COA 373087 ALEXANDER KRULL V SERGEI CHUIKOV Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/22/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ALEXANDER KRULL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 22, 2026
11:13 AM
v No. 373087
Washtenaw Circuit Court
SERGEI CHUIKOV and IRINA KOMELKOVA, LC No. 23-001209-CH
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right an order granting summary disposition to plaintiff under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), (C)(9) (failure to state a valid defense) and (C)(10) (no
genuine issue of material fact). The order additionally quieted title to a portion of disputed
property in plaintiff’s favor and granted an easement over the property to defendants. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This dispute concerns the ownership of a strip of land between the parties’ respective
properties. Plaintiff owns a vacant parcel of land located at 5100 Park Road, and defendants own
the adjoining property at 5078 Park Road. Both properties are located in Washtenaw County,
Michigan.1 Defendants run a daycare out of their home at 5078 Park Road and use the disputed
area for ingress and egress, parking, and as a play area for daycare clients. The following photo
contains an overhead view of the properties:
1 The legal description of the properties indicates that they are located in Scio Township, Michigan;
however, the mailing addresses for the properties indicate that they are located in Ann Arbor.

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The property on the right side is defendants’ home at 5078 Park Road, and the property on the left
side is plaintiffs’ property at 5100 Park Road. The following photo contains a more detailed view
of the disputed area:

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The disputed area is along the boundary line between the two properties and is partially bisected
by the retaining wall. It also contains part of the gravel road and a sprinkler system, as described
in the photograph above.2
In September 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title to the property and for a
declaratory judgment. Plaintiff alleged that an asphalt driveway that served defendants’ property
encroached on plaintiff’s land. Plaintiff further alleged that a retaining wall extended into his
property, but benefitted defendants’ property. Both encroachments appeared to have been in use
for 15 or more years “and constitute[d] visible easements for ingress and egress to 5078 Park Road
and to prevent erosion and lateral intrusion from 5078 Park.” Plaintiff asked that the court
determine that defendants had a non-exclusive prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over
the driveway and an easement to maintain the existing retaining wall. Plaintiff also requested that
the court enter a declaration of specific rights regarding the disputed area.
In November 2023, defendants filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint, generally denying
liability, and a list of affirmative defenses, in which they raised the doctrines of adverse possession
and acquiescence. Defendants additionally filed a countercomplaint to quiet title. Defendants
asserted that they and their predecessors “occupied, possessed, maintained, and used” the driveway
since at least 1998. They claimed that they “occupied, possessed, maintained, and used” the
surrounding maintenance area since at least 2002 “in a manner that was actual, visible, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted” for the statutory 15-year period required
under the doctrine of adverse possession. Defendants also raised a claim under the doctrine of
acquiescence, stating that “Counter-Defendants, and their predecessors in interest, acquiesced in
the exclusive possession, occupation, and use by Counter-Plaintiffs, and their predecessors in
interest, of the Driveway and Surrounding Maintenance Area for more than fifteen (15) years.”
Defendants requested that the court enter an order quieting title and declaring them owners of the
driveway and the disputed area. Defendants further asked that the court rule that plaintiff had no
“right, title, claim, or interest” in the disputed area.
In December 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). In a
brief in support of the motion, plaintiff explained that the dispute concerned three adjacent 1.01-
acre parcels on Park Road in Scio Township: 5100 Park Road (plaintiff’s vacant parcel), 5078 Park
Road (defendants’ parcel), and 5118 Park Road. All three parcels were originally owned by
William and Martha Edwards. The Edwards family owned plaintiff’s parcel until 2021, when it
was transferred to Martha’s daughter, Laura Fader, who then sold it to plaintiff. Plaintiff further
explained that defendants purchased their property from Martha’s son, Lawrence Edwards, in
2013.
Plaintiff argued that the boundary dispute between the properties at 5100 and 5078 Park
Road should be resolved based on the deeds in the public record, which clearly define the property
lines. He noted that defendants claimed that the boundary shifted westward based on the doctrines
of adverse possession and acquiescence, both of which require a 15-year period of adverse use or
2 For clarity, the disputed area map has been rotated to match the layout depicted in the overhead
view of the properties.

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acquiescence to establish a new boundary line. Regarding adverse possession, plaintiff asserted
that defendants could not meet the legal requirements, which include proving that possession was
actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the statutory period.
Plaintiff reiterated that defendants purchased their property in 2013 and argued that they could not
rely on their own actions to establish adverse possession. Instead, they were required to
demonstrate that, between 2000 and 2013, Lawrence maintained the property with the intent to
claim ownership. Plaintiff contended that defendants had not provided evidence of such intent or
any hostile actions by Lawrence, particularly given the familial relationship between Lawrence
and Martha, who owned the adjacent property during that time.
On the issue of acquiescence, plaintiff highlighted that defendants were required to
establish that the property owners treated a specific boundary line as the true property line for at
least 15 years. This required evidence of an agreement, whether explicit or implied, regarding the
boundary’s location. Plaintiff argued that defendants had not identified any physical markers or
conditions on the ground that would indicate such an agreement.
Furthermore, plaintiff contended that the precise zoning requirements for the parcels made
it unlikely that Martha and Lawrence would have acquiesced to a boundary change. Plaintiff
explained:
All three lots are 1.01 acre in size and located in the A-1 zoning district of
Scio Township. All three lots are served by public water and sewer. The minimum
lot size for construction of a residence in the A-1 District, if served by public water
and sewer, is 1.0 acres.
Plaintiff reasoned that even a small decrease in the property allotted to 5100 Park Road would
dramatically decrease its value and render 5100 Park Road unbuildable. Plaintiff argued that the
Edwards family likely did not “acquiesce in such a change and the ensuing loss of value.”
Ultimately, plaintiff concluded that defendants did not meet the legal or evidentiary standards
required to support their claims of adverse possession or acquiescence. Plaintiff requested the
court to grant his motion for summary disposition.
Defendants responded that they properly established ownership of the disputed area
through the doctrines of adverse possession and acquiescence. Defendants asserted that the
driveway and retaining wall were constructed in 1994 and had been used for ingress, egress,
parking, and daycare activities ever since. Defendants also stated that they and their predecessors
had consistently mowed, watered, and maintained the disputed area. They further argued that their
predecessors installed and maintained a sprinkler system and retaining walls that extended into the
disputed area, further evidencing their exclusive use and possession.
Regarding the doctrine of adverse possession, defendants again claimed to have satisfied
their burden to show entitlement to the property through their actions and those of their
predecessors. Regarding the doctrine of acquiescence, defendants contended that plaintiff and his
predecessors acquiesced to the boundary defined by the driveway. Defendants argued that plaintiff
had failed to present evidence to refute defendant’s claims or to create a genuine issue of material
fact. Defendants therefore requested that the court deny plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition.

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A hearing on the matter was held in March 2024, and the parties largely argued consistent
with their briefs. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, finding that
questions of fact remained regarding whether defendants could tack on the previous owner’s use
in order to establish entitlement to the property through adverse possession or acquiescence. The
court thereafter entered an order denying the motion for summary disposition.
In April 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. In a brief in support of the
motion, plaintiff stated that he had obtained affidavits from Lawrence Edwards and Martha
Edwards that were unavailable prior to the court’s decision on his motion for summary disposition.
Plaintiff explained that, “[i]n the time since the court’s decision, the Plaintiffs’ Vendor, Laura
Fader, through her counsel, has made contact with both Lawrence Edwards, her brother, and
Martha Edwards, her mother, and has obtained affidavits which address the issue in question.”
Plaintiff argued that the affidavits demonstrated that Lawrence’s maintenance and use of 5100
Park was with his mother’s knowledge and permission and that his activities on the property were
not intended to alter boundary lines in the recorded deeds. Plaintiff also noted that the affidavits
indicated that Martha and Lawrence never had any agreement or intention to establish boundaries
different from those in the recorded deeds.
In his affidavit, Lawrence averred that he “would assist my parents and sister in
maintaining all three parcels of land, occasionally cutting grass across all three parcels a few times
a year, with no intention of altering the legal boundary lines as established by the legal descriptions
for each property.” He additionally averred that “[a]ny access or use of any of the three parcels
owned and controlled by the family . . . was done with permission and with no intention of
establishing any claim to the other plotted parcel.” Similarly, Martha averred: “My son Lawrence,
with my permission and consent would assist me in maintaining all three parcels of land,
occasionally cutting grass across all three parcels a few times a year, with no intention of altering
the legal boundary lines as established by the legal descriptions for each property.”
In June 2024, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration,
noting that plaintiff had presented evidence not previously reviewed by the court. The order
essentially treated the motion for reconsideration as a motion for summary disposition and granted
defendants an opportunity to file a brief in response to the motion in light of the new evidence.
In August 2024, defendants responded to the motion for reconsideration. Defendants again
argued that they established entitlement to the property through adverse possession by showing
clear proof of possession that was actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and
uninterrupted for the statutory period of fifteen years. They explained that “[t]he house on 5078
Park, two retaining walls, the rock wall at the eastern edge of the retaining wall, the Driveway, and
secondary gravel driveway, all of which encroach on 5100 Park, were built by Lawrence Edwards
and his father between 1992 and 1994.” Defendants claimed that the disputed property had thus
been used and maintained in a hostile manner for more than 15 years.
Defendants also argued that Lawrence’s affidavit was false, noting that while his affidavit
testimony was consistent with testimony given during an August 2024 deposition, his testimony
was inconsistent with statements made during a telephone conversation with defendants’ counsel.
In the telephone conversation, which was transcribed and attached as an exhibit to the response,
Lawrence stated that he did not ask his mother for permission to mow the disputed area that

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encroached on plaintiff’s property. Defendants thus challenged the veracity of the affidavit
presented by plaintiff. They contended that Lawrence signed the affidavit solely to placate his
sister, who was angry about the property dispute.
Regarding the doctrine of acquiescence, defendants noted that they did not need to prove
hostility in order for their claim to succeed. Defendants argued that they and their predecessors
treated the boundary between properties as a line from a telephone communications box, along the
sprinkler line, to the edge of the retaining wall, ending at a sunken pipe. Defendants further stated
that Lawrence Edwards testified that he and his father, who jointly owned 5100 Park Road with
Martha, knowingly built improvements that extended beyond their property lines. Based on the
foregoing, defendants asked the court to quiet title in their favor.
A second hearing on the motion for summary disposition was held in September 2024. The
court examined whether defendants could claim adverse possession by tacking their use of the
property onto Lawrence’s use as the prior owner of the property. The court ultimately agreed with
plaintiff that defendants did not meet the requirements for adverse possession because they had
not held the property for the requisite 15-year period and could not tack their ownership onto
Lawrence’s prior possession of the property. The court further agreed with plaintiff that there was
no evidence that Martha had acquiesced to a boundary line with defendants, or that there was a
meeting of the minds between the parties to prove that they had acquiesced to a new boundary
line.
In October 2024, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition. The court reiterated that defendants had not shown entitlement to the property under
either a theory of adverse possession or acquiescence. The court additionally held that plaintiff’s
ownership of the property was
subject to an easement benefiting the owner of the real property located at 5068
Park, allowing the retaining walls and paved and gravel portions of the Defendant’s
drive to remain and be maintained. Both may be used for normal purposes (play,
daily parking) but no extended parking. Play and parking on driveway and gravel
driveway allowed for personal children and daycare children. Defendants may
leave or remove the sprinklers that currently encroach on Plaintiff’s Property.
The court thus quieted title in plaintiff’s favor. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to plaintiff.
They maintain that the undisputed facts showed that they could establish entitlement to the
property through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession, and that summary
disposition should have instead been granted in their favor. We disagree.
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
As an initial matter, we note that the statement of the issue in defendants’ brief on appeal
does not match the substance of their brief. The statement of the issue only addresses defendants’
argument regarding acquiescence. It makes no mention of their argument regarding adverse

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possession. Defendants have therefore waived the issue. See English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich, 263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004) (“An issue not contained in the statement
of questions presented is waived on appeal.”). However, we will overlook defendants’ failure to
preserve the issue in this instance. See Smith v Foerster-Bolser Const, Inc, 269 Mich App 424,
427; 711 NW2d 421 (2006) (stating that this Court may overlook preservation requirements if the
“failure to consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a
proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary
for its resolution have been presented”).
Defendants’ statement of the issue presented also raises an argument about the credibility
of plaintiff’s “central witness,” Lawrence Edwards, but defendants’ argument regarding that issue
is not substantively briefed. Generally, if an issue is presented in the statement of issues, but is
not substantively addressed in the body of the brief, it is considered abandoned. See Berger v
Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008) (“A party abandons a claim when it fails
to make a meaningful argument in support of its position.”). Here, it is clear that defendants’
argument regarding Lawrence’s credibility is merely part of defendants’ larger arguments
regarding adverse possession and acquiescence. Thus, to the extent necessary, we will overlook
defendants’ noncompliance with the court rules and address the matter of Lawrence’s credibility
as part of defendants’ adverse possession and acquiescence claims. See Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich
186, 207; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (“[A]ddressing a controlling legal issue despite the failure of the
parties to properly frame the issue is a well understood judicial principle.”).
B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Claims for adverse possession, quiet title, and acquiescence are equitable claims that this
Court reviews de novo. Beach v Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504, 508; 770 NW2d 386 (2009). This
Court also reviews de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Hubbard
v Stier, 345 Mich App 620, 625; 9 NW3d 129 (2023). Here, the trial court granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), (C)(9), and (C)(10).3 Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), summary
disposition is proper if “[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.” When addressing a motion under this subrule, “a trial court must accept all factual
allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare,
Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be
3 Plaintiff brought his motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), not (C)(9). As an initial matter,
we note that “[a] trial court is not necessarily constrained by the subrule under which a party moves
for summary disposition.” Babi v Estate of Herman, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2023) (Docket No. 364375); slip op at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, it is clear
that the court added (C)(9) as a subrule based on defendants’ decision to raise adverse possession
and acquiescence as affirmative defenses. “In circumstances where a party brings a motion under
the wrong subrule, the trial court may proceed under the proper rule provided the parties were not
misled or otherwise prejudiced by the decision.” Id. Neither party disputes the general
applicability of MCR 2.116(C)(9) in this matter.

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granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify
recovery.” Id.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9) tests the sufficiency of a defendant’s pleadings. When
deciding a (C)(9) motion, “the trial court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and
properly grants summary disposition where a defendant fails to plead a valid defense to a claim.”
Slater v Ann Arbor Pub Sch Bd of Ed, 250 Mich App 419, 425; 648 NW2d 205 (2002). Summary
disposition is appropriate when “the defendant’s pleadings are so clearly untenable that as a matter
of law no factual development could possibly deny the plaintiff’s right to recovery.” Id. at 425-
426.
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. El-
Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. When reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the parties’ documentary evidence “in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751,
761; 918 NW2d 785 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A (C)(10) motion is properly
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might disagree.” Johnson, 502 Mich
at 761.
While the trial court stated that it granted summary disposition under all three subrules, it
clearly considered documentary evidence outside the pleadings, thus rendering summary
disposition improper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(9). This was procedural error. “However,
summary disposition under the incorrect subrule is not fatal . . . if the record supports review under
the proper subrule.” Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Null, 304 Mich App 508, 517; 847 NW2d 657
(2014); see also Detroit News, Inc v Policemen & Firemen Ret Sys of Detroit, 252 Mich App 59,
66; 651 NW2d 127 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“If summary disposition is
granted under one subpart of the court rule when it was actually appropriate under another, the
defect is not fatal and does not preclude appellate review as long as the record permits review
under the correct subpart.”). Here, the record is sufficient to allow this Court to review the matter
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
C. ACQUIESCENCE
Michigan recognizes three theories of acquiescence: “(1) acquiescence for the statutory
period; (2) acquiescence following a dispute and agreement; and (3) acquiescence arising from
intention to deed to a marked boundary.” Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 457; 608 NW2d
97 (2000). For acquiescence established through the statutory period, MCL 600.5801(4) requires
“a showing that the property owners treated a boundary line or marker as the property line for 15
years.” Houston v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich App 545, 568; 968 NW2d 9 (2021). Unlike
adverse possession, “a claim of acquiescence does not require that the possession be hostile or
without permission.” Walters, 239 Mich App at 453 (citation omitted). Instead,
[t]he law of acquiescence is concerned with a specific application of the statute of
limitations to cases of adjoining property owners who are mistaken about where the
line between their property is. Adjoining property owners may treat a boundary

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line, typically a fence, as the property line. If the boundary line is not the recorded
property line, this results in one property owner possessing what is actually the
other property owner’s land. Regardless of the innocent nature of this mistake, the
property owner whose land is being possessed by another would have a cause of
action against the other property owner to recover possession of the land. After
fifteen years, the period for bringing an action would expire. The result is that the
property owner of record would no longer be able to enforce his title, and the other
property owner would have title by virtue of his possession of the land. [Sackett v
Atyeo, 217 Mich App 676, 681-682; 552 NW2d 536 (1996) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).]
Thus, while hostility is not required, acquiescence does require evidence that parties treated a
particular boundary line as the property line. Id. Acquiescence must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. Walters, 239 Mich App at 455.
Here, defendants rely on the actions of their predecessors in order to establish acquiescence
for the applicable statutory 15-year period. “The acquiescence of predecessors in title can be
tacked onto that of the parties to establish the mandated period of fifteen years.” Houston, 335
Mich App at 568 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unlike claims brought under the doctrine
of adverse possession, “proof of privity is not necessary . . . to employ tacking of holdings to obtain
the 15-year minimum under the doctrine of acquiescence.” Siegel v Renkiewicz’ Estate, 373 Mich
421, 426; 129 NW2d 876 (1964). Defendants contend that the construction of the retaining wall
and the driveway, both of which encroach on plaintiff’s property, demonstrate that the Edwards
family intended to alter the boundary line between the 5100 and 5078 Park Road properties. They
also claim that the installation of a sprinkler system in the disputed area is evidence of acquiescence
to a new boundary line.
Since acquiescence requires evidence that adjoining property owners treated a particular
boundary line as the property line, “[o]nly when there has been some agreement, whether tacit or
overt, as to the location of the boundary does the question of acquiescence become important.”
Houston, 335 Mich App at 568 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). The
affidavits presented by plaintiff establish that no such agreement existed. Both Lawrence and
Martha Edwards swore under oath that any use of the disputed property was permissive and that
they never intended to alter the legal boundary lines established in the recorded deeds. Martha
specifically stated that, “[a]s a family, we looked after each other’s parcels with no intention of
changing the legally described boundary lines . . . .” This testimony directly contradicts any claim
that the parties acquiesced to treating the maintained area as establishing a new boundary line.
Additionally, while defendants point to physical improvements like driveways, retaining
walls, and sprinkler systems as evidence of boundary treatment, these improvements were made
with the knowledge and permission of both property owners. The fact that plaintiff’s and
defendants’ predecessors—at that time, William and Lawrence Edwards—constructed these
improvements together, knowing they extended beyond the surveyed boundary, demonstrates
family cooperation rather than boundary acquiescence. The doctrine of acquiescence requires
more than mere physical encroachment; it requires evidence that the property owners treated the
encroachment as establishing the actual property boundary. Houston, 335 Mich App at 568. The
affidavit evidence establishes the opposite, and clearly demonstrates that the Edwards family

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understood that the legal boundaries remained as described in their deeds despite permissive use
arrangements.
Defendants nevertheless argue that the trial court erroneously relied on Lawrence’s
affidavit in determining that defendants failed to establish entitlement to the property through
acquiescence. They contend that Lawrence’s affidavit testimony is contradicted by a telephone
conversation with defendants’ counsel, in which he stated that he maintained the disputed area
without Martha’s permission in the years that she owned it. Lawrence stated in the telephone call
that he knew where the boundary line of his property was and crossed over it to mow the vacant
land at 5100 Park Road without asking for permission from Martha, who owned it at the time.
Defendants claim that this contradicts Lawrence’s affidavit testimony, in which he stated:
7. I would assist my parents and sister in maintaining all three parcels of
land, occasionally cutting grass across all three parcels a few times a year, with no
intention of altering the legal boundary lines as established by the legal descriptions
for each property.
8. Any access or use of any of the three parcels owned and controlled by
the family (i.e. my parents, my sister, and myself) was done with permission and
with no intention of establishing any claim to the other plotted parcel. I simply help
to maintain all lots to assist my family with no attempt to alter the established legal
boundaries[.]
Our review of both documents indicate that there are no material contradictions between
Lawrence’s statements in the affidavit and his statements in the telephone transcript. Assuming
arguendo that the telephone transcript constitutes substantively admissible evidence under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), it does not create a genuine factual dispute sufficient to defeat summary
disposition when compared to the sworn affidavit testimony presented by plaintiff. Both
documents consistently reflect that Lawrence maintained and used the land between the properties
for family reasons, with no intention to claim ownership or alter boundaries, and with an
understanding and respect for the legal property lines. The affidavit provides a more general
overview, while the transcript adds detail about Lawrence’s actions and motivations. Minor
differences in detail, such as whether Lawrence had Martha’s explicit permission to mow the lawn,
do not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lawrence acquiesced to a new
boundary line between the properties. Defendants’ argument to the contrary lacks merit.
D. ADVERSE POSSESSION
“A party claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent proof of possession that
is actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant
statutory period” of 15 years. Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, 501 Mich
192, 202; 912 NW2d 161 (2018) (citations omitted); MCL 600.5801(4). “Clear and cogent
evidence” is “more than a preponderance of the evidence, approaching the level of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Walters, 225 Mich App at 223; 570 NW2d 301 (1997). “Hostility is the very
essence of adverse possession.” King v Battle Creek Box Co, 235 Mich 24, 35; 209 NW 133
(1926). “[H]ostile use is that which is inconsistent with the right of the owner, without permission
asked or given, and which would entitle the owner to a cause of action against the intruder.”

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Houston, 335 Mich App 545, 559; 968 NW2d 9 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“When the elements of adverse possession have been met, the law presumes that the true owner,
by his acquiescence, has granted the land, or interest to the land, so held adversely.” Marlette Auto
Wash, LLC, 501 Mich at 202 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants cannot establish entitlement to the property through adverse possession.
Defendants purchased their property in November 2013, providing only 10 years of possession
before this litigation commenced in 2023. This falls short of the required 15-year statutory period
required for a claim of adverse possession. MCL 600.5801(4). To remedy this deficiency,
defendants must successfully “tack” Lawrence’s prior use onto their own possession period.
Successive periods of adverse possession by different owners can be tacked together in order to
satisfy the 15-year statutory requirement, provided that there was privity of estate between the
parties. Houston, 335 Mich App at 560. Privity may be established if the deed contains a
description of the disputed property, or if there is an actual transfer or conveyance of the disputed
property by parol statements made when the property is conveyed. Marlette Auto Wash, LLC, 501
Mich at 203. Additionally, “a parol transfer may occur if a property owner is ‘well-acquainted’
with the previous property owner and had visited and used the disputed property for many years
before acquiring title.” Id. For the latter to occur, “the parties must have understood that an
easement was appurtenant to the land.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, defendants cannot establish the required privity with Lawrence. Lawrence’s affidavit
does not indicate that he had any interaction or conversation with defendants prior to closing.
Indeed, the record contains no evidence that there was any communication between defendants
and Lawrence regarding boundaries. The warranty deed from Lawrence to defendants likewise
contains no reference to any land other than the 1.01-acre parcel as originally surveyed. Without
either inclusion of the disputed property in the deed or parol references at the time of conveyance,
no privity exists to support tacking. Id. Defendants therefore cannot establish entitlement to the
disputed property under the doctrine of adverse possession.4
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
4 Because defendants cannot establish the requisite 15-year period for adverse possession, we
decline to address their arguments regarding hostility and their related challenge to the credibility
of Lawrence’s deposition testimony.

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