COA 374103 PEOPLE OF MI V CHAD PATRICK WINTERS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 09, 2026
12:00 PM
V No. 374103
Marquette Circuit Court
CHAD PATRICK WINTERS, LC No. 2023-063116-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of assault with intent to
commit great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84(1)(a), two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm), MCL 750.227b(1),
and one count of carrying a firearm with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226(1). He was sentenced as
a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10(1)(a). The sentencing guidelines provided a
recommended minimum term of imprisonment of between 34 to 83 months, but the trial court
departed from the guidelines and imposed a concurrent sentence of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment
for each AWIGBH conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to serve 2 years on each of the
felony-firearm convictions and 400 days’ imprisonment for the unlawful-carrying conviction. On
appeal, defendant challenges the sentences he received for his AWIGBH convictions. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The events giving rise to this case occurred on September 21, 2023, but some background
about defendant is important. In December 2020, defendant was involved in an altercation with
the police which resulted in five criminal charges, including two for assaulting, resisting, or
obstructing a police officer. He pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to assault, resist, or
obstruct a police officer and the other charges were dismissed.
Post-conviction, defendant received both inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment,
including for schizophrenia, which is something he had received off and on since at least 2019.
His treatment notes from this time described “paranoia and delusions stating the military and state
are using artificial intelligence to cause him pains and aches” and that “they give me meds for the

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voices, voices, voices, but it is not the voices, it’s the equipment and the people.” In October 2022,
law enforcement petitioned for him to receive inpatient treatment, reporting that defendant had
been observed stating that he wanted to kill law enforcement or government officials, that he had
access to firearms in his home, and that he had “no insight into his mental illness and [was] evasive
to all attempts to engage in a conversation.”
Further relevant to defendant’s opinions about law enforcement, at some point before the
events giving rise to this case, defendant’s son was charged and convicted of a drug offense and
was incarcerated. Then-Michigan State Police (MSP) Trooper Brian Muladore was involved in
that case, and it appears defendant became familiar with Muladore at that time. Also, at some
point, defendant interacted with MSP Trooper Andrew Peterson and became familiar with him.
In addition, leading up to the offense, on June 28, 2023, MSP Trooper Alec Blank
conducted a traffic stop of defendant. During this encounter defendant mentioned a “Brian” from
MSP, believed to be Trooper Muladore, and that he wanted to “beat the f*** out of him,” and he
mentioned “Peterson,” believed to be Trooper Peterson.
At trial, a non-law enforcement officer witness testified that, at some point before the
incident, defendant showed him a rifle and ammunition in defendant’s car, and that defendant had
told him that defendant “didn’t like cops” and that the next time he was stopped by the police, he
would start “a shootout.”
Then on September 21, 2023, Muladore, who by that point was an analyst with the
Michigan Department of Corrections, and Trooper Peterson both began receiving strange text
messages from a phone number that was quickly tied to defendant. For example, Trooper Peterson
received pictures of defendant’s ID with his name and his wallet. Defendant also sent Peterson a
picture of himself holding a pistol in front of his face. At trial, Trooper Peterson testified that he
interpreted the pictures defendant sent as threatening. Muladore also testified about text messages
he received that day from defendant that included pictures of rifles. Based on the messages, law
enforcement obtained an arrest warrant for defendant on charges of making a false report or threat
of terrorism and, after defendant failed to respond to messages asking that he turn himself in, they
began looking for defendant.
Later that evening, Trooper Peterson and Trooper Tyler Vargo located defendant and
attempted to conduct a traffic stop of his vehicle at an intersection in Marquette County. Trooper
Peterson testified that, when defendant pulled over, he saw defendant “violently reaching for
something,” adding that “it was . . . an aggressive reach towards the passenger’s side, it looked
like he was almost throwing himself over the center console of the vehicle.” Peterson testified
further that, as he was exiting his patrol vehicle, he saw defendant “come out, pull out a pistol two
hands and extend it towards us and at that point, we started firing.” Trooper Peterson testified that
it appeared to him that defendant “was pointing it towards my partner Trooper Vargo, who was
the driver of the vehicle, him or the vehicle itself.” He further testified that he believed “it was
[defendant’s] intent to kill us,” and therefore “I took the action that I needed . . . to protect the life
of my partner and myself.” Trooper Vargo gave similar testimony, stating affirmatively that he
believed both himself and Trooper Peterson could be shot and killed.
Trooper Peterson testified he shot defendant, which caused defendant to fall back into his
car. He continued by testifying that after defendant fell, he and Trooper Vargo ceased firing, and
“started to give verbal commands, show us your hands, show us your hands.” Trooper Vargo

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testified, however, that he saw defendant “stick the pistol back out and point it back towards us,”
and that he feared that he or Trooper Peterson might be shot. Trooper Peterson also testified that
he believed defendant was a continued threat. He testified that he and Trooper Vargo opened fire
again until Trooper Peterson observed defendant’s gun stop moving. He then saw defendant raise
one hand and heard him yell, “I’m done.” The troopers talked defendant into crawling out of his
car, and defendant was placed into custody.
The troopers searched defendant’s vehicle and found a bloody handgun, a rifle, and
hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Trooper Peterson and Trooper Vargo were not injured;
however, defendant had gunshot wounds to his upper torso, leg, and hand. He was taken to the
hospital and received emergency medical care.
Later, MSP Detective Sergeant Ron Baril executed a search warrant at a barn associated
with defendant. He testified that, among the items found, there was a “torture bag” containing “a
shovel, a machete, jumper cables, an extension cord with the female end cut off, so you could plug
it into the wall and shock somebody with it.” Additionally, Detective Sergeant Baril testified that
there “was a post fencer,” which was “another shocking device,” and Molotov cocktails. Another
bag had multiple zip-ties and ropes.
Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to murder based upon
defendant’s actions toward the troopers. However, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser
offenses of AWIGBH along with the other charges outlined above.
Before sentencing, defense counsel filed a written memorandum challenging the scoring
of 25 points for offense variable (OV) 3 and 25 points for OV 13. At the sentencing hearing,
defendant further argued against scoring 25 points for OV 13 but did not mention the scoring of
25 points for OV 3. The trial court disagreed and scored 25 points for each OV and calculated a
guidelines range of 34-83 months. The court found that defendant’s history with schizophrenia
and physical injuries were mitigating factors, but it also identified several aggravating factors,
some of which were not factored into the minimum sentencing guidelines range. The court
imposed an upward departure sentence of 10 to 15 years’ incarceration for the AWIGBH
convictions.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly scored points for OV 3 and OV 13. He
also argues that the court failed to adequately justify its upward departure sentence. This Court
reviews de novo issues involving the interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing
guidelines. People v Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004). “Under the sentencing
guidelines, a trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.” People v Thompson, 314 Mich App 703, 708; 887 NW2d 650
(2016). “Clear error is present when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that an error occurred.” People v Fawaz, 299 Mich App 55, 60; 829 NW2d 259 (2012) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
We review a departure sentence to determine whether it “is so unreasonable as to constitute
an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and warrant reversal on appeal.” People v Steanhouse, 500

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Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). “A sentence is unreasonable—and therefore an abuse of
discretion—if the trial court failed to adhere to the principle of proportionality in imposing its
sentence on a defendant.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 125; 933 NW2d 314 (2019).
III. OV 3
Defendant argues first that he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information because
the trial court should not have assessed 25 points for OV 3 for injuries that he sustained rather than
for injuries sustained by another victim. Applying binding precedent, we disagree.
“Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1). “A sentencing court
is required to assess 25 points for OV 3 when ‘[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury
occurred to a victim[.]’ ” People v Teike, 348 Mich App 520, 526; 19 NW3d 733 (2023), quoting
People v Chaney, 327 Mich App 586, 589; 935 NW2d 66 (2019). “When calculating sentencing
guidelines, the trial court may consider all record evidence, including the presentence investigation
report (PSIR), plea admissions, and testimony. The trial court may also consider victim-impact
statements, and may make reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.” Teike, 348 Mich
App at 526-527 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[T]he presence of a victim is a necessary condition to the assessment of points under OV
3.” People v Laidler, 491 Mich 339, 344; 817 NW2d 517 (2012). “[P]ursuant to common, and
relevant, usage, a ‘victim’ is any person who is harmed by the defendant’s criminal actions.” Id.
at 348. In Laidler, our Supreme Court rejected the argument “that a victim and an offender cannot
be the same person,” and rejected “a definition of ‘victim’ that excludes offenders and co-
offenders.” Id. at 351. The Court acknowledged that the result of its interpretation of OV 3’s text
was that “an offender can be scored points for his own injury under OV 3.” Id. at 352.
The PSIR, therefore, scored OV 3 at 25 points and the trial court adopted that scoring in
calculating the guidelines. First in his sentencing memo and now on appeal, defendant tries to
distinguish this case from Laidler because in Laidler the defendant was held accountable for
injuries to a co-defendant, whereas, in this case, he was held accountable for injuries he sustained.
But Laidler makes no such distinction and even acknowledges that its interpretation of the plain
language of “victim” in MCL 777.33 includes this result. Thus, Laidler permits trial courts to
apply OV 3 to injuries sustained by a defendant. Laidler reasoned that “the state has a generalized
interest in minimizing physical harms to all persons, and, all else being equal, the commission of
a crime that results in a physical harm, even when the harm is the perpetrator himself, might be
deemed more serious than the commission of the same crime that does not result in such harm.”
491 Mich at 352-353. This case is an example of where that reasoning applies. Defendant pulled
out a gun during a confrontation with police officers and, as a result, sustained serious injuries.
The fact that the officers who defendant pointed his gun at went uninjured does not mean the trial
court erred in assessing 25 points for OV 3 in this case.
Further relevant to OV 3, on appeal defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel did not object to scoring OV 3 at 25 points. However, as
mentioned, defense counsel did object to scoring OV 3 in a written memorandum filed before
defendant’s sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that it
had read the memorandum and asked for any challenges “beyond” what was already argued in the
memorandum. Therefore, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument lacks merit.

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IV. OV 13
Defendant next challenges the scoring of OV 13. He argues that the trial court erred by
assessing OV 13 at 25 points rather than zero points because his convictions originated from a
single felonious act. We disagree.
OV 13 addresses a “continuing pattern of criminal behavior.” MCL 777.43(1). The trial
court must assess anywhere from 0 to 50 points depending on the applicable circumstances, and
25 points if the “offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more
crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43(1)(c). To determine the appropriate points to be assessed
under OV 13, “all crimes within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted
regardless of whether the offense resulted in a conviction.” MCL 777.43(2)(a). “The sentencing
offense is the crime of which the defendant has been convicted and for which he or she is being
sentenced.” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 122 n 3, 771 NW2d 655 (2009). A pattern of
criminal activity may be based on multiple offenses arising from the same event. People v
Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 532; 640 NW2d 314 (2001). However, “a single felonious act cannot
constitute a pattern” under MCL 777.43(1). People v Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 704; 915 NW2d
387 (2018).
The PSIR assessed 25 points for OV 13. At sentencing, defense counsel challenged the
assessment by arguing that defendant only committed at most two qualifying crimes against a
person during the July 21 incident. In response, the prosecutor argued that the 2020 incident
provided multiple qualifying felonies as well such that OV 13 applied. The trial court agreed with
the prosecutor, explaining that there was “at least one” instance of resisting and obstructing the
police from that incident that took place in December 2020, which, “combined with the two
[AWIGBH] convictions in this case, that would combine for three total.”
The record supports the trial court’s reasoning and scoring of 25 points for OV 13. A trial
court properly scores OV 13 in cases where “the defendant committed separate acts in a single
criminal episode.” Carll, 322 Mich App at 705. Here, defendant grabbed his loaded gun, got out
of his vehicle, and pointed the gun toward law enforcement, thus prompting Troopers Peterson
and Vargo to begin firing based on a belief that defendant was going to shoot them. After the first
round of shots ended, the troopers saw defendant raise his arm and gun towards them again,
prompting additional fire.
Defendant relies on Carll, 322 Mich App at 693, 704, which held that a trial court
erroneously scored 25 points for OV 13 following that defendant’s convictions for one count of
reckless driving causing death, MCL 257.626(4), and three counts of reckless driving causing
serious impairment of a bodily function, MCL 257.626(3), but the facts of this case are
distinguishable. Carll held that, although there were multiple victims, “nothing was presented to
show that he committed separate acts against each individual victim in the course of the reckless
driving.” Carll, 322 Mich App at 705-706. In this case, however, both Trooper Peterson and
Trooper Vargo testified that defendant threatened them by pointing a handgun at them two times,
and so the record indicates that there were “separate acts in a single criminal episode,”
substantiating at least two crimes that constitute a pattern of felonious criminal activity. Id. at 705.

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And for a third criminal act to support scoring 25 points, the trial court correctly referenced
defendant’s plea to attempted resisting and obstructing an officer, MCL 750.81d, from 2020. Our
Supreme Court has held that “a prior conviction for attempted resisting and obstructing does not,
on its face, establish felonious criminal activity” because such convictions are “not punishable
with imprisonment for more than one year[.]” People v Jackson, 504 Mich 929, 929 (2019)
(citations omitted). The PSIR, however, indicates that defendant was originally charged with
multiple counts of resisting and obstructing, and the trial court considered the factual basis for
defendant’s 2020 conviction, including that defendant actively resisted multiple law enforcement
officers following a car accident in which he was the driver. Specifically, defendant refused to
follow lawful commands to exit his vehicle, then he attempted to kick the officer who gave the
commands, and the officers tasered defendant. MCL 777.43(2)(a) expressly states “that all crimes
within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted regardless of whether
the offense resulted in a conviction.” Therefore, in addition to the act that resulted in his conviction
for attempted resisting and obstructing, any of defendant’s other acts of resisting were available
for the trial court to apply to score OV 13.
For these reasons, defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s scoring of 25 points for OV 13
fails.
V. DEPARTURE SENTENCE
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court failed to justify its decision to impose a
departure sentence and therefore violated governing principles of proportionality. We disagree.
A sentencing court that departs from the applicable guidelines range no longer needs to
supply a substantial or compelling reason for doing so. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364-
365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). Because the sentencing guidelines remain “a highly relevant
consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion,” however, trial courts must still
consult them and “take them into account when sentencing.” Id. at 391 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “In imposing an out-of-guidelines sentence, a trial court must justify the
sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, which includes an explanation of why the
sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence
[i.e., one within the guidelines] would have been.” People v Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 500-501;
967 NW2d 847 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “principle of proportionality requires ‘sentences imposed by the trial court to be
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’ ”
Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474, quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
“ ‘[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter, not
whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range.’ ” Steanhouse, 500
Mich at 472, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 661.
This Court has identified relevant factors to apply for determining whether a departure
sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range. People v Dixon-Bey,
321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017). These factors include: (1) whether the guidelines
accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime; (2) factors not considered by the guidelines; and
(3) factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate weight.” Id. (citations omitted).

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Additional factors a sentencing court may consider when contemplating a departure sentence
“include the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and
the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” Id. at 525 n 9 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In contesting his sentence on proportionality grounds, defendant argues that the trial court
failed to consider his mental health problems and that he was actively attempting to address his
schizophrenia before he committed the sentencing offenses. But, at sentencing, the trial court
acknowledged defendant’s schizophrenia as a mitigating factor while also calling attention to the
factors that indicated planning and clear-headed criminal intent. The trial court also found that
defendant presented a special risk of future danger given he began mental health services for his
schizophrenia in 2019, at which time his paranoia regarding the government was already apparent.
Despite receiving treatment, he began expressing a desire to kill government officials by 2022 as
demonstrated by the testimony from the non-law enforcement witness regarding defendant’s intent
to get into a “shootout” with police the next time he was pulled over. Moreover, the court heard
Trooper Blank’s testimony and saw text messages from defendant indicating that he specifically
held a grudge against Muladore and Trooper Peterson. And despite his attempts to address his
mental illness, defendant discontinued services and sent threats to both men. The trial court
specifically mentioned concerns over defendant’s risk of future violence and found that the
guidelines did not sufficiently account for the degree of risk defendant presented. These
considerations were appropriate in fashioning a departure sentence.
Defendant also argues that the court failed to account for his physical injuries as a
mitigating factor. But the trial court expressly acknowledged defendant’s extensive physical
injuries, stating that he had “paid a physical price of being shot during this encounter, having an
amputation to part of his . . . middle finger on his right hand and having to recover in the hospital.”
Despite this, the court reasoned that defendant had intended to cause great bodily harm to law
enforcement officers as evidenced by the testimony about his disdain for law enforcement and the
“torture kit” recovered from the barn. The record indicates that the trial court accounted for
defendant’s physical injuries as a factor and weighed it against the serious harm he intended toward
law enforcement officers.
On the whole, the trial court provided extensive reasoning for the departure sentence,
describing several factors that it believed the guidelines did not reflect. Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App
at 525. Again, the court described the planning, intent, and lack of hesitation that defendant had
displayed and described defendant’s “torture kit.” The court further explained that defendant’s
targeting of law enforcement was particularly concerning both because it had “a chilling effect on
other members of law enforcement,” and because it ran the risk of injuring those that are needed
to protect the community. It also noted that defendant had a criminal history beyond what the
scoring of his prior record variables had considered. The court reasonably adjudged defendant a
significant future threat and stressed the need for a sentence that would deter both defendant, and
others, from engaging in similar conduct.

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For these reasons, defendant’s sentences for the AWIGBH convictions did not violate the
principle of proportionality and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward
departure sentence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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