with Kaminski. The court noted
that RFG’s business revenue for 2022 was $273,909.72, and defendant’s distribution was $74,078,
with a three-year average income of $77,078. The court also considered testimony estimating
defendant’s future business revenue and acknowledged the difficulty in pinning down her precise
income due to the nature of the LLC and the marital/business partnership she shares with
Kaminski. The court further referenced Larson’s testimony, noting that he calculated defendant’s
income at well over $100,000 per year, although that figure included non-cash items like stock and
retirement fund transactions.
Regarding assets, the trial court reviewed the property division from the divorce, noting
that both parties left the marriage with significant assets and have since invested in real estate and
stocks. The court observed that both parties used common tax benefits from real estate investments
and that neither party appeared to be struggling financially. Finally, regarding other income-
generating resources, the court considered defendant’s ability to generate income through her
business and investments, as well as Kaminski’s earning capacity and their joint financial
activities. The court noted the purchase of expensive vehicles as business expenses and the
flexibility in allocating income and expenses within the LLC. The court also discussed the impact
of defendant’s remarriage and cohabitation on her financial status, including the mutual support
available in her new marriage. Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the trial court thoroughly
explored defendant’s income, assets, and other income-generating resources as part of its analysis
of whether to modify or terminate spousal support.
2 For purposes of this analysis, we do not address the additional deduction the court imposed in
the USSO as compensation for plaintiff’s request for retroactive modification of spousal support
and attorney fees. Those portions of the revised USSO are instead addressed in subsections
(II)(B)(3) and (II)(C) below.

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In its analysis of the spousal support factors, the court additionally gave a thorough
explanation of its decision to modify spousal support, rather than terminate it, stating that its
decision was largely based on balancing the equities between the parties. The court found that,
despite the positive changes in defendant’s financial status, there remained a “significant disparity
between the income of plaintiff and defendant, even if we treat the gross business income as
arguably hers.” The court thus reasoned that termination of the USSO would not be equitable.
The court also recognized that the original purpose of spousal support was to balance the parties’
incomes and assist defendant in becoming self-sufficient. The court therefore found that a
significant modification, rather than termination, would best serve those goals.
“Spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of
the case.” See Korth, 256 Mich App at 289. Here, the trial court noted that “[d]uring the marriage,
the parties enjoyed an upper-class lifestyle that would be the envy of most people.” Both parties
continued to enjoy a comfortable standard of living following the divorce, but plaintiff’s income
continued to far exceed defendant’s income. Thus, the determination here was not based solely
on whether defendant continued to need spousal support, which plaintiff suggests should be the
focal point of the analysis, but rather, what was reasonable and necessary to balance the equities,
based on the specific circumstances presented. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 726 (“The object in
awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither will be
impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the
circumstances of the case.”). As discussed, the trial court thoroughly analyzed the relevant spousal
support factors. The court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and its decision to modify
spousal support, rather than terminate it, was not an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff also briefly argues that the trial court failed to consider that Kaminski may be
benefiting from plaintiff’s payment of spousal support. This argument is speculative, and rather
than being legally significant, appears largely rooted in the bad blood between the parties. Rather
than directing this Court to portions of the record supporting the contention that defendant is using
spousal support money to Kaminski’s benefit, or explaining why that should have impacted the
trial court’s ruling, plaintiff merely states that, “[n]ot only is [defendant] now benefitting from her
infidelity, but so is the man with whom she was likely disloyal.” We thus consider the argument
abandoned. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 712 (“A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a
meaningful argument in support of its position.”).
Defendant additionally argues on cross-appeal that the court clearly erred by failing to
make factual findings regarding the parties’ income for spousal support purposes. As already
discussed, the court made specific findings regarding defendant’s reported business revenue from
RFG, as well as her take-home distribution, which totaled $273,909.72 and $77,078 in 2022,
respectively. The court also considered Larson’s expert testimony that defendant’s income was
more than $100,000 per year, but discounted some of his calculations as including non-cash
income from stocks and retirement fund transactions. The court went on to find that plaintiff’s
income had remained stable since the divorce, with his 2022 gross income at $330,625 and taxable
income at $314,409.12, which was the same as in 2017. The court admitted that it was challenging
to attribute income from RFG, which is an LLC, especially given the ability of defendant and
Kaminski to allocate income and expenses and the use of business funds for personal expenses.
Nevertheless, the court endeavored to properly calculate defendant’s income based on the record
available. The court also considered the parties’ investments, real estate holdings, and the income

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generated from those assets. On this record, the trial court conducted a thorough and fact-specific
analysis of both parties’ incomes, the sources and reliability of those incomes, and the impact of
business and marital arrangements on the determination of spousal support. Defendant’s argument
to the contrary lacks merit.
3. RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to retroactively
modify spousal support.
In its opinion denying the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the trial court explained that
a credit of $481.48 per month for the ensuing 54 months constituted plaintiff’s reimbursement for
overpayment of spousal support dating from the time he filed his motion to terminate the USSO
in August 2022. Specifically, the court stated:
The Plaintiff believes that the opinion does not address the overpayment of
spousal support created by the Court’s opinion. Both parties seem to agree that the
Plaintiff overpaid by $26,000.00. A significant consideration for the Court was
how to amortize that overpayment over the remaining term of the obligation by
giving the Plaintiff credit against a $3,000.00 obligation. The obligation terminates
by its terms on February 28, 2028. The Court calculated that 4 1/2 years remained
on the obligation. That equates to 54 months remaining. $26,000.00 divided by 54
equals $481.48. That amount would be the monthly credit Plaintiff is entitled to
for the remainder of the obligation based solely on the overpayment.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by only retroactively modifying spousal
support to August 30, 2022, the date on which he filed the motion to terminate the USSO. He
claims that he is instead entitled to retroactive modification of spousal support dating back to
January 1, 2018, based on the language of MCL 552.603b and defendant’s failure to comply with
the 10% provision set out in the judgment of divorce.
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich App 487, 495; 948 NW2d 452 (2019)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed in the statute.” Id.
Under MCL 552.603(2), “[r]etroactive modification of a support payment due under a support
order is permissible with respect to a period during which there is pending a petition for
modification, but only from the date that notice of the petition was given to the payer or recipient
of support.” The plain language of MCL 552.603(2) makes clear that retroactive modification of
spousal support is permissible only from the date that notice of a petition to amend support is
given. In other words, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff was only entitled to
retroactive modification of spousal support from the date that he filed his motion to terminate the
USSO, i.e., August 30, 2022. See also Cipriano v Cipriano, 289 Mich App 361, 374; 808 NW2d
230 (2010) (“[T]he clear language of MCL 552.603(2) also allows for the retroactive modification
of support orders from the date of notice of a petition for modification of support.”).

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However, plaintiff contends that MCL 552.603b provides an avenue through which he can
obtain retroactive modification of spousal support from January 1, 2018 forward. MCL 552.603b
states:
If an individual who is required by the court to report his or her income to
the court or the office of the friend of the court knowingly and intentionally fails to
report, refuses to report, or knowingly misrepresents that income, after notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, the court may retroactively correct the amount of
support.
Plaintiff argues that, because defendant violated the 10% provision in the judgment of divorce by
failing to report that her income increased by more than 10%, the court was required to grant his
request to retroactively modify spousal support from 2018 onward. First, the 10% provision in the
judgment of divorce, which will be examined in more detail below, only requires that an increase
in income be reported to the other party, not to the court, indicating that MCL 552.603b does not
apply.
Second, the plain language of the statute requires that the offending party “knowingly and
intentionally fails to report, refuses to report, or knowingly misrepresents that income[.]” Here,
the record indicates that defendant’s failure to report her income was not knowing or intentional.
Additionally, even if we concluded that MCL 552.603b applies, plaintiff overlooks that the plain
language of MCL 552.603b merely gives the court discretion to retroactively correct support.
“The use of the word ‘shall’ constitutes clear language designating a mandatory course of conduct;
whereas, the term ‘may’ presupposes discretion and does not mandate an action.” In re Weber
Estate, 257 Mich App 558, 562; 669 NW2d 288 (2003) (citations omitted). The word “may” in
MCL 552.603b therefore indicates that the trial court had the option to retroactively correct the
amount of support in general. Importantly, however, the plain language of MCL 552.603b does
not state that the court has authority—discretionary or otherwise—to retroactively correct support
to the date the alleged misrepresentation occurred. Plaintiff’s argument thus lacks merit.
Plaintiff’s argument that the terms of the judgment of divorce entitle him to a greater
retroactive modification of spousal support fails for similar reasons. The 10% provision in the
judgment of divorce states:
The parties shall provide notice to the opposing party of any increase in income of
l 0% or more in any calendar year. Failure to provide this information to the other
party will expose that party to the payment of attorney fees and expenses generated
by the opposing party’s effort to gather the withheld information.
A judgment of divorce is a contract and is treated as such by the courts. Andrusz v Andrusz, 320
Mich App 445, 453; 904 NW2d 636 (2017). “This Court’s goal in interpreting a contract is always
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reflected in the plain language of the
contract.” Patel v FisherBroyles, LLP, 344 Mich App 264, 271-272; 1 NW3d 308 (2022). “The
words of a contract are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning, and this Court
gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause while avoiding interpretations that would render any
part of the document surplusage or nugatory.” Id. at 272 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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“Unambiguous contracts must simply be enforced as they are written, absent a handful of
extremely unusual circumstances like fraud, duress, or illegality.” Andrusz, 320 Mich App at 453.
Plaintiff maintains that the 10% provision is plainly written and that the trial court was
obligated to apply it to defendant’s failure to timely notify him of her increased earnings once they
exceeded 10% of her earnings the prior year. Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s failure to
provide such notice automatically obligated her to pay plaintiff’s attorneys fees and expenses
relative to the discovery of the withheld information. We find it is not so cut and dry. First, as
written, the provision at issue uses the term “exposed”, which is not defined in the judgment of
divorce. If the terms [of a contract] are ambiguous or undefined, this Court may use dictionary
definitions to ascertain their plain and ordinary meaning.” IGCFCO III, LLC v One Way Loans
LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 366535); slip op at 6. The term
“exposed” is defined as “open to view” or “not shielded or protected[.]” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). The term “exposed” is not a mandate of certainty. Rather, it
signals a likelihood or probability. Thus, plaintiff’s insistence of an automatic entitlement to
attorney fees and expenses related to discovery of the 10% increase in income is misplaced. The
judgment does not mandate it.
Second, the provision contains no express language authorizing the court to retroactively
modify spousal support upon noncompliance by either party with the 10% provision. Indeed, in
its written opinion and order, the trial court acknowledged: “The Judgment only expressly calls
for sanctions in the form of attorney fees and costs necessitated by the need to pursue discovery
for the withheld information, not a retroactive modification of spousal support.” Here, the trial
court recognized that it would defy logic if it were to “sanction a violation of the notice requirement
without having an impact on the underlying spousal support award.” It was based on this
interpretation that the trial court reduced plaintiff’s spousal support obligation, deviating from the
step-down scale as contained in the judgment of divorce. Accordingly, we find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by retroactively modifying spousal support from August 2022 onward.
C. ATTORNEY FEES
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly
consider his request for attorney fees.
Along with his request to terminate the USSO, plaintiff sought an award of $28,933 in
attorney fees for costs associated with obtaining defendant’s income information. Defendant
opposed the request, arguing that the request for attorney fees should be denied. As earlier
described, the trial court reduced plaintiff’s overall spousal support obligation to $3,000. It then
reduced that obligation by an additional $500, to account for plaintiff’s request for retroactive
modification of spousal support and attorney fees. In its opinion on the parties’ motions for
reconsideration, the trial court clarified that $481.48 of that $500 award represented the retroactive
modification of spousal support, meaning that the remaining $18.52 was meant to cover plaintiff’s
request for attorney fees. It further explained:
Both parties seem to think that the $500.00 reduction is related solely to attorney
fees. That is not the Court’s intent. The Court recognizes that the attorney fee
provision applies to fees associated with discovery. The Court rounded up to

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$500.00 per month to account for attorney fees associated with discovery as
provided in the Judgment of Divorce. Consideration of the overpayment was the
primary focus of the Court’s ultimate determination.
The trial court did not address attorney fees in any greater detail, nor did it make factual findings
in support of its decision.
Michigan follows the “American Rule,” which states that “attorney fees are not recoverable
as an element of costs or damages unless expressly allowed by statute, court rule, common-law
exception, or contract.” Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). Here,
attorney fees were permitted by contract, per the 10% provision in the judgment of divorce. The
party requesting fees bears the burden to show that the fees were incurred and that they were
reasonable. Id. at 165-166. “When requested attorney fees are contested,” as they were in this
matter, “it is incumbent on the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine what services were
actually rendered, and the reasonableness of those services.” The trial court is not permitted to
“award attorney fees . . . solely on the basis of what it perceives to be fair or on equitable
principles.” Id. at 166. The trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing or make finding of
facts regarding the reasonableness of plaintiff’s request for attorney fees. Thus, the record is
inadequate to allow for meaningful review of the issue. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the
revised USSO pertaining to attorney fees, and direct the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
and make appropriate findings of fact on remand.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revising the USSO, rather than terminating
it. The court made appropriate findings of fact regarding the parties’ assets and income, and
thoroughly supported its decision to reduce plaintiff’s spousal support obligation to $3,000. It
likewise did not abuse its discretion by retroactively modifying spousal support from August 30,
2022. However, the court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees without conducting an
evidentiary hearing or making any factual findings to support the award.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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