COA 374282 HOLLY CYNTHIA THOMAS V BRADLEY EDWARD THOMAS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
HOLLY CYNTHIA THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2026
2:01 PM
v No. 374282
Van Buren Circuit Court
BRADLEY EDWARD THOMAS, LC No. 2020-070131-DM
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this custody action, following remand from this Court,1 the trial court awarded the
parties joint legal and physical custody of the children. Defendant appeals of right the order
denying his motion to change legal and physical custody. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and defendant share four children: JT, BT, UT, and ST. Plaintiff filed for divorce
in June 2020. In February 2022, the trial court entered a stipulated order regarding custody and
parenting time, in which the parties would share joint legal and physical custody. The order was
to be incorporated into the judgment of divorce. By November 2022, the judgment of divorce had
not yet been entered, however, and defendant moved to modify custody and parenting time.
Defendant requested sole legal and physical custody. Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant’s
motion, and a hearing began on the motions in February 2023. During an April 2023 hearing,
however, the trial court dismissed defendant’s motion to modify custody. Afterward, the trial court
entered the judgment of divorce, granting the parties joint legal and physical custody.
Defendant appealed the judgment of divorce, and the trial court’s orders for spousal support
and child support. This Court held, in relevant part, that the trial court erred by dismissing
1 Thomas v Thomas, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 22,
2024 (Docket No. 366112).

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defendant’s motion for a change of custody without notice and without addressing the merits of
the motion. Thomas v Thomas, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
February 22, 2024 (Docket No. 366112). In doing so, the panel held that “[t]he trial court’s failure
to make best interest findings when it was clearly apparent there was a continuing dispute over the
proper custody for the children was a clear legal error,” vacated the trial court’s custody order, and
remanded for a best-interest hearing. Id. at 4.
On remand, the trial court held several days of evidentiary hearings to address custody,
parenting time, and the children’s best interests. Various witnesses testified, including the
middle/high school principal; an employee of the before-and-after school enrichment program that
the children attended during defendant’s parenting time; a Children’s Protective Services (CPS)
investigator; the office manager of an eye doctor’s office; defendant’s girlfriend, Tiana Compton;
ST’s second-grade teacher; a medical social worker; the school resource officer; JT; Dr. Kimberly
Lem; a paraprofessional and coach at the elementary school; UT’s fourth-grade teacher; two of
plaintiff’s friends; defendant; and plaintiff.
The trial court found that the children had established custodial environments with both
parents, and after addressing the best-interest factors of MCL 722.23 and the parenting-time
factors of MCL 722.27a, ordered joint legal and physical custody between the parties.
II. ANALYSIS
A. REMAND
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to follow the remand instructions.
We review de novo as a question of law whether a trial court followed an appellate court’s ruling
on remand. Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 275 Mich App 121, 127; 737 NW2d 782
(2007). We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and review de novo the trial
court’s conclusions of law. Id.
A trial court must strictly comply with an appellate court’s mandate on remand. Rodriguez
v Gen Motors Corp (On Remand), 204 Mich App 509, 514; 516 NW2d 105 (1994). When an
appellate court remands a child custody matter, the trial court “should consider up-to-date
information.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). The trial court
may conduct the hearings or proceedings that are necessary for it to make accurate determinations
about the child’s best interests. Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 468-469; 547 NW2d 686 (1996).
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court properly complied with the remand order.
Our prior opinion remanded this matter for the trial court to hold a hearing to consider the
children’s best interests in relation to defendant’s motion. Thomas, unpub op at 4. The trial court
complied with this mandate, as it held an evidentiary hearing and then resolved defendant’s
motion. Nothing more was required of the court to comply with this Court’s remand directive.
Defendant’s arguments about the correctness of the trial court’s decision, or it’s perceived

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reluctance to decide the motion, are not remotely relevant to whether the court complied with the
remand order.2
B. BEST INTERESTS
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in its findings under almost all of the best-
interest factors, as well as in its ultimate custody determination.
“To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all
orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made
findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion
or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28. Consistent with this directive, we will affirm
the trial court’s factual findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction.
Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519-520; 823 NW2d 153 (2012). A trial court abuses its
discretion in a custody dispute when its “decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and
logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or
bias.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). Finally, we review
de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. Kaeb v Kaeb, 309 Mich App 556, 564;
873 NW2d 319 (2015).
In all custody disputes, the trial court’s custody determinations must be made on the basis
of the child’s best interests. See Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).
The trial court found that the children had an established custodial environment with both parents,
which is permissible. Berger, 277 Mich App at 707. A trial court may not modify a child’s
established custodial environment unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the change is
in that child’s best interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c). To determine the custody arrangement that is in
a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider the factors outlined in MCL 722.23. See
Bofysil v Bofysil, 332 Mich App 232, 244; 956 NW2d 544 (2020).
First, the trial court’s determination that Factor (a) was equal was not against the great
weight of the evidence. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary represent more of a highlighting
of the parenting differences that the trial court also observed, rather than a direct attack on the
Factor (a) criteria. In fact, defendant acknowledges that the children and plaintiff love each other,
2 For example, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing, in its decision, to refer to
certain parts of defendant’s evidence, such as JT’s testimony about plaintiff coaching him, and a
counselor’s testimony about certain behavioral issues. However, a trial court is not required to
comment on every piece of evidence, Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 583; 309 NW2d 532 (1981),
and again, the substantive correctness of the trial court’s ruling does not impact whether it
complied with the remand order. And, in any event, the trial court acknowledged JT’s testimony
and questioned why JT’s opinions about his parents changed throughout the case. The trial court
was in the best position to judge JT’s credibility. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d
111 (2011).

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and the issues that he raises under this factor, such as plaintiff’s smoking and their difficulty
coparenting, do not detract from the emotional ties that this factor contemplates.
Likewise, it was not against the great weight of the evidence to weigh equally Factor (b).
Specifically, defendant objects to the trial court’s failure to rely on counselor Cricket Alexander’s
testimony. The trial court, however, had the opportunity to hear from the parties, as well as
additional witnesses, who provided evidence of more recent events than what was contained in
Alexander’s testimony. It was the role of the trial court to determine credibility and weigh the
evidence. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33. Although defendant argues that plaintiff lacked
the capacity and disposition to provide the children with guidance, the record also demonstrated
that plaintiff was affectionate with the children and was involved in their education and
extracurriculars.
Next, the trial court’s finding that Factor (c) weighed equally was not against the great
weight of the evidence. It is true, as defendant argues, that defendant financially supported the
children throughout their lives. There was no evidence, however, that plaintiff could not provide
for the children. Plaintiff had stayed home with the children before the divorce and began to work
part-time after the separation. And although JT testified that plaintiff did not cook for the children,
the trial court was not required to accept JT’s testimony, as plaintiff testified that she provided
food for the children, took the children to appointments, and had them shower and brush their
teeth. Further, it was not irrefutably established that ST’s dental issues were the result of
negligence by plaintiff. In the end, there was sufficient evidence in the record such that the trial
court’s findings on Factor (c) were not against the great weight of the evidence.
It was also not against the great weight of the evidence for the trial court to weigh equally
Factor (d). The children had always lived in the home in which they lived with plaintiff. Since
defendant moved out, the children also consistently lived with him. Defendant’s family lived near
him, while plaintiff’s parents did not live near her, but the record also demonstrates that plaintiff’s
older son lived nearby. Further, the children consistently had friends over to plaintiff’s home, and
plaintiff had farm animals with whom the children engaged. Defendant relies significantly on JT’s
testimony as evidence that plaintiff’s home was inappropriate, but JT had also chosen to move out
of defendant’s home and stop communicating with him for a significant period. Again, it is the
trial court, not this Court, that gauges credibility, which then impacts the weight given to the
evidence.
The defendant also challenges the trial court’s findings under Factor (f). The record
demonstrated that defendant operated his business and had positive interactions with mental-health
professionals, CPS, and school officials. Counselor Alexander testified that defendant was stricter
than plaintiff was and that the children were better behaved with him. Plaintiff did not dispute that
the children engaged in concerning behavior like swearing and threatening defendant, or that she
encouraged JT to post negative statements about defendant online. Further, it was undisputed that
when with plaintiff JT, UT, and BT wore shirts with inappropriate messages. JT also testified that
plaintiff attempted to drive with him while intoxicated. Despite this concerning evidence, there
was no evidence that either party had substance-abuse issues that impacted their relationships with
their children. Plaintiff testified that her “No Brad Rule” was intended to keep the children from
speaking negatively about defendant throughout her parenting time. Although, as defendant
argues, even the fact that the rule uses defendant’s first name rather than “dad” raises a question

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about the purported positive intent of the rule, plaintiff was employed at the children’s school, and
other witnesses testified positively about her and her interactions with the children, and about her
trying to correct the children’s inappropriate language. Considering the trial court’s better position
from which to weigh the evidence, the evidence on this factor did not clearly preponderate in the
opposite direction. See Mitchell, 296 Mich App at 519-520.
Next, the trial court did not err by weighing equally Factor (g). Defendant argues that the
trial court did not, but should have, relied on Dr. Lem’s findings about plaintiff’s personality or
counselor Alexander’s testimony. However, the trial court heard plaintiff testify, and there was
not conclusive evidence that she had a mental-health issue that affected her ability to parent. As
plaintiff argues, Dr. Lem’s reports that defendant now claims demonstrate plaintiff’s mental-health
issues, came before the parties agreed to joint custody. Finally, there was no evidence that either
party had physical health issues.
Likewise, the trial court’s determination that Factor (h) weighed equally was not against
the great weight of the evidence. The record demonstrated that both parents communicated with
the school and attended conferences and sporting events. Plaintiff also worked in the children’s
school, and defendant engaged the children in a before-and-after school program, which seemed
to be a positive experience for the children. Although defendant relies on the principal’s testimony
to argue that defendant held the children accountable while plaintiff justified their actions, the
record demonstrates that the children had various struggles, including mental-health concerns.
Defendant has not established that plaintiff’s attempt to understand the children’s struggles was
negative. The children appeared to have more absences when with plaintiff, but plaintiff also
testified about the children being ill and going to the dentist, which was a significant distance
away. Although there is a potential, as defendant argues, that plaintiff upset BT to the point that
he ran from the school and resisted going to defendant’s house, the record does not conclusively
demonstrate that plaintiff tried to interfere with defendant’s parenting time or otherwise disrupt
BT’s experience at school, or that plaintiff caused BT to post the photograph of the toy gun that
resulted in a school threat assessment. Finally, defendant argues that the children were overtired
when they returned from plaintiff’s house, but ST’s teacher testified that she could not see a
difference in ST on the basis of whose week of parenting time it was. Again, the conflicting
evidence required the trial court to determine which evidence to believe and weigh accordingly.
Nor was it against the great weight of the evidence for the trial court to weigh equally
Factor (j). The record demonstrated that plaintiff had a “No Brad Rule,” but the trial court found
that this rule was intended to prevent the children from complaining about defendant during their
time with plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that she regularly updated the Our Family Wizard app with
appointments and ensured that the children made their Thursday phone calls to defendant, but that
defendant regularly failed to give her appropriate notice of appointments. The trial court found
that both parties alleged that the other party failed to properly facilitate the phone calls. Defendant
testified that he encouraged the children to speak respectfully of plaintiff, which his girlfriend
Compton confirmed. Plaintiff also testified that she encouraged the children to show defendant
respect. Most concerning are the comments that BT made about killing defendant, without
plaintiff correcting him. Defendant also raises the issue of plaintiff taking BT and ST to get their
ears pierced, even after defendant told her that he disagreed with her decision to allow JT to get
his ears pierced. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, however, see

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Shann v Shann, 293 Mich App 302, 305; 809 NW2d 435 (2011), the evidence does not clearly
preponderate against the trial court’s findings under Factor (j).
The trial court, under Factor (i), twice met with the children, and the trial court stated that
it considered the children’s preferences.
Although defendant argues that, under Factor (l), the trial court only relied on the fact that
JT testified instead of considering the details of JT’s testimony or other evidence that defendant
presented, the record demonstrates that the trial court properly weighed the children’s best interests
and did not abuse its discretion by awarding joint physical custody. Further, even if the trial court
erred by weighing equally Factors (f) and (j), a trial court’s best-interest determination is not a
mathematical weighing of the factors, see Berger, 277 Mich App at 712, and the record does not
demonstrate that the trial court’s ultimate determination was an abuse of discretion.
C. LEGAL CUSTODY
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by awarding joint legal custody. Though
we recognize that this is a closer question, given the standards of review, we reject the argument
that reversal is warranted.
Joint legal custody means that parents share decision-making authority for the important
decisions affecting the child’s welfare. Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 80; 900 NW2d 130
(2017). See also MCL 722.26a(7)(b). MCL 722.26a(1) provides that, when a trial court is
determining whether joint custody is in a child’s best interests, in addition to considering
MCL 722.23, the trial court is to consider “[w]hether the parents will be able to cooperate and
generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.”
MCL 722.26a(1)(b). To share joint legal custody, “parents must be able to agree with each other
on basic issues in child rearing—including health care, religion, education, day to day decision-
making and discipline—and they must be willing to cooperate with each other in joint decision-
making.” Bofysil, 332 Mich App at 249 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If two equally
capable parents are unable to cooperate regarding important decisions that involve the welfare of
their children, then the trial court must determine which parent will have sole custody. Id.
The trial court found that, although the parties had a history of difficulties agreeing on
certain issues affecting the children, “they seem to be able to work those out generally.” The court
noted, when discussing the best interest factors, that despite some communication issues the parties
were not out to sabotage each other, and as the children get older, it may be easier for the issues
surrounding appointments to be worked out. In addition, the court offered its availability if the
parties could not agree on certain matters.
We recognize that there is record evidence supporting each view on this issue. The record
shows many instances of the parties moving the trial court to resolve disagreements between the
parties on such things as medical appointments and certain medical care. On the other hand, those
disagreements did not generally harm the children, as they have fared well in school and are
otherwise in good health. And, as the trial court noted, the children are older and perhaps will
have fewer issues to address, and the trial court was still available should the parents reach an
impasse. Because this Court should affirm trial court custody orders to promote “prompt and final

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adjudication,” MCL 722.28, and because the trial court was aware of the parties and their issues
since 2020, and was best able to gauge the evidence on this issue, we cannot disturb the court’s
ruling as to legal custody.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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