COA 375032 IN RE HENRY MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2026
10:27 AM
In re HENRY, Minors.
No. 375032
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 23-050138-NA; 23-
050139-NA
Before: RICK, P.J., and MALDONADO and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children, WH and MH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to
adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody),
and MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (prior termination of parental rights because of serious and chronic
neglect).1 We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 2023, WH and MH were taken into protective custody because of housing
instability and domestic violence, leading petitioner, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) to file an initial petition to terminate mother’s and respondent-father’s2 parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). Mother admitted to the previous involuntary termination of her
1 The order also terminated the parental rights of the children’s legal father, who is not a party to
this appeal.
2 Respondent-father was named in the petition and ultimately had his parental rights to MH and
WH terminated. He has taken no action to challenge the termination of his parental rights and
does not participate in this appeal. Accordingly, all references to father are for background
information only.

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parental rights to three older children in 2014 because of similar issues. The trial court declined
to terminate parental rights and instead ordered that efforts be made to reunify the family.
Initially, mother made significant progress, participating in domestic violence counseling,
parenting time, and other services. She was successful in obtaining unsupervised overnight
parenting time visits with the children. By April 2, 2024, the case reached its high point for mother,
with the children’s caseworker reporting that mother had completed all required tasks and was
ready for the children to be returned. However, on May 6, 2024, CPS received a report that father
had broken into mother’s house during her unsupervised weekend parenting time. When mother
failed to obtain a personal protection order (PPO) as requested by DHHS, concerns arose about
her ability to protect the children from domestic violence. Subsequently, WH reported believing
that father might be living in mother’s basement. The children reported seeing signs that father
was living in the basement, which mother denied. Nevertheless, the trial court found the children’s
reports credible and directed the agency to address specific issues with mother to ensure safe
reunification.
By November 2024, the children’s well-being had declined. WH exhibited escalating
unsafe behaviors, required police involvement, and was hospitalized multiple times. He expressed
anger toward mother and fear about returning to her home. MH also struggled with sleeping,
argumentative behavior, and experienced depression and anxiety when visiting mother. Mother’s
housing was also at risk because of rent arrears. Her parenting skills were additionally identified
as a barrier to reunification.
In December 2024, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for the termination of mother’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). Attached to the supplemental petition was
a document describing the case’s history, the initial challenges, the progress made, and remaining
barriers to reunification with respect to housing, child characteristics, emotional instability,
parenting skills, and domestic relations. The termination hearing was held in March 2025. At the
hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of mother’s
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (i). The court further found that termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The court thereafter entered an
order terminating mother’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Mother first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence established statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (i). We disagree.
Appellate courts review for clear error a trial court’s decision that a ground for termination
has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination is in the children’s best
interests. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-359; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding is clearly
erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a “definite and firm
conviction” that a mistake was made. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one

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statutory ground existed, then that one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of the
respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supports termination when “182 or more days have elapsed since
the issuance of an initial dispositional order,” and the trial court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the
child’s age.”
Here more than 182 days elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order. The
conditions that led to mother’s adjudication were: (1) housing instability; (2) inadequate finances;
(3) domestic violence; (4) emotional instability; and (5) parenting skills. The trial court did not
find that mother lacked adequate housing or resources, but nevertheless determined that mother
had not adequately rectified her issues with emotional instability and inadequate parenting skills.
Initially, DHHS provided positive assessments of mother’s parenting skills and emotional
stability, praising her performance at parenting time and her ability to manage the children’s
conduct effectively. Mother had a legal source of income and suitable housing; exercised
unsupervised overnight parenting time with the children; and was a mere two to three weeks away
from reunification. However, the break-in incident in May 2024, the children’s subsequent
disclosures regarding mother allowing father to live in the home, and mother’s poor response to
those disclosures led DHHS to reassess mother’s parenting skills, emotional stability, and benefit
from her treatment plan.
The evidence presented to the trial court indicated that parenting time went well only when
neither child had a meltdown. However, when the children became “escalated,” mother responded
similarly. Mother would then blame her caseworkers or the foster-care system for the children’s
behavior. This dynamic raised questions about mother’s emotional stability and ability to handle
the children in an emotional crisis. In addition, a Bethany Christian Services (BCS) supervisor
and the trial court stressed more than once mother’s inability to understand—or to even
acknowledge—the connection between her children’s behaviors and their exposure to domestic
violence in her household, as well as the effect that this lack of insight had on mother’s parenting
skills.
Mother responded poorly to the children’s disclosure that they believed father was living
in the basement of the family home. Regardless of whether he was actually living in the basement,
mother failed to adequately consider the children’s emotional states and clearly alienated WH,
causing him to grow angry with her and to view her as a liar. WH’s mental health additionally
deteriorated over the course of the proceedings. At one point he was admitted to the hospital for
emergency psychiatric care, and mother failed to respond to the hospital’s multiple attempts to
contact her regarding the hospitalization. Her response to the hospitalization raised questions
about the extent to which she could recognize and operate effectively in a crisis situation to ensure
her children’s health and safety. Additionally, mother’s counselor testified that, although she had
made improvements in emotional regulation and stability, it was difficult to determine whether she
could protect the children physically and emotionally, especially if she refused to acknowledge
their experiences.

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Regarding whether there was a “reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age,” the trial court observed that mother
had not benefited from the most recent services offered, and had likewise not benefited from “11
years of service delivery.” The court further noted that mother had received every service that the
child-welfare system had to offer. Both children had waited for nearly two years for mother to
provide them a stable environment and were facing an extended trauma-informed therapy. In light
of these circumstances, the trial court found that the children had an immediate need for stability
and finality that mother could not provide. In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly
err by finding statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).3
B. BEST INTERESTS
Mother next contends that the trial court erred by finding that a preponderance of the
evidence established that termination was in the children’s best interests. We agree in part.
This Court reviews a trial court’s best-interests determination for clear error. In re White,
303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Miller, 347 Mich
App 420, 425; 15 NW3d 287 (2023) (citation omitted).
“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the Department has established
a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a
preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the child[]’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. When determining best interests,
the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond
to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.
The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption. [Id. at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In making a best-interest determination, the focus is on the child, not the parent. In re Schadler,
315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).
Mother broadly argues that the trial court did not adequately consider: (1) whether the
children’s behavioral issues were not in part due to delayed reunification; (2) that WH’s threats of
self-harm began while he was in foster care; (3) that MH reported being inappropriately touched
by another child in her placement; (4) concerns regarding MH’s vision that arose while she was in
3 Because “one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of the respondent’s parental rights”,
In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273, we decline to address mother’s arguments regarding
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (i).

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foster care; and (5) that the children would likely be adopted separately. Regarding delayed
reunification, the court specifically noted the significant emotional struggles and trauma
experienced by the children were due to the ongoing uncertainty and repeated changes in the
direction of the case. The court also addressed WH’s mental health while in foster care, noting
that he was admitted for psychiatric treatment while in foster care and that mother was unable to
prioritize his needs, requiring ex parte petitions for his admission and medication. The court did
not specifically address MH’s allegations of inappropriate touching or her medical issues, but did
address the children’s overall wellbeing while in care, largely focusing on their emotional
wellbeing. Finally, regarding the potential that the children may end up in separate adoptive
homes, the court observed that MH’s caregiver was open to adopting her, as well as possibly
adopting WH, if he could be stabilized.
Mother additionally contends that the trial court’s best-interest analysis was flawed because
the court did not make particularized findings for each child. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297
Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Generally, a court is not required to explicitly make
individual and redundant factual findings concerning each child’s best interests if the children’s
best interests do not significantly differ. In re White, 303 Mich App at 715-716. Even so, we
believe that the record revealed significant differences between WH and MH, such that an
individualized best-interests analysis was necessary in this case.
Broadly speaking, the court’s best-interest analysis largely focused on WH. The court
considered the bond between parent and child, finding that the bond between mother and WH was
broken. The court also weighed WH’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, noting this was
“the third case for [WH] since he has been born being made a ward of the court,” and considering
his desire for the proceedings to end. The record suggests that among WH’s greatest needs was
emotional stability. The court found that “[WH] is angry at his mother for not believing his
disclosures, and he directs that pain inward thinking he is an unworthy, unlovable child, and he
directs it at anger at the system and classmates.” The court further found that WH no longer wanted
to see mother. It concluded that the advantages of the foster home were superior to remaining in
mother’s care. This conclusion was supported by the record. The BCS supervisor testified that
WH’s current placement had significant training and experience with high-needs children, and that
WH had had fewer meltdowns since the suspension of mother’s parenting time. Thus, the trial
court properly considered numerous factors when making its best-interest determination regarding
WH. It did not err by concluding that termination was in WH’s best interests.
However, the court failed to meaningfully analyze MH’s specific circumstances. Instead,
the court’s analysis largely treated MH as part of a unit, making general statements about “the
children” without adequately distinguishing between their individual circumstances. Regarding
MH’s bond with mother, the court merely noted that “[MH] wants to see her mother, although this
has become inconsistent.” The record nevertheless suggested that MH’s bond with mother
remained strong. The court failed to address MH’s specific need for permanency or how her
continued desire to maintain contact with mother should factor into the best-interests
determination. Ultimately, the court’s failure to adequately individualize its best-interests analysis
for MH constituted clear error. We therefore vacate the portion of the order terminating mother’s
parental rights as to MH. On remand, the trial court must conduct a new best-interests analysis
that specifically addresses MH’s individual circumstances.

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C. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Mother also argues that the trial court erred by determining that DHHS made reasonable
efforts at reunification after new circumstances arose that differed from those that led to the
original adjudication. We disagree.
This Court generally reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable
reunification efforts. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). Generally,
“the Department has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before
seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637
(2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and MCL 712A.19a(2). See also In re Simonetta, 340
Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d 919 (2022). The parents have a corresponding responsibility to
engage with and benefit from the services offered. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824
NW2d 569 (2012). As part of these reasonable efforts, “the [Department] must create a case
service plan outlining the steps that it and the parent will take to rectify the conditions that led to
court involvement and achieve reunification.” In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App at 707. The trial
court should regularly update the plan to account for the parent’s progress and developing needs.
In re Mason, 486 Mich at 159. The parent should be given a reasonable time to make changes and
benefit from services before termination of parental rights. See id. “When challenging services
offered, a respondent must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had
been offered.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 264.
The premise of mother’s argument is that emotional stability, parenting skills, and child
characteristics were new circumstances introduced into the case by the May 2024 break-in. She
contends that DHHS should have provided new or additional services tailored to these
circumstances. The record shows, however, that emotional stability and parenting skills were areas
of need identified in mother’s initial parent-agency treatment plan (PATP). The record further
indicates that DHHS provided services to address these issues from the start and offered additional
services after the May 2024 break-in.
Regarding emotional stability, the initial PATP reflected that mother was given a
psychological evaluation, through which she was diagnosed with major depression. The PATP
also noted that mother displayed explosive behavior in her communications with agency staff,
which sometimes resulted in her refusing to leave the premises until her demands were met.
Consequently, DHHS referred mother to counseling that focused on domestic relations and
addressed issues affecting mother’s emotional stability.
As to parenting skills, the initial PATP identified that mother was involved in a parent
coach program and was taking a Parenting After Trauma class, both of which were provided by
DHHS. DHHS later provided the services of a parenting-time specialist, who addressed how to
manage the children’s behaviors during supervised community parenting time. According to the
record, mother engaged in trauma-informed parenting sessions with the children’s enhanced-
foster-care (EFC) specialists. After the May 2024 break-in, mother attended Together Facing
Challenges, a program designed to teach caregivers how to “navigate children with trauma” and
children who “have a lot of big behaviors.” In addition to these services, the caseworker and
mother read and discussed a book about parenting in the aftermath of family violence, which
mother had expressed an interest in reading.

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The children’s challenging behaviors could not be deemed new developments attributable
to the May 2024 break-in. At least nine months before the break-in, the July 2023 PATP reported
that WH showed “severe behavioral problems.” In summer 2023, WH was seen at Helen DeVos
Children’s Hospital because of threats of self-harm. By fall 2023, WH had been suspended from
school three times for threatening to harm himself and others, as well as for other disruptive
behavior. By winter 2024, WH was responding well to prescription medication; his mood and
focus were better, and he had not been suspended since mid-November.
Mother asserts that DHHS did not facilitate her engagement in WH’s counseling, which
prevented her from understanding the extent of his needs and how to address them. This is belied
by the record. Not only did DHHS provide services that addressed trauma in general, such as
Parenting After Trauma and Together Facing Challenges, DHHS also provided a parenting-time
supervisor to assist mother with the children’s behaviors as parenting time transitioned to the
community. In addition, as early as March 2023, mother agreed in her PATP “to engage in the
children’s services, as desired, such as therapy and/or EFC services for youth.” Mother worked
with the EFC specialists, including participating in trauma-informed parenting sessions.
As the foregoing shows, emotional stability and parenting skills were not new barriers to
reunification that first arose in May 2024. DHHS provided mother with services to address these
areas of need throughout the pendency of this matter. Mother offers no substantive argument on
how the services provided were deficient. She lists the recommendations in her psychological
evaluation to essentially argue that the services offered by the Department were insufficient. But
when challenging the services offered, mother must establish that she would have fared better if
other services had been offered. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich at 266. Mother has not made this
showing.
Mother also argues that DHHS’s efforts were not reasonable because the children’s initial
counselors were not competent to deal with the children’s issues. Mother does not explain how
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different with an earlier change in therapists. She
merely speculates that doing so would have allowed her to avoid the termination of her parental
rights. Accordingly, mother has not established that the trial court erred by concluding that DHHS
made reasonable efforts toward reunification.
D. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ERRORS
Lastly, mother alleges that various procedural and evidentiary errors require reversal of the
trial court’s termination order. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo whether child protective proceedings complied with a
respondent’s constitutional rights, In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462; 781 NW2d 105 (2009), as
well as the trial court’s interpretation and application of statutes and court rules, In re Sanders, 495
Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings in a
termination proceeding for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 130; 777
NW2d 728 (2009).

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Mother first contends that the trial court erred by granting an oral motion made by counsel
for DHHS, requesting leave to amend the supplemental petition to add MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) as a
ground for termination. She argues that she was prejudiced by this last-minute addition. If not for
the improper and untimely inclusion of MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) as a ground for termination, mother
contends that her parental rights would not have been terminated. However, the record indicates
that mother’s attorney waived this issue by explicitly stating that he did not object to DHHS’s
motion. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the trial court properly terminated mother’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). As already indicated, only “one ground is sufficient to
affirm the termination of the respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.
Mother therefore cannot show that she was prejudiced by DHHS’s oral motion to amend the
supplemental petition for termination of her parental rights.
Mother also asserts that DHHS filed its witness list and discovery demands late and that
there was no proof of service indicating their transmission to mother or her attorney at the time.
She asserts that these errors prejudiced her ability to prepare for the termination hearing.
This issue comes to us unpreserved. Therefore, our review is for plain error affecting
substantial rights. In re MJC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket
No. 365616); slip op at 2. “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must
be met: (1) error must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) and the
plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412
(2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An error is clear or obvious if the error is “not
subject to reasonable dispute.” In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused
prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761
NW2d 253 (2008). The party asserting plain error bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App at 463.
Although DHHS erroneously sent its witness list and discovery demands to mother’s
former attorney, rather than to the attorney representing her at the termination hearing, mother has
not established prejudice. Mother has not provided an offer of proof, such as an affidavit from the
attorney who represented her at the termination hearing, affirming that he did not receive notice or
disclosure documents, notwithstanding the incorrect service, or that he was unprepared to proceed
at the termination hearing. Further, nothing in the record suggests that mother’s attorney was
unprepared to proceed. Accordingly, mother has not met her burden to establish that she was
prejudiced by the circumstances surrounding DHHS’s filing of its witness list and discovery
demands. See id.
Mother next argues that the supplemental petition added three circumstances different from
the original petition: child characteristics, emotional stability, and parenting skills. Mother
contends that DHHS was required to prove these new circumstances by clear and convincing,
legally admissible evidence. She argues, however, that the trial court erred by admitting
impermissible hearsay evidence regarding a report made by WH’s counselor, mother’s parenting
skills, and the children’s statements about father living in mother’s basement. In addition, mother
asserts that testimony from the BCS supervisor about mother’s alleged inability to manage the
children’s behaviors was not attributable to personal knowledge. Therefore, she asserts, it
constituted an improper lay opinion. We find no error requiring reversal.

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MCR 3.977 “applies to all proceedings in which termination of parental rights is sought.”
MCR 3.977(A)(1). If termination did not occur at the initial disposition hearing and the case later
proceeds to termination on grounds that formed the basis for adjudication, then the rules of
evidence—except those for privilege—typically do not apply at the termination hearing. See
MCR 3.977(H); MCR 3.977(H)(2). Instead, “[a]t the hearing all relevant and material evidence,
including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and may be relied upon to the
extent of its probative value.” MCR 3.977(H)(2). However, at a termination hearing on “a
supplemental petition that seeks to terminate the parental rights of a respondent over a child already
within the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of one or more circumstances new or different from
the grounds that led the court to take jurisdiction,” the trial court’s findings must be based on
“legally admissible evidence.” MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b).
Although the trial court mentioned the children’s characteristics during its oral ruling, the
court terminated mother’s parental rights on the basis of her inability to manage the children
because of her own emotional instability and parenting skills. Those same grounds led the trial
court to exercise jurisdiction at the beginning of the proceedings. As already indicated, mother
admitted that emotional instability was a factor in a prior termination. She also admitted that, since
2021, police had responded to numerous instances of domestic violence, many of which involved
emotional-health issues. As to allegations that fall under parenting skills, mother admitted CPS
involvement with the family in 2016, when WH was found crying after food left cooking on the
stove set off fire alarms, which mother and father did not hear because they were passed out. She
also admitted to CPS involvement in 2019 on the basis of improper supervision of both children.
Even if the specific challenges to mother’s emotional stability and parenting skills evolved during
the case, mother’s emotional instability and poor parenting skills were among the reasons for the
trial court’s initial exercise of jurisdiction. Accordingly, mother’s parental rights were not
terminated on the basis of new circumstances, and MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b) did not apply.
Mother finally argues that the trial court erred by overruling her trial counsel’s objection
to the admission of reports that he recently received and had not had a chance to review. She
asserts in her brief to this Court that the trial court’s error “prejudiced her in the filing of the
termination petition supplement.” Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting the reports before counsel had an opportunity to review them, mother
cannot show that, but for this error, the trial court would not have authorized DHHS to file a
supplemental petition seeking termination of her parental rights. See MCR 2.613(A); see also
In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 21. To the contrary, a caseworker’s sworn testimony at a
November 2024 permanency planning hearing provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to
determine that the supplemental petition was warranted. Accordingly, mother has not shown a
procedural or evidentiary error requiring reversal of the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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