COA 372753 PEOPLE OF MI V DEVON KAREEM-BUCKINGH ROBINSON Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 11/17/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2025
10:29 AM
v No. 372753
Wayne County Circuit Court
DEVON KAREEM-BUCKINGH ROBINSON, LC No. 19-008817-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and MARIANI and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
When he was 18-years-old, defendant, Devon Kareem Robinson, murdered three strangers
after a late-night sexual encounter with them. A jury convicted him of three counts of first-degree
murder and other crimes, and the trial court imposed mandatory sentences of life in prison without
the possibility of parole. But following our Supreme Court’s determination that such a sentence—
“without considering the attributes of youth”—violates the 1963 Michigan Constitution’s
proscription against cruel or unusual punishment, People v Parks, 510 Mich 161, 176; 987 NW2d
161 (2022), this Court remanded for resentencing. The trial court then imposed a 35- to 60-year
sentence for his first-degree murder convictions. On appeal from that resentencing, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This Court previously described how defendant met and murdered his three victims within
just a few hours as follows:
This case arises from the murders of Timothy Blancher, Alunte Davis, and
Paris Cameron. The murders occurred while Blancher, Cameron, and Davis were
in a home located at 3474 Devonshire Street in Detroit. Blancher, Cameron, and
Davis died after defendant shot them multiple times. Clifton Keys and Armon
Matthews were also present in the home at the time of the murders, but they escaped
the gunfire.
On May 24, 2019, Lance Atterberry had a party at his home at 3474
Devonshire Street. In relevant part, Blancher, Cameron, Davis, Keys, Matthews,

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and Brandon Suttles attended the party. At about 2:30 a.m., on May 25, 2019,
Blancher, Cameron, Davis, Keys, and Matthews went to a nearby BP gas station.
Defendant was at the gas station when they arrived. Cameron approached
defendant and invited him to the party even though he was a stranger. Defendant
went to the party, where he engaged in sexual activities with Blancher, Cameron,
Davis, and two other individuals. Several guests joked about the “orgy” and
defendant’s sexuality.
Atterberry, Blancher, Cameron, Davis, Keys, Matthews, and Suttles were
present when defendant left the house, with Keys and Matthews noting that
defendant’s demeanor was concerning and that defendant informed them that they
would “see [him] again.” Atterberry and Suttles later left 3474 Devonshire Street
and drove to the other side of Detroit. Blancher, Cameron, Davis, Keys, and
Matthews remained in the home and waited for Suttles and Atterberry to return. As
they were sitting around a table and “laughing” about the events that occurred, an
individual wearing a ski mask entered the home and began shooting. Keys saw the
shooter’s eyes and noted he had the same complexion as defendant. Keys and
Matthews, who could not see the shooter, were able to avoid the gunfire. Blancher,
Cameron, and Davis were fatally wounded. [People v Robinson, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 27, 2022 (Docket No.
356401), p 1-2.]
For these acts, a jury convicted Robinson of three counts of first-degree murder, two counts of
assault with intent to murder, and five counts of felony firearm. As relevant here, the trial court
imposed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for his murder counts.
Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed his convictions. Id. at 3-6. But binding
intervening authority required vacating his life sentences. Id. at 6-7. That is, our Supreme Court
held during the pendency of his appeal that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life
in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment
and thus is a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ ” under
Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s Constitution. Parks, 510 Mich at 176. So, in light of Parks, this
Court remanded for resentencing on the life sentences. Robinson, unpub op at 6-7.
Following defendant’s unsuccessful application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court,
the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing in July 2024 (at which point defendant was 23-
years-old) and imposed 35- to 60-years’ imprisonment for each first-degree murder conviction. In
so doing, the trial court reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report, took victim impact
statements, heard counsel arguments and allocution from defendant, and considered the statutory
sentencing requirements (25 to 40-year minimum term of imprisonment, with the maximum being
not less than 60 years, MCL 769.25(10); MCL 769.25a(4)(c)). The trial court reasoned:
Mr. Robinson, the Court has received a number of pleadings filed by the
People as well as a brief filed by your appellate counsels. And the Court has
reviewed all of the exhibits that have been provided to the Court.

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I presided over the trial so the Court did hear a lot of the evidence, the facts
in evidence in this particular case. The Court has considered the Miller factors as
it relates to whether or not they would be mitigating in terms of the sentence that
you would receive. I will say for this record that the Court was struck when it was
reviewing the documentation provided by appellate counsel wherein you Mr.
Robinson indicated that your behavior or your actions on that night was associated
with nonconsensual sex with the parties that were present in the home.
I was struck by that because from my perspective having sat through the
trial and heard the evidence in this particular case it seems as if you’re offering yet
another excuse for why you did what you did. I know the People’s theory of the
case was that you were not able to deal with your own sexuality and that’s why you
left that home and went back to your home and changed your clothes and 50
minutes later came back and shot up the home and killed three people and almost
killed two other people.
And so now the explanation that the Court is getting is that you were the
victim of nonconsensual sex in this home and that’s why you did what you did. I
appreciate the statements that you’re making on the record today that you are
remorseful. I appreciate that you are apologizing to the family.
This was not an impulsive act. This was not an impulsive act. You left that
home. You went back to your house. You changed clothes. You came back and
you shot three people to death and nearly killed two others.
As indicted on the record that the injuries were sustained by the victims in
this case; it was your, you wanted to kill them. You came back to kill everyone in
that home. Based upon everything that the Court has reviewed, the documentation
that’s been provided by appellate counsel along with the presentence investigation
report, the Court’s consideration of the Miller factors in this case as well as the
statute you will be sentenced to no less than 35 years and no more than 60 years for
each of the three counts of homicide and the first-degree premeditated.
Defendant now appeals, asserting the trial court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor.
Before turning to the appeal, we are compelled to comment on the briefing in this matter.
We recognize the prosecutor’s office was not obligated to file an appellee brief, cf People v Smith,
439 Mich 954, 954 (1992), but not doing so risks having us render a decision on the merits without
the benefit of adversarial briefing, see People v Hatfield, 46 Mich App 149, 151; 207 NW2d 485
(1973). We thankfully have that here, but barely so. The Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office
tardily filed its appellee brief just one week before we heard argument in this case (and six months
after defendant filed his appellant’s brief). There are of course many understandable reasons for
delayed filings. The consequences of doing so, however, affect oral argument preparation and, in
this case, the ability to file a reply brief before oral argument. We thus emphasize our desire that
parties timely file briefs to best aid in our consideration of every case before us.

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II. ANALYSIS
A. SENTENCING OVERVIEW
Courts must impose reasonable sentences. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902
NW2d 327 (2017). A sentence is reasonable if it adheres to the “principle of proportionality.” Id.
That means it is “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the offender.” Id. at 474, quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
In arriving at a proportionate sentence, a sentencing court must consider the four Snow factors.
See People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 194 NW2d 314 (1972). Those factors “are: (1) ‘reformation
of the offender’; (2) ‘protection of society’; (3) ‘disciplining of the wrongdoer’; and (4) ‘deterrence
of others from committing like offenses.’ ” People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 188; 987 NW2d 58
(2022) quoting Snow, 386 Mich at 592. And it must “state on the record which criteria were
considered and what reasons support the court’s decision regarding the length and nature of
punishment imposed.” People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 549; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), overruled on
other grounds by Milbourn, 435 Mich at 635. This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of
discretion, which occurs when a sentencing court imposes an unreasonable sentence. Steanhouse,
500 Mich at 471.
B. SENTENCING YOUTHS
Review of Robinson’s sentence begins with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller v Alabama, which held that mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences for
those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455;
183 L Ed 407 (2012). The Court also held sentencing courts may still exercise their discretion to
impose life sentences on juveniles (after consideration of certain factors set forth next), id. at 477-
479, but emphasized that they must be able to impose lesser sentences by considering the
“mitigating qualities of youth,” id. at 476 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme
Court has since extended Miller’s holding under Michigan’s similar constitutional proscription to
include 18-year-old offenders, like defendant here, Parks, 510 Mich at 244-245, as well as 19- and
20-year-olds, People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and
166654); slip op at 2, 37-38.
Miller begat numerous changes to Michigan’s sentencing scheme, including the
elimination of mandatory life sentences for juveniles. See, e.g., MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a.
Consistent with Miller, a trial judge may still impose a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole
sentence upon a motion by the prosecutor and following a hearing that considers the so-called
Miller factors. MCL 769.25(6). These factors are “(1) the juvenile’s chronological age and its
hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences; (2) the juvenile’s family and home environment—from which he cannot usually
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional; (3) the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him; (4) the incompetencies of youth, which affect whether the
juvenile might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser crime, for example, because the
juvenile was unable to deal with law enforcement or prosecutors or because the juvenile did not
have the capacity to assist their attorney in their own defense; and (5) the juvenile’s possibility of

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rehabilitation.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 126; 987 NW2d 132 (2022), quoting Miller, 567
US at 477-478 (quotation marks omitted).
Left in the wake of Miller—and our Supreme Court’s extension of it—is how trial courts
must consider youth going forward. In Boykin the Supreme Court answered that question:
“Sentencing courts must consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing hearings . . . when the
defendant is sentenced to a term of years.” 510 Mich at 196. And they do so by considering “the
Snow factors, which necessarily include consideration of youth as a mitigating factor.” Id. This
is so, reasoned Boykin, because each Snow factor implicates youth:
For example, since a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies
will be reformed, the mitigating qualities of youth necessarily transform the
analysis of the first Snow criterion. Without considering the mitigating factors of
youth, then, a sentence cannot adequately address the reformation of the offender.
Next, because youth have a heightened capacity for change relative to adults, the
needs for protecting society should be given individualized consideration, which
necessarily considers the way youth affects the defendant’s ability to change. In
addition, because it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character, Snow’s
focus on discipline of the wrongdoer must be viewed differently under the lens of
youth. Nor can deterrence do the work in this context, because the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults make them less likely
to consider potential punishment. [Id. at 188-189 (alterations, quotation marks, and
internal citations omitted).]
To repeat, Boykin sets forth a specific requirement for courts sentencing defendants like Robinson:
“in all sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial courts are to
consider the defendant’s youth and must treat it as a mitigating factor.” Boykin, 510 Mich at 189.
The Boykin Court, like it had in Taylor, again instructed trial courts to be cautious not to turn
consideration of a defendant’s youth into an aggravating factor. Id. at 195 (“[Y]outh is a mitigating
factor at sentencing, not an aggravating factor.”); Taylor, 510 Mich at 139 n 25 (“We caution the
trial courts to ensure that the Miller factors are not used as aggravators.”).
Importantly, Boykin also held that there is “no requirement for an on-the-record articulation
of how youth or the Miller factors affected a sentence . . . .” Id. at 192. “[I]f the sentencer has
discretion to consider the defendant’s youth,” reasoned Boykin, “the sentencer necessarily will
consider the defendant’s youth, especially if defense counsel advances an argument based on the
defendant’s youth. Faced with a convicted murderer who was . . . 18 at the time of the offense and
with defense arguments focused on the defendant’s youth, it would be all but impossible for a
sentencer to avoid considering that mitigating factor.” Id. at 193 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Indeed, Boykin preserved a sentencing court’s discretion “to articulate how an offender’s
youth or the Miller factors apply to th[e] particular offender’s sentence,” which “enhance[s] an
appellate court’s ability to review the proportionality of that sentence.” Id. at 194 n 9.
This Court’s decision in People v Copeland illustrates Boykin’s application. --- Mich App
---; --- NW3d --- (2024) (Docket No. 363925). The defendant there claimed the trial court did not
adequately justify its sentence because it failed to “consider the mitigating qualities of youth within

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Snow’s sentencing criteria” based on the record being devoid of statements reflecting consideration
of youth. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. Relying directly on Boykin, the Copeland Court responded:
“[T]here is no requirement that a trial court resentencing a defendant to a term-of-years sentence
. . . articulate on the record its consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth within Snow’s
sentencing criteria. . . . [T]here are no magic words or phrases that a trial court must use to show
that it adequately considered the mitigating qualities of youth.” Id. And in reviewing the trial
court’s reasoning, this Court found record support for such consideration, which was properly
informed by the years that had passed since the offense: “defendant was not a juvenile at the time
of his resentencing, but instead had already served over 20 years in prison. It follows that when
the trial court was considering the Snow factors, it was doing so with the benefit of hindsight.” Id.
at 5 (footnote omitted).
Boykin’s no-articulation standard, as attractive as its plain and straightforward dictate may
be, does not easily comport with the abuse-of-discretion standard this Court applies to reviewing
trial courts’ sentencing decisions. As persuasively reasoned by Judge BOONSTRA in a recent
concurrence, it is “inherently impossible” to ensure that a trial court considers a juvenile offender’s
youth under Parks and Taylor when Boykin instructs that trial courts need not put on the record
how it did so. See, e.g., People v Abbatoy, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued Aug. 18, 2022 (Docket No. 357766) (BOONSTRA, J., concurring), p 2-3. We share similar
concerns.
In practice, Boykin’s standard might counterintuitively incentivize trial courts to adopt a
less-is-more approach—that is, to avoid articulating their sentencing reasoning or to minimize it
to little more than an acknowledgment of the relevant case law governing sentencing, as was the
case here. This inhibits appellate review. It seems to us that trial courts should do more than cite
cases and set forth minimal or generally applicable sentencing rationales and instead state more
clearly how they have considered an offender’s youth when imposing a sentence. For how are we
to conduct a constitutionally required and appropriate review of a sentence for reasonableness and
proportionality without sufficient articulation of the rationale of the trial court plainly set forth in
the record? Nor are we persuaded that Boykin’s conclusion that the Snow factors necessarily
include considering youth, Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189, justifies excusing a trial court from
making an on-the-record statement about how it considered youth, especially because Boykin
separately notes that “trial courts are not required to consider each of the [Snow] factors when
imposing a sentence,” id. at 183-184.
As the intermediate appellate court, we must of course apply Boykin’s holding to the
contrary. To that we turn next.
C. APPLICATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE
Robinson argues that the trial court’s “brevity” in proclaiming his sentence demonstrates
that it failed to consider his youth as a mitigating circumstance (through Snow’s prism) and indeed
that its emphasis on the brutal nature of defendant’s crimes and its finding that defendant acted

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intentionally and not impulsively reflects that it treated Robinson’s youth as “aggravating.”1 On
this record and on abuse-of-discretion review, see id. at 182, we cannot agree.
We begin with what the trial court had before it. Robinson’s PSIR detailed a troubled
childhood due to his father’s incarceration, his lack of stable housing, and drug abuse. The PSIR
also extensively detailed his significant history of misconduct since being incarcerated, but also
noted he took steps to complete some educational programs and that he was “working hard in
improving his behavior.” Also before the trial court was a well-prepared resentencing
memorandum from his attorneys. That filing took issue with the consensual nature of the sex acts
preceding the murders and extensively discussed the post-Miller legal developments that now
require a court’s consideration of youth when sentencing 18-year-old defendants. And, most
important, Robinson’s resentencing memorandum set forth how he thought the Miller factors
applied to him. That section is replete with arguments tied to his youth. It asserts, for example,
that his childhood difficulties—“experienc[ing] extreme poverty, and sexual assault,” and being
shot “while defending his mom when he was 17 years old”—limited his maturation. And in
addition to victim impact statements and a brief allocution from defendant who indicated “regret”
and asked for “forgiveness,” both his counsel, and the prosecution, had extensive opportunities to
further discuss the Miller factors at the resentencing hearing.
With this background, and Boykin’s instruction that trial courts need not “articulate a basis
on the record to explain how youth affected the sentence imposed,” 510 Mich at 193, we do not
understand the trial court’s brief statement in support of its sentence to run afoul of Parks and its
progeny. Crucial here is the background animating the trial court’s discussion. The trial court
considered extensive materials detailing Miller’s application, expressly leading and concluding
with that point, stating twice that it considered “the Miller factors as it relates to whether or not
they would be mitigating in terms of the sentence that you would receive.” And, as with Copeland,
the trial court had the “benefit of hindsight,” sentencing Robinson then as a 23-year-old with
several years of incarceration behind him. Copeland, __ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. So, to our
eye, the record reveals the trial court appropriately considered Robinson’s youth when
resentencing him.
That the trial court relied heavily on the facts of Robinson’s atrocious crimes does not give
us pause. “[T]he circumstances of the crime remain a primary consideration in determining a
proportionate sentence, . . . [and t]he factors of youth do not detract or preclude that consideration,
they simply add” to it. People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
No. 369185), slip op at 9. The trial court’s statements concerning Robinson’s deliberateness
reinforces its consideration of defendant’s youth—in its view, Robinson did not act with the typical
1 We briefly note issues not raised. Robinson does not contend that his presumptively proportional
sentences are disproportionate. See, e.g., People v Brown, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d
531 (2011). Nor does Robinson argue the trial court inadequately articulated its reasoning for why
it imposed those sentences. In certain circumstances, we have independently raised issues for
defendants. See, e.g., People v Billings, 283 Mich App 538, 549; 770 NW2d 893 (2009). Although
we wish the trial court would have done more to explain its reasoning, we see no reason to go
beyond addressing defendant’s preserved issues on appeal.

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“characteristics of youth” like immaturity, impulsivity, and lack of discipline and self-restraint.
See People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 357332), slip op
at 15, quoting Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189. Rather, Robinson had time to reflect following the
group sexual encounter by leaving, returning to his house, changing clothes, and then retrieving a
gun, donning a mask, and returning to murder those involved. The trial court reasonably concluded
that Robinson’s actions were not youthfully impulsive.
Others could view the fine line between intentionality and impulsivity differently. The
prosecutor theorized that Robinson’s struggles with his sexuality caused him to murder three
individuals just after engaging in group sex with random strangers. And that framing, combined
with defendant’s tumultuous childhood, could be considered as reflective of the various
“characteristics of youth,” like immaturity, impulsivity, and lack of discipline and self-restraint.
Yet, given the deference we must accord trial courts and the “no magic words” requirement,
Copeland, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4, we cannot agree with defendant’s assertion that the
trial court used the crime’s facts—viewed through the youth lens—as a prohibited aggravating
circumstance.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, although the trial court could have done significantly more to justify its
resentencing of defendant to a term of 35- to 60-years imprisonment, it did enough to satisfy Parks’
and Boykin’s requirement to consider his youth when imposing that sentence. For these reasons,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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