COA 370759 SAAD YOUSIF ISHOO V FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE CO OF MICHIGAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/21/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
SAAD YOUSIF ISHOO and MARENA SAAD
ISHOO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 2026
9:44 AM
v No. 370759
Wayne Circuit Court
FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,
LC No. 22-000973-NI
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and BORRELLO and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right the trial court’s stipulated order of dismissal.1 We dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arose after plaintiffs sought uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM/UIM)
coverage and personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from defendant for a hit-and-run
accident. Relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs’ insurance policy with defendant mandated that they
permit defendant to inspect their vehicle within 15 days of the accident and that they submit to
examinations under oath (EUO) as required by defendant. The policy further provided that “[n]o
1 We initially dismissed plaintiffs’ claim of appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Sandoval v
Farmers Ins Exch, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (Docket Nos. 361166 and 361176), vacated
by 20 NW3d 588 (Mich, 2025). Ishoo v Farm Bureau Ben Ins Co of Mich, unpublished order of
the Court of Appeals, entered June 10, 2024 (Docket No. 370759). Our Supreme Court vacated
that order and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this Court’s recent decision in
Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363572)
(Jaber II). As will be discussed below, this case is distinct from Jaber, and we conclude that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ appeal.

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legal action may be brought against [defendant] until . . . there has been full compliance with all
the terms of this policy[.]”
Defendant requested to conduct an inspection of plaintiffs’ car shortly after the 15-day time
frame had passed, but plaintiffs did not respond. They later reported that they gave the car away
within a week of the accident because the repair costs exceeded its value. Defendant also
scheduled an EUO for plaintiffs, and instructed that, if they could not attend on the scheduled date,
they should reach out “to arrange for a mutually agreeable time and date for the examination[.]”
Plaintiffs did not reach out to inform defendant of any scheduling problems. Instead, they filed
the instant lawsuit.
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition of plaintiffs’ UM/UIM claims under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). It argued that plaintiffs failed to comply
with the car-inspection and EUO-attendance provisions of the policy, which precluded suit. The
trial court agreed and dismissed plaintiffs’ UM/UIM claims. The parties continued litigating
plaintiffs’ remaining PIP claims but ultimately stipulated to dismissal. The stipulated order
provided that plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed with prejudice, but did not include any reservation
of appellate rights. Plaintiffs now appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo “[w]hether this Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal . . . .” Varran
v Granneman (On Remand), 312 Mich App 591, 598; 880 NW2d 242 (2015).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to reserve their
right to appeal in the stipulated order of dismissal. We agree.
“The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law and the practice and
procedure therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court.” Const 1963, art 6, § 10.
“Although parties typically may appeal a final order by right, the general rule is that parties who
consent to a final order cannot appeal its merits.” Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC, ___ Mich App
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363572) (Jaber II); slip op at 4.2 But “a consent judgment
may be appealable when a reservation of rights is included.” Id.
In Jaber II, the plaintiff was injured while standing outside a club when an employee was
escorting an intoxicated patron outside. Id. at ___; slip op at 2. Things between the employee and
patron became physical, and the employee “violently pushed or threw him into [the] plaintiff.” Id.
Plaintiff filed suit against the company that owned the club as well as the patron. Id. The trial
court granted the club owner’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims
2 Jaber II was decided by a conflict panel after this Court’s initial decision, Jaber v P & P
Hospitality, LLC, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363572) (Jaber I).
Because the citations are identical, this opinion will use “Jaber II” even though it does not rely on
Jaber I.

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against the company with prejudice. Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3. Litigation continued between the
plaintiff and patron, which ultimately resulted in the parties signing a stipulated order dismissing
the plaintiff’s remaining claims against the patron with prejudice. Id. at ___; slip op at 3. The
dismissal order did not reserve the plaintiff’s right to appeal the trial court’s earlier grant of
summary disposition to the club-owner company. Id. The plaintiff appealed from the final,
stipulated order, but only challenged the trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Id.
As a result, this Court was tasked with the question of “whether this Court has jurisdiction
over a claim of appeal taken from a stipulated final order when the issue on appeal derives from
an earlier interlocutory order relating to another party but the appellant did not reserve the right
to appeal that issue in the stipulated final order.” Id. (Emphasis added). Jaber II answered this
question in the affirmative. Id. at ___; slip op at 10. But Jaber II expressly declined to address
the issue in this case: “whether an appellant may raise issues arising out of an earlier order if the
appellant, while failing to reserve the right to appeal, subsequently enters into a stipulated order of
dismissal as to the same party that was the subject of the earlier order.” Id. at ___ n 3; slip op at
2 n 3 (emphasis added).
“Stipulated orders that are accepted by the trial court are generally construed under the
same rules of construction as contracts.” Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183
(2000), app dis 618 NW2d 591 (Mich, 2000). The goal of contract interpretation “is to give effect
to the intent of the parties, to be determined first and foremost by the plain and unambiguous
language of the contract itself.” Kendzierski v Macomb Co, 503 Mich 296, 311; 931 NW2d 604
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The reasoning in Jaber II was premised on the fact
that the plaintiff was challenging an order dismissing claims against a different party than the party
to the stipulated order. It reasoned that a nonparty to a stipulated order “should not be permitted
to dictate that [a] plaintiff [is] required to include a reservation of the right to appeal the earlier
ruling” in the nonparty’s favor. Jaber II, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10.
This reasoning makes sense; a nonparty to a contract should not be able to claim protection
under the contract to which only a party is entitled. But this is not the case here. Here, defendant
was a party to the stipulated order. Thus, it was entitled to claim protection under the contract as
a party. The stipulated order of dismissal states “that Plaintiffs Saad Yousif Ishoo and Marena
Saad Ishoo’s claims against Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan are
dismissed with prejudice and without costs and fees to the parties.” The parties used broad
language in dismissing plaintiffs’ “claims” against defendant—a party to the stipulated order—
with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ “claims” against defendant included both their UM/UIM claims and
their PIP claims. Thus, when plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal of their “claims” against
defendant, the stipulation applied to their PIP claims as well as their UM/UIM claims previously
dismissed. To infer that the broad term “claims” actually means “remaining claims” or “PIP
claims” would be to read words into the contract’s plain language; an exercise in which this Court
may not partake. Northline Excavating, Inc v Livingston Co, 302 Mich App 621, 628; 839 NW2d
693 (2013), app dis 497 Mich 867 (2014).

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Because plaintiffs consented to dismiss their “claims” against defendant with prejudice and
did not reserve any appellate rights, they cannot challenge the trial court’s decisions with respect
to any of these “claims” on appeal. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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