COA 375074 TOM DJONOVIC V UTICA VAN DYKE SERVICE LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
TOM DJONOVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 2026
9:41 AM
v No. 375074
Macomb Circuit Court
UTICA VAN DYKE SERVICE LLC, LC No. 2023-000273-NI
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s
failure to appear at trial. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case were summarized in Djonovic v Utica Van Dyke Serv LLC,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 27, 2024 (Docket No.
367474), p 1-2. In short, defendant assists the Shelby Township Police Department with vehicle
removal and towing services, and in that capacity defendant removed several improperly stored,
unregistered, and inoperable vehicles from plaintiff’s property as authorized by a court order. Id.
at 1. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendant’s use of overweight towing equipment was
negligent or grossly negligent and caused substantial damage to his driveway and landscaping. Id.
at 2. “Defendant [initially] moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing
that it was entitled to governmental immunity under the [g]overnmental [t]ort [l]iability [a]ct
(GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., because it was acting as the Township’s agent when the alleged
torts occurred.” Id. After a successful appeal to this Court of the order granting defendant
summary disposition, plaintiff’s counsel withdrew, and plaintiff proceeded in propria persona.
Discovery was extended, but plaintiff refused to appear for his deposition. Defendant moved to
compel plaintiff to appear for deposition, answer interrogatories, and respond to requests for
production. Despite several orders instructing plaintiff to respond, he remained noncompliant.
On October 8, 2024, the court entered an order setting a pretrial for March 20, 2025, and
trial for March 25, 2025. An amended order was entered on January 22, 2025, rescheduling the

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in-person pretrial from March 20, 2025, to March 18, 2025. The order was e-served to the same
e-mail address at which plaintiff was effectively e-served from the time his counsel withdrew.
Before trial, defendant filed and e-served several motions in limine and requested a hearing
on March 18, 2025, to coincide with the rescheduled pretrial. In part, defendant sought to prevent
plaintiff from offering standard of care testimony given the failure of plaintiff to identify an expert.
The pretrial was held as scheduled but plaintiff did not appear. The court noted: “Plaintiff was
advised that this hearing was to take place in person at the settlement conference. He was also
sent an email on Thursday, March 6 confirming the in-person hearing to be here at the pretrial
date.”
Defendant moved to “dismiss the case on the grounds that plaintiff has violated your order
by failing to show today,” and the court reserved the issue for trial. The trial court agreed plaintiff
would need an expert to articulate the standard of care, but left “the balance of issues raised on the
motion” to be addressed at trial. The trial court entered an order on the remainder of defendant’s
motions in limine, rejecting one of plaintiff’s proposed jury instructions, and taking another under
advisement. Plaintiff appealed that order, which this Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Djonovic v Utica Van Dyke Serv LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 2,
2025 (Docket No. 374920).
Plaintiff did not appear for the March 25, 2025 trial. The court noted: “I’m advised this
morning that the plaintiff is not here and spoke with the clerk and said he filed an appeal and
therefore was not appearing. That’s not how it works.” It continued: “I had the secretary call him
and advise[] him that he should be here and at least gave him an option of appearing by Zoom and
indicated he wouldn’t do that either.” Defendant renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court
explained it was inclined to dismiss the case because plaintiff was offered and used services for
litigants acting in propria persona. Further, plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal to this Court did not
justify his absence. The trial court dismissed the case given plaintiff’s disregard of the court’s
instruction to appear.
II. DISCUSSION
At the outset, while not part of the statement of the issue,1 plaintiff’s brief includes a
recitation of his version of the facts followed by allegations of conspiracy against him in the trial
court, implying judicial bias. Plaintiff’s failure to raise this issue in the trial court by, for example,
seeking judicial disqualification, results in waiver of appellate review of that issue unless such
review is demonstrated as being necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Walters v Nadell,
481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008). See also MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a). Because there has
been no factual showing or discernible legal argument to support plaintiff’s implication a
1 As recognized in English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich, 263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d
523 (2004), “[a]n issue not contained in the statement of questions presented is waived on appeal.”

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miscarriage of justice will occur if this Court fails to review this assertion,2 plaintiff’s implied
assertion of judicial bias is waived.
Plaintiff has failed to make a viable legal argument or cite legal authority concerning an
abuse of discretion by the trial court in its dismissal of his case for failure to appear at trial, which
could allow this Court to find this issue abandoned on appeal for insufficient briefing. Greater
Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Managers, LLC, 282 Mich App
410, 413; 766 NW2d 874 (2009) (“Insufficiently briefed issues are deemed abandoned on
appeal.”). Notwithstanding the deficiencies in plaintiff’s brief, we address the trial court’s
dismissal for plaintiff’s failure to appear.
“Trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction litigants and their counsel, including
the right to dismiss an action,” and appellate courts may disturb exercises of that authority only
for a “clear abuse of discretion.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d
809 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The trial court abuses its discretion when it
chooses an outcome outside the range of principled outcomes.” Gueye v State Farm Mut Auto Ins
Co, 343 Mich App 473, 487; 997 NW2d 307 (2022). This Court reviews for clear error factual
findings underlying the trial court’s decision. Id. Clear error has occurred “when this Court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
“A court, in its discretion, may dismiss a case with prejudice or enter a default judgment
when a party or counsel fails to appear at a duly scheduled trial.” Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich
App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995), citing MCR 2.504(B)(1). “Dismissal is a drastic step that
should be taken cautiously.” Swain v Morse, 332 Mich App 510, 518; 957 NW2d 396 (2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court has identified several considerations courts
should assess before dismissing an action:
(1) whether the violation was willful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of
refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing
party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of
compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect;
and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. [Woods
v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 631; 750 NW2d 228 (2008), quoting
Vicencio, 211 Mich App at 507.]
Here, plaintiff received notice that trial was scheduled for March 25. Trial was held as
scheduled. On or near that date, plaintiff “spoke with the clerk and said he filed an appeal and
therefore was not appearing.” In response, the court “had the secretary call him and advise[] him
that he should be here and . . . gave him an option of appearing by Zoom,” but plaintiff refused.
2 “[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion
alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial
impartiality.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (quotation
marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

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Plaintiff’s willful and deliberate absence in violation of the court’s instruction, especially in light
of the court’s offered accommodation to appear remotely to enable plaintiff to cure the defect,
favors dismissal. Woods, 277 Mich App at 631. Plaintiff’s failure to appear or cooperate in
discovery (including failure to appear for his deposition) occurred prior to trial, and reflected a
history of noncompliance and delay.
A lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice. Id. Plaintiff’s lack of
compliance with discovery required the trial court to expend judicial time and resources, and
several orders were previously entered requiring plaintiff to comply with discovery. Plaintiff also
showed an intent not to appear for trial despite the court contacting and attempting to accommodate
him. For these reasons, the interests of justice would not be better served by a lesser sanction, id.,
particularly when prior orders did not gain compliance.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the action in light of the
considerations delineated in Vicencio, 211 Mich App at 507, and reiterated in Woods, 277 Mich
App at 631.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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