COA 374676 SAVANNAH VICTORIA SHAW V MATTHEW BENJAMIN SHAW Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/16/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
SAVANNAH VICTORIA SHAW, also known as
SAVANNAH VICTORIA HART,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2025
11:21 AM
v No. 374676
Jackson Circuit Court
MATTHEW BENJAMIN SHAW, LC No. 2019-001496-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Savannah Victoria Shaw, also known as Savannah Victoria Hart, appeals of right
the trial court’s order awarding her and defendant, Matthew Benjamin Shaw, joint physical custody
of the parties’ minor child and denying plaintiff’s motion to change schools. On appeal, plaintiff
does not challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to change schools. Rather, she argues that
the trial court erred by awarding the parties joint physical custody, violated her right to due process
by relying on personal protection orders (PPOs) that were not admitted into evidence, improperly
weighed the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23, and erred in its credibility determinations.
Plaintiff also asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth
in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties were married in March 2013 and had one child together, BS. Plaintiff filed a
complaint for divorce in April 2019. In November 2019, the trial court entered a judgment of
divorce granting the parties joint legal custody of BS, granting plaintiff physical custody of the
child, and granting defendant reasonable and liberal parenting time as agreed upon by the parties.
When disputes about parenting time persisted, the trial court entered an order granting defendant
specific parenting time. In September 2022, the parties agreed to extend defendant’s parenting
time. Relevant to the instant appeal, because concerns had arisen that homeschooling the child
had resulted in academic and social deficiencies, the parties agreed to the immediate enrollment
of BS at Sharp Park Academy in Jackson, where both parties lived.

-- 1 of 9 --

-2-
In January 2023, plaintiff moved with BS and her daughter from a previous relationship to
Lake Orion to live with plaintiff’s boyfriend. In August 2024, plaintiff moved for a change in the
child’s domicile and a change in schools. Defendant opposed the motion and moved for a change
in custody, which plaintiff opposed. The competing motions proceeded to a two-day evidentiary
hearing.
At the hearing, plaintiff, acting in propria persona, acknowledged relocating BS to Lake
Orion schools would be more convenient, considering that she made the 90-minute to two-hour
trip from their home in Lake Orion to Sharp Park Academy at least four days a week. However,
her primary motivation was to have BS attend school in the community where he lived with
plaintiff, his half-sister, and plaintiff’s partner of nearly three years. Plaintiff also asserted that BS
expressed a preference for attending school in Lake Orion.
Plaintiff detailed her disputes with the Sharp Park Academy principal, BS’s third-grade
teacher, and the superintendent of Jackson Public Schools (JPS). Plaintiff filed a formal complaint
with the superintendent against Sharp Park Academy, and, dissatisfied with the outcome, plaintiff
posted several TikTok videos criticizing school personnel. Plaintiff also submitted a request under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., and received e-mails that she
interpreted as derogatory toward her and defendant. Plaintiff acknowledged that both the principal
and BS’s teacher had active PPOs against her, and she claimed that she was denied a hearing to
terminate the PPOs because of a concurrent show-cause motion. Plaintiff opposed increasing the
child’s overnight stays in Jackson and stated that she would consider relocating closer to reduce
the commute.
Defendant testified about his residence and home life. Defendant denied any domestic-
violence or health issues affecting his parenting, and he said that they did not follow any particular
religious observances at his home. Defendant believed that BS was strongly bonded to both
parents. Defendant advanced that his attendance at special school events was important to BS. He
acknowledged that it would be a struggle to participate as fully in such events if BS went to school
in Lake Orion, but defendant implied that he would “make it happen.” Defendant also testified
about his active involvement in BS’s education. He alleged that plaintiff obstructed BS’s
participation in school events when she knew defendant would be present. Defendant also
expressed concern about BS missing school weekly for allergy shots, which he believed were
nonessential. Defendant acknowledged that he and plaintiff disagreed about the severity of BS’s
allergies, and he noted that BS was not required to carry an EpiPen or an inhaler.
It was undisputed that BS was doing well academically and socially at Sharp Park
Academy. The principal testified that BS entered second-grade with a significant reading
deficiency. With additional instruction, BS was reading at grade level by the end of third grade.
The principal described BS as well-behaved and well-liked. She confirmed her PPO against
plaintiff and explained that she was compelled to obtain a PPO when plaintiff started making
personal attacks against the principal’s character in August 2024. BS’s teacher also described him
as attentive and well-behaved. BS’s teacher testified that interactions with defendant were
positive, but those with plaintiff were aggressive and persistent. BS’s teacher recounted that
plaintiff posted derogatory TikTok videos about her and threw papers at her at a school board
meeting. The latter incident led to a PPO request by BS’s teacher.

-- 2 of 9 --

-3-
After hearing oral argument and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court
determined that plaintiff’s voluntary move to Lake Orion in January 2023 constituted a change in
circumstances sufficient to revisit custody. Turning to the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23(a)
through (l), the court found that the parties were equal with respect to the following:
MCL 722.23(a) (love, affection, and other emotional ties); MCL 722.23(b) (capacity and
disposition of each party to give child love, affection guidance); MCL 722.23(c) (capacity and
disposition of the parties involved to meet the child’s material and medical needs); MCL 722.23(f)
(moral fitness); and MCL 722.23(k) (domestic violence). The court noted that it interviewed BS;
on the basis that interview, the court determined that MCL 722.23(i) (child’s preference) also
favored neither party.
The trial court found that the following factors favored defendant: MCL 722.23(d) (length
of time the children have lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity); MCL 722.23(e) (permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial homes), MCL 722.23(g) (mental and physical health of the parties), MCL 722.23(h)
(home, school, and community record of the child), MCL 722.23(j) (willingness and ability of
each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and
the other party). The court did not make any determinations under MCL 722.23(l) (any other
factors considered).
Considering these findings, the trial court concluded that defendant demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that a change in custody was warranted. Accordingly, the court awarded
the parties joint physical custody of the child, leaving undisturbed the parties’ joint legal custody.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to change schools and ordered week-on/week-off
parenting time as further specified in the order. The court additionally addressed holiday and
weekend parenting time, neither of which is relevant to the instant appeal. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On appeal, this Court must affirm all orders and judgments of the circuit court pertaining
to a child custody dispute “unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of
evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.”
MCL 722.28. “The great weight of the evidence applies to all findings of fact.” Vodvarka v
Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 507; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A trial court’s finding is against the great weight of the evidence when it is so contrary
to the weight of the evidence that it is unwarranted or is so plainly a miscarriage of justice that it
would warrant a new trial. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 878; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
“An abuse of discretion standard is applied to a trial court’s discretionary rulings such as
custody decisions.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 507 (quotation marks and citation omitted). With
respect to custody issues, a palpable abuse of discretion exists “when the trial court’s decision is
so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance
of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747
NW2d 336 (2008).
“Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Clear legal error occurs when the trial court incorrectly

-- 3 of 9 --

-4-
chooses, interprets, or applies the law.” Brown v Brown, 332 Mich App 1, 9; 955 NW2d 515
(2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts, Kaeb v Kaeb, 309 Mich App 556, 564; 873 NW2d 319 (2015),
and “gives deference to the trial court’s factual judgments and special deference to the trial court’s
credibility assessments,” Brown, 332 Mich App at 8. “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d
567 (2010).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises several related issues regarding the trial court’s custody decision. She first
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her evidence of defendant’s medical
neglect of the child, particularly with respect to the child’s allergies. She then contends that the
exclusion of this evidence contributed to the trial court’s failure to properly assess and weigh best-
interest Factors (b), (c), (d), (h), and (j). These errors led in turn to an erroneous award of joint
physical custody to the parties. We find no error that requires reversal of the trial court’s order.
Before modifying a custody or parenting-time order, a trial court must first consider
whether the moving party has shown by a preponderance of the evidence a proper cause or change
of circumstances sufficient. Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508-509. Once that threshold showing
has been made, the court must next consider the child’s established custodial environment.
Barretta v Zhikov, 348 Mich App 539, 552; 19 NW3d 420 (2023). If an established custodial
environment exists, then a trial court may not modify its previous judgments or orders so as to
change that established custodial environment unless presented with clear and convincing evidence
that the proposed order is in the child’s best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c). Evidence is clear and
convincing if it is “so clear, direct, and weighty” that the fact-finder can “come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re ASF, 311 Mich App
420, 429, 876 NW2d 253 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If no established custodial
environment exists, then “the trial court may change custody if it finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the change would be in the child’s best interests.” Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich App
110, 119; 916 NW2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not dispute the trial court’s finding of proper cause or a change in
circumstances or that defendant, as the moving party, had to present clear and convincing evidence
before the trial court could modify the governing custody order. She also does not challenge the
trial court’s findings with respect to Factors (a), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (k).
A. EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
Plaintiff first implies that the trial court erred by excluding documentary evidence that she
alleges demonstrates defendant’s repeated failure to follow BS’s allergy-care regime. The
evidence to which plaintiff refers includes letters from BS’s allergists stating that the child needed
weekly allergy shots, medical records, and an e-mail from plaintiff to defendant asking why he did
not inform her that BS got sick on an outing. The record shows that the trial court properly
excluded the letters and medical records because they were hearsay and plaintiff failed to establish
a foundation for their admission. See MRE 801(c); MRE 802; MRE 803(6). As to the e-mail, it
is not clear from the record that plaintiff attempted to enter the e-mail into evidence. Plaintiff

-- 4 of 9 --

-5-
cross-examined defendant about the substance of the e-mail, then, after coming back from a short
break in the proceeding, plaintiff turned her attention to another e-mail that she sent defendant
about the same incident. Plaintiff admitted the latter e-mail into evidence. Given this record, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence for which no foundation
had been laid and evidence that had not actually been submitted for admission. A trial court’s
best-interest analysis must rest on admissible evidence. See Brugel v Hildebrant, 332 Mich 475,
484; 52 NW2d 190 (1952); see also Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 532; 476 NW2d 439 (1991).
B. BEST INTERESTS
Plaintiff next argues that, because the trial court did not explicitly address certain evidence
favorable to her, the trial court’s analysis of Factors (b), (c), (d), (h), and (j), was inadequate and
its findings lacked evidentiary support. We disagree.
A trial court must explicitly address each of the statutory best-interest factors in a child
custody case, making specific findings and conclusions for each. Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273
Mich App 462, 475; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). Although the court is not required to discuss every
piece of evidence or argument in detail, Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 583; 309 NW2d 532 (1981),
“the record must be sufficient for this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly
preponderates against the trial court’s findings,” MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich
App 449, 452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). In the present case, the trial court’s findings under best-
interest Factors (b), (c), (d), (h), and (j) are sufficient to allow appellate review and are supported
by the evidence.
MCL 722.23(b) assesses the parties’ capacity and disposition “to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion
or creed, if any.” MCL 722.23(c) considers, in relevant part, “[t]he capacity and disposition of the
parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care . . . and other material
needs.” The trial court found the parties equal with respect to these factors. Under
MCL 722.23(b), the trial court found that both parties “share[d] a dedicated interest” in BS’s
education; both had the capacity and disposition to give BS love, affection, and guidance; and
neither was involved in an established religion. Under MCL 722.23(c), the trial court found that
both parties were “employed and able to provide BS with food, clothing, medical care, and material
needs.”
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing showed that defendant was familiar with BS’s sore-
throat issues and allergy treatment, investigated the availability of “take-away” allergy dosages,
and sought medical attention when BS became sick while on vacation. This testimony, if deemed
credible, established that defendant was attentive to BS’s basic medical needs. Although plaintiff
presented evidence that she and defendant disagreed on the severity of BS’s allergies and illnesses
and how they should be treated, and defendant admitted as much, plaintiff’s evidence did not
indicate that defendant lacked the capacity and disposition to meet BS’s basic medical needs and
to provide BS with the care necessary, even if it was not the care that plaintiff would have
preferred. The trial court’s finding under Factor (c) suggests that the court credited defendant’s
testimony, and plaintiff has given this Court no reason to disregard the trial court’s implied
credibility assessment. See Brown, 332 Mich App at 9. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff
has not established that the trial court’s findings under MCL 722.23 (b) and (c) that both parties

-- 5 of 9 --

-6-
were equal in their capacities and dispositions to give BS “love, affection, and guidance,” and to
provide him “with food, clothing, medical care . . . and other material needs” were against the great
weight of the evidence. See Fletcher, 447 Mich at 878.
MCL 722.23(d) considers the “length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” The trial court’s finding that this
factor favored defendant is additionally not against the great weight of the evidence. See
Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 507. Defendant testified at length about the stability and quality of
the home and neighborhood environment that BS experienced in Jackson. He supported his
testimony with numerous photographs showing his and his fiancée’s home, BS’s room, and that
defendant and BS engaged in recreational activities. Defendant’s fiancée interacted well with BS
and helped defendant provide BS with artistic and educational opportunities. Defendant testified
about his and his fiancée’s interactions with the large extended families that each had in the area,
the safety of the neighborhood in which they lived, and BS’s circle of neighborhood friends. By
contrast, plaintiff testified that she lived in several residences since BS’s birth, including one
residence in Lansing. Plaintiff moved to Lake Orion in January 2023, where she, BS, and
plaintiff’s daughter lived in a house owned by her boyfriend, plaintiff’s third serious partner during
BS’s lifetime. Apart from having been together with her boyfriend for nearly three years, there is
no record evidence about the stability or nature of BS’s life in Lake Orion. Under the facts
presented in this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that Factor (d) favored
defendant was against the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not consider her longstanding role as BS’s primary
care provider and her consistent involvement in BS’s schooling and housing. It is true that
plaintiff’s role as BS’s primary caregiver provided a measure of stability to BS’s environment.
However, given that the parties shared joint legal custody and agreed that BS would attend Sharp
Park Academy, plaintiff’s move to Lake Orion disrupted BS’s environment to the extent that it
required a lengthy commute to and from school most days of the week and prevented him from
engaging fully in either community. Plaintiff acknowledged that the arrangement was deficient.
Further, although plaintiff was involved in BS’s schooling, an unsatisfactory environment was
created by plaintiff’s behavior toward school personnel and JPS. See Quint v Quint, ___ Mich
App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368002); slip op at 6. Notwithstanding her role
as BS’s primary caregiver, plaintiff provided no evidence that BS had lived with her in a “stable,
satisfactory environment” for an appreciable length of time. Given the foregoing, plaintiff has not
established that the trial court’s finding that MCL 722.23(d) favored defendant was against the
great weight of the evidence.
MCL 722.23(h) assesses the child’s “home, school, and community record.” This Court
has affirmed a trial court’s finding that Factor (h) favored both parties when a child was doing well
academically, both parties helped the child with homework, and the parties supported the school
environment. See Kuebler v Kuebler, 346 Mich App 633, 684-685; 13 NW2d 339 (2023). In the
present case, it was undisputed that BS was doing well academically and socially at Sharp Park
Academy, and both parties testified that they helped him with homework. Further, defendant
supported BS’s school environment at Sharp Park Academy, and his interactions with the staff
were reported as appropriate. However, plaintiff did not support the school environment. She
believed that the principal, BS’s teacher, and the JPS superintendent made derogatory comments
about her, and school personnel saw her interactions as aggressive and intimidating. Although BS

-- 6 of 9 --

-7-
was doing well at Sharp Park Academy and both parents were interested in his education, given
the environment created by plaintiff’s behavior toward school personnel, we cannot say that the
trial court’s finding that this factor favored defendant was against the great weight of the record
evidence.
Lastly, MCL 722.23(j) examines “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent . . . .” Plaintiff’s insistence that BS stay with her when he was sick rather than go to
parenting time with defendant, tracking BS with an air tag while he was on vacation with
defendant, and interjecting herself into defendant’s effort to get the child medical care while on
vacation arguably signaled to the child that defendant was unable to provide him with adequate
care. In addition, taking BS out of school when defendant was scheduled to attend a field day
belied plaintiff’s willingness to “facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship” between defendant and BS.
Plaintiff contends that Factor (j) should have favored her because of defendant’s
unwillingness to coordinate with her. In support of her argument, plaintiff relies on three messages
that were not part of the lower court record and which plaintiff did not properly attempt to admit
at the evidentiary hearing and which we decline to consider on appeal. See Lamkin v Engram, 295
Mich App 701, 702 n 2; 815 NW2d 793 (2012). Although it does not appear that plaintiff sought
to admit the messages during the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony about the
content of the messages nonetheless. Defendant admitted that he did not timely turn in his
preferred summer parenting-time dates for two years in a row, and he acknowledged that plaintiff
signed up BS for summer soccer and basketball in Lake Orion. Under the facts presented in this
record, the trial court’s finding that Factor (j) favored defendant was not against the great weight
of the evidence.
C. CREDIBILITY
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overlooking evidence of
retaliation and bias in the testimonies of the principal and BS’s teacher. We disagree.
We typically give special deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments. Brown, 332
Mich App at 8. We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court on issues of
credibility unless the record demonstrates that the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite
direction, if there is a palpable abuse of discretion, or if there is clear legal error. See Bowers v
Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 324; 497 NW2d 602 (1993). The basis of plaintiff’s claim of bias is
her interpretation of various e-mails that she received as a result of her FOIA request. The trial
court in the present case did not make express findings regarding the credibility of the principal
and BS’s teacher. However, a fair reading of the e-mails that plaintiff had the principal and BS’s
teacher read into evidence do not support plaintiff’s assertion that these two witnesses said
derogatory things about her or engaged in retaliation against her.
Plaintiff complains in her brief to this Court that the trial court allowed the principal’s and
BS’s teacher’s testimonies but excluded plaintiff’s “FOIA and complaint-related documentation.”
However, some of the e-mails that plaintiff asserts were excluded were, in fact, admitted into
evidence. Plaintiff (1) testified extensively that she was the victim of retaliation, (2) called a

-- 7 of 9 --

-8-
witness who opined that JPS had treated plaintiff unfairly, (3) had opportunities to cross-examine
the principal and BS’s teacher regarding their alleged bias, and (4) admitted into evidence certain
e-mails that she implied proved the educators’ bias. Accordingly, the issue of bias was squarely
before the trial court. The trial court was in a position to judge the credibility of the witnesses
before it in light of the documentary evidence that plaintiff relied upon to establish bias, and the
trial court impliedly rejected plaintiff’s interpretation of the e-mails as support for her claim that
the principal and BS’s teacher were actively retaliating against her, and, therefore, that their
testimony could not be considered credible. We defer to the trial court’s implied credibility
assessment. See Brown, 332 Mich App at 8.
D. REMAINING ISSUES
Plaintiff raises two additional arguments, neither of which have merit. She argues that the
trial court relied on extrajudicial materials created by nonparties and not subject to cross-
examination when it explicitly cited PPOs obtained by the principal and BS’s teacher as
justification for altering custody. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the trial court did not rely on or
cite the PPOs. The trial court indicated in its analysis of MCL 722.23(g) (mental and physical
health of the parties) that plaintiff’s admitted mental-health challenges may have factored into her
actions toward these educators, which resulted in PPOs being issued against plaintiff in 2024. The
focus of the trial court’s observation was plaintiff’s actions. Both the principal and BS’s teacher
testified about plaintiff’s behavior that caused them to obtain the PPOs, and plaintiff cross-
examined both witnesses.
Next, plaintiff contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel from her
retained counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may arise in child protective
proceedings or cases involving the termination of parental rights. See In re Casto, 344 Mich App
590; 2 NW3d 102 (2022); In re AMB, 248 Mich App 144; 640 NW2d 262 (2001). However,
neither this Court, nor the Michigan Supreme Court, has extended this constitutional protection to
custody cases such as the one at issue. See Haller v Haller, 168 Mich App 198, 199; 423 NW2d
617 (1988)1 (ruling that while child custody proceedings are “sufficiently complex to require
counsel, this factor alone is insufficient to give rise to a due process right to appointed counsel”
considering “a custody decree does not constitute a complete termination of the parental bond,”
“the element of finality of obligation . . . is not present in a custody proceeding,” and, “[a] decree
is only effective until the minor attains the age of majority”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that plaintiff has not shown that the trial court’s
findings were against the great weight of the evidence, see Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 507; that
the court’s discretionary rulings were palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic, see Berger,
1 “Although published decisions of this Court issued prior to November 1, 1990, are not strictly
binding upon us, all published decisions of this Court are precedential under the rule of stare decisis
and generally should be followed.” Stoudemire v Thomas, 344 Mich App 34, 41 n 2; 999 NW2d
43 (2022).

-- 8 of 9 --

-9-
277 Mich App at 705; or constituted clear legal error, see Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508;
MCR 2.613. Therefore, we are compelled to affirm the trial court’s order granting the parties joint
physical custody. See MCL 722.28.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

-- 9 of 9 --