COA 378285 PEOPLE OF MI V RONNIE ALLEN YOUNGER JR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 12, 2026
2:16 PM
v No. 378285
Osceola Circuit Court
RONNIE ALLEN YOUNGER, JR., LC No. 2024-006318-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Ronnie Allen Younger, Jr., stabbed the boyfriend of his daughter during an
argument and pleaded no contest to felonious assault, MCL 750.82. The trial court, accepting
Younger’s representation that he was remorseful for his actions, sentenced him to 18 months’ to 4
years’ incarceration. As Younger exited the courtroom, he stated to his wife that the complainant
“better be gone.” This interaction was recorded on body-camera footage from a police officer, and
it was given to the trial court. The trial court then sua sponte resentenced Younger a few days later
to an increased minimum term of 24 months’ incarceration, in part because Younger made an
intemperate remark on his way out of the courthouse that the trial court took as a violation of a no-
contact order to which Younger was subject and also as proof that Younger’s remorse had been
insincere. On appeal, Younger contends that the trial court was not authorized to resentence him
and seeks reinstatement of his original sentence.1 While we disagree that the trial court was
unauthorized to resentence Younger, the trial court made several errors in crafting its revised
sentence. Accordingly, we vacate Younger’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. RESENTENCING AUTHORITY
Younger argues that the trial court was not authorized to resentence him sua sponte because
his original sentence was not invalid. We agree that the trial court’s changed perception of
1 Younger appeals the amended judgment of sentence by leave granted. People v Younger Jr,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 8, 2026 (Docket No. 378285).

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Younger’s remorsefulness did not authorize it to resentence Younger sua sponte. But because the
trial court crafted Younger’s original sentence partly on the basis of a misapprehension as to his
probation status, the trial court was authorized to resentence Younger to correct that
misapprehension, and it was permitted to consider up-to-date information while crafting its revised
sentence.
“[A] trial court cannot set aside a valid sentence and impose a new and different one, after
the defendant has been remanded to jail to await the execution of the sentence.” People v Barfield,
411 Mich 700, 703; 311 NW2d 724 (1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However,
“[a]lthough the authority of the court over a defendant typically ends when a valid sentence is
pronounced, the court may correct an invalid sentence after sentencing.” People v Miles, 454 Mich
90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). “A sentence is invalid when it is beyond statutory limits, when it
is based upon constitutionally impermissible grounds, improper assumptions of guilt, a
misconception of law, or . . . if it is based on inaccurate information.” Id. at 97. Under
MCR 6.429(A), a trial court “may correct an invalid sentence on its own initiative after giving the
parties . . . an opportunity to be heard . . . within 6 months of the entry of the judgment of
conviction and sentence.”
The trial court stated that it had based Younger’s sentence on inaccurate information about
Younger’s remorsefulness. But while it would be an objective fact whether a defendant did or did
not express remorse, a determination of whether a defendant is remorseful is a subjective
assessment. People v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 8 n 9; 609 NW2d 557 (2000). When the trial court
accepted that Younger was truly remorseful at his original sentencing, it did not rely on inaccurate
information, but rather a subjective assessment that the trial court questioned in retrospect after
receiving new information. See People v Wybrecht, 222 Mich App 160, 173-174; 564 NW2d 903
(1997) (distinguishing between drawing a conclusion about a defendant’s character and the
underlying facts upon which that conclusion was based). That new information did not exist at
the time of the original sentencing, so it could not have been inaccurate. It is “axiomatic . . . that
the trial court cannot invalidate its sentences by simply changing its mind.” Id. at 168-169.
Younger’s sentence was not invalid because the trial court changed its mind about whether
Younger’s remorse was sincere.
Nevertheless, Younger’s original sentencing guidelines calculations contained an error
because prior record variable (PRV) 6 was originally scored at five points, which is proper if a
defendant was “on probation or delayed sentence status or on bond awaiting adjudication or
sentencing for a misdemeanor,” MCL 777.56(1)(d). Younger provided evidence that he was not
on probation after the original sentencing, resulting in the trial court correcting Younger’s
sentencing guidelines accordingly at resentencing. That correction reduced his total PRV score
from 70 to 65 points, which did not change his PRV level, MCL 777.67, and therefore did not
affect his minimum sentencing guidelines range. A defendant is entitled to resentencing if a
guidelines variable scoring error changes the sentencing guidelines range. People v Jackson, 487
Mich 783, 792-795; 790 NW2d 340 (2010). And resentencing is not required if a scoring error
does not alter the sentencing guidelines range. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711
NW2d 44 (2006). Thus, a sentence is not invalid merely because there was an error in a guidelines
variable score. However, the trial court’s commentary at Younger’s original sentencing and at
resentencing reflects that it crafted its original 18-month minimum sentence in part because it
believed that Younger had been on probation. Thus, his sentence was “based on inaccurate

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information” even if that error did not affect his guidelines minimum range because it was part of
the trial court’s proportionality determination.
Defendants must be sentenced on the basis of current information. People v Triplett, 407
Mich 510, 513-516; 287 NW2d 165 (1980). Triplett specifically addressed the importance of an
up-to-date presentence investigation report (PSIR), but “the manner in which the pertinent facts
are compiled is not as crucial as is the content or accuracy of this information after it reaches the
hands of the trial judge.” People v Hemphill, 439 Mich 576, 581-582; 487 NW2d 152 (1992).
Unpublished cases have emphasized that, while an updated PSIR might not be mandatory at
resentencing, trial judges at resentencing must consider up-to-date information. People v Stoltz,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 20, 2023 (Docket
No. 363425), p 9; People v Calloway (After Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued July 30, 2020 (Docket No. 349870), p 6; People v Croff, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2014 (Docket No. 314409), p 5. While
these cases are not binding, the principles they espouse are consistent with the Michigan Supreme
Court’s emphasis on the need for sentences to be based on accurate and current information, so we
find their reasoning persuasive. Johnson v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, ___ Mich App ___, ___
n 3; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368048); slip op at 5 n 3. Because the trial court was
already authorized to resentence Younger, the trial court was permitted to consider up-to-date
information in crafting a new sentence.2
II. VALIDITY OF REVISED SENTENCE
Younger argues that his revised sentence is invalid because it was vindictive,
disproportionate, and based on an erroneous finding that he violated the no-contact order. We
agree that the record does not support the trial court’s determination that Younger violated the no-
contact order, but the record does not reflect vindictiveness, and Younger fails to show that the
sentence is disproportionate.
A. ERRONEOUS FINDINGS OF FACT
We first note that Younger does not challenge the trial court’s determination that his
intemperate remark was threatening in its general nature, which would, in any event, be the kind
of credibility assessment to which we would defer. People v White, 331 Mich App 144, 150; 951
NW2d 106 (2020). The trial court did not identify which provision of the no-contact order it
2 We therefore need not consider defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless or futile objection. People v
Serges, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 355554); slip op at 14. We
further reiterate that the trial court’s changed opinion of Younger’s remorsefulness on the basis of
his alleged statement to his wife did not authorize it to resentence Younger sua sponte. Rather,
resentencing was permitted because of the trial court’s misconception regarding Younger’s
probation status.

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believed that Younger violated. The provisions of the no-contact order that are relevant to this
appeal state:
q. Do not harass, intimidate, beat, molest, wound, stalk, threaten, or engage in other
conduct that would place any of the following persons or a child of any of the
following persons in reasonable fear of bodily injury: spouse, former spouse,
individual with whom the defendant has a child in common, resident or former
resident of the defendant’s household.
r. Do not assault, harass, intimidate, beat, molest, wound, or threaten the following
person(s): [Complainant]
s. Do not have (or cause any third party to have) any direct or indirect contact with
the following person(s): (Note: This condition also applies while the
defendant/juvenile is in custody.) [Complainant]
We presume that Younger’s remark might have placed complainant in reasonable fear of injury or
that it would have threatened complainant if complainant had been aware of the statement. But
the only evidence in the record reflects that complainant was not present for, in the vicinity of, or
even aware of Younger’s remark. Thus, to the extent the trial court may have found that Younger
directly threatened or contacted complainant in violation of prohibition (q) or (r), the trial court
clearly erred because nothing in the record could support such a finding. See People v Chaney,
327 Mich App 586, 591; 935 NW2d 66 (2019) (when there was no evidence of the factual basis
for the trial court’s scoring of a sentencing guidelines variable, “the trial court’s finding was clearly
erroneous, i.e., not supported by a preponderance of the evidence”).
The record also does not support a finding that Younger violated prohibition (s) of the no-
contact order. Again, there is no evidence that Younger had any direct contact with complainant.
However, complainant’s absence from the scene does not preclude the possibility that Younger
tried to cause a third party to have contact with complainant. Defense counsel attempted to explain
to the trial court that she believed Younger “was indicating to [his wife] that their daughter needs
to—she needs to let their daughter know that—” before being cut off by the trial court. The trial
court also believed that “[t]here was a message that was being sent.” Thus, the trial court might
have found that Younger was attempting to transmit a message through his wife. But the evidence
only supports a finding that Younger might have intended to have indirect contact with his
daughter through a third party. Younger’s daughter is not identified as a protected individual
under prohibition (s). Thus, the trial court also clearly erred if it found that Younger violated
prohibition (s). On this record, the trial court clearly erred by finding that Younger violated the
no-contact order, and, because it crafted its 24-month minimum sentence partly on the basis of that
error, Younger’s revised sentence is invalid.
B. VINDICTIVENESS
Younger argues that his revised sentence was vindictive. We disagree.
If a defendant is resentenced by the original sentencing judge to a longer sentence for the
same crime, a presumption arises that the new sentence was vindictive. People v Mazzie, 429

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Mich 29, 35 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.), 37 (LEVIN and CAVANAGH, JJ., concurring); 413 NW2d 1
(1987). The presumption may be overcome if the trial court articulates reasons for the increase
and the increase bears “a reasonable relationship to the new information.” Id. at 35-37. An
increased sentence is not vindictive if the increase is based on an error by the trial court. People v
Lino, 213 Mich App 89, 99; 539 NW2d 545 (1995), overruled in part on other grounds by People
v Carson, 220 Mich App 662, 673-674; 560 NW2d 657 (1996).
Younger argues that because he did not actually violate the no-contact order or threaten
anyone, the trial court’s perception that he was not truly remorseful did not justify a higher
sentence, let alone a six-month increase. But Younger primarily takes issue with whether the trial
court was correct, which is irrelevant to whether the trial court’s sentence was vindictive. The trial
court at Younger’s original sentencing was concerned about Younger’s potential for rehabilitation
and deterrence, but it imposed a sentence of 18 months in large part because it chose to accept that
Younger was truly remorseful. The trial court articulated reasons for increasing Younger’s
sentence by reconsidering the sincerity of that remorse. Our Supreme Court has held that a
sentencing judge may consider whether a defendant testified falsely for purposes of assessing the
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. People v Adams, 430 Mich 679, 689, 693; 425 NW2d 437
(1988). While Younger did not testify, the trial court clearly believed that Younger was being
deceitful and manipulative, and Adams suggests that the trial court did not err by doubting
Younger’s potential for rehabilitation on the basis of his deceit. Additionally, the trial court’s
belief that Younger violated its no-contact order and threatened complainant would, if true, suggest
that Younger was indeed dangerous and that there was a greater need to protect society from him.
Irrespective of whether the trial court was correct, its articulated reasons for the increased sentence
are reasonably related to a six-month increase in his minimum sentence.
C. PROPORTIONALITY
Younger argues that a minimum sentence of 24 months is disproportionate because the trial
court’s reassessment of his remorsefulness did not justify “a higher sentence, let alone a one-third
increase” to the top of his guidelines range. But Younger fails to identify any unusual
circumstances that render his ultimate 24-month minimum sentence disproportionate. People v
Ventour, 349 Mich App 417, 430; 27 NW3d 660 (2023). This issue is therefore abandoned. In re
Conservatorship of Murray, 336 Mich App 234, 260-261; 970 NW2d 372 (2021).
III. PRIOR RECORD VARIABLES
Younger argues that the trial court erroneously scored PRV 1 at 25 points, which is
appropriate if “[t]he offender has 1 prior high severity felony conviction,” MCL 777.51(1)(c),
because none of his prior felonies are “high severity.” A “prior high severity felony conviction”
is defined as
a conviction for any of the following, if the conviction was entered before the
sentencing offense was committed:
(a) A crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, or D.

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(b) A felony under a law of the United States or another state corresponding
to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, or D.
(c) A felony that is not listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H
and that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more.
(d) A felony under a law of the United States or another state that does not
correspond to a crime listed in offense class M2, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, or H and that
is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more.
[MCL 777.51(2).]
Because Younger’s prior convictions were all from Arizona, one of them must satisfy either
MCL 777.51(2)(b) or (d) to be a high-severity felony conviction for purposes of PRV 1. Neither
Younger’s PSIR nor Younger’s publicly available record on the Arizona Department of
Corrections website3 identifies which Arizona statutes Younger violated, although both confirm
that he had at least four prior felonies, and the trial court did not specify which offense supported
PRV 1. Younger offers, for the first time on appeal, documentation purporting to identify the
statutes underlying at least some of those convictions, but parties generally may not expand the
record on appeal, People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 659 n 1; 862 NW2d 432 (2014), and the
trial court is better situated to address the factual question of what Younger’s offenses were, In re
Martin, 200 Mich App 703, 717-718; 504 NW2d 917 (1993). We therefore decline to consider
whether any of Younger’s prior felonies should be considered high severity.
We do, however, observe a discrepancy in Younger’s sentencing guidelines calculation.
Specifically, the trial court scored PRV 2 at 30 points, which is proper if “[t]he offender has 4 or
more prior low severity felony convictions.” MCL 777.52(1)(a). The Legislature intended to
distinguish between high-severity and low-severity felonies, People v Crews, 299 Mich App 381,
388-390; 829 NW2d 898 (2013), which implies that any particular felony may be scored under
only one of PRV 1 or PRV 2. Thus, for the trial court to have properly scored PRV 2 at 30 points
and scored PRV 1 at 25 points, Younger must have had at least five prior felony convictions.
Accordingly, irrespective of the severity of Younger’s offenses, the trial court appears to have
impermissibly double-counted one of them. Because the trial court’s decision to score PRV 1
at 25 points and PRV 2 at 30 points followed an off-the-record discussion, the record does not
reveal what information the trial court relied on or what factual findings it made. See In re Monier
Khalil Living Trust, 328 Mich App 151, 156; 936 NW2d 694 (2019) (the trial court conducted
proceedings “off the record, hampering our review”). This discrepancy should be corrected or
explained on the record on remand, when Younger may also present his challenge to whether any
of his prior convictions constituted high-severity felonies.
3 Arizona Corrections Database, Print Inmate Ronnie Younger,
< https://inmatedatasearch.azcorrections.gov/PrintInmate.aspx?ID=147713 > (accessed August 7,
2026).

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IV. REASSIGNMENT ON REMAND
Younger lastly requests reassignment to a different judge on remand. While the transcript
of the resentencing hearing reflects that the judge was upset by Younger’s perceived insincerity,
it also reflects that the judge was conscientious and dedicated to accuracy, including not only
correcting the court’s mistake as to Younger’s probation status but ensuring that all parties had an
opportunity to listen to the recording of Younger’s statement and verify whether the trial court
heard Younger correctly in the recording. The trial court gave Younger an opportunity to explain
himself, even if the trial court did not believe that explanation. Reassignment may be proper if the
sentencing judge expresses hostility, bias, and incredulity toward a defendant, People v Walker,
504 Mich 267, 286-287; 934 NW2d 727 (2019), but we find no reason on the record to believe
that the trial court would be unable to correct its own errors on remand. People v Dilling, 222
Mich App 44, 56; 564 NW2d 56 (1997). On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial judge
would have difficulty disregarding any predetermined conclusions, that reassignment would be
necessary to preserve the appearance of justice, or that reassignment would not entail a
disproportionate waste and duplication of effort. See People v Evans, 156 Mich App 68, 72; 401
NW2d 312 (1986). We therefore deny his request for reassignment on remand.
Younger’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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