COA 375839 IN RE L D LEASTER JR MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/2/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
March 02, 2026
2:25 PM
In re L. D. LEASTER, JR., Minor.
No. 375839
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-001853-NA
Before: FEENEY, P.J., and GARRETT and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right a March 31, 2025 order, which terminated her
parental rights to her minor child, LL, at the initial disposition. Respondent also challenges the
trial court’s September 23, 2024 order, which exercised jurisdiction and found statutory grounds
to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) (a)(ii) (parent has deserted the child for
91 or more days), [(b)(ii) (parent failed to prevent physical injury or abuse),] (b)(iii) (abuse by
nonparent adult and reasonable likelihood of abuse if child returned to parent), (c)(i) (conditions
of adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions exist that could have caused the minor
child to come within the trial court’s jurisdiction), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody
despite financial ability to do so), (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child returned to parent),
(k)(i) (abuse including abandonment), and (k)(ii) (abuse including criminal sexual conduct).1 We
affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1 It appears certain statutory grounds cited by the trial court to support termination of respondent’s
parental rights were erroneously included in the order. But any error was harmless because
termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) for the reasons subsequently explained in this
opinion. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

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This matter arose when petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
filed a petition alleging respondent abused and neglected LL’s half-sibling, NO, while she was in
respondent’s care.2 NO had scars, “skin injuries,” and scurvy from a vitamin C deficiency. LL
lived in the home where the abuse and neglect occurred, and it was alleged there was a risk of
harm to LL if she remained in respondent’s care. It was requested the trial court authorize the
petition, place LL in the care of DHHS, exercise jurisdiction, and terminate respondent’s parental
rights at the initial disposition. After the petition was authorized, LL was placed with relatives,
under the supervision of DHHS. Respondent’s parenting times with LL were suspended, and
DHHS was ordered not to make efforts toward reunification due to aggravated circumstances per
MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) and MCL 722.638(2)(c)3.
The adjudication trial and termination hearing were adjourned multiple times for various
reasons. During this time, respondent repeatedly moved for parenting times, but the motions were
denied. In May 2024 and September 2024, the trial court held a combined adjudication trial and
termination hearing. Testimony was presented concerning the abuse and neglect of NO while in
respondent’s care. In the September 23, 2024 order, the trial court exercised jurisdiction and found
statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights to LL as described above. After
a best-interest hearing was held on March 7, 2025, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental
rights to LL in the March 31, 2025 order. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews “de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules.
De novo review means we do not extend any deference to the trial court.” In re Ott, 344 Mich
App 723, 735; 2 NW3d 120 (2022) (citations omitted). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision
to suspend, or modify, parenting time for an abuse of discretion. In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485;
490-491; 845 NW2d 540 (2013), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by In re
Ott, 344 Mich App at 738-741. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an
outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” In re COH, ERH, JRG, & KBH, 495
Mich 184, 202; 848 NW2d 107 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review the trial court’s “findings of fact underlying the legal issues” for clear error. In
re McCarrick/Lamoreaux (On Remand), 307 Mich App 436, 463; 861 NW2d 303 (2014). We
also review “for clear error the trial court’s finding that there are statutory grounds for termination
of a respondent’s parental rights.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 343; 990 NW2d 685 (2022).
A trial court’s best-interest determination is also reviewed for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich
App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court
has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial
court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Miller, 347 Mich App 420, 425; 15
NW3d 287 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
2 NO has a different mother, but the same father as LL.
3 Battering, torture, or other serious physical harm.

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III. SUSPENSION OF PARENTING TIME
Respondent first argues the trial court improperly suspended her parenting time throughout
the proceeding, which violated MCL 712A.13a(13). We disagree.
MCL 712A.13a(13) “is tied to custody and placement orders after removal. . . .” In re Ott,
344 Mich App at 738. It applies “before and after adjudication.” Id. at 739. Under MCL
712A.13a(13), “a parent is entitled to parenting time with a removed child unless it ‘may be
harmful to the juvenile’s life, physical health, or mental well-being. . . .’ ” In re Ott, 344 Mich
App at 739 (second alteration in original), quoting MCL 712A.13a(13). A finding of harm is
required before parenting time can be suspended. See MCL 712A.13a(13).
The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that allowing respondent to have
parenting time, even if supervised, may be harmful to LL. Respondent was accused of severe
abuse and neglect of NO, who is LL’s sibling, in LL’s presence. See MCL 712A.13a(1)(l). A
criminal investigation was ongoing at the time of the preliminary hearing. At that time, the Detroit
Police Department did not want one-year-old LL to have contact with respondent. While
respondent was not criminally charged and respondent voluntarily participated in parenting classes
after the petition was filed, she was still accused of atrocious abuse and neglect and the trial court
found that her limited participation was a “small token gesture”. The trial court undoubtedly had
the authority to suspend respondent’s parenting time under MCR 3.977(D) and MCL 712A.19b(4)
because respondent was the subject of a permanent custody petition. Additionally, although NO
is not respondent’s child, and there is no evidence she ever physically harmed LL, respondent
abused and neglected NO while LL was also in her care. Living in an environment where this took
place would undoubtedly be psychologically harmful to LL. Additionally, for the reasons
discussed in detail below, the doctrine of anticipatory neglect applies in this case. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion, or violate MCL 712A.13a(13), by suspending respondent’s parenting
time throughout the proceedings.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Respondent argues the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights because DHHS
failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with LL, in violation of MCL 712A.19a(2).
Respondent also challenges the trial court’s application of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, and
argues a statutory ground did not exist to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
A. REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
Child protective proceedings are generally divided into two phases: the adjudicative phase,
which determines whether the court can take jurisdiction over a juvenile, and the dispositional
phase, which determines what action will be taken on behalf of the juvenile. In re Pederson, 331
Mich App 445, 463-464; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). “One of the actions that the trial court may take
is to terminate parental rights.” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 167745); slip op at 3, citing MCL 712A.19b. “In most circumstances, however,
DHHS has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to achieve reunification before a court
may terminate parental rights.” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 3. “[O]nly in
rare circumstances provided by statute may the trial court hold a combined adjudicative and

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dispositional hearing in which parental rights may be terminated at the initial dispositional
hearing.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3, citing MCL 712A.19b(4) and MCR 3.977(E).
“MCL 712A.19a(2) provides a narrow exception for when DHHS may forgo reasonable
reunification efforts.” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 3. Relevant in this case
is MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), which permits termination of parental rights without DHHS being
required to make reasonable reunification efforts where “[t]here is a judicial determination that the
parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as provided in . . . MCL 722.638.” See
MCL 712A.19a(2)(a). MCL 722.638 states, in relevant part:
(1) The department shall submit a petition for authorization by the court. . .
if 1 or more of the following apply:
(a) The department determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a
person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any length of time in the
child’s home, has abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse included
1 or more of the following:
* * *
(iii) Battering, torture, or other serious physical harm.
* * *
(2) In a petition submitted as required by subsection (1), if a parent is a
suspected perpetrator . . . the department shall include a request for termination of
parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing. . . .
“Under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), in order to conclude that aggravated circumstances exist that
excuse the requirement of reasonable efforts toward reunification, a trial court must make findings
consistent with both MCL 722.638(1) and MCL 722.638(2).” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich
at ___; slip op at 9. In this case, DHHS was ordered not to make efforts toward reunification
because the trial court found respondent “[t]orture[d]” NO, who was beaten, locked in a room, and
found covered in her own feces. This was not clear error.
“The first relevant finding required by MCL 722.638(1)(a) is whether ‘a parent, guardian,
or custodian, or a person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any length of time in
the child’s home, has abused the child or a sibling of the child . . ..’ ” See In re Barber/Espinoza,
___ Mich at ___; slip op at 9 (alteration in original), quoting MCL 722.638(1)(a). NO was placed
in respondent’s care beginning in either June 2022 or July 2022. NO remained there until she was
taken to the hospital on October 18, 2022. During the time NO lived in respondent’s home,
respondent was more than 18 years of age, and NO was less than 18 years of age. Also, contrary
to respondent’s arguments on appeal, NO and LL are siblings because they are related by birth
through one common parent. See MCL 712A.13a(1)(l).
With respect to whether respondent abused NO, MCL 722.622(g) defines “child abuse” as:
“[H]arm or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare that occurs through nonaccidental
physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment, by a parent, a legal

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guardian, [or] any other person responsible for the child’s health or welfare. . . .” See also In re
Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 10 (relying on MCL 722.622(g) to define “abuse”).
Respondent admitted she hit NO with her hands. The legal father of NO and LL reported he knew
respondent physically abused NO while she was in her care, and he did not intervene.
Dr. Bradley Norat, who examined NO in October 2022, testified NO had “a scar to the
right side of her jawline” and “areas of scarring around her eyes, by her eyebrows.” There were
also “skin injuries,” “multiple scars covering [NO’s] back,” “scarring on the backside of her hips,”
an “injury to her left lateral thigh,” and “a healed loop mark on her right lower leg.” These issues
“drove the concern for child physical abuse.” NO reported she “fell from a bike which resulted in
an injury to her [left] leg the week prior.” However, Dr. Norat did not believe the scarring on
NO’s back was caused from falling off a bicycle because children tend to fall forward, “and they
protect themselves with their hands” or arms. Even if a child fell backward, it would be unusual
to “have this quantity of injury,” or skin lesions. Dr. Norat did not count the number of scars on
NO’s body because “[t]here was such a quantity that [he] did not feel that that would be
appropriate.” Dr. Norat’s medical opinion would not have changed if he knew the exact number
of scars. He testified NO’s injuries were “highly concerning for non-accidental trauma,” and he
agreed the injuries were consistent with “a series of assaultive events.” Based on this evidence,
the court properly concluded that respondent abused NO. See MCL 722.622(g).
“But child abuse perpetrated by a listed individual is not independently sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of MCL 722.638(1).” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 11.
“Such abuse committed by a listed offender must also have included certain circumstances listed
under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i) through (vi).” In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 11
(quotation marks omitted). The relevant additional circumstance relied upon DHHS and the trial
court in this case is “[b]attering, torture, or other serious physical harm.” See MCL
722.638(1)(a)(iii).
The evidence presented permitted an inference that respondent had repeatedly physically
abused NO in the months she was placed in respondent’s care. Respondent admitted to using
corporeal punishment and hitting NO. Respondent-father Leaster admitted to witnessing physical
abuse and that he did not intervene. The medical testimony of Dr. Norat established NO was
subjected to a series of assaultive events, as opposed to accidental events that often occur in
childhood. Dr. Norat did not count the number of scars on NO’s body, which were copious and
found on her back, legs, and face. Because NO had scarring, it is clear the wounds caused by the
abuse created permanent physical changes. As a result, there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding respondent abused NO; and the abuse amounted to battering, torture, or
other severe physical abuse. See MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii). We are not left with the definite and
firm conviction a mistake was made. Because “the circumstances in both MCL 722.638(1)[(a)(iii)]
and MCL 722.638(2) [were] demonstrated,” aggravated circumstances existed. See In re
Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 12. DHHS was not obligated to make reasonable
efforts to reunify LL and respondent. See id. at ___; slip op at 12.

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B. STATUTORY GROUNDS
“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We conclude termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which permits
termination when “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s
parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of the parent.” Exhibiting
behavior that would put a child at a risk of harm is sufficient to justify terminating parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). In re White, 303 Mich App at 712-713. The harm contemplated
under (j) includes emotional harm, as well as physical harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261,
268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011).
LL was removed from respondent’s care because respondent physically abused and
neglected NO. LL was in the same home as NO when this occurred, which demonstrates
respondent’s disregard for LL’s psychological well-being. Although respondent was not given a
case-service plan because DHHS sought termination at the initial disposition, she was referred for
a psychological evaluation and mental health counseling. Respondent did not submit to the
psychological evaluation, and she was terminated from counseling because of her inconsistent
participation. Respondent voluntarily completed a parenting class in 2023 and attended court
hearings. However, she failed to stay in contact with the caseworker in the months leading up to
termination despite the caseworker’s efforts to engage respondent.
Respondent is correct that the evidence did not indicate she physically abused, or neglected,
LL. However, “the doctrine of anticipatory neglect allows an inference that a parent’s treatment
of one child is probative of how that parent will treat other children.” In re Kellogg, 331 Mich
App 249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). The doctrine “permits a forward-looking assessment of
risk.” In re KV, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374236); slip op
at 7. If applicable, “it permits an inference that a parent who abuses a child’s sibling may also
abuse that child.” Id. at ___; slip op at 8. However, this Court has cautioned against relying on
the doctrine of anticipatory neglect when the child at issue has not been abused and is not similarly
situated to a sibling who was abused. See e.g., In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 730-732; 858
NW2d 143 (2014). The probative value of the evidence must be considered before the doctrine
can be applied. See In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App at 260. “[T]he probative value . . . is decreased
by differences between the children, such as age and medical conditions.” In re Boshell/Shelton,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 371973); slip op at 6 (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
In this case, there are ostensible differences between LL and NO. NO is not respondent’s
biological child. NO is also older and of a different gender than LL. However, these differences
alone do not demonstrate that LL would be safe from physical abuse and neglect while in
respondent’s care. Respondent’s abuse and neglect of NO was significant. NO was discovered
locked in a room in respondent’s home for 12 hours a day after NO called 911. NO was covered
in feces and displayed signs of severe physical abuse, including scarring on her face and back. NO

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had a significant vitamin C deficiency, which resulted in NO developing scurvy and being
hospitalized. It was noted NO was unable to “bear weight on her left leg.” CAT scans revealed
subperiosteal hematomas on both thighs, which are caused by “bleeding underneath” the protein-
rich layer “on the outside of the bones.” Subperiosteal hematomas are associated with “scurvy or
a vitamin C deficiency.” According to Dr. Norat, scurvy is highly preventable. NO’s vitamin C
levels registered at a level five, which was the lowest level. NO was also not enrolled in school
while in respondent’s care.
Importantly, caselaw suggests the doctrine of anticipatory neglect can be applicable despite
differences in age, gender, and biological relationship because “abuse is abuse.” See In re Mota,
334 Mich App 300, 320, 322-323; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). There is no indication respondent would
not physically abuse or neglect LL simply because he is her male biological child, who is younger
in years than NO. Arguably, LL’s young age would make him more vulnerable to abuse, and there
is no indication LL and NO had different developmental needs. Cf. In re LaFrance, 306 Mich
App at 730-732; Kellogg, 331 Mich App at 260. Importantly, respondent disregarded LL’s well-
being by abusing and neglecting NO over a period of months, while LL lived in the same home.
This disregard for LL’s psychological well-being, combined with the significant abuse and neglect
experienced by NO, supports application of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect. See In re Hudson,
294 Mich App at 267-268. Evidence of respondent’s treatment of NO is highly probative of how
respondent would treat LL, and the trial court did not improperly rely on the doctrine of
anticipatory neglect. The trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was not clearly erroneous.4
C. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent argues the trial court clearly erred by finding termination of her parental rights
was in LL’s best interests, and sufficient findings of fact were not made to support this decision.
We disagree.
“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if [DHHS] has established a
statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a
preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. See also MCR 3.977(E)(4). “The trial court should
weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich
App at 713. This Court focuses on the child—not the parent—when reviewing best interests. In
re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346. When determining best interests,
the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond
to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.
4 Because only one statutory ground for termination must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, we need not consider whether termination was proper on the remaining grounds relied
upon by the trial court. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32 (“[o]nly one statutory ground need be
established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights”).

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The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
When a minor child is placed with a relative, that placement “is an explicit factor to
consider” in the best-interest analysis. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144
(2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The court shall state on the record or in writing
its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” MCR 3.977(I)(1). “The trial court’s findings need
not be extensive; ‘brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are
sufficient.’ ” In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 62; 27 NW3d 122 (2023), quoting MCR 3.977(I)(1).
In this case, respondent argues the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support
termination was in LL’s best interests. We disagree because detailed findings of fact were made
by the referee who presided over the best-interest hearing. The findings, set forth below, were oral
and in writing, and the trial court adopted them. The findings as to LL’s best interests more than
satisfied MCR 3.977(I)(2)’s requirements.
Respondent next argues the evidence did not establish that it was in LL’s best interests for
her parental rights to be terminated. We again disagree because the record establishes LL and
respondent were not bonded. LL was removed from respondent’s care when he was 18 months
old. At the time of termination, LL had not seen respondent in more than two years. Respondent’s
parenting time was suspended throughout the proceedings, which was necessary to protect LL.
While the parent-child bond is only one factor to consider, In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich
App at 41-42, the record also supports respondent was unable to safely parent LL. Respondent
physically abused and neglected NO while NO was in her care for several months. Although
respondent is correct there was no evidence to support LL was physically abused or neglected, the
doctrine of anticipatory neglect applied. Additionally, the record supports LL was exposed to
NO’s abuse and neglect, which was significant. This undoubtedly demonstrated respondent’s lack
of concern for LL’s mental well-being. Respondent’s abuse and neglect of NO also occurred while
NO was under the supervision of DHHS. While DHHS was not obligated to provide respondent
with a case-service plan, she was referred to mental health counseling and a psychological
evaluation. Respondent failed to submit to the evaluation and was terminated from counseling
because of her failure to comply. Respondent voluntarily completed a parenting class in 2023 and
attended all court hearings, but she failed to maintain communication with the caseworker in the
months leading up to termination.
LL, who had been in foster care for most of his young life, required permanency and
stability. LL was doing well in the care of his maternal grandparents, with whom he had been
placed for the duration of the proceedings. LL had a healthy bond with his grandparents, who
were devoted to LL’s well-being and wanted to adopt him. Notably, the grandparents preferred
adoption over a guardianship. While it is true that relative placement weighs against termination,
termination is not prohibited merely because the child is placed with a relative. See In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. Rather, the child’s best interests control. See In re Atchley, 341
Mich App at 346. LL’s placement with relatives was considered, and it was nonetheless found

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termination was in his best interests. A preponderance of the evidence establishes termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in LL’s best interests. The trial court did not clearly err by
terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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