COA 365745 CITY OF EASTPOINTE V ZSAZSA MICHELLE SOWARD Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/29/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CITY OF EASTPOINTE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 29, 2026
10:59 AM
V No. 365745
Macomb Circuit Court
ZSAZSA MICHELLE SOWARD, LC No. 2023-000195-AR
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Zsazsa Michelle Soward appeals by leave granted1 the circuit court’s order
denying her motion for resentencing after the district court imposed a sentence of incarceration for
a nonserious misdemeanor, driving without a valid license, MCL 257.904(1). Because the district
court failed to fully explain why its departure from the statutory presumption of a nonjail,
nonprobation sentence under MCL 769.5(3) was warranted based on the circumstances of the
offense and the offender, we reverse the circuit court’s order, vacate defendant’s sentence, and
remand to the district court for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is just one in defendant’s lengthy history of citations for driving without a license,
registration, or insurance. In January 2023, defendant was pulled over because her vehicle was
missing its driver’s side mirror and appeared to have an expired registration tab. When defendant
was asked for her driver’s license, she provided her Michigan identification card but said that she
did not have a driver’s license, nor did she have registration or insurance for the vehicle. Because
defendant had several outstanding warrants, she was arrested and spent the next several days in
jail.
1 Eastpointe v Soward, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 17, 2023 (Docket
No. 365745).

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In February 2023, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of driving without a valid license
in District Court Case No. 2023-23-22-CA-OT, which is the subject of this appeal. Defendant told
the district court that she never obtained a driver’s license, but she was in the process of doing so.
The district court then sentenced defendant. The district court found it problematic that defendant
repeatedly was cited for driving without a license, and yet she still did not appear to understand
that she could not drive without one. Accordingly, the district court sentenced defendant to 93
days in jail.
Defendant appealed her sentence to the Macomb Circuit Court, arguing, in part, that the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a jail sentence for a nonserious misdemeanor
contrary to MCL 769.5. The circuit court affirmed her sentence, ruling that defendant’s repetitive
conduct justified the departure from the statutory presumption that nonserious misdemeanors do
not warrant incarceration.
Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted.
Eastpointe v Soward, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 17, 2023 (Docket
No. 365745). However, in August 2023, the parties filed a joint motion to remand to the district
court for resentencing. We granted the motion and remanded the case to the district court to allow
defendant to move for resentencing, and for the court to resentence her if warranted. Eastpointe v
Soward, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 14, 2023 (Docket No.
365745). We retained jurisdiction and stayed any possible jail sentence pending appeal. Id. We
also imposed certain requirements for remand, including that defendant promptly initiate the
proceedings on remand and that defendant file a copy of any motion for resentencing filed in the
district court with this Court. Id.
After remand, defense counsel apparently filed a substantive motion for resentencing in
April 2024, although we were not provided a copy of this motion, nor does it appear in the lower-
court record. However, the district court did agree to resentence defendant. Over the next 12
months, defendant’s resentencing was adjourned a number of times. Many, but not all, of those
adjournments appear have been due to defendant’s failure to attend required hearings and her
failure to bring required documentation for her ability-to-pay hearing, which this Court separately
ordered in Docket No. 365735.2 When defendant failed to appear for resentencing on April 24,
2025, the district court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. After the bench warrant was issued,
defendant filed her appellant’s brief with this Court and requested that this appeal be allowed to
proceed because the district court still had not resentenced her. Because we granted leave to hear
this appeal in 2023 but have not yet had the opportunity to consider the merits of defendant’s
arguments, we do so now.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich
171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). “An abuse-of-discretion standard recognizes that there may be
2 Eastpointe v Soward, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 17, 2023 (Docket
No. 365735).

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more than one principled outcome and the trial court may not deviate from that principled range
of outcomes.” Id. We review a trial court’s factual determinations at sentencing for clear error.
People v Gloster, 499 Mich 199, 204; 880 NW2d 776 (2016). “A trial court’s finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, we, on the whole record, are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Thigpen, 349 Mich App
437, 446-447; 27 NW3d 647 (2023).
“[A]lthough we give no deference to the circuit court’s findings in its review of the district
court decision, we give a great deal of deference to the district court’s decision; that is, we review
that decision for an abuse of discretion.” People v Crumbley, 346 Mich App 144, 166; 11 NW3d
576 (2023) (explaining the standard of review in the context of a circuit court’s review of a district
court’s bindover decision) (emphasis omitted).
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Boykin, 510 Mich at 183.
Likewise, the interpretation of a court rule also is a question of law that we review de novo. People
v Walters, 266 Mich App 341, 346; 700 NW2d 424 (2005).
III. PROPORTIONALITY OF DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE
Defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it declined to order resentencing because
the district court abused its discretion by departing from the statutory presumption of nonjail,
nonprobation sentences for nonserious misdemeanors.
Since the trial court last considered the matter now before us, we issued a published
decision on sentencing in nonserious misdemeanor matters. See People v Mason, ___ Mich App
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367687). “A trial court’s sentencing decisions must be
based on the principle of proportionality.” Id. at ___; slip op at 2 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Under Michigan law, this requires that “the sentences imposed across the discretionary
range are proportionate to the seriousness of the matters that come before the court for sentencing.
In making this assessment, the judge, of course, must take into account the nature of the offense
and the background of the offender.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 472; 902 NW2d 327
(2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A sentence is unreasonable—and therefore an
abuse of discretion—if the trial court failed to adhere to the principle of proportionality in imposing
its sentence on a defendant.” Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
MCL 769.5 provides a rebuttable presumption against incarceration for nonserious
misdemeanors:
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that the court shall sentence an
individual convicted of a misdemeanor, other than a serious misdemeanor, with a
fine, community service, or other nonjail or nonprobation sentence.
(4) The court may depart from the presumption under subsection (3) if the
court finds reasonable grounds for the departure and states on the record the
grounds for the departure. [MCL 769.5(3) and (4).]

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Together, these provisions “establish a sentencing framework for misdemeanor convictions
that is similar to the framework for felony convictions and the legislative sentencing guidelines.”
Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4.
The statute further provides that the definition of a “serious misdemeanor” in this context
is taken from MCL 780.811. MCL 769.5(7). MCL 780.811(1)(a) lists specific misdemeanors that
are defined as serious, such as domestic violence. See MCL 780.811(1)(a)(i). The charge at issue
in this case, driving without a valid license, is not included in the list of serious misdemeanors.
Under MCL 769.5, a nonjail or nonprobation sentence imposed for a misdemeanor that is
not serious is a “presumptively proportionate sentence, as a within-guidelines sentence is for a
felony conviction.” Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. However, a trial court has the
discretion to depart from the general presumption and impose a sentence of incarceration “if the
court finds reasonable grounds for the departure and states on the record the grounds for the
departure.” MCL 769.5(4). “This provision corresponds to MCL 769.34(3), which provides that
a ‘court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing
guidelines . . . if the departure is reasonable and the court states on the record the reasons for
departure.’ ” Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. In such a case, the court must examine
“whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). To make this determination,
the trial court may appropriately consider a defendant’s criminal history, but it also must weigh
the seriousness of the offense. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. To justify a departure from the general
presumption of a nonjail sentence, the trial court should consider factors “that demonstrate
circumstances taking this particular case outside the realm of the ordinary [driving with a
suspended license] case.” Id. Indeed, the trial court must explain on the record “why the sentence
imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence . . . would
have been.” People v Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 500-501; 967 NW2d 847 (2021) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Additionally, “a sentence that exposes an offender to incarceration unless he pays
restitution or some other fine violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state
constitutions because it results in unequal punishments for offenders who have and do not have
sufficient money.” People v Collins, 239 Mich App 125, 135-136; 607 NW2d 760 (2000) (internal
citations omitted). As a result, a defendant cannot be incarcerated for the failure to pay restitution
or fines unless the failure to pay was willful. Id. To that end, MCR 6.425(D)(3)(a) provides that
[t]he court shall not sentence a defendant to a term of incarceration, nor revoke
probation, for failure to comply with an order to pay money unless the court finds,
on the record, that the defendant is able to comply with the order without manifest
hardship and that the defendant has not made a good-faith effort to comply with the
order.[3]
3 MCR 6.001(B) provides that MCR 6.425(D)(3) “govern[s] matters of procedure in criminal cases
cognizable in the district courts.”

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With these principles in mind, we must analyze whether the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a sentence of incarceration for defendant’s conviction of a nonserious
misdemeanor. In imposing its sentence, the district court engaged defendant in the following
exchange:
The Court: You know the problem that we have . . . and I’m sorry that—
you know her pregnancy is causing her problems at this point, but she has all of
these files. And she keeps doing the same thing over and over again. And what—
what’s the definition of insanity; do you know that?
* * *
The Court: And same result keeps happening, she gets locked up and then
she gets behind the wheel again. She doesn’t get it. She doesn’t get it. You don’t
get that you can’t drive without a license, ma’am. And I still have three more show
causes against you. So, not only are you a bad driver because that’s how you get
caught. You continue to drive on a suspended license, and then you come to court,
and your attorneys work out a deal for you and then you fail to pay your fines and
costs and then you get behind the wheel again. So there’s not consequences to your
actions. Right?
Defendant: Right.
The Court: Why do you keep doing this? That’s what I don’t understand.
Tell—tell—give me a plausible reason why—why you would keep doing this time
and time and time again. I don’t get it. Tell me.
Defendant: I’m not planning on getting out and doing the same thing, just
my circumstances need transportation due to my situation to d— [sic] to my job
and where I stay, my location. So, I kinda took a chance.
The Court: Well, you take a chance and when you take a chance and lose,
what happens? You end up in jail. You end up in a worse circumstance. And
that’s the part I don’t get because this has happened so many times, you would think
that you were tired of having this happen to you. And having all these fines and
costs hang over your head, but it doesn’t seem to bother you because you don’t pay
them. And you don’t do what you’re supposed to do, but you continue to drive to
work. So, it’s not like you don’t have a job, you just choose not to pay for your
fines and costs that were your fault. That you knowingly committed these criminal
offenses and then you don’t—there—there’s no consequences for you. So I—
I’m—I’m sorry . . . , we’re gonna deal with all the show causes. It’s—it’s at this
point it’s not about money, at all. I’m gonna give her 93 days Macomb County
Jail[,] credit for 13 [days] and I’m gonna close the file.
The district court appropriately considered defendant’s lengthy history of operating a
vehicle in Michigan while failing to comply with the basic requirements for doing so, namely
having a valid driver’s license, valid registration for her vehicle, and valid no-fault insurance. See

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Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4-5. Indeed, in addition to the misdemeanor charge at
issue in the present case, defendant had a long list of citations in Eastpointe for failing to comply
with these minimum requirements to operate a vehicle. Consequently, the district court correctly
considered defendant’s lengthy history of traffic infractions, and the fact that her prior citations
did not seem to deter her from driving without the required license, registration, and insurance.
However, when deciding to sentence defendant to jail, the district court also considered
that defendant had repeatedly failed to pay her fees and fines for her outstanding citations. The
district court held that defendant had willfully disregarded her obligations to pay fees and fines for
these citations despite the ability to do so. Again, a court can consider a defendant’s failure to pay
fees and fines when weighing whether incarceration is warranted, but only when the defendant has
the means to pay but willingly refuses to do so. Collins, 239 Mich App at 135-136. To make this
determination, the court must evaluate whether the defendant can pay the fees and fines without
“manifest hardship,” which requires the court to consider:
(i) Defendant’s employment status and history.
(ii) Defendant’s employability and earning ability.
(iii) The willfulness of the defendant’s failure to pay.
(iv) Defendant’s financial resources.
(v) Defendant’s basic living expenses including but not limited to food,
shelter, clothing, necessary medical expenses, or child support.
(vi) Any other special circumstances that may have bearing on the
defendant’s ability to pay. [MCR 6.425(D)(3)(c).]
Here, the district court’s conclusory determination that because defendant had a job, she
was willingly choosing not to pay the fees and fines, does not appear to have been supported by
the record. The district court did not consider, for instance, the full picture of defendant’s financial
resources and expenses. Accordingly, on remand, the district court must determine whether
defendant had the ability to pay the fees and fines without manifest hardship. To not do so and
then sentence a defendant guilty of a nonserious misdemeanor to a jail term under these
circumstances is an abuse of discretion.
In addition to its evaluation of the offender, the district court also must weigh the
seriousness of the offense when determining whether a sentence of jailtime was appropriate. See
Mason, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. More specifically, the district court is required to
explain what circumstances removed this particular case from the realm of the ordinary
misdemeanor for driving without a valid license. Id. Here, the district court opined that defendant
was a “bad driver” which was why she was repeatedly getting pulled over. This observation may
not entirely be supported by the record here, however. Defendant’s history of citations reflects
that she has been cited for failing to maintain the required documentation to drive a vehicle, but
not necessarily that she is a bad or dangerous driver. In the instant case, for example, defendant
was pulled over because her vehicle was missing the driver-side mirror and had an expired

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registration tab, only one of which—the missing mirror—might suggest that defendant is a “bad
driver.” Consequently, the record lacks full consideration of the circumstances of the offense and
an explanation as to why the district court’s departure was “more proportionate than a different
sentence would have been,” “which hinders our appellate review of whether the sentence was
reasonable.” Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the circuit court, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand this matter to the
district court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.4
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Anica Letica
4 To be clear, our opinion does not necessarily prohibit the district court from imposing a sentence
of incarceration on remand, only that the existing record is insufficient to affirm that sentence.

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