COA 378517 IN RE RICHARDSON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/26/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
August 26, 2026
10:08 AM
In re RICHARDSON, Minors.
No. 378517
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 11-000976-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children JR-2 and ZR under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication
continue to exist). We affirm.
I. FACTS
In 2011, Children’s Protective Services (CPS) petitioned for the removal of JR-1 and
another one of respondent-mother’s children, after both JR-1 and the other child tested positive for
THC at birth. The petition was discharged after respondent-mother signed a power of attorney to
her now deceased grandmother. In January 2016, CPS opened another case against respondent-
mother after JR-2 tested positive for THC at birth. In 2021, CPS was again involved after
respondent-mother’s infant daughter died in 2020; CPS alleged that respondent-mother was
physically neglecting and improperly supervising the other children in the home. In April 2023,
shortly after ZR was born, respondent-mother tested positive for methamphetamines and THC,
and ZR’s cord segment tested positive for THC, oxymorphone, noroxymorphone, amphetamines,
and methamphetamines. CPS received a referral alleging that respondent-mother gave birth to
“her fourth drug-positive infant,” ZR. During the investigation it was discovered the respondent-
mother had “medically neglected” JR-2. JR-2 was born with cerebral palsy and required bi-yearly
checkups with neurosurgery, plus weekly physical, occupational, and speech-therapy
appointments, but had not visited neurosurgery since 2018 and had not attended any of the therapy
appointments since 2019. Neither JR-1 nor JR-2 were attending school at that time.
In August 2023, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the
trial court to exercise jurisdiction over JR-1, JR-2, and ZR. The trial court authorized the petition

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and ordered that the children remain with respondent-mother under the supervision of the DHHS.
Respondent-mother continued to have issues scheduling and attending JR-2’s required medical
appointments. In December 2023, JR-2’s school reported to CPS that JR-2 smelled of urine and
was observed “in pants and underwear stained yellow but dry.” Respondent-mother also failed to
take ZR to his six-month wellness appointment in October 2023. CPS offered respondent-mother
a week of paid childcare to provide her an opportunity to clean up her home, which “was extremely
cluttered,” but respondent-mother declined the services.
In January 2024, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition with the trial court, requesting
that JR-1, JR-2, and ZR be removed from respondent-mother’s home because “[i]t is contrary to
the welfare of the children to remain in the care of their mother due to ongoing concerns of medical
neglect. . . . [Respondent-mother] continues to refuse to participate in services or cooperate with
the agency and has continued to miss medical appointments,” and “[t]he children are at imminent
and substantial risk of harm.” The supplemental petition was granted on the same day, and an
order was issued for protective custody of the children.
In April 2025, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights, stating that “[t]hroughout the CPS court process [respondent-
mother] has refused to engage in or participate in services recommended or offered by [the DHHS]
to address concerns of medical neglect, substance abuse, mental health needs[,] home conditions,
and parenting skills.” The first day of the termination trial was held in June 2025. The trial court
concluded trial by finding, “I’m not convinced today that it is in the best interest of any of these
children to terminate [respondent-mother’s] parental rights. I’m going to give [her] a little more
time.”
In October 2025, the DHHS filed another supplemental petition, requesting again that
respondent-mother’s parental rights be terminated as to JR-2 and ZR. The petition no longer
included JR-1 because he was of an age at which he could choose not to be adopted, and his new
permanency plan was a guardianship.
On the second day of the termination trial, held in November 2025, the caseworker testified
that respondent-mother continued to miss medical appointments, failed to engage with her
therapist or to attend group therapy sessions, and had only attended 15 out of the 56 drug screens
that were ordered throughout the proceedings. The trial court concluded trial by terminating
respondent-mother’s parental rights to JR-2 and ZR. The trial court first found that termination
was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because the conditions that led to adjudication,
including respondent-mother’s “[s]evere medical and dental neglect . . . particularly with [JR-2],
who has significant medical needs” and respondent-mother’s mental-health issues, continued to
exist, “and there’s no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified in a reasonable
period of time considering [the children’s] age.” Regarding the children’s best interests, the trial
court concluded that JR-2 and ZR have
got a cloud of uncertainty hanging over their head that’s been hanging over their
heads for two years. The fact that there—there’s a bond obviously exists, but
there’s also a bond with placement. But this uncertainty, this lack of permanency,
and no reasonable expectation that they would be able to return home in a
reasonable period of time, given mom’s lack of participation and lack of benefit

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from services, there’s just no reasonable likelihood. There’s no good reason for me
to keep this case open. For the sake of these children I need to close this case and
allow them to move on towards permanency.
Respondent-mother now appeals as of right, arguing that the trial court erred by finding
statutory grounds for termination and by finding that termination was in the children’s best
interests.
II. DISCUSSION
“We review for clear error both the trial court’s decision that a [statutory] ground for
termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and . . . the court’s decision
regarding the child’s best interests. . . .” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823
NW2d 144 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving
due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich
App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s finding that termination was supported
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). Termination of parental
rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when 182 or more days have passed since the initial
disposition order, and “the totality of the evidence amply supports that [respondent-mother] had
not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions” that led to the adjudication, In re
Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009), and she would not be able to rectify
those conditions within a reasonable time.
The trial court found that respondent-mother failed to rectify her medical neglect of the
children, her substance abuse, and her mental-health issues, stating that respondent-mother
continued to present with “[l]ack of empathy for her children, lack of insight, lack of cooperation,
psychopathology, extremely long documented history of failure to provide even basic or minimal
medical care for her special needs daughter and her other children.” The record supports the trial
court’s findings.
The initial disposition order was filed on March 29, 2024, and the final day of the trial was
held on November 19, 2025, over 19 months later. Respondent-mother’s primary barriers to
reunification at the start of the proceedings were her substance abuse, medical neglect of the
children, and mental-health issues. The DHHS caseworker testified at the June 2025 trial that
respondent-mother’s participation in drug screens was still “minimal.” It was reported that
respondent-mother’s participation in her children’s medical appointments was “about the same”
since the first reporting period. She further testified that respondent-mother failed to participate
in counseling for her mental health since proceedings began, which she was referred to by the

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DHHS. The trial court concluded the trial by giving respondent-mother “a little more time” to
rectify those conditions, specifically ordering her to get assistance for her mental health and
substance-abuse disorder.
Five months later, at the November 2025 trial, the caseworker affirmed that respondent-
mother was attending therapy, but that respondent-mother’s therapist reported that her
involvement “was superficial.” The caseworker further testified that respondent-mother missed
four appointments scheduled for her for other mental-health services. It was reported that
respondent-mother only participated in approximately 27% of all drug screens offered throughout
the proceedings and that all completed drug screens were positive for THC. The caseworker also
testified that respondent-mother only attended approximately 22% of the children’s scheduled
medical or dental appointments throughout the proceedings and that she only scheduled one of
those appointments herself. An incident was detailed in which respondent-mother became
aggressive with ZR at ZR’s medical appointment. Accordingly, the totality of the evidence
supported the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother had not accomplished any meaningful
change in the conditions that led to the adjudication. See id.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court focused on respondent-mother’s drug use,
citing In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 731; 858 NW2d 143 (2014), in support of her argument,
in which this Court held that “drug use alone, in the absence of any connection to abuse or neglect,
cannot justify termination solely through operation of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” Citing
In re Richardson, 329 Mich App 232, 255; 961 NW2d 499 (2019), respondent-mother further
argues that the trial court failed to present facts within the record demonstrating that her actions
were “presenting an articulable risk of harm” to the children and that the trial court erroneously
presumed a risk of harm to the children from “personal disapproval” of respondent-mother’s drug
use. We are not persuaded by this argument.
JR-1, JR-2, and ZR were all born THC positive at birth. ZR also tested positive for
oxymorphone, noroxymorphone, amphetamines, and methamphetamines at birth. It was reported
in the January 2024 amended supplemental petition that when CPS went to inform respondent-
mother of the ex parte removal order, there was concern that respondent-mother was under the
influence of substances “based on [her] demeanor.” ZR was found in the home on the floor of a
closet with several injuries. Following respondent-mother’s completion of a psychological
evaluation in April 2024, respondent-mother was diagnosed with “stimulant use disorder, cannabis
use disorder, bipolar disorder, and PTSD,” and the doctor stated that she would not recommend
[respondent-mother] for custodial parent . . . in part [because] of her substance abuse.” Later,
when scheduled for a substance-abuse evaluation at Family Services and Children’s Aid,
respondent-mother incorrectly stated that she had no need for substance-abuse services. Overall,
the record demonstrates that respondent-mother’s drug use was connected to the abuse and neglect
of her children and presented an articulable risk of harm to them since their birth. The respondent-
mother’s drug use combined with the continuing medical neglect of the children and her mental
health issues that she has been unable to consistently address, support the trial court’s finding that
termination was supported under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

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B. BEST INTERESTS
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40. “Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance
of the evidence.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich Appat 733. When considering best interests, the
focus is on the child’s interests rather than the parent’s interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76,
87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine
the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). When
deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court “may consider the
child’s bond to the parent[;] the parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court can also consider the
likelihood that “the child could be returned to [the] parent[’]s home within the foreseeable future,
if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
In In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42, this Court held that “the trial court has a duty to
decide the best interests of each child individually.” See In re JMG/JGG/JMG, 516 Mich 960,
960 (2025). But in In re White, 303 Mich App at 715, this Court also held that individualized best-
interest inquiries are required only when “the best interests of the individual children significantly
differ . . . .”
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination was
in JR-2 and ZR’s best interests because it did not make best-interest determinations as to each child
separately. We disagree.
In reporting its findings with respect to JR-2 and ZR’s best interests, the trial court jointly
addressed JR-2 and ZR’s bonds with respondent-mother, bonds with their separate placements,
and their needs for permanency. See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The trial court
did not make individualized best-interest determinations as to JR-2 and ZR because their best
interests are aligned. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 715. Individualized best-interest inquiries
are not required in this case because the best interests of the individual children do not significantly
differ and trial courts are not required “to explicitly make individual and . . . redundant factual
findings concerning each child’s best interests.” Id. at 716.

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At the time of termination, JR-2 was 10 years old and ZR was 2 years old. Both children
required a level of parenting, such as making and attending medical and dental appointments, that
respondent-mother could not provide due to her drug use combined with her mental health issues
that she had been unable to consistently address. Both JR-2 and ZR had been in foster homes for
around two years, and it was in their best interest to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights
because they needed permanency, stability, and finality.
It is clear from the record that the trial court did not clearly err when it jointly addressed
the best interests of JR-2 and ZR. See id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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