COA 374844 PEOPLE OF MI V ARTIS LEE HOLMES Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/18/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2025
12:36 PM
v No. 374844
Jackson Circuit Court
ARTIS LEE HOLMES, LC No. 2019-002923-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to us after remand to the trial court. Defendant was charged and convicted
of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm after a fight between him and the victim, a
member of his girlfriend’s family, resulted in the victim being stabbed. Defendant appealed his
conviction and his 28-month upward-departure sentence of 15 to 40 years, and this Court remanded
to the trial court to “further articulate its reasoning for its upward-departure sentence or to
resentence defendant.” People v Holmes, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued February 22, 2024 (Docket No. 362221), p 1. Defendant is now appealing the trial court’s
resentencing of 152 to 360 months’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of the underlying crime were set forth in this Court’s previous opinion:
This case arises from a fight between defendant and Donald Cain [the victim]
during which Cain was repeatedly stabbed.
For years, Cain had been in a dating relationship with the mother of Brianna Sweet,
and she viewed him as her stepfather and as a quasi-grandfather to her children.
Sweet lived with defendant, their children, and her aunt. Sweet had two children
with defendant, and on August 7, 2019, Cain had plans to take one of the children
to the county fair. Unbeknownst to Cain, defendant had been feuding with Cain’s
brother, Ernest Eison, and Eison had sent threatening text messages to defendant.
When Cain arrived to pick up the child for the county fair, Sweet told him that she

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did not want Cain to take the child. When defendant arrived and confirmed what
Sweet said, Cain was outraged and a heated argument with defendant ensued. The
pair argued in the driveway, and as defendant went into the breezeway of his house,
Cain followed him and attacked him with his fists. Cain started the fight, but
defendant finished it.
Defendant stabbed Cain in his arm, chest, neck, and thorax area. Cain suffered
some of the stab wounds to his back as he was trying to leave the breezeway. Once
outside the breezeway, Cain passed out, and while he was on the ground, defendant
stomped on his face, causing Cain to suffer a broken nose and a broken eye socket.
Cain was able to get into his car and drove to his brother’s house, and an ambulance
then took him to the hospital. Defendant was arrested the same day; he was charged
with assault to commit murder. [Holmes, unpub op at 1-2.]
During trial, the jail deputy who searched defendant when he was booked after his arrest
testified that he “observe[d] a red splatter on [defendant’s] shoes,” which “appeared to be blood.”
Later, when retrieving defendant from a holding cell, the deputy noticed that defendant’s “shoes
were completely white” and no longer had a red splatter on them. Finding this suspicious, the
deputy reviewed the surveillance video from the holding cell and testified that it appeared that
defendant “put some toilet paper in the sink to get water” and rubbed his shoes.
Further, one of the investigating officers testified that he listened to a jail phone call
between defendant and Sweet in which defendant “indicate[d] he’s surprised . . . that a weapon
was not recovered” and that he would be sending a letter to her. The officer then screened letters
sent to Sweet, and in one of the letters, defendant “mentioned needing [Sweet] to get some money
and shit off of the roof.” Upon investigation, the officer located a pair of silver steel scissors
wrapped in clear plastic Saran Wrap. Although there was a dark substance on the scissors that the
officer suspected could be blood, lab testing found that there was not an indication of blood on the
scissors. The officer suspected that the scissors were cleaned before being wrapped in Saran Wrap
because he saw the wrap inside the home next to rubbing alcohol and a towel.
Although charged with assault to commit murder, the jury found defendant guilty of the
lesser crime of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. The
trial court sentenced him to a 28-month upward-departure sentence of 15 to 40 years. Defendant
appealed, arguing errors with the jury instructions, his right to testify, prosecutorial conduct, and
sentencing, specifically that the trial court did not properly justify its 28-month upward-departure
sentence. Defendant’s convictions were affirmed, but this Court remanded the case back to the
trial court for either an explanation for the departure from the sentencing guidelines or for
resentencing. On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to serve 152 to 360 months’
imprisonment based on a minimum sentencing guidelines range of 38 to 152 months. Defendant
now appeals his resentencing.
II. ANALYSIS
In this appeal, defendant is arguing that the trial court erred in its scoring of Offense
Variables (OV) 7 and 19. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual determinations when
calculating the guidelines and review de novo statutory interpretation of scoring conditions.

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People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). Trial courts are to determine
sentencing variables “by reference to the record, using the standard of preponderance of the
evidence.” People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111; 748 NW2d 799 (2008).
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly assessed 50 points for OV 7 because
his conduct was a mutual fight with an initial aggressor rather than heinous or extreme conduct.
OV 7 considers whether there was aggravated physical abuse involved in the sentencing offense
and is assessed at 50 points if a victim “was treated with sadism, torture, excessive brutality, or
similarly egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim
suffered during the offense.” MCL 777.37(1)(a). When assessing OV 7, the trial courts “must
consider whether the defendant engaged in conduct beyond the minimum required to commit the
offense and, if so, whether the conduct was intended to make a victim’s fear or anxiety greater by
a considerable amount.” People v Rodriguez, 327 Mich App 573, 579; 935 NW2d 51 (2019)
(cleaned up). A defendant’s use of excessive violence, taunts, threats, or a weapon not required to
commit the underlying offense can all be considered when assigning points to OV 7. People v
Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 497-499; 967 NW2d 847 (2021).
Defendant’s sentencing offense, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, does not
require the use of a weapon. MCL 750.84(1)(a). Defendant repeatedly stabbed the victim in the
stomach with a sharp object and continued to kick the victim while on the ground and retreating
from defendant, resulting in victim’s broken eye socket and broken nose. Defendant’s continued
attack in conjunction with defendant’s use of a weapon to stab the victim supports by a
preponderance of the evidence the trial court’s finding that defendant’s conduct was excessive and
intended to increase the victim’s fear or anxiety. See Rodriguez, 327 Mich App at 580. Therefore,
the trial court did not err by assigning 50 points to OV 7.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in assessing 10 points for OV 19 because
he did not interfere with the administration of justice. Specifically, defendant argues that the
scissors found on the roof were not the weapon used to stab the victim, and thus their presence on
the roof cannot support assigning 10 points to OV 19. The trial court must assign 10 points under
OV 19 if the “offender otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration
of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). The plain and ordinary meaning of interference for assessing points
for OV 19 “is to oppose so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering
judgment of individuals or causes by judicial process.” People v Hershey, 303 Mich App 330,
343; 844 NW2d 127 (2013). Generally, “conduct that occurred after an offense was completed
may be considered” when assessing points for OV 19. People v Smith, 488 Mich 193, 202; 793
NW2d 666 (2010).
Although defendant argues that the wrapped scissors on the roof were not the object used
to stab the victim, the trial court could infer defendant’s interference or attempted interference with
the investigation based on the evidence. The scissors wrapped in plastic wrap were located by
police after defendant sent his girlfriend a letter from jail directing her to remove something from
a particular area of the roof. Although no fingerprints, blood, or DNA evidence was found on the
scissors, police suspected that the scissors were cleaned after they found plastic wrap inside the
home near a bottle of rubbing alcohol and a towel. From this evidence, and considering that
defendant provides no alternative explanation as to why he sent the letter from the jail or why
scissors wrapped in plastic were found on the roof, the trial court could reasonably infer that

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defendant intended to interfere with the investigation by hiding the scissors that he used to stab the
victim and instructing his girlfriend to remove the scissors from that hiding spot. See Hershey,
303 Mich App at 343. Similarly, despite defendant’s claim that his shoes were not part of the
investigation, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer from the evidence that defendant acted
to evade the administration of justice when he removed blood from his shoes. See Smith, 488
Mich at 202. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when assessing 10 points for OV 19.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not clearly err in its resentencing of defendant. OV 7 was properly
assessed at 50 points for excessive brutality when defendant used a weapon when the offense did
not require it, and defendant’s continued attack on the victim resulted in the victim’s serious
injuries. Further, the trial court did not err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant intended to interfere with the administration of justice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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