COA 367782 DEARBORN HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION INC V FAWZIEH BITTAR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/20/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
DEARBORN HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2025
2:20 PM
v Nos. 367782
Wayne Circuit Court
FAWZIEH BITTAR and ACHRAF HOUEIDI, LC No. 21-009017-CH
Defendants-Appellees.
DEARBORN HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 367857
Wayne Circuit Court
FAWZIEH BITTAR, LC No. 22-005596-CH
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and WALLACE and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The stucco siding of defendants’ Tudor-style house was failing, so they began replacing it
with cedar. That drew plaintiff’s attention as being out of compliance with the development’s
deed restrictions. Defendants immediately stopped work and the parties attempted to find an
agreeable solution. After they were unable to do so, plaintiff filed suit to enforce the deed
restrictions, and defendants voluntarily removed the cedar siding during its pendency. The trial
court ultimately found no deed-restriction violations, and granted summary disposition in
defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s claims and in plaintiff’s favor on the counterclaims. Because the
trial court erroneously concluded defendants did not alter their home by adding the cedar siding
without plaintiff’s approval as required by the deed restrictions, we vacate that aspect of the trial
court’s judgment. We affirm in all other respects.

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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
Defendants Achraf Houeidi and Fawzieh Bittar (husband and wife, collectively,
defendants) own a house on Fairmount Drive in Dearborn. Being located in Hannan’s Dearborn
Hills Subdivision No. 4, the property is subject to certain deed restrictions. Three Articles are of
importance to this appeal.
First, Article II sets forth a pre-approval process for alterations to buildings within the
subdivision:
No building shall be . . . altered . . . until the building plans, specifications, and plot
plan showing the location of such building have been approved in writing by the
Dearborn Hills Civic Association [(DHCA)] or by a representative designated by
said Association for conformity and harmony of external design with existing
structures in said subdivisions . . . .
Second, Article VI’s “Character and Value of Buildings” provision dictates what materials must
be used for exteriors:
All buildings shall be constructed of stone, brick or stucco exterior. A wood
exterior may be used providing same has been approved in detail in writing by the
[DHCA] or its designated representative as provided for in Article II hereof.
And it imposes certain building timelines:
The construction of all buildings started in said subdivisions shall be carried
forward to completion with reasonable promptness. In the event that any building
in said subdivisions is damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, the said
building shall either be repaired or removed within a period of four (4) months after
such occurrence.
Finally, Article XII discusses what other property owners may do upon a violation of the deed
restrictions:
If [a property owner] . . . violate[s] or attempt[s] to violate any of the covenants
herein, it shall be lawful for any other person or persons owning any real property
situated in [the] development or subdivisions to prosecute any proceedings at law
or in equity against such covenant and either to prevent him or them from so doing
or to recover damages or other dues for such violation.
Now to defendants’ house. In the spring of 2021, they began replacing its stucco siding—
starting with its street-facing upper portion—because it was both rotted and damaged by
woodpeckers. Doing so was problematic for two reasons: defendants had not sought preapproval
from DHCA as required by Article II, and they used cedar instead of stucco. So, on the day that
DHCA discovered the issue, it issued defendants a cease and desist letter.

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That began a series of escalating interactions between the parties wherein defendants
sought “review and approval” of the project and indicated that they would “cease further action”
until they received approval. One part of that back-and-forth was defendants submitting to DHCA
an “Architectural Plan Review Request Form” (DHCA refers to this as “the Plan Review
Contract”), which DHCA uses for homeowners “to request the approval of [certain] alterations to
lots or to the exterior of structures.” It provides: “Owner acceptance and assurance to fully comply
with the DHCA approved plans and any conditions of approval: I (we) agree to complete the
proposed project in full accord to the DHCA approved plans, including any stated conditions for
that approval.”
DHCA eventually denied the proposed plans, concluding they were “of a contemporary
design . . . not in conformity or harmony with the traditional designs of the homes in Dearborn
Hills and also do not conform to the traditional Tudor style of [the] house and as such violate
Article II of the Deed Restrictions.” Of specific concern to the DHCA was defendants’ use of
cedar, which was not “consistent with the Tudor-style of the home.” That denial led to more
discussions between the parties to try to find a way to draft conforming plans to no avail.
B.
With the parties unable to resolve their differences, DHCA commenced this litigation. The
operative complaint—filed as two separate actions in the trial court (for reasons unimportant
here)—pleads seven counts: breach of Article II’s prior-approval mandate (count one); breach of
Article II’s conformity and harmony mandate (count two); anticipatory breach of Article II’s deed
restrictions (count three); breach of Article VI’s reasonable promptness requirement (count four);
breach of contract (count five); promissory estoppel (count six); and fraud (count seven).
Defendant Bittar counterclaimed, asserting abuse of process, fraud, and conversion. During the
litigation, defendants voluntarily removed the cedar siding.
Following discovery, the trial court resolved numerous pending motions for summary
disposition and sanctions filed by both parties in each action in one written opinion and order.
That order dismissed all claims, granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor regarding
DHCA’s claims, and summary disposition in DHCA’s favor regarding the counterclaims. The
trial court denied DHCA’s motion for reconsideration. DHCA appeals by right in both matters,
which this Court consolidated for administrative efficiency.
II. DHCA’S STANDING
We first consider whether DHCA has standing in this litigation. Article XII of the deed
restrictions governing the disposition of this case provides a cause of action to “any other person
or persons owning any real property” within the subdivision for deed restriction violations by
others. In defendants’ view, this means DHCA—a voluntary association that does not own any
land in the subdivision—cannot sue to enforce the deed restrictions. On de novo review of the
trial court’s rejection of that argument, Groves v Dep’t of Corrections, 295 Mich App 1, 4; 811
NW2d 563 (2011), we too conclude defendants’ no-standing contention is without merit.
Under Civic Ass’n of Hammond Lake Estates v Hammond Lake Estates No 3 Lots 126-135,
DHCA has standing to enforce deed restrictions on behalf of the property owners it represents,

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despite not owning land. 271 Mich App 130, 134-135; 721 NW2d 801 (2006). Defendants
acknowledge Hammond Lake, but argue our Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Bloomfield
Estates Improvement Ass’n, Inc v City of Birmingham, 479 Mich 206; 737 NW2d 670 (2007),
commands a reading to the contrary. Although not entirely clear, they appear to rely on the
Supreme Court noting that courts must “enforce [a] deed restriction as written. . . .” Id. at 214.
But nothing in that general principal-of-law statement about deed-restriction interpretation gives
us license to set aside Hammond Lake’s organizational-standing holding (which Bloomfield
Estates did not address). Moreover, this Court has continued to follow Hammond Lake post-
Bloomfield Estates. See, e.g., Franklin Commons, LLC v Helman Woods Subdivision Homeowners
Ass’n, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Nov. 5, 2010 (Docket No.
292952), p 2-3. Defendants’ challenge to DHCA’s standing is, therefore, without merit.
III. DEED RESTRICTION CLAIMS
The main issues on appeal concern the trial court’s resolution of DHCA’s claims for
defendants’ failure to obtain preapproval (Article II), erecting a nonconforming structure (Article
II), and not completing the project within a reasonable time (Article VI). “Courts review restrictive
covenants with a special focus on determining the restrictor’s intent.” Thiel v Goyings, 504 Mich
484, 496; 939 NW2d 152 (2019). To do so, courts must read “the covenants ‘as a whole rather
than from isolated words. . . .’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Although unambiguous restrictions must
be enforced “as written, . . . any uncertainty or doubt must be resolved in favor of the free use of
property.” Id. at 158. The trial court found no violations of the deed restrictions when it granted
summary disposition in defendants’ favor, and this Court reviews that decision de novo. Jostock
v Mayfield Twp, 513 Mich 360, 368; 15 NW2d 552 (2024).
A. ARTICLE II
Two parts of DHCA’s claim of appeal concern Article II—its preclearance requirement
and its conformity and harmony requirement. Each are addressed in turn.
1. PRECLEARANCE REQUIREMENT (COUNT ONE)
We begin with the trial court’s summary-disposition grant in defendants’ favor on DHCA’s
claim that defendants violated the deed restrictions by altering their house without prior approval.
Utilizing a dictionary’s definition, the trial court defined “alter” as to “change or cause to
change in character or composition, typically in a comparatively small but significant way.” The
parties do not contest this definition and for good reason, as it accords with the commonly
understood meaning of the term. See Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 524, 534; 676 NW2d
616 (2004). And under this meaning, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that defendants
did not alter their home merely because, in the trial court’s words, they “applied the cedar siding
to only 30% of one side of their home,” which “was able to be removed on one day.” To the
contrary, the installation of cedar siding both significantly changed the house’s “character” (bright
siding on the front of the house instead of dark accent beams over light stucco) and its
“composition” (cedar wood instead of stucco and brick). This constitutes an alteration under
Article II, and defendants thus were required to seek approval from DHCA before commencing

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their project. Because they admittedly did not do so, they violated Article II’s preapproval
requirement.
It is true that defendants’ alteration was “comparatively small” in that only a portion of one
side of the house received cedar siding, but that does not make it any less “significant.” As the
pictures in the record depicting the siding’s appearance demonstrate, placing cedar on the front of
the house starkly contrasts with the rest of its Tudor character, and runs counter to Article VI’s
mandate that exteriors be made of “stone, brick, or stucco” and that wood may be used only if
approved in advance by DHCA. That it took less than a day to restore the Tudor appearance is of
no moment for doing so cost tens of thousands of dollars, thus reflecting how significant the
alteration was. Finally, we are not persuaded that defendants’ removal of the siding changes this
analysis or renders moot this appeal, as they still “altered” their house without preapproval and
thus DHCA can obtain relief in the form of at least damages and declaratory relief.
For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for it to enter summary
disposition on count one in DHCA’s favor.
2. CONFORMITY AND HARMONY REQUIREMENT (COUNT TWO)
DHCA next asserts defendants breached Article II’s conformity and harmony requirement
by installing the cedar siding, noting both its different look and its expert’s statement that
“untreated cedar is inconsistent with the classical English Tudor design and is not conforming with
the other homes in Dearborn Hills.” That may be, but Article II makes plain that the “conformity
and harmony” requirement relates only to DHCA’s review obligations, and nothing more. That
is, DHCA must review plans proposing to “alter” structures “for conformity and harmony of
external design with existing structures.” Here defendants make no claim that DHCA’s review
and subsequent non-approval was somehow rooted in an erroneous conformity-and-harmony
conclusion. This fact renders distinguishable DHCA’s reliance on one of its other efforts to
enforce the deed restrictions, in which the DHCA found the homeowners’ use of stone “failed to
conform and harmonize with the other houses in the subdivision” and the homeowners challenged
that conclusion on appeal. See Dearborn Hills Civic Ass’n, Inc, v Merhi, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 28, 2022 (Docket No. 354905), p 13-16. So even if
the trial court was wrong in concluding there existed no evidence concerning conformity and
harmony (and relatedly setting aside DHCA’s expert affidavit for want of signature) as DHCA
insists, this Court “will not reverse a trial court’s decision when it reaches the right result, even if
it was for the wrong reason.” Bailey v Antrim Co, 341 Mich App 411, 420; 990 NW2d 372 (2022).
For these reasons, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition on this claim in
defendants’ favor.
B. ARTICLE VI’S REASONABLE PROMPTNESS REQUIREMENT (COUNT FOUR)
Turning next to the length of time the cedar was on defendants’ house, DHCA contends
the trial court erroneously dismissed its Article VI claim because defendants started their siding
project in March 2021 and did not remove the cedar siding until August 2022, thus violating Article
VI’s “reasonable promptness” requirement as well as its requirement to complete construction

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within four months to repair damage caused by “fire or other casualty.” Article IV’s plain language
forecloses these readings.
Begin with the “reasonable promptness” requirement. The trial court concluded “[t]here
was no construction to complete with reasonable promptness . . . because Defendants’ [application
to DHCA] was never approved,” highlighting that defendants “honor[ed] the cease and desist
issued by DHCA” and thus withheld completion of the project. This conclusion comports with
Article VI’s “reasonable” restrictions, and DHCA cites no record facts undermining the conclusion
that the decision to pause all activities in the face of litigation was somehow unreasonable. Nor
are we persuaded that we should read anything into it taking less than a day to remove the cedar
siding, for Article VI mandates that the construction “be carried forward to completion with
reasonable promptness” and thus does not apply to DHCA’s revert-to-how-it-was argument.
As for DHCA’s “fire or other casualty” argument, that too is without merit. DHCA
contends this provision applies because woodpeckers damaged the siding, constituting a
“casualty.” We disagree. The deed restrictions do not define “casualty,” but its context—“fire or
other casualty”—gives it meaning. See Bloomfield Estates, 479 Mich at 215 (“[U]nder the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, ‘a word or phrase is given meaning by its context and setting.’ ”
(citation omitted)). Casualty must thus be read as an accidental event and not one covering over-
time, normal wear-and-tear like damaged siding due to wood rot or woodpeckers.
C. DEED RESTRICTION REMEDIES
That leaves us with DHCA’s request for us to grant it declaratory relief, monetary (or even
nominal) damages, and attorney fees. Because the trial court erroneously granted summary
disposition on count one and because “we are a court of review, not first view,” Cutter v Wilkinson,
544 US 709, 718 n 7; 125 S Ct 2113; 161 L Ed 2d 1020 (2005), we will leave it to the trial court
on remand to consider the remedies to which DHCA may be entitled.
IV. DHCA’S REMAINING CLAIMS
We turn next to DHCA’s remaining claims that it has appealed: breach of contract (count
five) and fraud (count seven). We again review de novo, Jostock, 513 Mich at 368, and, like the
trial court, consider them together. DHCA premises its contract claim on defendants’ submission
of an “Architectural Plan Review Request Form,” which DHCA uses for homeowners “to request
the approval of [certain] alterations to lots or to the exterior of structures.” As part of that form,
defendants agreed to the following language: “Owner acceptance and assurance to fully comply
with the DHCA approved plans and any conditions of approval: I (we) agree to complete the
proposed project in full accord to the DHCA approved plans, including any stated conditions for
that approval.” DHCA claims defendants breached this commitment by backing out on their
proposed siding replacement project. But as the trial court appropriately reasoned when it granted
summary disposition in defendants’ favor on this claim, that “contract” spoke of post-approval
terms and did not reflect mutuality of agreement, impose any obligation prior to approval, or
include consideration—each of which are required elements to form a contract. See AFT Mich v
Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235; 866 NW2d 782 (2015). And because there was no contract,
DHCA’s fraud claim—based on the contract (that defendants entered into the agreement to induce
DHCA to expeditiously approve the plans without any intent to abide by DHCA’s conditions)—

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is similarly without merit. See generally Huron Tool and Engineering Co v Precision Consulting
Servs, Inc, 209 Mich App 365, 373; 532 NW2d 541 (1995) (“[M]isrepresentations relat[ing] to the
breaching party’s performance of the contract . . . do not give rise to an independent cause of action
in tort.”).
V. DHCA’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Finally, DHCA contends that the counterclaims were frivolous and thus requests
approximately $2,500 in attorney fees as a sanction under MCR 1.109(E)(6). But based on our
review of the record, we see nothing establishing that defendants’ attorney failed to conduct a
“reasonable” inquiry before signing the counterclaims pleading as required for sanctions under
MCR 1.109(E)(6). We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of DHCA’s request for attorney
fees.
VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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