COA 362506 PEOPLE OF MI V ANTOINE WILLIE-LEZELL MYERS Opinion - On Remand SCt - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/30/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
January 30, 2026
10:08 AM
v No. 362506
Berrien Circuit Court
ANTOINE WILLIE-LEZELL MYERS, LC No. 2021-003480-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and BORRELLO and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court to address a narrow sentencing
issue. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
As stated in more detail in our prior opinion,1 defendant was convicted by a jury of two
counts of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i);
knowingly keeping a building for keeping or selling controlled substances (maintaining a drug
house), MCL 333.7405(1)(d); knowingly keeping a vehicle for keeping or selling controlled
substances (maintaining a drug vehicle), MCL 333.7405(1)(d); possessing a firearm while
ineligible to do so (felon-in-possession of a firearm), MCL 750.224f(1); possessing ammunition
while ineligible to do so (felon-in-possession of ammunition), MCL 750.224f(3); and three counts
of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to serve
180 months to 40 years in prison for his first conviction of possessing methamphetamine with the
1 See People v Myers, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September
19, 2024 (Docket No. 362506).

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intent to distribute, 120 months to 40 years in prison for his second conviction of possessing
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, 30 months to 4 years in prison for each of his
convictions of maintaining a drug house and maintaining a drug vehicle, 28 months to 7 years in
prison for each of his felon-in-possession convictions, and 2 years in prison for each of his felony-
firearm convictions. This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences on appeal.
Defendant sought leave to appeal to our Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued an
order stating in relevant part: “[I]n lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the
Court of Appeals to allow the defendant to file a supplemental brief regarding whether, in light of
People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015), a court can double an individual’s sentencing guidelines
pursuant to MCL 333.7413(1).” People v Myers, ___ Mich ___; 21 NW3d 187 (2025). Leave to
appeal was denied in all other respects. Id. Supplemental briefs having been filed by the parties,
we now address this issue on the merits.
II. ANALYSIS
As relevant to this appeal, MCL 333.7413 provides:
(1) . . . an individual convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this
article may be imprisoned for a term not more than twice the term otherwise
authorized or fined an amount not more than twice that otherwise authorized, or
both.
* * *
(4) For purposes of subsection (1), an offense is considered a second or
subsequent offense, if, before conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time
been convicted under this article or under any statute of the United States or of any
state relating to a narcotic drug, marihuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic
drug.
Here, the prosecution requested that the trial court double defendant’s sentencing
guidelines ranges for his four drug-related convictions based on his prior conviction for possession
of marijuana and evidence in the present case, such as the large amount of methamphetamine and
weapons involved, suggesting that defendant was engaged in wholesale drug trafficking. The trial
court decided to double the guidelines ranges on these counts, stating, “because of the prior
conviction and based upon everything I’ve read on his history and what I saw in the course of the
trial I think it’s appropriate to double the guideline range.” This had the effect of raising
defendant’s guidelines ranges for his two possession-with-intent-to-deliver convictions from 72 to
120 months to 144 to 240 months and from 51 to 85 months to 102 to 170 months, respectively.
The ranges for his other two drug convictions went from 2 to 17 months to 4 to 34 months and
from 0 to 17 months to 0 to 34 months, respectively. Defendant was sentenced as previously
stated.
Our task, pursuant to the order of our Supreme Court, is to determine whether the trial court
was prohibited from doubling defendant’s sentencing guidelines under MCL 333.7413(1) because
of our Supreme Court’s holding in Lockridge. In Lockridge, our Supreme Court held that the
Michigan sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment’s fundamental right to a jury trial

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to the extent that the guidelines required “judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by the
defendant or found by the jury to score offense variables (OVs) that mandatorily increase the floor
of the guidelines minimum sentence range, i.e., the ‘mandatory minimum’ sentence . . . .” People
v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). Consequently, the Supreme Court made
the guidelines advisory and struck down the requirement that a departure be supported by a
substantial and compelling reason. Id. at 364-365, 391-392.
MCL 333.7413(1) provides a trial court with the discretion to impose a sentence of
imprisonment “for a term not more than twice the term otherwise authorized” on a defendant
convicted of a second or subsequent drug offense as defined by the statute. People v Green, 205
Mich App 342, 344-346; 517 NW2d 782 (1994). A trial court’s discretionary sentencing decisions
are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 664; 897
NW2d 195 (2016). However, issues of statutory construction and whether a statute violates the
Sixth Amendment are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Lockridge, 498 Mich at
373; People v Sours, 315 Mich App 346, 348; 890 NW2d 401 (2016).
In People v Hines, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 363151);
slip op at 15, this Court held that “[p]ost-Lockridge, MCL 333.7413 has no effect on the advisory
sentencing guidelines,” but it “does, however, potentially increase the statutory minimum.” We
concluded in Hines:
MCL 333.7413(1) provides, “an individual convicted of a second or subsequent
offense under this article may be imprisoned for a term not more than twice the
term otherwise authorized or fined an amount not more than twice that otherwise
authorized, or both.” Post-Lockridge, the minimum allowed sentence is no longer
limited to twice the sentencing guidelines range. Rather, the enhanced minimum
could be up to ⅔ of the new statutory maximum. See MCL 769.34(2)(b). The trial
court would just be required to articulate its reasoning for increasing the statutory
maximum, its reasoning for departing from the guidelines, and its reasoning
supporting the extent of the departure. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court
erred by “doubling the guidelines.” [Id.]
Accordingly, this Court determined that the defendant in Hines was entitled to resentencing
because the trial court erroneously doubled the guidelines to determine the defendant’s minimum
sentence even though the trial court had adequately explained its reasons for doubling the
defendant’s statutory maximum sentence pursuant to MCL 333.7413(1). Id. at ___, ___; slip op
at 14-15, 20.
Here, the trial court made the same error by doubling defendant’s sentencing guidelines to
determine his minimum sentence pursuant to MCL 333.7413(1). Id. We therefore vacate
defendant’s sentences for his four drug-related convictions and remand this matter for resentencing
under the framework set forth in Hines.
Remanded for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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