COA 376696 CH V BD Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CH,
Petitioner-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 2026
1:37 PM
v No. 376696
Macomb Circuit Court
BD, LC No. 2025-001112-PP
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The trial court granted petitioner’s request for a personal protection order (PPO) and denied
respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO. Respondent now appeals, arguing that the PPO was
improperly granted and infringed on her rights. Because the trial court did not err, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
These parties appeared previously in this Court when respondent appealed a trial court
order that denied respondent’s motion to modify custody and parenting time involving the child.
Dean v Hunter, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 18, 2026
(Docket No. 376734). Although this appeal deals with the same events, respondent is appealing
the trial court’s order denying her motion to terminate the PPO in this case.
The problems between the parties that resulted in the PPO began when the child was in
petitioner’s care, and respondent repeatedly called and messaged petitioner to speak to the child.
The situation escalated when respondent posted a video on social media that included a screenshot
of the parties’ messages, along with petitioner’s cell phone number. Petitioner received messages
from an unknown number that told petitioner that his information was “going viral,” the police
were being called, and his address would be leaked. Further, respondent contacted the police, and
officers visited petitioner’s home and performed a welfare check on the child. Petitioner informed
respondent that he intended to file for full custody and asked respondent why she was harassing
him; respondent replied that she would call the police every time petitioner denied her contact with
the child.

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Petitioner moved for full custody and sought an ex parte PPO against respondent. The PPO
was granted without a hearing, and petitioner informed respondent of the PPO when she contacted
petitioner to arrange pick up of the child. A week later, the trial court held a custody hearing and
increased petitioner’s parenting time. After respondent delayed transfer of the child to petitioner
during petitioner’s next scheduled parenting time, the trial court adopted the Friend of the Court’s
(FOC) recommendation that respondent’s parenting time be temporarily suspended.
When the child was finally transferred into petitioner’s care, respondent contacted law
enforcement and requested that they conduct a welfare check on the child at petitioner’s house.
According to a police report, the officers who received the dispatch call were familiar with the
situation between the parties and contacted respondent, informing her that they would not be
conducting a welfare check due to the excessive number of calls where neglect was unfounded.
The officers proceeded to petitioner’s home, spoke with petitioner, and checked on the child.
Respondent moved to modify custody and parenting time, and the FOC recommended that
petitioner be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child. At the hearing on respondent’s
motion, the trial court reviewed police reports documenting respondent’s excessive reporting of
petitioner to the police. Given the lack of evidence of abuse, the trial court instructed respondent
to cease calling the police and confirmed that petitioner’s PPO was still effective. After claiming
that she had never been served notice of the PPO, respondent was served with the PPO by the trial
court.
Subsequently, respondent moved to terminate the PPO, and the trial court denied the
motion. Respondent now appeals the trial court’s order denying the PPO termination.
II. ANALYSIS
A. PERSONAL PROTECTION ORDER
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in granting petitioner’s request for a
PPO. We review for an abuse of discretion of the trial court’s grant of a PPO, as well as its denial
of the PPO’s termination. CAJ v KDT, 339 Mich App 459, 463; 984 NW2d 504 (2021). The trial
court abuses its discretion if its decision is “outside the range of principled outcomes.” Brown v
Rudy, 324 Mich App 277, 288; 922 NW2d 915 (2018). The trial court’s findings of fact for its
PPO decision are reviewed for clear error—a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” CAJ, 339 Mich App at 464.
Here, the PPO expired on September 3, 2025, and there is no evidence in the record of
efforts to continue the PPO, which suggests that this case is moot, and a judgment would not “have
any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.” TM v MZ, 501 Mich 312, 317; 916
NW2d 473 (2018). A case is not moot, however, if a respondent argues that a PPO was improperly
issued and requests that notice of the PPO’s rescission be reflected in the Law Enforcement
Information Network (LEIN). Id. at 319-320. Respondent argues on appeal that if the trial court
should have never issued the PPO, then references to the PPO should be removed from LEIN.
Accordingly, this case is not moot.

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Under MCL 600.2950, a trial court must issue a PPO that restrains an individual with whom
a petitioner shares a child if the trial court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that
the individual may commit certain acts, including unauthorized removal of a child, conduct under
MCL 750.411h or MCL 750.411i, or “[a]ny other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or
interferes with personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” When
deciding whether there is reasonable cause for the PPO, the trial court considers whether
respondent has committed one of the acts listed, as well as testimony, documents, or other
evidence. MCL 600.2950(4). “The petitioner bears the burden of establishing reasonable cause
for issuance of a PPO and of establishing a justification for the continuance of a PPO at a hearing
on the respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO.” Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 326;
760 NW2d 503 (2008) (cleaned up).
Here, respondent’s actions created reasonable cause to believe that she would commit acts
of stalking under MCL 750.411h. Under MCL 750.411h, stalking includes repeated uncontested
contact through electronic communications that reasonably causes emotional distress, such as
terror, fright, or intimidation. After petitioner received an excessive number of calls and messages
from respondent and told respondent to stop contacting him, respondent not only ignored his
request but also published petitioner’s phone number on social media, which led to threats from
an unknown phone number, as well as called the police to petitioner’s house multiple times.
Because petitioner reasonably felt harassed, intimidated, and concerned for his safety as a
result of respondent’s actions, there was reasonable cause to believe respondent committed an act
under MCL 600.2950(1). Further, there was reasonable cause to believe that respondent would
continue the harassment, considering that respondent explicitly stated that she would be continuing
her course of action, including contacting the police every time petitioner denied respondent
contact with the child. Although respondent claims that her conduct was simply parental
communication, the excessiveness and pervasiveness of respondent’s contact with petitioner fails
to serve any legitimate purpose. See Hayford, 279 Mich App at 332-333.
Respondent also argues that the PPO was misused to interfere with the custody
arrangement. Although the trial court must have reasonable cause that respondent will commit an
act under MCL 600.2950(1) in order to issue a PPO, there is nothing in the section that prevents
issuing the PPO because it interferes with a custody arrangement. See MCL 600.2950(5)
(preventing issuance of a PPO where certain conditions involving property interests apply).
Rather, “this Court has recognized that a PPO need not comply with the Child Custody Act under
certain circumstances,” Hayford, 279 Mich App at 328, and respondent has failed to show that
those circumstances did not apply here given her behavior. Thus, the trial court did not err when
issuing the PPO and denying respondent’s request to terminate the PPO.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Additionally on appeal, respondent argues that her due process and First Amendment rights
were violated by the granting of the PPO without notice and without factual allegations. The Court
reviews de novo constitutional issues. In re MS, 291 Mich App 439, 442; 805 NW2d 460 (2011).
Here, a majority of respondent’s arguments are abandoned on appeal because respondent has failed
to address or explain her arguments pertaining to constitutional errors. See PIC Maintenance, Inc
v Dep’t of Treasury, 293 Mich App 403, 414; 809 NW2d 669 (2011). To the extent that the Court

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is able to glean and address respondent’s arguments, it will do so below, but keep in mind, “[a]n
appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for [her] claims.” Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184,
220; 761 NW2d 293 (2008).
For arguments relating to notice, “[t]here is no procedural due process defect in obtaining
an emergency order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for the
emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances
justifying entry of an emergency order without prior notice and where there are appropriate
provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.” Kampf v Kampf,
237 Mich App 377, 383-384; 603 NW2d 295 (1999) (cleaned up). Petitioner properly received an
ex parte PPO. After petitioner received the PPO, respondent was served notice of the PPO, moved
to terminate the PPO, and argued at the hearing the same issues she now raises on appeal.
Respondent’s arguments about notice are without merit given that the ex parte PPO was properly
issued.
Respondent additionally argues that “under MCR 3.705(B)(1), the PPO and supporting
documents must be served ‘as soon as practicable’ after entry to ensure the respondent’s ability to
respond.” MCR 3.705(B)(1) does not support this contention and instead provides that “as soon
as possible,” the court shall schedule a hearing unless the petitioner requests an ex parte order.1
Here, petitioner requested an ex parte order, and so MCR 3.705(B)(1) is inapplicable.
1 Throughout her brief on appeal, respondent cites to several cases, statutes, and court rules for
various propositions, including the following as they appear in her brief:
• “Michigan courts have consistently held that lawful conduct, such as parental contact or
requests for welfare checks, does not satisfy this statutory threshold. See Pickering v
Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 701; 659 NW2d 649 (2002) (finding that a PPO cannot be
premised on conduct that is not unlawful and poses no credible threat).”
• “Michigan precedent is clear that orders entered without proper service are void. Alken-
Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 229; 600 NW2d 638 (1999).
Because service is a jurisdictional prerequisite, the trial court’s entry and enforcement of
the PPO absent timely service rendered the order void ab initio. See also MCR 2.105(J)(3)
(defective service deprives the court of jurisdiction).”
• “Additionally, the First Amendment protects lawful communications and the right to
petition the government, including contacting law enforcement for welfare checks. City of
Houston v Hill, 482 US 451, 461; 107 S Ct 2502; 96 L Ed 2d 398 (1987).”
The authorities that respondent cites above do not support these contentions. We expect that
parties provide authority for their arguments, see Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d
100 (1998), and we understand that mistakes may happen. Despite this, we require that the
authorities cited in the parties’ filings substantially and reasonably support their arguments.

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Respondent also argues that the PPO violated her First Amendment rights. “While a person
subject to a PPO does not give up the constitutional right to free speech merely by being subject
to an order, the right to speak freely is not absolute” and “must be understood in light of another
person’s interest in being left alone.” ARM v KJL, 342 Mich App 283, 299; 995 NW2d 361 (2022)
(cleaned up). The PPO does not censor what respondent says but instead limits her contact with
petitioner, regardless of what respondent attempts to communicate to petitioner, which is not a
violation of her right to free speech. See id. at 299-301. Therefore, respondent’s First Amendment
argument fails.
III. CONCLUSION
Respondent has failed to show that the trial court erred in issuing petitioner’s PPO request
and denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO. Further, respondent has not shown that
the PPO violated her constitutional rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
By signing a document, the signer certifies that she has read the document and that to the best of
“her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” MCR 1.109(E)(5). Violations of this rule may result
in appropriate sanctions, such as an award to the other party of reasonable attorney fees. MCR
1.109(E)(6). Further, this Court may take disciplinary action when a party files a brief that is
“grossly lacking in the requirements of propriety, violate[s] court rules, or grossly disregard[s] the
requirements of a fair presentation of the issues to the court.” MCR 7.216(C)(1)(b). These rules
apply to all parties, regardless if they appear in propria persona. See Totman v Sch Dist of Royal
Oak, 135 Mich App 121, 126; 352 NW2d 364 (1984) (“We agree with the appellees that a person
acting in propria persona should be held to the same standards as members of the bar.”).
Here, the errors that we found in respondent’s brief do not rise to a level to warrant disciplinary
actions in this instance. We warn respondent and other participants in this Court, however, that
submissions of filings that contain overt and excessive errors in authority may lead to disciplinary
actions in the future. See United States v Farris, 171 F4th 920 (CA 6, 2026).

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