HARLOW HOSPITALITY LLC V KATHY D HAMLIN

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
HARLOW HOSPITALITY LLC V KATHY D HAMLIN
Docket No. 379072
LC No. 21-013678-CB
Brock A. Swartzle
Presiding Judge
Thomas C. Cameron
Christopher M. Trebilcock
Judges
The delayed application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The time for taking further
steps in this appeal runs from the date of the Clerk’s certification of this order. MCR 7.205(E)(3).
Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(4) and Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App
379, 399; 651 NW2d 756 (2002) (“a court is continually obliged to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction
over a person, the subject matter of an action, or the limits of the relief it may afford”), this appeal is not
limited to the issues raised in the delayed application and supporting brief. Instead, in addition to the
issues raised in the delayed application, the parties should address the following questions:
(1) whether the trial court’s March 27, 2024 order constituted a “final” order, as
defined by MCR 7.202(6)(a), in LC Case No. 22-001878-CK (the “-CK action”);
(2) if so, whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over the instant delayed application
as it applies to the -CK action;
(3) whether, under the circumstances at bar, equitable tolling might be appropriate
to extend the applicable jurisdictional time limit under MCR 7.205(A); and
(4) assuming that this Court has appellate jurisdiction, whether appellant is
attempting to improperly use this appeal to collaterally attack orders over which this Court
no longer has jurisdiction.
See Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, 471 Mich 411, 432; 684 NW2d 864 (2004) (“[U]nder ordinary
circumstances, plaintiff’s . . . medical malpractice complaint . . . would be time-barred. * * * The
equities of this case, however, compel a different result. . . . Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the applicable
statute of limitations is the product of an understandable confusion about the legal nature of her claim,
rather than a negligent failure to preserve her rights.”); Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 199;
771 NW2d 820 (2009) (“[T]he consolidation did not merge the two cases; instead, both cases retained
their separate identities. Because the cases retained their separate identities, the time for appeal must be
determined by reference to the final judgment or order for the individual cases.”) (citation omitted);
Bergeron v Busch, 228 Mich App 618, 623; 579 NW2d 124 (1998) (“Consolidation is permitted as a
matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or
change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted); Faircloth v Family Independence Agency, 232 Mich App 391, 400; 591
NW2d 314 (1998) (“Mere certification, . . . does not resolve whether an order is actually ‘final.’ ”).

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On the Court’s own motion pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(7), this case is CONSOLIDATED
with the delayed application in Docket No. 379112, Harlow Hospitality LLC v Conifer Insurance
Company.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge

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