COA 372894 LEO PELLOT V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/12/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
LEO PELLOT, Individually and as Next Friend of
AKP, Minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2025
9:59 AM
v No. 372894
Wayne Circuit Court
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
LC No. 23-004629-NF
Defendant-Appellee,
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY, MICHIGAN
ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, and CURRENTLY
UNNAMED ASSIGNEE OF THE MICHIGAN
ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN,
Defendants.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Leo Pellot was injured in an accident and seeks no-fault benefits from his one-
time insurer, defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Defendant maintains
that it canceled the policy before the accident occurred and that no coverage was in effect at that
time. Because defendant did not notify plaintiff of that cancellation by mailing a written notice to
the address last known to defendant, as required by MCL 500.3020, our caselaw holds that the
cancellation was ineffective. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

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I. FACTS
On June 21, 2022, defendant issued plaintiff a renewal of his auto insurance effective
July 14 of that year. At the time, plaintiff was living in Grand Rapids, but he testified that he
moved to Wyoming that summer and arranged to have his mail forwarded to his new residence.
In August, plaintiff contacted the office of his insurance agent, Kevin Curtis, and submitted an
address change listing a residence on Whiting Street in Wyoming. According to Curtis, State
Farm’s corporate office takes three to four weeks to process address changes.
Meanwhile, plaintiff was having difficulty making timely payments. His payment due
July 20 was not made until August 11, and his August 20 payment was made on August 30. He
never made the required September 20 payment. On September 27, defendant mailed a
cancellation notice to plaintiff’s Grand Rapids address, warning that the policy would be canceled
on October 12 if he did not pay. Curtis testified that text messages were sent to plaintiff on
October 4 and 11 warning him that his policy was about to be canceled if he did not make a
payment, although plaintiff testified that he never received these messages. Defendant’s attorney
also represented to the trial court that the mailed cancellation notice was never returned to
defendant as undeliverable. Plaintiff made no further payment, and defendant considered his
policy as canceled.
On November 30, 2022, plaintiff and his daughter were in a serious car accident in
Wyoming. In April 2023, plaintiff filed suit—on his own behalf and as next friend of his
daughter—in two courts. In Kent Circuit Court, he sued defendant and the driver who hit him,
seeking third-party noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(1) from the driver and
uninsured/underinsured-motorist benefits from defendant. In the instant case, filed in Wayne
Circuit Court, he sought PIP benefits from defendant. In September 2023, the Kent Circuit Court
granted summary disposition to defendant “as a result of the underlying claimants . . . having failed
to issue payment for the insurance premiums for the policy at issue and Defendant having cancelled
said policy resulting in Plaintiffs not having a policy of insurance with Defendant.” The case
against the other driver remained ongoing.
In the Wayne Circuit Court proceedings, defendant moved for summary disposition, which
the trial court denied to allow discovery. After discovery, defendant renewed its motion for
summary disposition in April 2024, arguing that the policy had been canceled and that the Kent
Circuit Court decision constituted “law of the case” or otherwise collaterally estopped plaintiff
from maintaining his claims against defendant. Plaintiff’s response to the motion did not address
collateral estoppel but argued that defendant failed to mail the cancellation notice to his last known
address. The trial court emphasized that plaintiff knew that he had not paid his premiums and
should have expected that his policy would be canceled. The court was also persuaded by
defendant’s argument that plaintiff had agreed to communicate electronically and therefore had
notice that his policy was on the verge of cancellation. It granted defendant summary disposition,
and this appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Defendant moved for summary

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disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), under which the court considers deposition testimony and
other documentary evidence, and may grant the motion if that evidence “show[s] that there is no
genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). This
case also concerns the proper interpretation of MCL 500.3020, and we review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. Ford Motor Co v Woodhaven, 475 Mich 425, 438; 716 NW2d
247 (2006).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the cancellation that defendant issued was ineffective because it did
not comply with MCL 500.3020. We agree.
Under MCL 500.3020(1), “[a] policy of casualty insurance, . . . including all classes of
motor vehicle coverage, shall not be issued or delivered in this state” unless it contains certain
provisions. One such provision is that “the policy may be canceled at any time by the insurer by
mailing to the insured at the insured’s address last known to the insurer or an authorized agent of
the insurer . . . a not less than 10 days’ written notice of cancellation.” MCL 500.3020(1)(b). By
its text, then, the statute requires that all car insurance policies provide that they can be canceled
if the insurer mails to the insured at the address last known to either the insurer or the insurer’s
agent a 10-day notice of cancellation.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that this requirement was not satisfied.
Defendant’s internal logbook entry that plaintiff produced at Curtis’s deposition shows that on
August 24, 2022, plaintiff’s address on file was updated to his Wyoming residence. As a result,
the address last known to either defendant or its authorized agent (Curtis) was plaintiff’s Wyoming
address. Nevertheless, the September 27 cancellation notice was mailed to his former Grand
Rapids residence. The question, then, is what effect this noncompliant notice has on the case.
The issue is controlled by Causin v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211 Mich App 369; 536 NW2d
247 (1995). There, the plaintiff fell behind on premium payments. On July 8, 1988, the insurer’s
Dearborn office generated a cancellation notice, but that same day the plaintiff submitted a change-
of-address form to the insurer’s Flint office. The Dearborn office mailed the cancellation notice
to the plaintiff’s former address on July 11. Although the plaintiff later obtained actual notice of
the cancellation, this Court held that the mailing was defective and the cancellation ineffective.
Id. at 372-373. The Court explained that “[t]he statute plainly indicates that the insurer is obliged
to mail the notice of cancellation to the most current address known to either the insurer or its
authorized agent” and that “defects in mailing are not cured by the insured’s receipt of the
cancellation notice.” Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Defendant’s records reflected plaintiff’s new address
when the cancellation notice was mailed. The fact that it may have taken several weeks for
corporate processing is immaterial; Causin held that once the insurer or its agent has knowledge
of a new address, subsequent mailings to the former address do not satisfy the statute. Indeed, the
facts here are even less favorable to defendant than in Causin, where the insurer’s error could be
attributed to pre-Internet mail delays. Nor does it matter whether plaintiff received actual notice
of cancellation or “should have” realized that nonpayment would result in termination. Under

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Causin, a defective mailing renders the cancellation ineffective per se, regardless of receipt or
foreseeability.
Defendant contends that the parties mutually agreed to electronic communications,
including text-message notices, and that nothing in MCL 500.3020 expressly prohibits such an
arrangement. We disagree. The statute provides that a policy “shall not be issued or delivered in
this state” unless it contains the mailing provision. If the parties could later contract around this
requirement, they would, in effect, create a new insurance policy that omits a term the Legislature
has deemed mandatory. Because “it is to be presumed that the parties contracted with the intention
of executing a policy satisfying the statutory requirements,” the policy is read “as though the
statutes were a part of the contract.” Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 525 n 3;
502 NW2d 310 (1993). The mailing requirement is therefore an unalterable term of the insurance
policy.
Finally, defendant renews its argument that plaintiff should be collaterally estopped from
maintaining these claims based on the Kent Circuit Court’s earlier summary disposition ruling and
offers this as an alternative basis for affirmance. Although this issue was raised in the trial court
and is therefore nominally preserved for our review, see Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich
App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020), we decline to resolve it at this juncture. Under the test set
forth in Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 & n 2; 677 NW2d 843 (2004),
collateral estoppel is a fact-intensive inquiry involving several essentially equitable considerations.
While it is unclear why plaintiff pursued parallel actions in two different judicial circuits arising
from the same accident against the same defendant, it is equally unclear why defendant failed to
raise this procedural irregularity earlier or whether the Kent Circuit Court’s interlocutory dismissal
of defendant constituted a “valid and final judgment” under Monat. Our decision does not preclude
defendant from renewing this argument in the trial court and, in doing so, more fully developing
the underlying factual record.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Anica Letica

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