COA 375171 IN RE K T MCGEE MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2026
12:00 PM
In re K. T. MCGEE, Minor.
No. 375171
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-000903-NA
Before: RICK, P.J., and YATES and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child, KM, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue
to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if
returned to parent).1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition
requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction over KM and remove him from respondent’s care.
DHHS alleged that respondent had unstable housing and was abusing substances, inadequately
treating her mental-health issues, and providing improper supervision for KM. DHHS alleged that
in April 2022, respondent was arrested and criminally charged for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated (OWI) with then-six-month-old KM in the car. DHHS also alleged that respondent
admitted to a Children’s Protective Services (CPS) investigator during their subsequent
investigation that she had housing issues. DHHS further alleged that respondent’s parental rights
to her two other children, TW and DW, had previously been terminated in February 2015 due to
respondent’s failure to rectify the conditions that led to the children’s removal in December 2012,
which included improper supervision, inadequately treated mental-health issues, and unstable
1 The order also terminated the parental rights of KM’s father, who is not involved in this appeal.

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housing.2 Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition, removed KM
from respondent’s care, and granted respondent supervised parenting time.3
In September 2022, respondent pleaded to the allegations in the petition and to the trial
court’s exercise of jurisdiction.4 At the initial dispositional hearing, the court ordered respondent
to comply with a case service plan provided by DHHS, which required respondent to participate
in and benefit from offered services to address her housing issues, substance-abuse issues, mental-
health concerns, and poor parenting skills. Throughout the proceedings, respondent struggled to
demonstrate any progress on her case service plan, and in March 2024, DHHS filed a supplemental
petition requesting termination of respondent’s parental rights. Following a termination hearing
in January 2025,5 the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established grounds for
termination of respondent’s parental rights and that a preponderance of the evidence established
that termination was in KM’s best interests. The trial court thereafter issued an order terminating
respondent’s parental rights as previously described. This appeal followed.
II. NOTICE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
On appeal, respondent argues that she did not attend—and was therefore unable to
meaningfully participate in—the termination hearing because she received inadequate notice and
corresponding service of process of that hearing, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise.
While respondent does not expressly say as much, it is clear from the substance of this argument
that she is asserting a violation of her procedural due-process rights. “Whether child protective
proceedings complied with a parent’s right to procedural due process presents a question of
constitutional law, which we review de novo.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 403-404; 852 NW2d
524 (2014). “De novo review means we review this issue independently, with no required
deference to the courts below.” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 14; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).
In child-protective proceedings, written notice of the termination hearing must be provided
to a respondent-parent “at least 14 days before the hearing.” MCR 3.920(D)(3)(b); see also MCL
712A.19b(2)(c); MCR 3.977(C)(1). A respondent-parent is also entitled to personal service of the
summons. MCL 712A.12; MCR 3.920(B)(2)(b) and (B)(4)(a). If, however, the trial court
determines that “personal service . . . is impracticable or cannot be achieved,” the court may direct
alternative service “in any manner reasonably calculated to give notice of the proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard[.]” MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b); see also MCL 712A.13; In re Lovitt, ___ Mich
App ___, ___; ___ NW3d___ (2024) (Docket No. 367124); slip op at 3. Alternative service
2 In the midst of these proceedings, respondent also gave birth to another child, DR, who
unfortunately passed away shortly after his birth.
3 The trial court initially suspended respondent’s parenting time, as it did not believe at that time
that any parenting time was in KM’s best interests, but following a pretrial hearing approximately
one month later, the court granted respondent weekly supervised parenting time.
4 DHHS sought termination of respondent’s parental rights at initial disposition in its original
petition, but in exchange for respondent’s plea, DHHS agreed to proceed with a case service plan.
5 As discussed more thoroughly below, respondent was not present during the termination hearing.

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includes “service by registered mail addressed to [the respondent’s] last known addresses, or by
publication thereof, or both[.]” MCL 712A.13; see also MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b). To be deemed
sufficient, personal service of the summons must be “effected at least 72 hours before the date of
[the] hearing,” whereas service via registered mail must be “mailed at least 5 days before the date
of [the] hearing if within the state,” and service via publication must be “made once in some
newspaper printed and circulated in the county in which said court is located at least 1 week before
the time fixed in the summons or notice for the hearing.” MCL 712A.13.
Early on in this case, the trial court ordered that all methods of service—personal,
registered mail, and publication—be used to provide respondent documents and notify her of
upcoming hearings, as the court had determined that she lived a very “transient” lifestyle and was
often difficult to serve. Consistent with this, after DHHS filed its supplemental petition requesting
termination on March 8, 2024, all three forms of service were used to serve a summons, a notice
of the termination hearing, and a copy of the supplemental petition. As the proceedings continued,
respondent, at the court’s request, repeatedly confirmed her current address to be used for service,
and all three forms of service were continually used to notify respondent of upcoming hearings,
which she attended. At a combined dispositional review and permanency planning hearing on
October 17, 2024, respondent was personally served another copy of the supplemental petition and
a notice of the termination hearing, and the court again ordered that all three forms of service be
used to notify respondent of the upcoming termination hearing, which, according to the
corresponding order, had been set to occur on February 14, 2025.
Respondent asserts that she did not attend the termination hearing because at some point
after the October 17, 2024 hearing, the date of the termination hearing was changed from February
14, 2025, to January 29, 2025, and she was never apprised of this. Specifically, respondent asserts
that she never received proper notice and service of this date change as required by the relevant
statutes and court rules. The record, however, belies this claim.
On January 8, 2025, a new summons, notice of hearing, and “ready for trial” document—
all of which stated that the termination hearing was set to take place on January 29, 2025—were
sent via registered mail to the address respondent had expressly told the court was her current
address for purposes of service. A summons dated January 8, 2025, also indicates that respondent
was personally served on that day. The new date for the termination hearing was also published
in the Detroit Legal News on January 2, 2025, and the court received an affidavit confirming that
publication on January 15, 2025. The publication similarly informed respondent that she was
required to personally appear in court on January 29, 2025, for the termination hearing and notified
her that the hearing “may result in the termination of [her] parental rights.” And the register of
actions, for its part, indicates that respondent was served a summons and notice of the new
termination hearing date via publication, registered mail, and personal service by January 8, 2025.
It is thus readily apparent that respondent was provided written notice of the new date of
the termination hearing within the time frames required by statute and court rule. See MCL
712A.13; MCR 3.920(B)(4)(a)-(b) and (D)(3)(b). It also bears mentioning that when the court
commented on respondent’s absence at the start of the termination hearing, respondent’s counsel
informed the court that he had spoken to respondent that morning and that respondent “knew about
the [termination] hearing” that afternoon. Respondent also called her counsel midway through the
termination hearing, at which point counsel again confirmed with the court that respondent knew

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of the hearing that day, as he had previously told her that she was required to personally appear in
court for the termination hearing on that date. Accordingly, we see no error in the trial court’s
conclusion that respondent was properly notified of the January 29, 2025 termination hearing, and
we see no grounds to conclude that respondent’s procedural due-process rights were violated.
III. TERMINATION OF RESPONDENT’S PARENTAL RIGHTS
Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for
termination of her parental rights. Additionally, respondent challenges the trial court’s finding
that termination was in KM’s best interests.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that a statutory ground
for termination of parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that
termination is in a child’s best interests. In re Simpson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 368248); slip op at 3. A finding is clearly erroneous if, even if some evidence
supports the finding, the reviewing court is nevertheless left with the firm and definite conviction
that the lower court made a mistake. Id. “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich
App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We give deference “to the special ability of the trial court to
judge the credibility of witnesses.” In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704
(2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
As noted, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds
for termination of her parental rights. On appeal, however, respondent has raised no challenge to
the trial court’s findings regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).6 Instead, respondent argues only that the
6 Nor, for that matter, do we see grounds in the record for a challenge to the trial court’s findings
under subsection (j). There was a significant amount of testimony presented at the termination
hearing that throughout the 28-month proceedings, respondent continued to abuse alcohol, did not
participate in parenting classes, did not obtain appropriate housing, minimally participated in
mental-health services, largely failed to participate in parenting time with KM, and had shown up
to several parenting times visibly intoxicated. Thus, there was ample evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s finding that there was “a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or
capacity of [respondent], that [KM] w[ould] be harmed” if returned to respondent. MCL
712A.19b(3)(j); see also In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (noting that
“a parent’s failure to comply with . . . her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if
returned to the parent’s home”).

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trial court clearly erred by finding that DHHS established statutory grounds for termination under
subdivisions (c)(i) and (c)(ii) by clear and convincing evidence. Because only one statutory ground
must be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights, In re Ellis, 294
Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), respondent’s failure to challenge the trial court’s findings
under subsection (j) precludes appellate relief for this issue, see In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92,
98-99, 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich
341, 353 n 10; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).7
C. BEST-INTERESTS DETERMINATION
Finally, respondent argues the trial court erred by finding that termination was in KM’s
best interests. We disagree.
When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests, the court should place
its “focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d
881 (2020). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the child’s best
interests,” and it should consider a variety of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent; the
parent’s parenting ability; the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality; and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Simpson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368248); slip op at 5 (cleaned up). “Other factors that the court
may consider include the parent’s history, the parent’s psychological evaluation, the age of the
child, and a parent’s substance-abuse history.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 62; 27 NW3d 122
(2023) (citations omitted). The court may also consider the parent’s ability to provide the child a
safe and permanent home, “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption,” id. (cleaned up), as well as “how long the child was in foster care or placed with
relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parents’ home within the
foreseeable future, if at all,” In re CJM, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 367565); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court must also expressly
consider a child’s placement with a relative, which ordinarily weighs against termination. Id. at
___; slip op at 4.
On appeal, respondent does not challenge any specific finding made by the trial court in its
best-interests determination. Rather, respondent asserts that the trial court “did not make any
findings” regarding KM’s best interests as required by the statutes and court rules. In making its
best-interests determination, the trial court was required to “state on the record or in writing its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on
contested matters are sufficient.” MCR 3.977(I)(1); see also MCL 712A.19b(5) (requiring a court
to expressly find that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests before terminating
7 To the extent that respondent argues that her minimal participation was due to DHHS’s failure
to provide adequate services to address her needs, she provides no factual or legal support for this
position, leaving it inadequately presented for appellate review. See In re Warshefski, 331 Mich
App 83, 87; 951 NW2d 90 (2020). We note, however, that from what we can glean of respondent’s
argument, we do not see any merit to it.

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parental rights); MCR 3.977(F)(1)(c) (same). Contrary to respondent’s assertion on appeal, the
record in this case clearly reflects that the trial court made such findings.
At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court summarized the testimony and
evidence relevant to both its statutory-grounds and best-interests determinations and indicated that
its determinations were based on those proofs. The court found that, despite KM having been
removed from respondent’s care in June 2022 after she was “caught drunk driving with [KM] in
the car,” respondent continued to drink alcohol over the ensuing two years and was unable to
participate in several parenting times because she had shown up drunk. The court also found that
respondent did not participate or minimally participated in services offered to address her alcohol
abuse, parenting skills, mental-health issues, and housing issues, and she failed to demonstrate any
benefit from the minimal services she did participate in. The court found that respondent simply
“failed to visit” KM, missing the majority of her parenting times throughout the proceedings. The
court further stated that it was not “swayed or persuaded” that respondent would “come into full
compliance” with her case service plan if “given more time” and that respondent “demonstrated
by not visiting [KM] and failing to comply with [her] treatment plan that [she was] not going to
be the one[] or d[idn’t] desire to be the one[] to provide the long-term care for” KM.
The court also stated its findings in its written order terminating respondent’s parental
rights. Much of the court’s written findings reiterated what it had already announced at the
termination hearing. However, the court also mentioned several other considerations relevant to
its best-interests determination, including: (1) that respondent and KM did not demonstrate any
bond; (2) that as KM got older, he consistently expressed that he did not want to enter the visiting
room during parenting times with respondent; (3) that KM was placed in a foster home, as no
suitable relative placements were available; (4) that KM had been placed in the same foster home
since his removal from respondent’s care when he was approximately nine months old; (5) that
KM was closely bonded to his foster parents; and (6) that KM’s foster parents wished to adopt
KM. The court concluded that, based on these findings, DHHS had shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in KM’s best interests. It is thus
clear from the record that the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its best-
interests determination as it was required to do. See MCR 3.977(I)(1).
These findings are also amply supported by evidence and testimony in the record. As
discussed, a significant amount of testimony was presented demonstrating that respondent failed
to participate in or benefit from her case service plan, and alcohol abuse, parenting skills, stable
housing, and mental health all remained issues for respondent. See MJC, 349 Mich App at 62. A
caseworker testified that respondent had been offered parenting time twice a week, but respondent
ultimately requested that her parenting time be decreased to once a week, and even then, she still
frequently missed parenting times. The caseworker testified that, in total, respondent missed 96
of her 154 scheduled parenting times, and respondent could not participate in several parenting
times because she had shown up drunk. The caseworker also testified that KM and respondent
had demonstrated no bond during parenting times and that, as KM got older, he expressed that he
did not wish to attend parenting times. KM’s foster parents had also reported to the caseworker
that KM was anxious before, during, and after parenting times with respondent and that KM
consistently had difficulties sleeping and eating after each parenting time. Conversely, KM had
clearly demonstrated a very close bond with his foster parents, with whom he had resided for over

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two years since his removal at approximately nine months old. Additionally, all of KM’s needs
were being met in his foster home, and his foster parents expressed interest in adopting him.
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court made express findings and conclusions
regarding its best-interests determination, MCR 3.977(I)(1), and properly weighed all the evidence
available to it at the time it made that determination, Simpson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.
We see no grounds to disrupt that determination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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