COA 375634 IN RE W P D RICHARDS-WELCH MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/30/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
April 30, 2026
10:47 AM
In re W. P. D. RICHARDS-WELCH, Minor.
No. 375634
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-005417-NA
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and REDFORD and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor child,
WRW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (failure to rectify conditions leading to termination of parental
rights to siblings).1 Because respondent was not served in accordance with the requirements of
MCL 712A.12, we vacate the trial court’s order of adjudication and order terminating respondent’s
parental rights and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2024, respondent’s parental rights to two children, ARS and ARW, were
involuntarily terminated because respondent failed to rectify barriers of substance use, housing,
employment, parenting skills, and domestic violence. Less than three weeks later, respondent gave
birth to WRW. Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received notice from a hospital social worker
that WRW tested positive for amphetamines the day after she was born. On that same day, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned for removal WRW from
respondent’s care. The petition alleged that respondent had not rectified the issues that led to the
termination of her parental rights to ARS and ARW. The petition further alleged that respondent
had not reported any income or identified housing or an ability to meet the immediate needs of
WRW. The petition also alleged that respondent also had two more children, MRW and ARS,
1 The petition did not name the father as a respondent, and the father is not a party to this appeal.

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who were under full care and custody of their respective fathers. An ex parte order was issued that
WRW be taken into protective custody and placed with DHHS for care and supervision.
Respondent appeared and participated in the preliminary hearing in November 2024. She
informed the trial court that she was living with her grandmother, and she provided her current
address. She also disputed many of the allegations, including that she did not share custody of
MRW and ARS. After hearing all the testimony, the trial court authorized the petition, ordered
WRW to be placed into foster care, and ordered supervised parenting time.
The DHHS subsequently confirmed that, although MRW lived with her father, respondent
actually shared equal custody of her. In December 2024, the DHHS amended its petition to request
that MRW be removed from respondent’s care and that respondent’s rights to WRW be terminated
at the initial disposition.
On January 24, 2025, a summons was issued for respondent to appear on April 22, 2025,
for a combined adjudication trial and termination hearing. According to a proof of service, a
process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve respondent with the summons and a copy of the
petition at the respondent’s last-known address on January 28, 2025. The process server returned
to the address on January 30, 2025. Respondent was not present. The summons and a copy of the
petition was served on respondent’s grandmother, and she signed the certificate of service.
In March 2025, WRW’s lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) moved to allow WRW’s foster
family to travel out of town with her. At the hearing, the LGAL explained: “[W]e have not had
any contact with [respondent]. I don’t believe [respondent’s counsel] has had contact in quite
some time, nor the [DHHS], which is why I brought this motion before the Court.” Respondent’s
counsel admitted that she had “not been able to reach [her] client in some time.” The trial court
granted the motion.
The trial court held the combined adjudication trial and termination hearing on April 22,
2025, as scheduled. Respondent did not appear. Respondent’s counsel requested verification
whether respondent received proper notice. The trial court found that service was sufficient:
Mr. Swears [counsel for the DHHS]: . . . I just received a copy of the proof of
service . . . signed for—by an adult at that residence that [respondent] uses on—it
appears to be January 28th and that’s been filed with the court, and for the record I
am showing a copy of that to defense Counsel.
The Court: Any objection to that service? You believe it’s proper?
Ms. Elzinga [counsel for respondent]: Well, your Honor, it’s signed by someone
else other than my client, but if it comports with the rules that’s where she received
the mail, so.
Mr. Swears: And the person who signed for it, your Honor, is Dian Matuz at—and
according to the communication I had from the court, that is the person on file that
[respondent] lives with. That would be an adult residing at the same address; I
believe that is sufficient under the personal service rules.

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The Court: Okay.
Ms. Elzinga: If the Court finds it sufficient, I just wanted to verify that she was
provided adequate notice.
The Court: Okay. Miss Valente, do you believe it’s sufficient?
Ms. Valente [LGAL]: I do, your Honor.
The Court: Okay. I do as well.
At the prosecutor’s request, the trial court took judicial notes of the prior proceedings
regarding the other children. The DHHS called a CPS investigator as its first witness. After
finishing direct examination, the DHHS’s counsel requested a recess. The record resumed about
30 minutes later, when the DHHS’s counsel explained that it was brought to his attention that
respondent was just located in the Muskegon County Jail and was transported to the court. The
DHHS was prepared to continue the hearing, but respondent’s counsel requested an adjournment
on the basis that respondent did not have appropriate attire and needed additional time to speak
with her counsel to prepare for the hearing. The LGAL stated that she had no objection to a one-
day adjournment. The trial court denied the request and continued with the adjudication, noting
that respondent was offered the opportunity to change her clothing, which she refused, and that
she was provided proper notice. The court further noted that the caseworker had made attempts to
contact respondent, but respondent had failed to keep in contact with the caseworker. The court
ordered the DHHS to restart its examination of the CPS investigator. Respondent eventually took
the stand and testified against the allegations in the petition.
The trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for
jurisdiction were satisfied for both WRW and MRW. The trial court transitioned into the
termination phase of the proceedings for WRW the same day. Respondent’s counsel moved to
adjourn the hearing for the same reason as her first motion. But the trial court denied the motion.
WRW’s foster-care case manager testified regarding WRW’s progress in foster care and
respondent’s lack of participation in parenting time. The trial court took judicial notice of the
testimony from the adjudication. The trial court determined that the DHHS satisfied the
requirements for termination at the initial disposition under MCR 3.977(E), aggravated
circumstances existed, statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) were proven
by clear and convincing evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that WRW would be harmed
if returned to respondent’s home, and termination of respondent’s parental rights was in WRW’s
best interests. On that basis, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to WRW. This
appeal followed.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Respondent argues that the termination of her parental rights violated her due-process
rights because she was not properly served with the summons and notice of the combined
adjudication and termination hearing. We agree.

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A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Generally, whether child protective proceedings complied with a respondent’s substantive
and procedural due process rights is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. However,
an unpreserved claim of constitutional error is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.”
In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 268; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (cleaned up). Because respondent
did not argue in the trial court that service of process was improper, this issue is not preserved and
our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id. at 258. “To avoid forfeiture under the
plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was
plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of
the proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). “The party asserting plain error bears the burden of persuasion
with respect to prejudice.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 48; 27 NW3d 122 (2023).
B. ANALYSIS
“It is well established that parents have a significant interest in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of their children.” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 109; 499 NW2d 752
(1993). “This interest has been characterized as an element of ‘liberty’ to be protected by due
process.” Id. “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”
In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 92; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (opinion by CORRIGAN, J.). This requires
notice of court hearings:
The “opportunity to be heard” includes the right to notice of that
opportunity. An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [Id. (cleaned up).]
The Legislature requires that a parent named in a termination petition receive personal
service of a summons before the court may conduct a hearing:
After a petition shall have been filed and after such further investigation as the court
may direct . . . the court may dismiss said petition or may issue a summons reciting
briefly the substance of the petition, and requiring the person or persons who have
the custody or control of the child, or with whom the child may be, to appear
personally and bring the child before the court at a time and place stated: Provided,
That the court in its discretion may excuse but not restrict children from attending
the hearing. If the person so summoned shall be other than the parent or guardian
of the child, then the parents or guardian, or both, shall also be notified of the
petition and of the time and place appointed for the hearing thereon, by personal
service before the hearing, except as hereinafter provided. Summons may be issued
requiring the appearance of any other person whose presence, in the opinion of the
judge, is necessary.

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Any interested party who shall voluntarily appear in said proceedings, may, by
writing, waive service of process or notice of hearing. [MCL 712A.12 (emphasis
added).]
“[S]tatutes requiring notice to parents must be strictly construed.” In re Atkins, 237 Mich
App 249, 251; 602 NW2d 594 (1999). “[P]ersonal service not only provides a parent notice, but
also apprises the parent of the charges levied against him or her and affords a reasonable time to
prepare a defense.” In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 694; 847 NW2d 514 (2014), citing In re
Brown, 149 Mich App 529, 541-542; 386 NW2d 577 (1986). The statutory requirement of
personal service protects a parent’s due-process rights. See id. See also In re Ferranti, 504 Mich
1; 22; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). “A failure to provide notice of a termination proceeding hearing by
personal service as required by statute, [MCL 712A.12], is a jurisdictional defect that renders all
proceedings in the trial court void.” Atkins, 237 Mich App at 250-251, citing In re Adair, 191
Mich App 710, 713–714; 478 NW2d 667 (1991); Brown, 149 Mich App at 534–542. Notably,
this Court determined in Brown, “the fact that respondent had actual notice does not cure this
jurisdictional error.” Brown, 149 Mich App at 541.
In cases where personal service is impracticable, MCL 712A.13 provides for service of
process by alternative methods, including publication:
Service of summons may be made anywhere in the state personally by the delivery
of true copies thereof to the persons summoned: Provided, [t]hat if the judge is
satisfied that it is impracticable to serve personally such summons or the notice
provided for in the preceding section, he may order service by registered mail
addressed to their last known addresses, or by publication thereof, or both, as he
may direct. . . .
“When determining whether personal service would be impractical, the trial court must determine
if reasonable efforts were made to locate the party.” In re Lovitt, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367124); slip op at 3. “Substituted service is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.” In re SZ, 262 Mich App 560, 565; 686 NW2d 520 (2004). However,
as this Court determined in Atkins, “receipt of the amended petition by respondent’s attorney
cannot be deemed a proper substitute for personal service on respondent.” Atkins, 237 Mich App
at 251.
The court rules reinforce the necessity of personal service. MCR 3.920(G) states that
“[a]fter a party’s first appearance before the court, subsequent notice of proceedings and pleadings
shall be served on that party or, if the party has an attorney, on the attorney for the party as provided
in subrule (D), except that a summons must be served for trial or termination hearing as provided
in subrule (B).” (Emphasis added.) MCR 3.920(B)(4) states:

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(a) Except as provided in subrule (B)(4)(b), a summons required under
subrule (B)(2)[2] must be served by delivering the summons to the party personally.
(b) If the court finds, on the basis of testimony or a motion and affidavit,
that personal service of the summons is impracticable or cannot be achieved, the
court may by ex parte order direct that it be served in any manner reasonably
calculated to give notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard,
including publication.
Similar to MCL 712A.12, MCR 3.920(F) provides that a respondent may execute a written waiver
of notice of hearing or service of process.
In this case, there is no evidence that respondent was personally served with notice of the
petition and the time and place for hearing. The proof of service reflects that the summons was
delivered to and signed for by respondent’s grandmother at the address that respondent last
reported to the trial court as her residence. The trial court accepted the DHHS’s argument that
service was proper because the documents were signed by an adult residing at the same address as
respondent. But service of a summons and notice of a termination proceeding on a parent is
governed by MCL 712A.12, which requires that the parent be personally served. There is also no
evidence that the DHHS moved for alternate service or that the trial court determined that personal
service on respondent would be impracticable. Moreover, respondent never executed a written
waiver of service of process or notice of hearing.
The DHHS argues that respondent’s appearance at the adjudication trial and termination
hearing and failure to raise objections regarding a specific defect in service constitutes a waiver
under MCR 3.920(H). Subsection (H) states, “The appearance and participation of a party at a
hearing is a waiver by that party of defects in service with respect to that hearing unless objections
regarding the specific defect are placed on the record.” At the adjudication trial, respondent’s
counsel inquired about whether service was proper, but she took no particular position on the issue,
noting only that she wanted to verify that respondent was provided adequate notice. The trial was
later halted when it was learned that respondent was being held in the Muskegon County jail.
Respondent was brought to the courtroom from the jail, and the trial was restarted after the trial
court denied her counsel’s request for an adjournment. Thereafter, respondent participated in the
hearing and testified. But respondent was not afforded a reasonable time to prepare a defense. As
this Court recognized in Brown and reaffirmed in Dearmon, personal service of a summons gives
2 MCR 3.920(B)(2) states in relevant part:
(2) When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the court shall
direct the service of a summons in the following circumstances:
* * *
(b) In a child protective proceeding, a summons must be served on any respondent
and any nonrespondent parent. . . .

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a parent notice of the hearing, apprises the parent of the charges, and affords the parent a reasonable
time to prepare a defense. Dearmon, 303 Mich App at 694, Brown, 149 Mich App at 541-542.
We question whether respondent’s appearance and participation in the hearing could be
considered voluntary under the circumstances. But it is not necessary for us to resolve that issue
because “a probate court’s jurisdiction over children is derived solely from the state constitution
and statutes.” Brown, 149 Mich App at 540. See also SZ, 262 Mich App at 567-568 (holding that
MCL 712A.13, not MCR 3.920, governs alternate service in child protective proceedings). MCL
712A.12 plainly states that a parent must be personally served with notice of a termination
proceeding hearing. Although the statute states that personal service may be waived in writing, it
does not state that a person’s appearance and participation in a hearing constitutes a waiver of any
defects in service unless objections regarding the specific defect are made. Thus, there is a conflict
between MCL 712A.12 and MCR 3.920. Our Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to
determine rules of practice and procedure, but it “is not authorized to enact court rules that
establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law.” McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 27; 597
NW2d 148 (1999); see also Brown, 149 Mich App at 540. Because the issue of service is a
jurisdictional one, MCL 712A.12 prevails. See McDougall, 461 Mich at 37.
Respondent was not personally served with the summons and amended petition. There is
no evidence that alternate service was requested or granted or that respondent executed a written
waiver of service. Because respondent was not served in accordance with the statutory mandates,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction and thus plainly erred by proceeding with the adjudication trial
and termination hearing. See Atkins, 237 Mich App at 250-251; see also Lovitt, __ Mich App at
__; slip op at 4. The lack of jurisdiction renders all trial court proceedings void.3 Lovitt, __ Mich
App at __; slip op at 3. On this basis, we must vacate the trial court’s order of adjudication and
order terminating respondent’s parental rights to WRW and remand for further proceedings.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Sima G. Patel
3 Because the proceedings in the trial court are void for lack of personal jurisdiction, we need not
address respondent’s other argument regarding the trial court’s denial of her requests for
adjournments of the adjudication trial and termination hearing.

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