COA 370753 PEOPLE OF MI V DEJON DEMARKUS-ROLAND JOHNSON Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 07, 2026
11:48 AM
v No. 370753
Wayne Circuit Court
DEJON DEMARKUS-ROLAND JOHNSON, LC No. 20-004764-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of assault with a dangerous weapon
(felonious assault), MCL 750.82, third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3), and three
counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.1
Defendant was sentenced to 40 to 60 months; imprisonment for the third-degree fleeing and
eluding conviction, 32 to 48 months’ imprisonment for his felonious assault conviction, and two
years’ imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction to be served concurrent to each other but
consecutive to their respective accompanying felony. We affirm defendant’s convictions and
sentence but remand for the ministerial task of correcting his judgment of sentence to remove one
count of felony-firearm.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 15, 2020, multiple officers with the Romulus Police Department were dispatched
to an apartment complex to respond to an ongoing situation involving an armed individual inside
a purple motor vehicle. When officers arrived, they split up to try to find the at-issue vehicle.
Sergeant Matthew Reese located it first—he saw a parked purple Chrysler 300 with individuals
inside. Sergeant Reese yelled at the individuals to exit the vehicle and show him their hands. In
1 Defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, but the jury convicted
him of the lesser offense of felonious assault. The jury also acquitted defendant of a separate
felonious-assault charge.

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response, the Chrysler backed out of the parking space and drove directly at the sergeant, who
jumped out of the way.
The Chrysler drove through the apartment-complex subdivision, and Detective Jason Otter
pursued it in his unmarked police vehicle. Meanwhile, Corporal Nathan Kuczera tried to position
his fully marked police cruiser in a different area of the complex subdivision to cut off potential
escape routes. The Chrysler eventually drove down a dead-end street inside the subdivision. It
then drove through a carport and onto some grass, where the individuals inside the vehicle got out.
Detective Otter saw a shorter male exit the passenger side and a “much larger male”—later
identified as defendant—exit from the driver’s side.
Detective Otter radioed that the suspects were on foot, and after hearing that call, Corporal
Kuczera saw the two suspects running around a building, with the taller individual carrying a rifle.
Corporal Kuczera watched as the individual raised the rifle towards the corporal’s vehicle, causing
the corporal to duck across his front seat. Corporal Kuczera then heard gun fire. Detective Otter,
who had gotten out of his vehicle to pursue the suspects on foot, saw Corporal Kuczera’s marked
patrol car and watched as the taller individual’s “arms came up and then [the detective] just saw
[a] muzzle flash and . . . heard two big bangs.” Detective Otter did not see a weapon—he only
“saw the muzzle flash and . . . heard the bangs,” which he identified as “gunfire for sure.” Traces
of a bullet hole were later located on the beam of a carport within 10 feet of Corporal Kuczera’s
patrol vehicle, and two rifle shell casings were found near where the shooting occurred.
The suspects fled the apartment complex and were eventually found trying to hide by lying
in a prone position in a wooded area. The suspects were arrested, and defendant was charged,
convicted, and sentenced as described earlier. This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of
felony-firearm connected to his third-degree fleeing-and-eluding charge because no evidence
established that he possessed a firearm during the course of that offense.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Meissner,
294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011).
B. ANALYSIS
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
this Court asks whether, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v Williams, 294 Mich App 461, 471; 811 NW2d 88 (2011). Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution requires the reviewing court to “draw
all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). It is the jury’s role alone “to determine what
inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those

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inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). It is likewise the
jury’s role alone to assess the credibility of witnesses because it is the jury, not the appellate court,
that “observes the witnesses and listens to their testimony.” People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394,
403; 956 NW2d 562 (2020). Direct evidence is not necessary to prove an element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt; circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that
evidence can be enough. Williams, 294 Mich App at 471.
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence established that he committed fleeing and
eluding; he contends only that “there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that [defendant]
possessed a firearm during the commission of third degree fleeing and eluding.” Defendant
acknowledges that a firearm was present in the vehicle during his commission of third-degree
fleeing and eluding, and he likewise concedes that there was evidence that he “produced and
discharged [that firearm] shortly after the vehicle crashed.” But defendant contends that this was
not enough to establish that he “possessed” the firearm during the commission of the fleeing-and-
eluding crime. We disagree.
Possession can be actual or constructive, as well as sole or joint. People v Hill, 433 Mich
464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). A person constructively possesses an article “if there is
proximity to the article together with indicia of control,” or put another way, if the location of the
article “is known” and the article “is reasonably accessible.” Id. at 470-471. A defendant’s mere
presence near a firearm is insufficient to establish possession. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 527;
489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Assuming without deciding that defendant’s actual possession of the firearm shortly after
exiting the vehicle was not enough to establish that he possessed the firearm during the commission
of third-degree fleeing and eluding, we conclude that there was circumstantial evidence sufficient
for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant constructively possessed
the firearm while driving the vehicle, i.e., while committing third-degree fleeing and eluding.
Defendant is correct insofar as he contends that the prosecution presented no direct evidence that
he possessed the gun while driving the vehicle. But the evidence established that he actually
possessed the firearm almost immediately after exiting the vehicle. From this evidence, a rational
trier of fact could infer that, while defendant was driving the vehicle, he knew where the firearm
was, had reasonable access to it, and had control over it. That would logically explain why
defendant almost immediately possessed the firearm upon exiting the vehicle. Accordingly,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant constructively possessed a firearm while committing third-degree
fleeing and eluding.2
2 Defendant seems to suggest that the evidence at his trial equally supports that the other individual
in the vehicle had sole and total control over the firearm while defendant was driving such that
defendant lacked actual or constructive possession of the firearm while committing the crime of
fleeing and eluding. While the prosecution did not affirmatively disprove this theory at
defendant’s trial, it did not need to. The prosecution “is not obligated to disprove every reasonable

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III. SENTENCING
Defendant next challenges his sentences for his third-degree fleeing-and-eluding
conviction and his felonious-assault conviction. Defendant’s sentencing guidelines range for his
felonious-assault conviction was 10 to 23 months’ imprisonment, and the guidelines range for his
fleeing-and-eluding conviction was 14 to 29 months’ imprisonment. The trial court, however,
departed from the guidelines and sentenced defendant to 32 to 48 months’ imprisonment for his
felonious-assault conviction and 40 to 60 months’ imprisonment for his fleeing-and-eluding
conviction. Defendant contends that his departure sentences were unreasonable and
disproportionate, and that the trial court failed to adequately justify the extent of the departures.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A sentence that departs from the sentencing guidelines range is reviewed for
reasonableness. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). A review for
reasonableness asks whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of
proportionality. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 477; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). The abuse-of-
discretion standard recognizes that there is no single correct outcome but a range of reasonable
and principled outcomes, and the trial court’s decision must fall within that range. People v
Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). The principle of proportionality requires that
a sentence imposed be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the background of the
offender. See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 651; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Taking all of this
together, reviewing a sentence for reasonableness asks whether the sentence imposed falls within
the range of reasonable and principled sentences that accurately reflects the seriousness of the
offense and the background of the offender.
B. ANALYSIS
A sentencing court must always justify the sentence it imposes in a manner sufficient to
facilitate appellate review. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 (explaining this rule for departure
sentences); Boykin, 510 Mich at 192 (explaining this rule in the context of sentencing juvenile
defendants to a term-of-years sentence). For a sentence that departs from the sentencing
guidelines, this rule requires that the sentencing court “provide adequate reasons for the extent of
the departure sentence imposed.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476. See also People v Dixon-Bey,
321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017).3 Those reasons, however, need only explain why
theory consistent with innocence to discharge its responsibility; it need only convince the jury in
the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.” Nowack, 462 Mich at
400 (quotation marks and citation omitted). That is what the prosecution here did.
3 The prosecution spends most of its brief on appeal criticizing this Court’s sentencing
jurisprudence post-Lockridge because it supposedly treats sentences that depart from the
sentencing guidelines as presumptively unreasonable because our cases require sentencing courts
to justify any departure sentence imposed. Suffice it to say, requiring sentencing courts to justify

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the sentence imposed was proportional to the seriousness of the offense and the background of the
offender. See Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 475; Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 521. Still, while the
guidelines are only advisory, sentencing courts must “ ‘consult’ ” the guidelines and take them
“ ‘into account when imposing a sentence.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 470, quoting Lockridge,
498 Mich at 392.4 Similarly, appellate courts can still “use the sentencing guidelines as an aid
when doing so assists in determining whether a sentence is proportionate.” Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich
App at 530-531.
At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed disagreement with the jury’s
verdict but noted that it was “stuck” with the verdict, and it was “not going to depart from the
guidelines just because [it believed that defendant] should have been convicted of a more serious
crime,” and the court was “not sure” that there was much of “a case for departure” otherwise. The
trial court and the parties then resolved issues related to the scoring of the guidelines. It was
ultimately determined that the sentencing guidelines range for defendant’s felonious-assault
conviction was 10 to 23 months’ imprisonment, and the guidelines range for his fleeing-and-
eluding conviction was 14 to 29 months’ imprisonment.
The court also heard from Corporal Kuczera, the officer that defendant was convicted of
feloniously assaulting, who gave a victim impact statement. Corporal Kuczera discussed how he
was scared for his life on the night that defendant shot at him, how the shooting that night has since
caused Corporal Kuczera to experience increased anxiety both at work and at home, and how the
shooting impacted Corporal Kuczera’s family members, particularly his wife, who would now
“shed tears” whenever Corporal Kuczera “get[s] called in in the middle of the night.” A letter
from Corporal Kuczera’s wife was also read into the record. In that letter, Corporal Kuczera’s
wife expounded on the anxiety that defendant’s shooting at her husband caused her.
Defendant was also given an opportunity for allocution. Defendant said that he wanted to
place on the record “what actually took place” on the day of the shooting because “the truth [sic]
facts haven’t been told.” Defendant then accused the officers who testified at defendant’s trial of
committing “perjury” and claimed that they suppressed evidence of body-cam audio from the night
of the shooting. Defendant also proclaimed his innocence and said that the officers’ testifying
falsely “ruined [his] life.” Defendant further accused his current trial counsel and former trial
counsel of failing to effectively represent him, claiming that if his counsel had called unidentified
“defense witness[es]” and provided “the body cams [sic] material,” then defendant would have
been “exonerated.” Defendant also claimed that, on the night of the shooting, the responding
officers did not identify themselves, which caused defendant to fear for his life, and that the officers
used excessive force when they approached him. Defendant then provided a lengthy account of
his version of events from the day of the shooting. Defendant alleged that he was not the driver
the sentence imposed is not equivalent to treating departure sentences as presumptively
unreasonable.
4 Our Supreme Court recently clarified that “[s]uch consultation necessarily requires that the trial
court has considered the accurate guidelines and has made a judicial choice about the sentence
given with reference to those accurate guidelines.” People v Armogeda, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___
NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 167760); slip op at 10.

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of the vehicle on the night of the shooting; that the other individual drove them into a parking lot
of an apartment complex then tried to drive out of the parking space when someone approached
the car with a gun; that the other individual drove to a dead end then told defendant to run, and
defendant did so because he thought that someone was trying to rob them; that, while running,
defendant heard two shots and thought he was going to die; and that he jumped the fence and hid
with the other individual because he thought someone was trying to kill them. Defendant claimed
that all of this would have been confirmed by “the body cam audio” but it “was suppressed by”
the officers and defendant’s counsel.
After confirming that defendant was finished, the trial court stated as follows:
I said I couldn’t think of any reason for a departure other than—supportable
reasons or reasons that wouldn’t stand up on appeal, but you know, after listening
to [defendant’s] long and rambling and largely incoherent and irrelevant recitation
here, [h]is repeated criticism of his own lawyer and lawyers, all of his lawyers who
have ever represented him and also looking back on his criminal history even
though he was not charged with habitual offender but, you know, and this goes to
a number of things. I mean, criminal history has to be taken into account in the
guidelines but also a remark that was made earlier about how his mother visited the
courtroom and she’s very supportive. And a lot of good that support has done all
those years as this young man has managed to commit crimes all over the country
and including some similar crimes in the past, fleeing and alluding [sic], resisting
arrest, theft crimes. I mean, some of them have been dismissed. And an escape,
I’m not sure what that means, but you know, his history of contact with the police
is voluminous and disturbing, and you know, from this long diatribe that I just
listened to . . . it is pretty clear to me that this young man’s likelihood of
rehabilitation in prison is relatively low. He has sort of a disorganized view of this
case and he seems to forget that I heard testimony and saw video evidence, as did
the jury, that clearly shows that he shot at the police and ran from the police, and I
mean, you know, I frankly had a hard time understanding his long ramblings, but
whatever it is, they pretty clearly show that this is a dangerous young man who has
I think a reduced risk of rehabilitation.
I am stuck with mandatory maximums in this case, and frankly, I think the
maximums, low as they are, a five-year felony in one case, a four-year in another,
that they pretty much establish, together with the Tanner[5] rule, proportionality in
the sentencing I’m about to impose.
So I am going to depart on both of these sentences for the reasons that I
have stated and also because I believe they are infinitely proportional given the
offense and the way it was committed and the Defendant’s explanation or excuses
for committing it.
5 People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972).

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On the basis of this reasoning, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 to 60 months’
imprisonment for the fleeing-and-eluding conviction and 32 to 48 months’ imprisonment for the
felonious assault conviction. After issuing defendant’s sentences, the court explicitly recognized
that the fleeing-and-eluding sentence was an 11-month departure from the sentencing-guidelines
range, and that the felonious-assault conviction was a 9-month departure from the sentencing-
guidelines range.
We conclude that the trial court sufficiently justified the sentence imposed to facilitate
appellate review, which included providing adequate reasons for the extent of the departure
imposed. While the guidelines consider a defendant’s criminal history, the court found it
significant that defendant continued engaging in criminality despite having support from his
family, and that he continued committing similar crimes despite getting caught in the past. More
than that, though, the court found it highly significant that defendant had not shown any growth
from his previous run-ins with the law, and it believed that defendant’s lengthy “diatribe” about
how he was innocent and was only convicted because the officers lied and his counsel was
incompetent demonstrated that defendant’s “likelihood of rehabilitation in prison [was] relatively
low.” The court was well-positioned to make this finding; it had sat through all of defendant’s
trial and heard the evidence against him, reviewed his criminal history in preparation for
sentencing, and was able to assess defendant and his demeanor during his lengthy allocution.
Additionally, after the court imposed its sentences, it expressly recognized the extent that those
sentences departed from the sentencing-guidelines range. This demonstrates that the court
believed that its reasoning was sufficient to justify not only a departure from the guidelines but the
extent of the departure imposed. Lastly, the court explained that it was sentencing defendant to
lengthy sentences because it “believe[d] they are infinitely proportional given the offense and the
way it was committed and the Defendant’s explanation or excuses for committing it,” i.e., the court
believe that the sentences it imposed were consistent with the principle of proportionality. We
agree and conclude that defendant’s sentences were within the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes that accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense and defendant’s background.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court could not rely on its “subjective”
determination “as to how defendant could be rehabilitated” to justify the length of defendant’s
sentence. Defendant cites no binding authority for the proposition that this is impermissible,
however. Indeed, contrary to defendant’s argument, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s
“low potential for rehabilitation” is a “legitimate consideration[] in determining a sentence,”
People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 323; 532 NW2d 508 (1995), and this Court has identified a
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation as a reason that may justify departure from the sentencing
guidelines, Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525 n 9.
Defendant alternatively contends that “[t]he trial court provided no explanation for the
extent of the departure in this matter,” but that is simply untrue. We quoted the trial court’s
explanation for the extent of the departures earlier in this opinion. Defendant alternatively argues
that “even if the judge had provided some explanation, the extent of the departures were still
unjustified,” but we disagree. A sentencing court need only “provide adequate reasons for the
extent of the departure sentence imposed,” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476, which the trial court here
did. And for the reasons already explained, defendant’s resulting sentences were within the range
of reasonable and principled outcomes that accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense and
defendant’s background.

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Defendant’s sentences are therefore affirmed.
IV. JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
For his final argument, defendant contends that his judgment of sentence incorrectly
reflects that he was convicted of a third count of felony-firearm. When the jury read its verdict,
the foreperson stated that the jury found defendant guilty of three counts of felony-firearm, and
the jury’s verdict form reflects the same. But after the foreperson read the verdict, the court asked
for clarification on one of the felony-firearm charges because the jury found defendant not guilty
of the underlying felony, and the following exchange ensued:
The Court: And Count 13 Felony Firearm in connection with the assault on
[Sergeant Reese]? Count 13, do you see that? It’s in connection with Count 8.
You found him not guilty in Count 8 and the Felony Firearm coincides with Count
8[,] so how do you find the Defendant?
Juror Number 7 [the foreperson]: Not guilty.
The jury was polled and confirmed the foreperson’s recitation of the verdict.
The parties on appeal agree that defendant’s judgment of sentence erroneously reflects that
defendant was found guilty of a third count of felony-firearm after the trial court clarified that the
jury was finding defendant not guilty of that charge. We likewise agree, and therefore remand for
the ministerial task of correcting defendant’s judgment of sentence by removing one count of
felony-firearm.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the ministerial task of
correcting defendant’s judgment of sentence as stated herein. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ James Robert Redford

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