COA 371980 ESTATE OF FRANK ANTHONY KARWOSKI V VICKY HAMLIN-ROGERS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ESTATE OF FRANK ANTHONY KARWOSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2026
9:39 AM
V No. 371980
Ostego Circuit Court
VICKY HAMLIN-ROGERS, LC No. 22-019131-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and KOROBKIN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case involving the conservatorship of a protected person, plaintiff, the estate of
Frank Anthony Karwoski, appeals as of right the trial court’s orders granting defendant, Vicky
Hamlin-Rogers, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material
fact), and denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of plaintiff’s allegations that defendant breached her fiduciary duty by
failing to inventory, and subsequently selling, the collections of coins and precious metals of Frank
Anthony Karwoski (decedent), resulting in an unverified amount of damages to the estate.
Decedent’s daughter, Kathy Alston, is the personal representative of his estate. Decedent had been
diagnosed with dementia and was living with his adult son. Defendant was decedent’s conservator
from October 21, 2020, until his death on September 4, 2022.1 Before defendant, Alston had
served as decedent’s conservator.
During her deposition testimony, defendant asserted that upon becoming conservator, she
searched decedent’s house for assets and information related to his assets. She eventually
1 Defendant was also appointed decedent’s guardian, but plaintiff’s complaint and arguments
solely pertain to defendant’s role as conservator.

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discovered a list of assets decedent had compiled, which delineated approximately $197,257 in
precious metals and coins. Because of decedent’s dementia, however, defendant “had no idea
what was true and was not true” regarding the list. As conservator, defendant prepared an
inventory of decedent’s assets. Defendant testified that she belatedly filed her initial inventory,
and she did not catalog the metals and coins because she did not know at that time that the items
were valuable. Approximately a year into the conservatorship, Alston informed defendant that the
metals and coins had potential value. Defendant subsequently sold certain metals and coins from
decedent’s collection after an appraisal at Treasure Trove, a store defendant frequented for 30
years. Before selling, defendant contacted other coin shops referenced in decedent’s documents,
and she was told that the coins were not worth what decedent paid for them. Defendant
additionally consulted with an elder-law attorney before the sale.
Defendant disclaimed that she sold all the coins except a number of souvenir pieces that
lacked intrinsic value or were worth only face value. According to a receipt from Treasure Trove,
the coins and metals were valued at $105,720, a sale on consignment may net $90,000, and
Treasure Trove offered $80,000 for the lot. Defendant opted to sell the items, as opposed to
consigning the coins, because the latter process appeared too extensive in light of decedent’s
condition. Defendant testified that she returned all unsold coins and materials to the safe where
she had found them. Alston, however, asserted that she was unaware of where the remaining coins
and metals were located, but she acknowledged that the $80,000 from the sale was deposited in
decedent’s bank account.
Alston believed that the value obtained for her father’s collection was too low, but she also
admitted that she had not consulted an expert, and Alston was solely relying on her own Internet
research as the basis for that opinion. In an unnotarized “affidavit,” Alston claimed that decedent
valued the collection at $426,000, that defendant informed Alston she was simply going to have
the collection appraised, that defendant nevertheless sold the assets, that no remaining items were
returned to the safe, that a probate court report indicated that defendant retained some of the coins,
and that there was “no legitimate financial reason” to sell the collection. But Alston conceded that
she had no evidence defendant converted coins for her personal use.
Defendant purportedly sold the disputed assets in response to information from decedent’s
doctor that decedent would likely pass away within months. Decedent maintained in-home care
services from Comfort Keepers; although decedent had liquid assets of approximately $35,000 and
monthly income of $4,000, defendant was concerned that decedent would soon require full-time
care, costing approximately $7,000 to $10,000 per month, resulting in her decision to liquidate the
coin and metal collections as funds for the additional services. Defendant admitted, however, that
it was a mistake not to inventory the items before the sale.
During the conservatorship, the probate court appointed Thomas Mammoser, a retired
pastor, to investigate claims regarding defendant’s handling of decedent’s assets. Mammoser’s
subsequent report detailed Alston’s concern about the coins and metals and the sale of these
collections, and stated that “[o]ther coins, not yet appraised, remain in [defendant’s] possession.”
Mammoser’s report delineated the gifts provided to Alston and to decedent’s son, in addition to
the expenses charged against the estate. While the report questioned defendant’s handling of the

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estate and recommended the removal of defendant as conservator, it was unclear why Mammoser
maintained such concerns.2
After decedent’s passing, Alston was appointed personal representative of his estate, and
commenced the underlying action. In her complaint, Alston alleged that defendant breached her
fiduciary duty by “failing to properly account for the assets of the Ward [i.e., decedent] and by
using the assets for her personal benefit.” Alston further contended that defendant failed to file
accurate accountings, and breached the fiduciary’s “prudent investment” rule by “failing to
accurately account for the gold and silver owned by the Ward,” “by selling the gold and silver
when there was no financial need to do so,” and by selling items “at a price that was inadequate
and below the standard value.”
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that there
was no issue of material fact regarding Alston’s conversion or fiduciary duty claims, precluding
judgment as a matter of law. At the subsequent motion hearing, the trial court questioned how
plaintiff determined the true value of the contested coins and metals. Plaintiff’s counsel cited
decedent’s list with the estimated values of the items. The trial court inquired regarding the
admissibility of the list, noting decedent could have simply made up the listed values. Regarding
the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, the trial court observed that there was no dispute that defendant
had such duties. But the trial court held that none of the evidence plaintiff proffered created an
issue of fact. The court further held that decedent’s list was inadmissible hearsay, over which
plaintiff had not argued any exception. The court also noted even if the list was admissible, that it
solely reflected what decedent believed his property was worth, and thus did not create a triable
issue. The trial court additionally resolved that while the receipt from Treasure Trove may be
admissible, the receipt was essentially a purchase agreement and did not support plaintiff’s
position regarding the inadequate purchase value of the coins and metals. The only other evidence
indicating the value of the collections was Alston’s personal online searches, which were
insufficient to properly establish the value of the items.
Regarding Mammoser’s report, the trial court concluded that it was hearsay from a person
not designated an expert, and who had no apparent expertise in the field. The court further ruled
that the report failed to qualify as an expert opinion because Mammoser did not possess sufficient
experience in investigation such claims, and it did not set forth a basis for recovering damages or
otherwise identify a breach of fiduciary duties. The trial court similarly held that Alston’s
“affidavit” did not substantiate her claims, and the document was not notarized, with allegations
that were “cursory and unsupported, making any evidentiary weight. . . minimal.” The trial court
additionally determined that Alston’s testimony indicated that she lacked proofs that defendant
retained any of the coins for her own use, and that Alston simply relied on the Internet to determine
the value of the coins and metals. The court also stated that Alston’s deposition testimony
2 During the conservatorship, defendant made gifts from decedent’s assets to her daughter and son.
Although plaintiff’s complaint included allegations concerning those gifts, plaintiff has not raised
on appeal any arguments challenging the propriety of the gifts. Similarly, although the complaint
alleged that defendant used decedent’s credit card for her own benefit, plaintiff does not raise any
related arguments in this appeal.

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contradicted her the allegations in the “affidavit” regarding the return of certain items to the safe.
The trial court noted that Alston conceded, in her deposition testimony, proof of conversion or
damages. Accordingly, the court ruled, even if there were a breach of duty, there was no evidence
of damages, which was fatal to her claim. The trial court ultimately granted defendant’s motion
for summary disposition.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, essentially reiterating the allegations in the complaint,
and contending that the record established a genuine question of material fact regarding her claims.
Plaintiff further argued, for the first time, that the report from the probate court’s investigation was
admissible as a regular business record under MRE 803. The trial court denied the motion, opining
that plaintiff’s argument concerning the business-records exception to the general hearsay
prohibition was cursory and insufficient. The court further provided that it considered the contents
of the report, and “found it. . . unavailing in creating any genuine factual issues for trial.” This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a summary disposition motion to
determine if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Patrick v Turkelson,
322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Motions
“for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) test[] the factual support for a
claim.” Id. A (C)(10) motion may be granted “when the affidavits or other documentary evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). The moving party may
satisfy its burden by “showing the insufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence.” Id. at 9. If the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof at trial, it
may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the
pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. . . . If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing
the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. [Id. at 7
(quotation marks and citation omitted).]
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.”
Shenandoah Ridge Condo Ass’n v Bodary, ___Mich App___, ___; ___NW2d___ (2025) (Docket
No. 364972); slip op at 6. An abuse of discretion occurs if the “trial court’s decision was outside
the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). To
prevail, “[t]he moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties
have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result from correction
of the error.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Evidentiary rulings are generally
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dorsey v Surgical Institute of Mich, LLC, 338 Mich App 199,
230; 979 NW2d 681 (2021).

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III. ANALYSIS
A. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Plaintiff argues that defendant breached her fiduciary duty to decedent in various ways.3
We disagree.
“[A] fiduciary relationship arises from the reposing of faith, confidence, and trust and the
reliance of one upon the judgment and advice of another.” Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App
501, 508; 536 NW2d 280 (1995). “To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff
must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages caused
by the breach of duty.” Highfield Beach at Lake Mich, 331 Mich App 636, 666; 954 NW2d 231
(2020).
In the present case, there is no dispute that a fiduciary relationship existed between
defendant and decedent. Under MCL 700.5416, “a conservator shall act as a fiduciary and observe
the standard of care applicable to a trustee.” At issue are the second and third elements of a breach
claim, i.e., whether the duty was breached and whether the breach caused damages. As a fiduciary,
a conservator must
discharge all of the duties and obligations of a confidential and fiduciary relation-
ship, including the duties of undivided loyalty; impartiality between heirs, devisees,
and beneficiaries; care and prudence in actions; and segregation of assets held in
the fiduciary capacity. With respect to investments, a fiduciary shall conform to
the Michigan prudent investor rule. [MCL 700.1212(1).]
Even assuming defendant breached her fiduciary duties, plaintiff has not offered evidence that the
estate suffered any damages. Plaintiff asserts, without any legal support, that it was not obligated
to present proofs in support of an award of damages. But Michigan caselaw expressly provides
that damages are an essential element of a breach claim. See Abdelmaguid Estate v Dimensions
Ins Gp, LLC, ___Mich App___, ___; ___NW2d___ (2024) (Docket No. 361674); slip op at 6; see
also Highfield Beach at Lake Mich v Sanderson, 331 Mich App at 666. Further, when damages
are an essential part of a claim, summary disposition is appropriate where there has been no
showing of damages. See New Freedom Mtg Corp v Globe Mtg Corp, 281 Mich App 63, 69-70;
761 NW2d 832 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by Bank of America, NA v First
American Title Ins Co, 499 Mich 74; 878 NW2d 816 (2016).
3 Plaintiff first questions whether the trial court applied the correct “standard of review,” by which
it apparently means the appropriate standard for deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Plaintiff does not, however, provide any argument on the standard itself, and there appears no
dispute that the trial court properly sought to determine whether a question of material fact existed.
Therefore, this argument is deemed abandoned on appeal. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700,
712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008) (“A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningful
argument in support of its position.”)

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Plaintiff further contends that the language of MCR 2.116(C)(10) providing that summary
disposition is proper when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of
law,” indicates that establishing damages is unnecessary at the summary-disposition stage. But
the cited subrule does not dispense with the need to establish a question of fact concerning the
existence of damages, rather, it permits summary disposition when the extent of a party’s liability,
i.e., the “amount of damages,” remains disputed. The standard remains “that a moving party may
be entitled to summary disposition as a result of the nonmoving party’s failure to produce evidence
sufficient to demonstrate an essential element of its claim.” Lowrey, 500 Mich at 9. Accordingly,
in response to a motion for summary disposition, a party must provide admissible evidence to
establish, to a reasonable certainty, the existence of damages. Hofman v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 211
Mich App 55, 108; 535 NW2d (1995).
Plaintiff additionally asserts that defendant sold decedent’s coins and metals below the
collection’s true value. However, the only admissible evidence of the items’ value was the receipt
from the Treasure Trove sale, as discussed further below. Moreover, Alston conceded, in her
deposition testimony, that her personal online searches were the sole support for her belief that the
coins and metals maintained greater value than what the items sold for. To be considered at the
summary disposition stage, evidence must be substantively admissible, even if not yet in
admissible form. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App
362, 373; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). Plaintiff makes no argument that Alston’s research is
substantively admissible, that Alston qualified as an expert in the valuation of such items, or that
Alston’s testimony otherwise established a genuine factual dispute sufficient to survive summary
disposition. The only other proof relevant to the valuation of decedent’s collection was his list of
the coins and metals with their purported values. But plaintiff does not contest the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling regarding the list on appeal, nor does plaintiff address the court’s alternative
holding that, even if the list were admissible, it failed to create a triable issue. As with Alston’s
research, plaintiff did not advance that decedent was an expert, or that his valuations were
otherwise based on reliable information. Consequently, that list does not present a triable issue.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments pertain to defendant’s alleged breaches of her fiduciary
duties to decedent. While, as previously noted, plaintiff cannot succeed on its claims because of
its failure to indicate any damages resulting from defendant’s alleged conduct, we nonetheless
address its contentions.
Plaintiff first asserts that defendant neglected to list all the assets on the inventory upon
becoming conservator. A conservator must, within 56 days of his or her appointment, file a
complete inventory of the ward’s estate. MCL 700.5417(1); MCR 5.409(B)(2). Further, a
“conservator must keep suitable records of the administration,” MCL 700.5417(2), and provide an
annual accounting of the estate, MCL 700.5418(1). Violation of these statutes can constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty. See In re Conservatorship of Murray, 336 Mich App 234, 247-248; 970
NW2d 372 (2021).
In the present case, defendant acknowledged that it was a “mistake” not to include the coins
and metals in the inventory before selling the items. But, for the reasons already discussed, even
assuming this was a breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff’s claim fails because plaintiff has not shown
that any damage arose from this breach. Alston acknowledged that the money received from the

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sale of the coins and metals was deposited in decedent’s bank account, and defendant stated that
all the unsold coins were returned to the safe. Plaintiff speculates that defendant may have kept
the unsold coins and metals, but it has presented no evidence supporting that conjecture. Indeed,
Alston testified that she lacked proofs that defendant retained the coins and metals. Consequently,
plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact in connection with this argument.4
Plaintiff further claims that defendant obtained the coins and metals under the pretense of
acquiring an appraisal, but with the true purpose of selling the items. Plaintiff, however, has
presented no authority or argument for the implicit proposition that defendant was obligated to
disclose her plans to Alston or any other party before selling the collection. MCL 700.5415 enables
individuals interested in the welfare of a person under a conservatorship to petition a court to
mandate a bond for the conservator, require a distribution, force an accounting, or obtain
appropriate relief. But plaintiff does not suggest that Alston took such actions, and, as noted,
plaintiff has offered no support for the proposition that defendant was required to inform Alston
of her intentions, or that damages resulted from defendant’s failure to inform Alston about the sale.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the sale of the coins and metals was unnecessary. But
plaintiff fails to sufficiently develop this argument. Nonetheless, the record indicates that
defendant testified that, on the basis of a conversation with decedent’s doctor, she anticipated
decedent would soon require full-time care. Defendant further testified that, despite decedent’s
monthly income and liquid assets, defendant believed additional funds were necessary to pay for
his increasing levels of care. Plaintiff has presented no evidence or argument that casts doubt on
this testimony, including whether decedent required the suggested care, or whether decedent’s
assets were sufficient to cover the costs.
Lastly, plaintiff asserts that defendant’s motion for summary disposition should have been
denied because the record may have developed further to unearth an issue of fact. But “ ‘[a]
litigant’s mere pledge to establish an issue of fact at trial cannot survive summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court rule plainly requires the adverse party to set forth specific facts at
the time of the motion showing a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Lowrey, 500 Mich at 7-8, quoting
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121, 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In light of the foregoing, we
conclude that the trial court applied the appropriate standard in deciding the summary-disposition
motion, and that plaintiff neglected to demonstrate that summary disposition was otherwise
improper.
4 Plaintiff’s complaint included a claim of conversion concerning the supposedly retained coins
and metals. The trial court dismissed this claim, and, aside from a stray reference to missing
property, plaintiff has not developed any argument on appeal challenging that decision. Further,
as the trial court recognized, Alston’s unnotarized affidavit asserting that defendant retained the
property was contradicted by Alston’s deposition testimony admitting she had no evidence of this
retention. “It is well established that a party may not manufacture a question of material fact by
directly contradicting the person’s own deposition testimony with an affidavit.” Bakeman v
Citizens Ins Co, 344 Mich App 66, 76-77; 998 NW2d 743 (2022). Accordingly, the unnotarized
affidavit did not create a triable issue.

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B. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PROBATE COURT’S REPORT
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by excluding Mammoser’s investigatory report to
the probate court. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff failed to properly preserve this argument for appellate
review because it first argued that the report was admissible as a business record in its motion for
reconsideration. An issue initially presented in a motion for reconsideration is not properly
preserved for appeal. Bodary, ___Mich App at___; slip op at 8. We nonetheless retain discretion
to consider an untimely argument
if the failure to consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration
is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a
question of law and facts necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the
issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been
presented. [Id at___ (quotation marks and citation omitted); slip op at 8.]
On appeal, plaintiff does not address why its unpreserved issue merits review, nor do we believe
the cited factors support the consideration of plaintiff’s evidentiary challenge. Eschewing review
would not result in manifest injustice because the trial court addressed the contents of the report
during the lower court proceedings, and it determined that the report did not present a triable issue.
Further, consideration is not necessary to fully resolve the case because plaintiff’s claims fail
regardless because it did not demonstrate the existence of damages. Additionally, the facts
necessary for resolution have not been established as a matter of record—plaintiff has not properly
indicated how the report would otherwise be admissible.
Plaintiff’s argument is further insufficiently developed. The parties do not dispute that the
report constituted hearsay, i.e., an unsworn, out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the statement,” MRE 801(c), and hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception
applies. MRE 802. Plaintiff relies on the exception provided under MRE 803(6) for records of
regularly conducted activity, which states:
A record of an act, transaction, occurrence, event, condition, opinion, or
diagnosis if:
The record was made at or near the time by—or from information
transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
Making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with a rule prescribed
by the Supreme Court or with a statute permitting certification; and

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The opponent does not show that the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Plaintiff entirely omits consideration of these requirements. Critically, plaintiff has offered no
testimony by a custodian or qualified witness, or any certification, that establishes the necessary
showings. We acknowledge that plaintiff was not obliged to lay a full and proper foundation for
admission at the summary disposition stage. See Barnard, 285 Mich App at 373. But plaintiff
has provided no basis for concluding that the report was a record of any regularly conducted
activity. Moreover, the trial court noted that the report itself provide that the author, Mammoser,
did not regularly prepare such documents. Plaintiff additionally disregards the trial court’s
alternative analysis, which assumed the admissibility of the report and found that it nevertheless
failed to create a triable issue. The trial court determined that Mammoser lacked relevant
experience, and that the report neglected to show either a breach of duty or resulting damages.
Without any argument from plaintiff against these rulings, we cannot conclude that plaintiff is
entitled to relief on this basis.
C. EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider defendant’s admission that
she should have inventoried the coins and metals before selling the items as evidence of
negligence. We disagree.
Plaintiff never pleaded a claim of negligence in the lower court, and plaintiff’s appellate
argument regarding this matter solely addresses defendant’s alleged breach of her fiduciary duties.
But we have already determined that this argument lacks merit because of plaintiff’s failure to
demonstrate the existence of damages arising from defendant’s conduct. Further, plaintiff has not
presented any evidence that the value of the collection was higher than the purchase price obtained
at Treasure Trove.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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