COA 375611 IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF LNW Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re Guardianship of LNW, Minor.
TARA LYNN MATHEWSON, formerly known as
TARA LYNN WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
August 14, 2026
12:37 PM
v No. 375611
Montcalm Circuit Court,
Family Division
DAVID CHARLES BINGAMAN and TIFFANY
BINGAMAN, Guardians,
LC No. 2021-000027-JG
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Tara Lynn Mathewson, appeals by leave granted an order denying her petition
to modify the terms of guardianship or, in the alternative, to allow parenting time with her minor
daughter, LNW. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is the mother of a minor child, LNW, who became the subject of a juvenile
guardianship after the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) initiated child
protection proceedings in 2018. There were allegations and evidence at the time that petitioner
improperly supervised LNW while under the influence of illegal substances including
methamphetamine. LNW was voluntarily placed with respondents, Tiffany Bingaman
(petitioner’s mother) and Tiffany’s husband, David. Petitioner’s parental rights to LNW were
terminated in 2019; however, this Court reversed the termination order in an unpublished opinion
because at that time, we were “left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a
mistake by not fully considering [petitioner’s] post-incarceration circumstances leading up to the

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termination hearing.” In re L N Winters, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued October 15, 2019 (Docket No. 348031).
Upon remand, a juvenile guardianship was established with the Bingamans on March 1,
2021, and on June 3, 2021, the trial court sua sponte issued a nunc pro tunc order of clarification,
stating that: “The parental rights of the mother, Tara Williams, to [LNW] have been suspended
pursuant to the Order Appointing Juvenile Guardian dated 03/01/2021, and the mother, Tara
Williams, has no parenting time with the minor child.” The child protection proceedings were
closed, see MCL 712A.19a(12), and the underlying case was initiated to monitor the guardianship
with annual review hearings held in 2022 and 2023.
On August 4, 2023, petitioner filed a petition requesting the trial court enter an order
granting “appropriate contact” between her and LNW as well as “parenting time according to a
schedule . . . and according to conditions to be determined by the Court.” The hearing on this
petition, which was originally scheduled for September 28, 2023, was adjourned until March 20,
2024, to allow for discovery and then continued on March 17 and 18, 2025, the dates of the
regularly scheduled annual review. The trial court heard the testimony of petitioner; Christopher
Thompson, petitioner’s former circuit court probation officer; Dr. Randall Haugen, a psychologist
retained to conduct a psychological evaluation of petitioner and to make recommendations for
counseling; Kimberly Lavender, a counselor who worked with petitioner; Megan Ledin, a
counselor who worked with LNW from 2018 until November 2020, and then periodically after
that; and respondent, Tiffany Bingaman.
Following the March 2024 evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the August 4, 2023
petition. While recognizing that MCL 712A.19a authorizes an order for parenting time in this
juvenile guardianship, the trial court cited what he described as “eye opening testimony . . . from
three separate psychologists” who laid out a “pathway for parenting time” that included a family
therapist working with respondents, petitioner, and eventually LNW, to facilitate a gradual
increase in parenting time. While agreeing “wholeheartedly” that “eventually [LNW’s] going to
want access to her mother,” the trial court cited what he described as a “strong opinion” from
Ledin, the only mental health professional who had worked with LNW, that LNW was not ready
for this contact and that it would be detrimental to her. The trial court also referenced Ledin’s
description of the relationship between petitioner and Tiffany Bingaman as “strained” and that
“this relationship needs to be worked on to help the child.”
While the trial court stated that petitioner’s counsel made a “compelling” argument that the
trial court should appoint a family therapist and “get the parties moving toward” the point in which
LNW would be ready to meet petitioner, he did not agree that it should happen in 2025 or 2026.
In the words of the court, “[t]here’s compelling testimony that this would be detrimental to [LNW]
that hasn’t been rebutted” and “I’m not, as the Judge in this case, going to take the position that I
should force this child into contact with her mother at this point.” To do so was not in LNW’s best
interests. While he was convinced that LNW would request such contact at some point, she had
not requested contact and the issue “will come back for an annual review next year” at which time
he may have a “different viewpoint on when family counseling should occur or begin.”
On appeal, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying parenting time. Petitioner
cites Michigan law recognizing a parent’s right to petition for parenting time in a juvenile

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guardianship such as this and disputes that the factual record supports the trial court’s basis for
denying her petition, which she describes as the conclusion that “the process of moving forward
needs to be child led, coupled with a finding that the child is not ready for parenting time” rooted
largely in Ledin’s testimony.
Because the trial court cited Dr. Haugen and Ledin specifically in support of his decision,
it is appropriate to include a summary of each witness’s testimony.
Ledin is a licensed social worker with a master’s degree from Grand Valley State
University. She has worked with LNW since September 4, 2018, with regular meetings until
November 2020, and then periodically after that date because she determined that regular
counseling was no longer clinically necessary. The last in-person visit occurred on December 6,
2024. Ledin met with petitioner on several occasions, during which time she expressed her opinion
that “it would be a very loving sacrifice” for petitioner to give LNW “a chance at permanency” by
voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights, and petitioner disagreed.
Ledin testified that LNW “seems very stable right now and has for some time.” With
respect to contact with petitioner, Ledin testified that she “definitely stand[s] firm that it should be
more [LNW’s] lead on when that happens.” While she maintained that “eventually children should
absolutely see their birth parents,” she testified that LNW had not requested this and she did not
think that LNW was “emotionally there yet.” She did not know when LNW would be ready,
testifying that “[i]t could be six months” or “another two, three years.” Until that time, even
minimal contact with petitioner would be “detrimental” because it may ignite questions that will
“spark anxiety” that LNW is not going to know “how to handle,” and this contact would “change
everything in her world.” She also testified that while the Bingamans were supportive, the
relationship between petitioner and Tiffany Bingaman is “obviously strained” and would
negatively impact LNW in its current state.
During cross-examination, Ledin testified that she introduced the topic of petitioner in her
counseling sessions with LNW approximately three times, most recently on November 30, 2023.
During this counseling session, LNW commented that “a stressful part of her life is she didn’t
think she would see her birth parents again.” When asked if she thinks about her birth parents
often or about the fact that she is unable to see them, LNW said no.
Dr. Haugen was admitted as an expert witness in the field of psychology. He administered
psychological testing to petitioner to evaluate her current level of functioning and to identify any
diagnostic issue that would impede her ability to provide a “clear and stable environment for her
child.”
Dr. Haugen testified that to re-establish visitation, both petitioner and the guardians would
have to agree on a therapist, “somebody trained in the area of reunification and visitation” who
could work with the guardians and petitioner “to see where they’re at” in terms of authorizing
contact with LNW. “Once there’s a readiness determined by the therapist, there needs to be contact
that’s slow.” Without contact allowed, he anticipated that problems would occur when LNW
reaches the ages of 14 to 17, which he characterized as rebellious years. In his experience, “it’s
better if some sort of contact can be worked out so as to prevent problems later.”

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Dr. Haugen agreed that the child needs to be ready for contact; however, he did not know
whether the child needed to express an interest in meeting the biological parent. The important
question was why the child was not expressing an interest, which is a “complex question” that he
would not know without seeing the child or the guardians. He also testified that it was preferable
for the reunification therapist to be “neutral,” not a therapist whom the child has worked with in
the past. Dr. Haugen had experience working as a reunification therapist throughout his career.
He explained the process for this person as slow and gradual, inquiring into the child’s feelings
toward seeing a birth parent, and discerning the reasons or origin of those feelings. In his
experience, it is common for guardians to have some opposition to contact with the parent, and
there are strategies to work through this.
Following the close of all proofs and the issuance of its decision from the bench, the trial
court entered an order on March 31, 2025, denying the petition and then an order denying an ex
parte motion for reconsideration on April 22, 2025.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo “whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and
applied a statute.” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 433-434; 857 NW2d 667 (2014). We
previously determined that the applicable standard of review for orders concerning parenting time
or visitation in juvenile guardianship proceedings is akin to that applied to similar orders in other
contexts. See In re Prepodnik, 337 Mich App 238, 242-243; 975 NW2d 66 (2021). This review
begins with the premise that “[o]rders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal unless
the trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed a
palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major issue.” Pickering v
Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 5; 706 NW2d 835 (2005). We defer to the trial court’s credibility
determinations. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 155; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). Findings
of fact are affirmed, “unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction,” Fletcher
v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and
an abuse of discretion exists only if the trial court’s “decision is so palpably and grossly violative
of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of
passion or bias.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). “A trial court
commits legal error . . . when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law.” McIntosh v
McIntosh, 282 Mich App 471, 475; 768 NW2d 325 (2009).
B. MICHIGAN LAW AUTHORIZES, BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE, ORDERS OF
PARENTING TIME IN A JUVENILE GUARDIANSHIP
Neither party disputes the trial court’s authority to enter an order authorizing parenting
time. The juvenile guardianship is governed by MCL 712A.19a, “which pertains to permanency-
planning hearings [and] governs juvenile guardianships created after child protective proceedings
have been initiated and in place for a certain period of time but termination of parental rights has
not occurred.” In re Ballard, 323 Mich App 233, 236; 916 NW2d 841 (2018). The guardianship
was established upon a finding that a guardianship without termination of petitioner’s rights was
in LNW’s best interests. In re Prepodnik, 337 Mich App at 245-246. Accordingly, while the

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guardians have “the powers and responsibilities of a parent” under MCL 712A.19a(10) and MCL
700.5215, parenting time was one factor to be contemplated by the trial court when the
guardianship was established.
This is founded in MCL 712A.19a(14), which reads in full as follows:
In making the determinations under this section, the court shall consider any
written or oral information concerning the child from the child’s parent, guardian,
custodian, foster parent, child caring institution, relative with whom the child is
placed, or guardian ad litem in addition to any other evidence, including the
appropriateness of parenting time, offered at the hearing . . . .
We have construed this provision as “providing a court with authority to order parenting time for
a parent after a juvenile guardianship has been established even if the court did not order parenting
time when the guardianship commenced or at the time of the permanency-planning hearing.” In
re Ballard, 323 Mich App at 237. The statutory language “plainly reflects legislative intent” to
permit this, authorizing petitioner to seek parenting time even in the context of the guardianship
and, also, the trial court to “increase, decrease, or terminate” parenting time during the course of
the guardianship. Id.
C. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO DENY THE AUGUST 4, 2023 PETITION DOES
NOT EXHIBIT ERROR WARRANTING REVERSAL
Neither petitioner’s right to seek parenting time, nor the trial court’s authority to grant it,
leads to a conclusion that the trial court was required to enter an order authorizing parenting time
in this matter. As explained earlier, the trial court’s order is granted significant deference on
appeal. The decision must be affirmed unless the trial court’s factual findings “were against the
great weight of the evidence,” or either a clear legal error or a “palpable abuse of discretion”
occurred. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 5.
None of these factors are present on the record before us. The trial court declined to order
parenting time at this annual review because he found that LNW was not ready at this time and
that it would be detrimental to her. This factual finding must be affirmed “unless the evidence
clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705. It does not. Both
Ledin and Dr. Haugen testified as to the importance of not abruptly introducing petitioner into
LNW’s life but, instead, ensuring that LNW was ready for this. Ledin testified that LNW was not
ready and that contact as of the date of the trial court’s hearing would be detrimental to LNW.
While petitioner questions the trial court’s reliance on Ledin and, in particular, her opinion
that contact with petitioner would be detrimental at the time of the circuit court hearing, this
reliance reflects the trial court’s determination as to a witness’s credibility, to which we defer to
the trial court. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 155. Indeed, Ledin was the only mental health
professional who testified who had actually met with and counseled LNW. While Ledin testified
that in the past she and petitioner disagreed about petitioner’s desire to maintain her parental rights,
her testimony at this hearing did not evidence an opinion that petitioner should never have contact
with LNW or undue bias against her request for parenting time. In fact, she testified that she
believed children should meet their biological parents when they are ready, that LNW may be

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ready in as short of a time as six months, and that she had been willing to engage with LNW on
the topic of the child’s biological parents when this arose during past counseling sessions. Ledin
also testified that LNW had not mentioned a desire to meet with petitioner and, in her professional
opinion, this should occur before contact with petitioner is required. Premature contact could be
detrimental to LNW. Neither Dr. Haugen nor any other witness directly refuted this.
To the extent petitioner suggests the trial court erred because he did not adequately consider
petitioner’s progress or the record evidence supporting a finding that reunification efforts should
begin now, we do not find a clear legal error. While the decision to establish a juvenile
guardianship over LNW required a finding that this was in LNW’s best interests, MCL
712A.19a(14) does not mirror this language for purposes of deciding whether to include an order
of parenting time. Instead, the court is required to consider the “appropriateness of parenting
time,” as well as other information concerning the child and “any other evidence.” MCL
712A.19a(14). Once the juvenile guardianship is established, the child protection proceeding is
terminated and the court is required to conduct reviews of the guardianship on at least an annual
basis. MCL 712A.19a(13). Annual reviews of a guardianship over a minor do not require
consideration of the parent’s progress, as petitioner suggests, but rather focus on the
appropriateness of the guardianship, the ability and willingness of the guardian to continue it, and
its effect upon LNW’s welfare. MCL 700.5207. Testimony at the evidentiary hearing
demonstrated that the guardianship has been to LNW’s benefit, providing her with a sense of
stability within a family unit with siblings and caretakers, and that she is doing well. The trial
court did not commit clear legal error in its decision to focus on LNW’s interests while still
considering petitioner’s significant progress as a parent.
In sum, the trial court denied the August 4, 2023 petition because it concluded that LNW
was not ready for contact with petitioner and, therefore, an order of parenting time at this annual
review was not appropriate. This finding is factual in nature and is not against the great weight of
the evidence and will not be overturned on appeal.
Had the trial court denied petitioner’s request outright and not left open the likelihood that
it would be considered again at the next annual review hearing, such a finding may likely have
been reversed. However, petitioner’s parental rights to LNW have not been terminated and,
therefore, her right to seek parenting time is vested in statute and this Court’s prior interpretation
of MCL 712A.19a. In re Prepodnik, 337 Mich App at 245-246. We note, neither the trial court
nor any mental health professional who testified in this matter definitively stated that continuing
the current prohibition against parenting time indefinitely or even beyond the next annual review
hearing was a foregone conclusion or that this was the decision being made in April 2025. To the
contrary, all of them, including Ledin, testified as to the benefit of a child having the opportunity
for contact with her biological parent whose parental rights have not been terminated. Dr. Haugen
testified that prohibiting contact would pose a threat to LNW’s well-being in a few short years if
the gradual, slow process of reunification does not begin soon. The trial court indicated that he
expected this issue to arise at the next annual review hearing.
D. ISSUES RAISED IN THE DISSENT
In reaching this conclusion, we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s characterization of
the trial court’s decision. The trial court did not place a burden on LNW to request parenting time

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or prohibit petitioner from parenting time until LNW requests it. Rather, in an analysis rendered
orally from the bench that spanned more than ten pages of transcript, the trial court summarized
testimony from three mental health professionals who agreed that it would be inappropriate, if not
detrimental, to suddenly order parenting time given LNW’s age, maturity, and the status of the
relationship between the adults in her life. While all agreed that contact between LNW and
petitioner will take place at some juncture, all mental health experts also agreed that it should begin
following a gradual process facilitated by therapists and with LNW’s needs in mind. Also, the
only mental health expert who had personally counseled LNW—Ledin—testified that she did not
believe LNW was emotionally mature enough for such contact to begin now. Ledin testified that
perhaps LNW would be ready in six months or a year, but she testified that it would be detrimental
to begin such contact now. This testimony was unrefuted. Accordingly, the trial court denied
petitioner’s request for parenting time and alerted all parties that he anticipated the issue arising at
the next annual review hearing.
This decision must be evaluated utilizing the highly deferential standard of review that this
Court has previously applied to requests for parenting time with children subject to a juvenile
guardianship under MCL 712A.19a. See In re Prepodnik, 337 Mich App at 242. Respectfully,
this is not the standard of review that the dissent utilizes, with citation to In re COH, 495 Mich
184, 187; 848 NW2d 107 (2014) (COH). COH considered a trial court’s order denying a
grandparent’s petition for guardianship posttermination. In the context of orders concerning
parenting time, this Court has held that they “must be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court’s
findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed a palpable abuse of
discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major issue.” Pickering, 268 Mich App at 5
(emphasis added). Under this standard, finding an abuse of discretion requires that the decision
“evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias,” rather
than merely falling outside of the range of principled outcomes as the dissent suggests. Berger,
277 Mich App at 705. Neither the dissent nor the record presented supports a finding that the trial
court abused its discretion under this standard in this case. Thus, under the applicable standard,
the trial court’s decision must be affirmed.
Likewise we observe, this standard of review is appropriate given the context presented
here. The existence of the juvenile guardianship and the Bingamans’ appointment is not at issue.
When the guardianship was established, DHHS was required to demonstrate that both the
guardianship and maintaining petitioner’s parental rights were in LNW’s best interests. MCL
712A.19a(9)(c). Given that decision, the Bingamans have all the “powers and responsibilities of
a parent who is not deprived of custody” of the minor child. In re Prepodnik, 337 Mich App
at 244, quoting MCL 700.5215. Because petitioner’s parental rights have not been terminated, she
may seek a court order authorizing parenting time. Id. at 245-46. The authority to grant or deny
such a petition lies with the trial court. In this way, the context of this case is more analogous to
a civil custody dispute where both parties have a potential, legal right to parenting time with the
minor child, than to a situation where the child is a ward of the court or under the care of DHHS
after termination of parental rights. And in this context, the trial court has the “authority to
increase, decrease, or terminate that parenting time during the guardianship if circumstances
warranted court intervention.” In re Ballard, 323 Mich App at 237-238. There is no indication in
statute or precedent requiring the trial court to employ the best-interest factors from the Child
Custody Act, as the dissent suggests.

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Relying on COH to read such a requirement into the statute or prior caselaw is problematic
for several reasons. First, COH involves an entirely different context—i.e., a petition for
guardianship by a maternal grandmother after both parents’ parental rights had been terminated.
Even in COH, the Supreme Court recognized that posttermination proceedings are distinct from
pretermination proceedings and that the statute authorizing a guardianship posttermination “is only
applicable at the posttermination stage of a child protective proceeding.” In re COH, 495 Mich at
196-97.
Second, the Supreme Court in COH did not require the trial court to apply the best-interest
factors from either the Child Custody Act or the Adoption Code. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court concluded that “depending on the circumstances, a case may more reasonably lend itself to
application of the Child Custody Act factors, some combination of the Adoption Code and the
Child Custody Act factors, or a unique set of factors developed by the trial court for purposes of a
particular case.” In re COH, 495 Mich at 202-03. This recognition of the trial court’s discretion
to decide whether to utilize the best-interest factors in COH is significant because the statutory
language at issue in COH required the trial court to determine if the guardianship was “in the
child’s best interests.” See MCL 712A.19c(2). No such language is present in MCL 712A.19a(14),
which authorized the parenting time in the present case and which requires the trial court to
consider whether parenting time is appropriate based on evidence and information from several
sources. See MCL 712A.19a(14). When this Court evaluated the statute, it held that a trial court
“would certainly have the authority to increase, decrease, or terminate parenting time during the
guardianship if circumstances warranted court intervention.” In re Ballard, 323 Mich App at 237–
238. This is consistent with the Legislature’s intent that the guardianship “may continue until the
child is emancipated,” that the neglect proceeding be closed, and that review hearings be
conducted. MCL 712A.19a(9)(c). The court’s jurisdiction continued over the guardianship and
the guardian “has all the powers and duties” of any guardian for a minor appointed under the
estates and protected individuals code, MCL 700.1101 to 700.8206. MCL 712A.19a(10); MCL
712A.19a(13).
In this case, the trial court’s decision not to apply the best-interest factors from the Child
Custody Act or to evaluate the matter as if it were sitting in an abuse-and-neglect proceeding is
consistent with the statutory authority governing this juvenile guardianship. To the extent the
dissent suggests the trial court’s order must be reversed because the court did not consider the best-
interest factors or apply the standard applicable to the Child Custody Act, we respectfully find no
basis for this in the relevant statutes or binding precedent from this Court and the Supreme Court
interpreting the relevant statutes.
Finally, two other points cited by the dissent bear mentioning, although it does not appear
either provides a basis for reversing the trial court’s decision. First, petitioner did not claim error
on appeal from the trial court’s decision to consider the petition during an annual review hearing.
Indeed, the record indicates the parties stipulated to more than one adjournment to allow discovery
and other matters. Nonetheless, this Court previously indicated that while the annual review of
the guardianship is mandatory, the trial court “may” hold additional reviews but is not required to
do so. See In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 705; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). Second, the petitioner did
not raise any questions regarding the status of Ledin’s licensure on appeal. It does not appear that
this issue is relevant to this appeal. The trial court expressed on the record that he was familiar
with the circumstances upon which the guardianship was entered and with Ledin’s opinion at that

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time, which was that the guardianship was not in LNW’s best interests because LNW should have
the opportunity to be adopted. The trial court entered an order for guardianship despite this, and
he was not reconsidering that decision in the context of this case. His reliance on Ledin’s testimony
in the context of the petition for parenting time was, in large part, based on her agreement with
other mental health professionals who testified and the fact that Ledin was the only professional
who had met with LNW.
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of April 2025 being appealed at this time is
affirmed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ James Robert Redford

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