COA 377006 CHIMERE MARIE BROWN V DERAMUS PAUL DAVID FRANCE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 6/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
CHIMERE MARIE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
June 09, 2026
2:43 PM
v No. 377006
Oakland Circuit Court
DERAMUS PAUL DAVID FRANCE, LC No. 2024-525282-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and CAMERON and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This dispute concerns the request to change the domicile of a minor child from Michigan
to Texas. Below, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to change domicile after concluding the
factors set forth in MCL 722.31(4) did not weigh in favor of changing domicile. That was
erroneous because those factors do not apply—as is the case here—“if the order governing the
child’s custody grants sole legal custody to 1 of the child’s parents.” MCL 722.31(2). We reverse
the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Chimere Brown, and defendant, Deramus France, are the divorced parents of
minor child DMRF. Their 2019 judgment of divorce provided joint legal custody, with plaintiff
having primary physical custody.1 As this Court detailed in a prior opinion, their relationship
appears fraught with domestic violence incidents. See In re DPDF, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 19, 2022 (Docket No 355799), p 1-2. This includes,
for example, defendant striking plaintiff’s head after she attempted to leave a school with DMRF
in compliance with their custody arrangement.
1 Our caselaw “uses ‘sole custody’ or ‘primary physical custody’ to distinguish between an award
of custody to one parent,” as here to plaintiff, “and an award of joint physical custody.” Lieberman
v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 79; 900 NW2d 130 (2017).

-- 1 of 3 --

-2-
In May 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to change domicile and grant her full legal custody
of DMRF. The Friend of the Court Referee recommended that the trial court grant plaintiff sole
legal custody of DMRF but deny her motion to change domicile. No objections were made to the
Referee’s recommendation, and the trial court approved that recommendation.
At issue is plaintiff’s March 2025 motion to change DMRF’s domicile to Texas. The
Referee recommended that the trial court deny the motion because plaintiff failed to establish how
the change of domicile would improve DMRF’s life and that the best-interest factors did not
support a change of domicile. Over plaintiff’s objection, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion.
This appeal by right followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends the trial court erroneously applied the statute governing a minor child’s
change of domicile, MCL 722.31, and its accompanying court rule, MCR 3.211(C)(3), to her
motion to change domicile. On de novo review of the trial court’s interpretation of the governing
statute, In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), we agree.
A minor child’s domicile “may not be moved from Michigan without the approval of the
judge who awarded custody,” and a trial court must comply with MCL 722.31 when considering
whether to grant a motion to change domicile. MCR 3.211(C)(1) and (3). Generally, “[w]hen the
parents share joint custody and one parent is seeking permission to relocate more than 100 miles
away, the family court must consider the factors of MCL 722.31(4).” Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich
App 432, 436-437; 741 NW2d 523 (2007). This requires applying a four-step approach, beginning
with the movant establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the five factors set forth in
MCL 722.31(4)(a) to (e) support a change (improvement of life, compliance with parenting time,
preservation of parental relationship, motivation of opposing parent, and domestic violence). See
Rains v Rains, 301 Mich App 313, 326-327; 836 NW2d 709 (2013). Upon satisfaction of that first
step (which are sometimes referred to as the D’Onofrio factors), the trial court must (step two)
“determine whether an established custodial environment exists,” (step three) “determine whether
the change of domicile would modify or alter that establish custodial environment, and (step four)
“determine whether the change in domicile would be in the child’s best interests by considering
whether the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 have been established by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. at 325.
However, the Michigan Legislature created an exception applicable here. When a parent
has sole legal custody, MCL 722.31(2) excuses courts from conducting the four-step inquiry.
Sulaica v Rometty, 308 Mich App 568, 581-582; 866 NW2d 838 (2014). It exempts that inquiry
“if the order governing the child’s custody grants sole legal custody to 1 of the child’s parents.”
MCL 722.31(2). As this Court has stated many times over now, “the language of the court rule
does not require the family court to consider the D’Onofrio factors. Instead, the court rule simply
requires the court to comply with MCL 722.31, which by its own language makes consideration
of the D’Onofrio factors unnecessary when the relocating parent has sole legal custody.” Spires,
276 Mich App at 439. See also Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 352; 770 NW2d 77 (2009)
(similar); Sulaica, 308 Mich App at 581-586) (collecting caselaw). Stated differently, “if a parent
with sole legal custody wishes to move a child subject to a custody order out of this state, MCL

-- 2 of 3 --

-3-
722.31 does not apply and the trial court may not consider the D’Onofrio factors.” Brecht v
Hendry, 297 Mich App 732, 742; 825 NW2d 110 (2012).
These authorities require us to hold that the trial court erred when it considered plaintiff’s
motion to change domicile through the factors set forth in MCL 722.31(4).2
While no one disputes that plaintiff had sole legal custody of DMRF at the time the trial
court ruled on plaintiff’s motion to change domicile and consideration of the factors in
MCL 722.31(4) was not required, the trial court must still determine whether the modified
residence would change the child’s established custodial environment. See Brown v Loveman,
260 Mich App 576, 598 n 7; 680 NW2d 432 (2004); Sulaica, 308 Mich App at 583. If relocation
would “result in a change in parenting time so great as to necessarily change the established
custodial environment,” the court must inquire into the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23.
Brown at 594–595, 598 n 7. The moving party must then prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the change of domicile is in the child’s best interests. Id.
We thus remand to the trial court for it to determine whether the modified residence would
change DMRF’s established custodial environment, which it must do based on up-to-date
information in existence at the time it makes this determination. See Butters v Butters, 510 Mich
503; 990 NW2d 826 (2022). And in so doing, we expect the trial court to expedite its consideration
of this issue, resolving it by no later than 60 days. Finally, “[i]n light of our resolution of the
dispositive issues, we decline to address the remaining issues raised by the parties on appeal,”
Huron Mountain Club v Marquette Co Rd Comm, 303 Mich App 312, 329; 845 NW2d 523 (2013),
including plaintiff’s alternative argument regarding her entitlement to the entry of an order
permitting a change of domicile.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. As the prevailing party, plaintiff may
tax her costs. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense
2 Defendant does not cite Brausch, Brecht, Spires, or Sulaica, let alone attempt to distinguish them.
Indeed, his appellee brief on appeal consists solely of examining the D’Onofrio factors.

-- 3 of 3 --