COA 379251 IN RE B G STEVENS MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
August 07, 2026
2:09 PM
In re B. G. STEVENS, Minor.
No. 379251
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-000483-NA
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s trial court’s order taking jurisdiction over the
minor child, BGS, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Before this case began, respondent had four children placed in the care and custody of the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). While that case was ongoing, caseworker
Tamia Peterson discovered the respondent was pregnant. Respondent received prenatal care at
Corewell Health Dearborn Hospital (Corewell Dearborn) and was scheduled to deliver BGS there.
But on June 19, 2025, respondent arrived at Garden City Hospital in labor. Garden City Hospital
was equipped to deliver babies in its emergency room, but it was not equipped to provide care for
newborns or mothers recovering from childbirth—the hospital did not have a neonatal intensive care
unit (NICU), nor did it have an obstetrics specialist on staff. Corewell Dearborn was the hospital
closest to Garden City Hospital both with a NICU and that was equipped to provide obstetric and
gynecological care. Peterson testified that she spoke with respondent about why she went to Garden
City Hospital, and respondent told Peterson that it was because Children’s Protective Services (CPS)
had made contact with Corewell Dearborn, and respondent wanted to go to a hospital that CPS had
not contacted so that respondent would be able to take the baby home. Garden City Hospital was,
however, notified that there was an active CPS case involving respondent. And staff at Garden City
Hospital informed respondent upon her arrival at the hospital that, after the baby was born,
respondent and the baby would need to be transferred to a facility with obstetric and neonatal
services.

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BGS experienced complications after birth—for instance, there was concern about
meconium aspiration, which required monitoring at a NICU. BGS was also having difficulty
feeding and her glucose levels were initially low, causing BGS to be actively in distress. Respondent
initially refused to place BGS under a warmer at her bedside, but she eventually agreed, after which
BGS’s temperature normalized, and her glucose levels increased. Still, staff at Garden City Hospital
informed respondent that BGS needed to be transported to a facility that was better equipped to care
for her, but respondent repeatedly refused. Respondent insisted that she and BGS be transported to
the new hospital together, but no EMS carrier would agree to that. Eventually, after more than 24
hours, respondent agreed to allow BGS to be transferred to a suitable hospital, where BGS stayed
until June 28, 2025.
Before BGS was released, the DHHS petitioned the court to take jurisdiction over BGS and
remove her from respondent’s care. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the
petition and ordered BGS removed from respondent’s home. BGS was thus released from the
hospital into the DHHS’s care. Following a bench trial, the trial court found statutory grounds to
exercise jurisdiction over BGS. This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found that jurisdiction was
proper under MCL 712A.2(b).
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
MCL 712A.2 provides the circumstances in which a trial court can exercise jurisdiction over
a juvenile. To exercise jurisdiction as provided in this statute, a trial court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the child comes within the statutory requirements.” In re Brock,
442 Mich 101, 108-109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). “We review the trial court’s decision to exercise
jurisdiction for clear error in light of the court’s findings of fact.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 295;
690 NW2d 505 (2004). See also In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 253; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). A
finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made. Id.
B. ANALYSIS
The court assumed jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), which
provide in relevant part that a court has jurisdiction over a child
(1) Whose parent . . . , when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for
[the child’s] health or morals [or] who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his
or her mental well-being . . . . As used in this sub-subdivision:
* * *
(B) “Neglect” means that term as defined in section 2 of the child abuse and
neglect prevention act, 1982 PA 250, MCL 722.602.

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(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other
custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in. As used in this sub-subdivision,
“neglect” means that term as defined in section 2 of the child abuse and neglect
prevention act, 1982 PA 250, MCL 722.602. [MCL 712A.2(b)(1), (2).]
MCL 722.602(1)(d) defines “neglect” as “harm to a child’s health or welfare by a person responsible
for the child’s health or welfare,” occurring “through negligent treatment, including the failure to
provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so, or the
failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care.” Our Supreme Court has defined “negligent” as used in MCL 722.602(1)(d) as
“failing to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.” In re
Lange, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 166509); slip op at 13.
Considering MCL 712A.2(b)(1), the trial court heard evidence that, despite staff at Garden
City Hospital repeatedly informing respondent that the hospital was not equipped to provide
neonatal or obstetrics care and that respondent and BGS would need to be transferred after BGS was
born to ensure that BGS was properly cared for, respondent initially refused all attempts to transfer
BGS to a suitable hospital. This was despite not only the risks that this refusal posed to BGS but
the actual issues that BGS was experiencing with her health in the hours following her birth. Staff
from Garden City Hospital that treated respondent and BGS testified about these problems at the
adjudication trial and explained how they were ill-equipped to address BGS’s issues. For instance,
the staff detailed how Garden City Hospital simply did not have staff with the expertise to deal with
typical issues that arise with newborns, such as issues that BGS was experiencing with feedings and
latching. Garden City Hospital staff also testified that there was a concern about possible meconium
aspiration, which required observation in a NICU, and Garden City Hospital did not have a NICU.
The staff also testified about how providing proper care to BGS was complicated by respondent’s
reluctance to allow the staff to give BGS proper care, such as when respondent initially refused to
place BGS in the warmer to normalize her temperature and increase her glucose levels. And, of
course, the staff detailed how respondent’s refusal to allow BGS to be transferred to a hospital that
was equipped to provide neonatal care placed BGS in danger of experiencing serious complications
that Garden City Hospital was not prepared to manage.1
Given this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err when it found by a preponderance of
the evidence that jurisdiction was established under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). The evidence supported
the court’s finding that, despite being able to do so, respondent refused to provide proper medical
care that was necessary for BGS’s health. The evidence likewise supported the court’s finding that
BGS was harmed by respondent’s negligent refusal to allow BGS to receive proper medical care—
a reasonably prudent person in respondent’s position would not have waited to address BGS’s
medical issues and would have immediately permitted BGS to be transferred to a hospital that could
provide the care that BGS needed. Indeed, one of the nurses from Garden City Hospital testified
that, in the nearly eight years that she had been a registered nurse, she had never had a mother refuse
1 While it is true that respondent did eventually agree to allow BGS to be transferred, it was only
following multiple attempts (and refusals).

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to have their child transferred to a different hospital that could provide the services that the child
needed and that Garden City Hospital was unable to provide. Respondent on appeal attempts to
minimize the harm that her decisions caused BGS, noting that she ultimately consented to have BGS
transferred, and the delay caused “no lasting harm” to BGS. But respondent does not dispute that
the delay did cause harm to BGS’s health (however minimal respondent believes that harm was),
which is the pertinent standard. See MCL 722.602(1)(d). On this record, we conclude that the trial
court did not clearly err by exercising jurisdiction over BGS under MCL 712A.2(b)(1).2
III. DUE PROCESS
Respondent next argues that the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over BGS violated her
due-process rights in a variety of ways. None of respondent’s due-process arguments are supported
by the record, however.
Respondent contends that the trial court “relied heavily on [respondent’s] prior cases
involving other children” in support of its decision to exercise jurisdiction over BGS, but that is
simply untrue. The trial court justified its exercise of jurisdiction over BGS by focusing exclusively
on respondent’s conduct directed towards BGS. The trial court did not even mention the case
involving respondent’s other children when it found that exercising jurisdiction over BGS was
proper.
Respondent also argues that the trial court reached its judgment by making factual findings
that relied entirely on speculation and conjecture instead of actual evidence. This is also untrue.
The trial court’s findings of fact were supported by the Garden City Hospital’s staff’s testimony
about the actual harm that respondent’s actions and decisions caused BGS and the medical records
reflecting the same.
Respondent lastly contends that the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction violated her right to
due process because the court’s finding was not supported by sufficient evidence. But this, too, is
untrue, as demonstrated by this opinion’s earlier discussion of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s decision.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ James Robert Redford
2 Because only one ground for jurisdiction must be found by a preponderance of the evidence, we
need not consider, and will not address, the other ground found by the trial court. In re SLH, 277
Mich App 662, 669, 747 N.W.2d 547 (2008) (“In order to find that a child comes within the court’s
jurisdiction, at least one statutory ground for jurisdiction contained in MCL 712A.2(b) must be
proven, either at trial or by plea.”).

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