COA 376043 IN RE Z A KELLER MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
January 14, 2026
9:23 AM
In re Z. A. Keller, Minor.
No. 376043
Branch Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 20-005979-NA
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and KOROBKIN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child, ZAK, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody),
(j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to the parent), and (i) (parental rights
to another child previously terminated; failure to rectify conditions of prior termination).
Respondent-father argues that the lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL)’s deficient performance
deprived the child of her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Because
respondent-father lacks standing to make this argument, and does not otherwise challenge whether
statutory grounds for termination existed or whether termination was in the child’s best interests,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In September 2024, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services filed a
termination petition against respondent-father alleging that he had a pending termination case for
another child and that he had failed to rectify any of the barriers that led to the other child’s removal
from his care. The trial court determined that the allegations raised in the petition were proven by
a preponderance of the evidence and exercised jurisdiction over the child and respondent-father,
as the putative father. Before the termination hearing, the trial court also determined that
respondent-father was the minor child’s legal father. After the termination hearing was adjourned
and rescheduled twice, the trial court determined that the statutory grounds for termination had

-- 1 of 2 --

-2-
been met. The trial court also concluded that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether a party has standing to appeal. Stankevich v Milliron, 313
Mich App 233, 237; 882 NW2d 194 (2015).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondent-father argues that the LGAL performed ineffectively in representing the
child’s best interests.
The constitutional protections of effective assistance of counsel are afforded to parties in
child protective proceedings. In re EP, 234 Mich App 582, 598; 595 NW2d 167 (1999), overruled
on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). But “constitutional
protections are generally personal and cannot be asserted vicariously, but rather only at the instance
of one whose own protection was infringed.” Id. (cleaned up).
MCL 712A.17c(7) provides that the trial court must appoint an LGAL for the child (or
children) in child protective proceedings. The LGAL thus has a duty to provide effective
assistance of counsel to the child—not the parents. See MCL 712A.17c(7); see also In re EP, 234
Mich App at 598. And “[b]ecause the right to effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional
one, it is personal to the child and [a] respondent [in a child protective proceeding] may not assert
it on behalf of the child.” Id. See also In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 458; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
Accordingly, in the present case, respondent-father lacks standing to challenge the LGAL’s
representation of the child. See id.; In re EP, 234 Mich App at 598. Respondent-father does not
acknowledge that he lacks standing to assert this claim and provides no argument that he should
have standing. Therefore, respondent-father provides no compelling reason that justifies
distinguishing the case from binding precedent. See MCR 7.215(C)(2); MCR 7.215(J)(1).
Accordingly, we follow the established precedent that parents lack standing to challenge whether
their child received effective assistance of counsel. See In re EP, 234 Mich App at 598. And
because respondent-father has no standing, we decline to address the merits of his claim. See id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

-- 2 of 2 --