378314•COA 378314 IN RE A MOJICA-HOWARD MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/16/2026
COA 378314 IN RE A MOJICA-HOWARD MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/16/2026
378314Court Of Appeals16.06.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 2026
9:57 AM
In re A. MOJICA-HOWARD, Minor.
No. 378314
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2025-001423-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order by which the trial court assumed jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b) of AMH, one of respondent’s minor children. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), petitioned to remove
AMH from respondent’s care on March 19, 2025. At that time, the child’s mother1 had sole legal
and physical custody of the child and coordinated parenting time with respondent on an informal
basis. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court ordered the child removed from
respondent’s care and released the child to his mother’s care, under the supervision of Intensive
Neglect Services (INS). The child later was removed from his mother’s care after she refused to
cooperate with INS and Children’s Protective Services (CPS).
Respondent requested that the child be placed with him and his fiancée, with whom
respondent has two other children. CPS conducted two home visits with respondent and found
that respondent’s home was suitable. CPS nonetheless recommended against placing the child
with respondent because of allegations of ongoing domestic violence by respondent against the
child’s mother.
1 The child’s mother is not a party to this appeal.
-- 1 of 3 --
-2-
At the adjudication hearing, the trial court heard testimony from police officers, CPS
employees, and the child’s mother about respondent’s history of domestic assaults and other
criminal behavior. The child’s mother testified that respondent had assaulted her at least 10-12
times in the past. She testified that in January 2025, respondent entered her home while she and
her children were away and ransacked her bedroom. On another occasion in January 2025,
respondent entered her home, physically assaulted her, then left with her cell phone. She further
testified that in September 2024, respondent hit her while she was in her home, and the child was
playing outside. Respondent denied most of the allegations but admitted that he had gone to prison
in the past for assaulting the child’s mother.
Respondent also admitted that he drove without a license to pick up one of his other
children from school. During a preliminary hearing before the trial court referee, respondent was
participating by Zoom when the referee observed that respondent was actively driving his car.
Respondent explained that he was on his way to pick up one of his other children from school.
The referee directed respondent to stop driving while participating in the hearing. Respondent
later admitted that he did not have a driver’s license.
The trial court found the allegations of domestic assault credible and found that
respondent’s testimony lacked credibility, noting that respondent was argumentative and denied
even those allegations that were thoroughly substantiated. The trial court therefore found that a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrated grounds to exercise jurisdiction over the child under
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (substantial risk of harm to child’s mental wellbeing), and MCL 712A.2(b)(2)
(unfit home or environment due to cruelty, depravity, or criminality by a parent), in light of
respondent’s historical and ongoing domestic violence with the child’s mother. Respondent now
appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent contends that the trial court erred when it found that one or more statutory
bases for jurisdiction over the child had been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent argues that evidence was presented that his home with his two other children is stable
and free from domestic violence and that he had not recently engaged in domestic assaults with
the child’s mother. We disagree that the trial court erred.
Whether a trial court can exercise jurisdiction over a child is a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo, In re Hull, 345 Mich App 562, 567; 7 NW3d 114 (2023), while we review
for clear error the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction in light of the trial court’s findings
of fact, In re Lange, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 166509); slip op at
6. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the Court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial court made a mistake, id., giving consideration to the trial court’s opportunity to
observe the witnesses, In re Sandborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
Generally, child protective proceedings are divided into two phases. In re Lange, ___ Mich
at ___ ; slip op at 6. The first phase is the adjudicative phase in which the trial court determines
whether to assume jurisdiction over the child. The second phase is the dispositional phase in which
the trial court determines the action it will take regarding the child. Id. To assume jurisdiction
over a child, the trial court must find that at least one of the bases for jurisdiction set forth in MCL
-- 2 of 3 --
-3-
712A.2(b) has been established by a preponderance of evidence. See In re Boshell/Shelton, ___
Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 371973); slip op at 3. The preponderance
of the evidence standard requires that the evidence supporting a proposition, when weighed against
the evidence against the proposition, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.
In re Surline, 515 Mich 953, 969 (2024) (WELCH, J., dissenting).
MCL 712A.2(b) provides, in relevant part, that the trial court has jurisdiction over a
juvenile
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance
of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or
necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or
her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her
mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . .
* * *
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or
other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in. . . . [Emphasis added.]
In this case, a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a
statutory basis for jurisdiction. Evidence was introduced that respondent had engaged in multiple
criminal acts inside the home of the child’s mother, including stealing her phone, ransacking her
bedroom, and repeatedly assaulting her, with the most recent assault occurring in January 2025.
Domestic violence in a home “reflects cruelty, criminality, and depravity on the part of [the
abuser],” and “a home where domestic violence repeatedly occurs is not a fit environment in which
to raise a child.” In re Sluiter, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ____ (2024) (Docket
No. 368266), slip op at 15-16. Here, the testimony suggests that not all of the domestic violence
occurred in front of AMH. However, “[there] is no provision in the statute that requires such
behavior be conducted in front of the child.” Id. at ___; slip op at 16.
Although evidence was introduced suggesting that respondent’s home is a suitable
environment for his other children, the evidence also supports the finding that respondent within
that same time frame failed to maintain a stable home environment for this child. Respondent
engaged in criminality and domestic assaults toward the child’s mother in the child’s home
environment, which created a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental wellbeing and thereby
rendered respondent’s home unfit for the child. The trial court did not clearly err when it found
statutory bases existed warranting the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Anica Letica
-- 3 of 3 --
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.