COA 372530 PEOPLE OF MI V MAX ALLEN SINCLAIR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2026
11:36 AM
v No. 372530
Oceana Circuit Court
MAX ALLEN SINCLAIR, LC No. 2023-016185-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and MALDONADO and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Max Allen Sinclair, appeals as of right his jury conviction of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(a), for which the trial court imposed a six-
month term of imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that remarks made by the prosecutor during
closing argument, specifically comments characterizing defendant’s conduct and referencing the
consistency of the victim’s account, deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from criminal sexual contact against then-15-year-old LP by then-53-year-
old defendant. The underlying facts are not challenged on appeal. LP testified that after meeting
at the gym, defendant asked him for help working out and invited him to breakfast multiple times.
After one workout, defendant offered to give LP a massage, which progressed into defendant
touching LP’s lower back, buttocks, and inner thighs, as well as kissing LP’s muscles. LP
immediately reported the incident to his mother, who took him to the police station. At the police
station, LP recounted the event to City of Hart Police Department Officer Kyle Moore.
At trial, LP testified without objection that what he told Officer Moore on the day of the
incident was consistent with his testimony at trial. Officer Moore testified that, after speaking with
LP, he interviewed defendant, who denied that he touched LP for a sexual purpose. A recording
of that interview was played for the jury, but defendant did not testify.
During closing arguments, the prosecution argued that it “[s]eem[ed] weird” that defendant
asked LP to breakfast, stated that the massage “[got] weird from there,” and argued that

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defendant’s actions were “not normal behavior.” After closing arguments and jury instructions,
the jury found defendant guilty. Defendant now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument
amounted to misconduct that denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant contends that he was denied
his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks, expressed a personal
opinion on the merits of the case, and improperly bolstered trial testimony.
“[T]o preserve an issue of prosecutorial misconduct,[1] a defendant must
contemporaneously object and request a curative instruction.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App
465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Because defendant did not object or request a curative
instruction, we review for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Isrow, 339 Mich App
522, 529; 984 NW2d 528 (2021). To obtain relief under that standard, the defendant must show
that “(1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 645; 672
NW2d 860 (2003). Even if those requirements are met, reversal is warranted only when the error
“resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant” or “seriously affected the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.”
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (cleaned up). An unpreserved
claim of prosecutorial misconduct will not warrant relief unless the prejudicial effect was so great
that it could not have been cured by an appropriate instruction. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643,
687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
III. ANALYSIS
Applying those principles, we conclude that the prosecutor’s challenged remarks, viewed
in context, did not constitute plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights and did not deprive
defendant of a fair trial.
The test for prosecutorial error is whether the defendant has been denied a fair trial. People
v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 88; 867 NW2d 452 (2015). The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. People v Brown, 279 Mich App
116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). Claims of prosecutorial error “are decided case by case, and this
Court must examine the entire record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context.” People v
Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 64; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Prosecutorial comments “must be read as
a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence
1 “Although the term ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ has become a term of art often used to describe
any error committed by the prosecution, claims of inadvertent error by the prosecution are better
and more fairly presented as claims of ‘prosecutorial error,’ with only the most extreme cases
rising to the level of ‘prosecutorial misconduct.’ ” People v Jackson (On Reconsideration), 313
Mich App 409, 425 n 4; 884 NW2d 297 (2015) (cleaned up).

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admitted at trial.” People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). Guided by
these principles, we address defendant’s arguments.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks by referring to
defendant’s conduct as “weird.” Although a prosecutor may not make “intemperate and
prejudicial remarks” about a defendant, People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 283; 531 NW2d 659
(1995), a prosecutor is not required to use the “blandest of all possible terms” when arguing a case,
People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Prosecutors are “generally . . .
accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct,” Cooper, 309 Mich App at 90
(cleaned up), and may argue the evidence and reasonable inferences from it, Bahoda, 448 Mich at
282-283.
Defendant challenges the following remarks:
[LP] told you that after working out with this guy, he meets this guy working
out at the gym, and the guy sort of mutual, like, let me help you out. Hey, can you
help me out. And the guy’s, like, asking him out to breakfast and asking him to,
like, help him workout and things like that, and, frankly, that’s weird.
And we can all sit here and say, like, maybe you should have said no, or
maybe you have been in that situation, but he’s just a kid. He’s a nice kid, who is
trying to help somebody out. He’s trying to be nice. We teach our kids to be nice.
We teach our kids to be respectful of adults and be kind and compassionate people.
And so that’s what [LP], he was doing. He was just being a good kid, ‘cause that’s
what he is. And the defendant starts asking him, like, hey let’s go to breakfast.
Seems weird.
And I don’t know any other way to describe that. I don’t take teenagers to
breakfast. It’s weird. [Emphasis added.]
When read in context, these statements described defendant’s conduct, not his character.
The prosecutor used the word “weird” to characterize defendant’s actions in asking a minor to
breakfast, not to denigrate defendant personally. Viewed as a whole, the remarks focused on
specific conduct relevant to the charged offense.
The prosecutor similarly described defendant’s conduct during the massage as “not normal
behavior” and “bizarre” while arguing that the touching was for a sexual purpose:
He starts touching him down the buttocks, across the leg. [LP] showed you across
the left thigh, with a hand up in the crevice area up to the crotch. He pulls down
his shorts and starts touching his buttocks, and then, when he’s rubbing his lats,
kisses him.
That’s just really not normal behavior. So [LP] very clearly demonstrated
to you the elements of a criminal sexual conduct.

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* * *
[I]f you touch somebody on their upper thigh, crotch, or buttocks area, and it’s for
a sexual purpose, that’s a criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree. Well, [LP]
clearly demonstrated to you that he was touched in those areas, okay? So now the
question, was it for a sexual purpose?
If it wasn’t for a [sexual] purpose, why is he kissing his back? It’s just
bizarre. [Emphasis added.]
To establish CSC-IV, the prosecutor was required to argue that the touching was for a
sexual purpose. See MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (CSC-IV); MCL 750.520a(q) (defining “sexual
contact”). In doing so, the prosecutor permissibly described defendant’s conduct and argued
reasonable inferences from the evidence. The remarks did not amount to personal attacks or
improper character assassination and therefore did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal opinion by
stating, “I don’t take teenagers to breakfast. It’s weird.” “It is improper for a prosecutor to express
a personal opinion about a case by suggesting that she has some special knowledge, unknown to
the jury, that the defendant is guilty.” People v Smith, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2024) (Docket No. 362114); slip op at 14, citing People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 456; 812
NW2d 37 (2011). But the prosecutor’s remark here did not imply special knowledge or assert
defendant’s guilt. Rather, it was rhetorical commentary offered to support an inference drawn
from the evidence. Accordingly, the statement did not constitute prosecutorial error.
Finally, defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly bolstered LP’s testimony by
referencing its consistency with statements LP made to Officer Moore.
A prosecutor “may not argue facts not in evidence or mischaracterize the evidence
presented . . . .” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 588; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Nor may a
prosecutor vouch for the credibility of a witness “to the effect that he has some special knowledge
concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 276. A prosecutor may, however,
“argue from the facts that a witness is credible . . . .” People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548;
575 NW2d 16 (1997). Further, “a prosecutor may comment on his own witnesses’ credibility
during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting evidence and the question of the
defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury believes.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App
450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Such arguments “are not improper when based on the evidence,
even if couched in terms of belief or disbelief.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 240; 749
NW2d 272 (2008).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly bolstered LP’s testimony by asserting that
it was “[p]retty consistent with what he told Officer Moore and what he told you here today.”
During rebuttal, the prosecutor further argued that LP had no reason to lie, stating, “[i]f he’s
making it up, why . . . There’s nothing on the record to support any reason why he . . . would have
immediately gone and told a story that wasn’t accurate.” The prosecutor continued, “[LP] went

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straight to Officer Moore. Officer Moore said, yeah, he’s in shock. This had just happened, but
he told a consistent, straightforward account of what happened.”
First, the prosecution’s statement that LP’s testimony was “[p]retty consistent” with what
he had previously told Officer Moore does not rely on a prior extrajudicial statement. During his
testimony, LP was asked, without objection, whether he told Officer Moore the same facts to which
he had testified. LP answered, “Yes, sir, I did.” Therefore, although defendant is correct that the
specific content of LP’s conversation with Officer Moore was not admitted into evidence, the
prosecutor’s argument was grounded in LP’s own testimony. The prosecution did not improperly
vouch for LP’s credibility or suggest specialized knowledge regarding LP’s truthfulness. Rather,
the challenged remarks were based on evidence presented at trial. See Howard, 226 Mich App
at 548.
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecutor alluded to “some special
knowledge” concerning LP’s truthfulness, Bahoda, 448 Mich at 276, or otherwise
mischaracterized LP’s testimony regarding consistency, any prejudice was cured by the trial
court’s instructions. In Meissner, this Court held that reversal was not required “because the trial
court clearly instructed the jury that ‘the lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence.’ ”
294 Mich App at 457 (cleaned up). “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and
instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662
NW2d 836 (2003).
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury regarding both the nature of evidence and
witness credibility. With respect to evidence, the trial court stated:
Evidence includes only the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits
admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence. . . .
The lawyers’ statements and arguments and any commentary are not
evidence. They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s
legal theories.
You should only accept things the lawyers say that are supported by the
evidence or by your own common sense and general knowledge.
As to credibility, the court instructed, in part, “You must decide which witnesses you believe and
how important you think their testimony is.”
Defendant has not explained why the instructions given were insufficient to cure any
potential prejudice. Nor does he assert that additional instruction would not have cured potential
prejudice. See Stanaway, 446 Mich at 687. Because there is no basis to conclude that the trial
court’s instructions—or an additional instruction—would have failed to cure any potential
prejudice arising from the prosecutor’s remarks, defendant has not established entitlement to relief
under the plain-error standard. See id.

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Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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