COA 373487 CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE V CELINDA WITT Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
May 05, 2026
10:35 AM
v No. 373487
Wayne Circuit Court
CELINDA WITT, ALTONIO ALLEN, and
ROBERT ALLEN
LC No. 24-006833-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CAPITAL ONE LEASING, LLC and MICHIGAN
FIRST CREDIT UNION,
Defendants.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and PATEL and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff in this matter, Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange (CURE), sought an order
from the circuit court declaring that a no-fault policy of insurance it issued to defendant, Celia
Witt, is void ab initio and declaring that plaintiff is not responsible for physical damage to one of
the vehicles covered under the policy, a 2023 Kia Sportage, which was allegedly involved in a
motor vehicle accident on April 14, 2023. Pursuant to this Court’s decision in Howard v LM Gen
Ins Co, 345 Mich App 166; 5 NW3d 46 (2023), the lower court granted summary disposition in
favor of defendants on the basis that any misrepresentation made by defendant was not material to
the collision claim. We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Witt submitted an application for insurance to plaintiff seeking coverage that included
“broadened collision” coverage on the Kia and one other vehicle, a 2020 Nissan Altima, as well
as other coverages pertaining to two additional older vehicles that did not include collision
coverage. Witt listed herself as the named insured and listed two of her grandsons, Altonio Allen

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and Robert Allen, as resident relatives covered under the policy. The application indicated that
the Kia, which was financed via a loan, was co-owned by Altonio and Witt. The application stated
that the Nissan, which was also financed by a loan, was owned by and registered to Witt. In
actuality, as defendants admit, Robert was the sole owner and registrant of the Nissan. After the
issuance of the insurance policy by plaintiff, Witt subsequently added and removed coverage for
other vehicles and maintained the above-referenced coverage for the Kia and Nissan.
After Altonio was allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident that caused significant
damage to the Kia, plaintiff refused to provide collision coverage, arguing that the policy was void
from the date of inception due to misrepresentation regarding ownership of the Nissan.
Following a civil action filed by Witt, for breach of contract arising out of plaintiff’s failure
to either pay for the repairs to the Kia or pay the actual cash value of the Kia, plaintiff brought the
instant action for declaratory relief, described above.
Defendants Witt, Altonio, and Robert filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) in lieu of an answer,1 arguing that, because Witt did not seek damages related to the
Nissan, her misrepresentation regarding the ownership of the Nissan was “immaterial for purposes
of Ms. Witt’s collision claim for damage to the 2023 Kia Sportage,” and that the declaratory action
should be dismissed as a result. In support of their motion, defendants relied upon Howard, in
which this Court held that rescission was not appropriate because the defendant in that case
provided no evidence demonstrating that it relied upon the misrepresentation made by the insured
pertaining to a vehicle that the insured added to the policy following his application for insurance,
i.e., it did not demonstrate that the misrepresentation was material to the coverage of the other
vehicle in question. Howard, 345 Mich App at 178-179. Similarly, in the present case, plaintiff
argued that defendant likewise offered no evidence that it relied upon Witt’s misrepresentation
regarding the ownership of the Nissan when it issued the coverage on the Kia. As a result, plaintiff
requested entry of summary disposition based on there being no issue of material fact that the Kia
is covered under plaintiff’s policy notwithstanding the misrepresentation regarding the Nissan, and
that the policy is not void ab initio with respect to the Kia collision coverage.
Plaintiff filed an answer to the motion, as well as a counter motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2), arguing that Howard was inapplicable to this case because the
coverage sought by the plaintiff in Howard pertained to personal protection insurance (PIP)
benefits, which are statutorily required to be included in a Michigan no-fault insurance policy,
meaning that such coverage is regulated by the no-fault act, the common law, and the terms of the
policy. Plaintiff asserted that, in order to justify rescission, an insurer must be able to demonstrate
fraud by the insured. In contrast, plaintiff argued, because there is no statutory requirement for a
no-fault insurance carrier to provide collision coverage, such coverage is regulated by the terms of
the policy and, in order to rescind such a policy, an insurer need merely prove that it would have
either charged a higher premium or not issued the policy if the misrepresentation had not been
1 The remaining defendants—Capital One Leasing, LLC and Michigan First Credit Union—are
not participating in this appeal. As such, any references to “defendants” in this opinion refer only
to Altonio, Robert, and Witt, collectively.

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made by the insured. Plaintiff attached an affidavit of its underwriting manager to its response
indicating that it would not have issued the policy of insurance absent Witt’s misrepresentation
about the Nissan.
The trial court then conducted a hearing pertaining to defendants’ motion for summary
disposition at which they argued that plaintiff’s interpretation of Howard was incorrect because,
while that case included a claim for PIP benefits, it also included a claim for underinsured motorist
benefits, which coverage (like collision coverage) is not statutorily required to be included in a no-
fault policy. Additionally, in response to plaintiff’s argument that its underwriting procedures
would not allow it to issue an insurance policy covering the Nissan because the named insured did
not own the Nissan, defendants argued that plaintiff had not produced any evidence regarding
same, except for a self-serving affidavit by its own employee. Further, defendants argued that
plaintiff’s response to their motion contradicted its earlier responses to requests for admissions in
this case, admitting that it does not always void a policy if the insured does not disclose the correct
owner of the vehicle. Finally, defendants argued that rescission is an equitable remedy and that it
would not be fair to rescind the policy in this collision coverage case, which does not even involve
the Nissan.
Following the hearing, the court granted defendants’ summary disposition motion, and the
relief requested. Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court likewise denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We . . . review de novo the interpretation of a contract, such as an insurance policy.”
Howard, 345 Mich App at 170 n 2.
As recently confirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court,
[w]hen rescission is requested through a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
the appellate court must first determine, de novo, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
the underlying claim. Then, the appellate court must review a trial court’s decision
to grant or deny the equitable doctrine of rescission for an abuse of discretion.
[Sherman v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026)
(Docket No. 167826); slip op at 15.]
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual
sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019).
When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted
by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves
open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).]

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III. ANALYSIS
As the parties agree, a carrier issuing no-fault insurance coverage is not required to include
coverage for collision under Michigan’s no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Because
such coverage is optional, the limitations and rights of such policy provisions are purely a matter
of contract and not regulated by the no-fault act. See Howard, 345 Mich App at 172 n 5. The
availability of rescission of insurance coverage for material misrepresentations as to optional
coverages, such as collision coverage, is likewise governed by the policy. Id. at 172.
In Howard, a policy of insurance from LM General Insurance Company (LM) covered a
2008 Mercury Mariner and listed the plaintiff and Jasmine Bartell as named insureds. The plaintiff
was injured in a motor vehicle accident while operating the Mercury. Several weeks before that
accident, Bartell added a 2008 GMC Yukon to the LM policy, after telling LM representatives that
she owned the Yukon and that it was garaged at her home. Following the accident, LM discovered
the Yukon was instead owned by Bartell’s relative, who garaged the vehicle at her Detroit home,
facts that LM claimed, “would have led to a denial of coverage or a greatly increased premium on
the Yukon.” Id. at 169. In order to determine whether rescission of optional underinsured motorist
(UIM) coverage was appropriate, this Court looked at LM’s antifraud provision, which stated:
Any changes we make at your request to this policy after inception will be made in
reliance upon information you provide. We may void this policy if you or an
“insured” have concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance, or
engaged in fraudulent conduct, at the time application was made, at the time
changes were requested, or any time during the policy period. [Id. at 178.]
Pursuant to that language, we determined that voiding of the policy was permitted “if any insured
made a material misrepresentation.” Id. But we nonetheless affirmed the denial of LM’s motion
for summary disposition because it did not provide any evidence that the above-referenced
misrepresentation was material to coverage on the actual vehicle involved in accident, the Mariner.
[W]e conclude that as to UIM coverage, Bartell’s misrepresentations regarding the
Yukon, if material, would allow for rescission. However, LM has not presented
any evidence that the misrepresentation was material to the coverage on the
Mariner. This Court has noted that an insurer is entitled to a rescission when it has
relied on a material misrepresentation that was made in a no-fault insurance
application. 21st Century Premier Ins Co v Zufelt, 315 Mich App 437, 445-446;
889 NW2d 759 (2016). “ ‘Reliance may exist when the misrepresentation relates
to the insurer’s guidelines for determining eligibility for coverage.’ ” Id. at 446,
quoting Lake States Ins Co v Wilson, 231 Mich App 327, 331; 586 NW2d 113
(1998). But LM has provided no evidence that Bartell’s statements concerning the
later-added Yukon affected LM’s earlier decision to insure the Mariner. In other
words, the alleged misrepresentation by Bartell as to the Yukon did not relate to the
eligibility for coverage on the Mariner that was previously obtained and as to which
no fraud is alleged. [Id. at 178-179].
Turning to the present case, as plaintiff notes, an application for insurance is deemed to be
part of the policy. “The policy application, declarations page of policy, and the policy itself

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construed together constitute the contract.” Mapp v Progressive Ins Co, 346 Mich App 575, 599;
13 NW3d 643 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As relevant to this matter, the policy application states the following:
I hereby declare that the statements on this application are true and request
CURE to issue the reciprocal insurance contract applied for in reliance thereon and
at rates based on these facts.
* * *
I acknowledge that . . . the Attorney-in-Fact for the subscribers of CURE,
has informed me that the submission of complete and accurate application
information to CURE is necessary for proper underwriting and rating of my
application. I further acknowledge that the completeness and accuracy of this
information is of the essence for the exchange of reciprocal insurance contract to
be effective. I understand and agree that any material misrepresentation or
omission by me in this application will void coverage from the inception date of the
contract and/or cause the contract to be cancelled in accordance with any
applicable laws. [(Emphasis added).]
We are bound by this Court’s decision in Howard as it pertains to the issue of materiality,
i.e., plaintiff must demonstrate that the misrepresentation was material to the coverage of the
vehicle in question. Howard, 345 Mich App at 178-179.2 Plaintiff attached two documents as
exhibits to its response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition to support its assertion that
it relied upon the misrepresentation, a rescission letter sent to Witt by one of its employees and an
affidavit of one of plaintiff’s employees.
The letter proffered by plaintiff indicates that the misrepresentation “affected [plaintiff’s]
ability to properly rate and underwrite the policy.” The letter, however, is not admissible as
evidence because it constitutes hearsay under MRE 801(a) and MRE 802, i.e., it is an out-of-court
statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted and does not fit within
any recognized hearsay exception. Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 144 Mich App 535, 546-547;
376 NW2d 664 (1985). By way of example, it cannot be deemed admissible under Rule 803(6),
as a record of a regularly conducted activity, because “the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” MRE 803(6)(E); Slayton 144
Mich App at 551. The letter was generated by plaintiff after the subject collision as a means to
avoid liability on its collision coverage. As such, we reject plaintiff’s invitation to reverse the trial
court on the basis of the proffered letter.
2 We note that the Supreme Court, in Sherman, once again confirmed that “[a] misrepresentation
is material if the insurer would have rejected the risk or charged an increased premium and would
not have issue the same contract had it been given the correct information.” Sherman, ___ Mich
at ___; slip op at 10.

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Turning to the only other evidence submitted to rebut defendant’s summary disposition
motion below, MCR 2.116(G) permits a party to submit an affidavit in support of a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) or response thereto. As noted above, the
affidavit submitted by plaintiff avers that its underwriting guidelines would have made Witt
ineligible for the policy she obtained as a result of her misrepresentation, i.e., she would not have
been eligible for the insurance because she did not own the Nissan. However, as defendants argue,
plaintiff’s affidavit undercuts an earlier, binding admission signed by plaintiff in this case, pursuant
to MCR 2.312 (request for admission), admitting that plaintiff does, in fact, issue policies to
insureds who do not own the vehicle covered. The effect of the signature of a party (or their
counsel) on such a document “constitutes a certification by the signer that: (a) he or she has read
the document; (b) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact . . .” MCR 1.109(E)(5). When a party
certifies or swears to a fact in a civil action, they may not create a factual issue by merely asserting
the contrary in an affidavit. See, e.g., Dykes v William Beaumont Hosp, 246 Mich App 471, 479-
480; 633 NW2d 440 (2001). Additionally, as defendants likewise argue, plaintiff did not actually
submit any underwriting documents to the trial court in support of its response and countermotion
to plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition in this matter which were specific to its assertion in
this case that but for the false representation it would not issue a policy.
This case is distinguishable from Sherman, a case in which the plaintiff’s insurance
application falsely “claimed a different garaging location for her vehicles than their actual location
and did not disclose the presence of relatives who resided with her.” Sherman, ___ Mich at ___;
slip op at 2. An affidavit signed by the defendant’s underwriting specialist in Sherman, which
averred that the subject premium would have increased by 75.5% if the plaintiff had disclosed her
permanent Detroit address, was unrebutted in that case. Since there was no genuine issue of
material fact on that issue, Sherman then addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the motion for summary disposition. Id. at ___; slip op at 12. In contrast, in the present
matter, as detailed above, the affidavit contradicts an earlier binding admission made by plaintiff.
In other words, we cannot ignore a prior admission of a party by relying on a later filed affidavit
which undercuts the import of the admission.
The facts of the present case are closer to Howard. The insurance carrier in Howard failed
to present admissible evidence establishing that the misrepresentation in that case was material to
the coverage of the other vehicle in question. In the present case, plaintiff’s only evidence of its
reliance upon Witt’s misrepresentation regarding the ownership of the Nissan when it issued the
coverage on the Kia is rebutted by its own admission. Thus, considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, we find that no genuine issue of material fact remains on
this issue. See Sherman, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 7, 15. We accordingly cannot conclude that

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the court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition and denying plaintiff’s
counter motion for summary disposition.3
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
3 Defendants also argue that a 30-day-cancellation-notice provision in the policy was violated by
plaintiff, and that plaintiff is not entitled to rescission as to Altonio or Robert because they are
innocent third parties; however, because we find that the trial court did not err when it granted
defendants’ motion under Howard, we need not address those arguments.

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