In re Ballot Challenge in Election of Town of Clifton Select Board Member — 2026 ME 64

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2026 ME 64
Docket: 	SJC-26-7
Decided: 	July 16, 2026
Panel: 	STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, LIPEZ, and TAUB, JJ.
Majority: 	CONNORS, LAWRENCE, LIPEZ, and TAUB, JJ.
Statement of Nonconcurrence: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
IN RE BALLOT CHALLENGE IN ELECTION OF TOWN OF CLIFTON SELECT
BOARD MEMBER
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[¶1] This matter comes before us on a petition submitted by the Town of
Clifton seeking resolution of a challenge by Jeffery F. Niles Jr. to two absentee
ballots cast in a Town Select Board election. 	With its petition, the Town
submitted an affidavit from Niles setting forth the bases for his challenge. See
21-A M.R.S. §§ 673(1), 696(1) (2026). Because the ballots affect the election
result, we have original jurisdiction to determine their validity, and we sit as
the trial court. 	See id.; In re Ballot Disp. in Election of Town of Winslow Dist. 3
Town Councilor, 2018 ME 2, ¶ 2, 176 A.3d 1290. The parties have stipulated to
the facts. 	After having reviewed the materials submitted, we reject the
challenge and conclude that the ballots must be counted.

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I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On March 24, 2026, the Town held a municipal election for, among
other things, a one-year-term Select Board member. 	The candidates for the
position were Steve Armenia and Cynthia Grant. In advance of the election, on
March 18, 2026, an immediate family member of two voters applied to the
Town Clerk for absentee ballots. 	See 21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(3) (2026) (“An
immediate family member of a voter may also make an application or written
request for an absentee ballot for the voter.”). In the section of each application
indicating the “Method of Delivery of Ballot to the Voter,” the applicant placed
a checkmark next to “By Immediate Family Member of Voter” and placed an
illegible signature on line 5(c), where the applicant is instructed to designate
the family member of the voter. 	On the adjacent “Relationship to the Voter”
line, the applicant indicated that he was the husband of one voter and the father
of the other. On each application, line 6, which is designated for the signature
of the voter or the immediate family member of the voter, was left blank.
[¶3] 	The Clerk issued to the applicant an absentee ballot and return
envelope for each voter. 	As required by statute, the line for the “Voting
Residence” on the return envelopes issued with the ballots indicates that it
“Must be completed by Clerk.” 	See 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(1) (2026) (“The clerk

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shall type or write in ink the name and the residence address of the voter in the
designated section of the return envelope.”). 	Although the Clerk wrote the
name of the voter in ink on each envelope, the Clerk wrote only “Clifton,”
without any street address, for “Voting Residence.” 	See 21-A M.R.S. § 1(40-B)
(2026) 	(“‘Residence 	address’ 	means 	the 	street 	and 	number 	or 	other
designation indicating the physical location of a person’s residence.”).
[¶4] 	The family member to whom the Clerk issued the ballots and
envelopes for the two voters was a candidate on the ballot for a separate Select
Board position with a three-year term, the result of which is not implicated by
the validation or invalidation of the ballots at issue.
[¶5] 	The same family member returned the two voters’ completed
ballots to the Clerk on March 24, 2026. 	The Clerk accepted the ballots. 	The
Town—through a clerical error—did not count the two absentee ballots in
determining the results of the election. The Town announced and certified the
results as 114 votes for Grant and 113 votes for Armenia.
[¶6] The Clerk, who was also the Election Warden presiding at the voting
place, see 21-A M.R.S. §§ 1(50), 628(1) (2026), discovered the clerical error the
morning after the results were announced. 	On March 27, 2026, the Town
resumed counting ballots to include the two absentee ballots. A member of the

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public who was present stated that he wished to challenge the ballots, and he
submitted an affidavit challenging both ballots. 	See 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)
(2026). Acting pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 696, which applies if the validity of a
challenged ballot affects the election result, the Town submitted to the
Executive Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court materials that included the
challenger’s affidavit, a “challenge certificate,” and the absentee ballots sealed
in their original envelopes. Id. §§ 673(3), 696(1).
[¶7] We concluded that the challenger had failed to file “an appropriate
affidavit setting forth the factual basis for the voters’ ineligibility and the source
of the information demonstrating that ineligibility” and dismissed the petition,
declining to invalidate the ballots. See In re Ballot Challenge in Election of Town
of Clifton Select Bd. Member, 2026 ME 42, ¶ 7, 355 A.3d 745.
[¶8] 	After we dismissed the matter, the Town resumed counting the
ballots. Niles attended the proceeding, and the Town Clerk granted his request
to inspect the two absentee ballots previously challenged, the applications for
the absentee ballots, and the register of absentee voters. Niles challenged the
ballots by submitting a signed affidavit. In his affidavit, Niles contended that
the absentee ballots had been impermissibly issued to a candidate whose name
appeared on the ballot, see 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(2)(E), upon applications that

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were not signed as required by 21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(3)(A)(3). Niles signed a
challenge certificate under oath. See id. § 673(1). The challenge certificate and
ballots were 	marked 	with 	unique 	identifying 	numbers, 	after 	which 	the
challenge certificate and affidavit were placed in an envelope and sealed, with
the unique ballot identifying numbers noted on the sealed envelope. 	See id.
§§ 673(3), 696(1).
[¶9] 	The Town proceeded with opening and counting the challenged
ballots. 	Both ballots were cast in favor of Armenia, resulting in a total of
115 votes for him and 114 votes for Grant. Because the two challenged ballots
changed the outcome of the election, the Clerk/Warden suspended certification
of the election and on May 8, 2026, delivered to us the envelope containing the
challenge certificate and the signed affidavit, together with other election
materials that are not in dispute.
[¶10] The Town, Niles, and Grant1 stipulated to the facts and submitted
legal memoranda, waiving oral argument. We now issue our judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] “A voter of a municipality . . . may challenge the right of another to
vote at an election in that municipality.” 	Id. § 673; see also 21-A M.R.S. § 757
1 Armenia has not participated in these proceedings.

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(2026) (“An absentee ballot may be challenged the same as a regular ballot
under section 673.”). The grounds upon which a ballot may be challenged are
set forth in 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)(A). To bring a challenge, the challenger must
submit an affidavit setting forth “the reason the particular individual being
challenged may be ineligible to vote, the specific source of the information or
personal knowledge upon which the challenge of the particular individual is
based and a statement that the challenger understands that making a false
statement on the affidavit is punishable under penalties of perjury.” 21-A M.R.S.
§ 673(1).
[¶12] 	Citing section 673(1)(A)(5), Niles’s affidavit challenges the two
absentee ballots on the grounds that the voters did not properly apply for them.
Specifically, he alleges that the applications were improper because the family
member who submitted them was a candidate and because the applications
were not signed. 	See id. 	§§ 753-A(3)(A)(3), 753-B(2)(E). 	In the legal
memorandum that Niles submitted to this Court, he challenges the ballots on
the additional ground that pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 762(1) (2026), the Clerk
should not have accepted them because the return envelopes did not contain
the voters’ full addresses.

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A. 	Challenge Based on Application for Ballots by a Candidate
[¶13] When statutory text is clear and constitutional, we are obliged to
obey it. See Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15, 895 A.2d
965 (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that when the words of the
Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further
judicial interpretation is not necessary.” (quotation marks omitted)). 	The
Legislature has limited the grounds upon which ballots may be challenged.
Section 673(1)(A) states: 	“Only the following reasons for challenges may be
accepted by the warden.” (Emphasis added). A list of reasons follows, and all
of them are things that the voter—the challenged person—did wrong, such as
not properly registering to vote, failing to return an absentee ballot in time, or
being ineligible to vote because of the voter’s age, citizenship, or residency.
21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)(A)(3), (4), (9). As relevant here, a ballot can be challenged
if 	the 	voter 	“[d]id 	not 	properly 	apply 	for 	an 	absentee 	ballot.” 	Id.
§ 673(1)(A)(5).2
[¶14] Niles alleges that it was improper for a candidate to apply for the
absentee ballots because section 753-B(2)(E) prohibits a clerk from issuing an
2 In full, the grounds for challenging a ballot are that the voter
(2) Is not enrolled in the proper party, if voting in a primary election;
(3) Is not qualified to be a registered voter because the challenged person:

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absentee ballot “[t]o any candidate, except for the candidate’s own ballot.” This
allegation 	fails 	as 	a 	basis 	to 	challenge 	the 	ballots 	because 	for 	section
673(1)(A)(5) to apply, it must be the voter who did not properly apply for the
absentee ballot. Section 673(1)(A)(5) plainly states that an absentee ballot may
be challenged only when the voter did not properly apply. 	If the Legislature
had intended for an improper application by someone other than a voter to be
a basis for challenging an absentee ballot, “it could have included specific
language to that effect.” Damon v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 24, ¶ 14, 990 A.2d
1028.
(a) Does not meet the age requirements as specified in section 111,
subsection 2 and section 111 -A;
(b) Is not a citizen of the United States; or
(c) 	Is not a resident of the municipality or appropriate electoral district
within the municipality;
(4) Registered to vote during the closed period or on election day and did not provide
satisfactory proof of identity and residency to the registrar pursuant to section 121,
subsection 1-A, except that only an election official may challenge for this reason;
(5) Did not properly apply for an absentee ballot;
(6) Did not properly complete the affidavit on the absentee return envelope;
(7) Did not cast the ballot or complete the affidavit before the appropriate witness;
(8) 	Communicated with someone as prohibited by section 754-A, subsection 1,
paragraph B or subsection 3, paragraph B or D;
(9) Did not have the ballot returned to the clerk by the time prescribed;
(10) Voted using the name of another;
(11) Committed any other specified violation of this Title; or
(12) Voted using the wrong ballot for the appropriate electoral district or political
party, if applicable.
21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)(A). (There is no reason number (1) in section 673(1)(A).)

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[¶15] Our conclusion that section 673(1)(A)(5) permits a challenge only
when it is the voter who improperly applied for an absentee ballot is consistent
with legislative intent. 	See, e.g., State v. Beaulieu, 2025 ME 4, ¶ 14, 331 A.3d
280; Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Servs., Inc., 675 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1996) (“[W]e
remain mindful of the whole statutory scheme, of which the section at issue
forms a part, so that a harmonious result may be achieved.”). Maine’s election
laws reflect two legislative objectives: protecting the integrity of elections and
at the same time not unnecessarily disenfranchising voters by invalidating their
ballots.
The object of elections is to ascertain the popular will, and not to
thwart it. The object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly
qualified voters, and not to defeat them. 	This must be borne in
mind in the construction of such statutes, and the presumption is
that they are enacted to prevent fraud and to secure freedom of
choice, and not, by technical obstructions, to make the right of
voting insecure.
Op. of the Justs., 152 Me. 219, 226-27, 130 A.2d 526, 530 (1956) (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶16] In Marden v. City of Waterville, we addressed the failure of a city
clerk to deliver absentee ballots for counting. 226 A.2d 369, 369-70 (Me. 1967).
Although our decision rests on other grounds, we quoted with approval an
opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court:

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Any qualified absent voter who returns his ballot to the (circuit
court) clerk’s office in time for it to be delivered to the voting place
in the precinct before the polls are closed on election day, and has
satisfied all the statutory requirements with 	which 	he must
comply, is entitled to have his vote counted, and if because of the
failure of the county clerk or any other election official to do his
duty, such ballot is not delivered to the inspector of the precinct in
time for it to be counted by the precinct election board it will be
counted by the court in an election contest proceeding.
Id. at 370 (quoting Brown v. Grzeskowiak, 101 N.E.2d 639, 654 (Ind. 1951)). As
we said in Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. at 225, 130 A.2d at 529, “[w]e
distinguish between acts of the voter and acts of the election officials.”
[¶17] Maine’s election laws reflect this distinction. While various laws
protect the integrity of elections by regulating the conduct of election officials,
candidates, and others, section 673(1)(A) allows ballots to be challenged only
when it is the voter who acted improperly. 	This helps ensure that improper
conduct by third persons will not disenfranchise voters by invalidating ballots
they cast in expectation that they were doing so properly. This further supports
our conclusion that section 673(1)(A)(5) allows for a challenge only when it
was the voter who did not properly apply for an absentee ballot.3
3 Niles argues that the immediate family member was an agent of the voters and that his acts
should therefore be imputed to the voters. He provides no legal support for this argument, which is
both contrary to the plain language of section 673(1)(A) and is inconsistent with the objective of
avoiding disenfranchising voters based on conduct of third parties. 	We accordingly reject this
argument.

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[¶18] 	Even if we were to extend the grounds for challenging absentee
ballots to a third person’s improper application, the candidate’s application
here was not improper. 	Section 753-B(2)(E) prohibits clerks from issuing
ballots to candidates, except for the candidates’ own ballots. Title 21-A M.R.S.
§ 791(3)(B) (2026) makes it a crime for a candidate to “deliver[], receive[],
accept[], notarize[], assist[] or witness[] an absentee ballot, other than the
candidate’s own absentee ballot.” 	These statutes prevent candidates from
assisting in the voting process, witnessing, or notarizing absentee ballots and
handling completed absentee ballots. Neither statute prevents candidates from
applying for them. 	Moreover, section 753-A(3), the statute that authorizes
immediate family members to apply for absentee ballots for voters, makes no
exception for family members who are also candidates. Taken together, these
statutes allow a candidate to apply for an absentee ballot on behalf of a family
member, so long as the candidate does not participate in the absentee ballot
voting process or subsequently handle the ballot. Instead, the clerk would need
to issue the ballot by mail or in person to the voter or to an immediate family
member or designated third person (unless the person is among those
expressly excluded, such as candidates). 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(1), (2). Here, it
was the delivery of the ballots (not the application) that was improper. 	And

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improper delivery of absentee ballots is not among the grounds for challenging
ballots. 	Id. § 673(1)(A). 	We therefore reject Niles’s challenge based on the
candidate’s application for the ballots.
B. 	Challenge Based on Lack of Signature on Applications
[¶19] 	In his affidavit, Niles also challenges the absentee ballots on the
ground that the applications are unsigned. An application or written request
for an absentee ballot must
contain[] . . . [t]he signature of the voter or the voter’s immediate
family member who is making the application or written request.
If an immediate family member is either making the application or
written request or is designated in the application or written
request to deliver or return the ballot to the voter, then the family
relationship to the voter must also be provided.
Id. § 753-A(3)(A)(3).
[¶20] 	Each of the applications for the challenged absentee ballots
includes the signature of the immediate family member making the application
and the relationship between that person and the voter. The family member
signed on the wrong line—while he should have signed the application on
line 6, he signed it on line 5(c), where he should have printed his name.
Nonetheless, the application “contains” his signature as required by section

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753-A(3)(A)(3), and Niles appears to concede as much.4 We thus find that there
is no merit to Niles’s claim that the applications were invalid for lack of
signatures.5
C. 	Challenge Based on Lack of Addresses on Return Envelopes
[¶21] 	In his memorandum, Niles challenges the ballots on the ground
that the return envelopes did not include the voters’ residence addresses. To
be accepted, “[t]he voter’s name and residence address typed or written in ink
by the clerk” must appear “in the designated section of the return envelope.”
21-A M.R.S. § 762(1). “Residence address” is defined as “the street and number
or other designation indicating the physical location of a person’s residence.”
Id. § 1(40-B). 	Here, the Clerk wrote only “Clifton” on the return envelopes
without any street addresses. Niles argues that therefore the Clerk should not
have accepted the two ballots.
4 While there is no legible designation of the family member’s name on the applications, Niles does
not dispute the identity of the person who signed them, nor did his affidavit raise this as a ground for
his challenge.
5 	Citing 21-A M.R.S. § 756(2) (2026), Niles argues that the ballots are defective because the
signatures on the return envelopes (which were the voters’ signatures) did not match the signatures
on the applications (which were the family member’s). 	Section 756(2) states: “[t]he clerk shall
compare the signature of the voter on the application, when required, with that on the corresponding
return envelope.” 	(Emphasis added). 	Here, though, the voters were not required to sign the
applications. 21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(3)(A)(3) (stating that an application for an absentee ballot must
contain “[t]he signature of the voter or the voter’s immediate family member who is making the
application or written request.” (Emphasis added)).

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[¶22] We do not reach this challenge to the ballots because Niles did not
assert it in his affidavit. The Legislature set forth, in detail, the information that
must be included in a challenge affidavit, including the specific reason for the
challenge, the source of information on which the challenge is based, and “a
statement that the challenger understands that making a false statement on the
affidavit is punishable under penalties of perjury.” 	Id. § 673(1). A challenger
who later argues a basis for his challenge that is not set forth in his affidavit has
not sworn to that basis. 	Niles had an opportunity to review the return
envelopes before he swore out his affidavit, but he did not assert that defects in
the return addresses were a basis for his challenge to the ballots. While we do
not reach this issue because Niles did not raise it in his affidavit, we note that a
defect in the address on a return envelope is not a ground enumerated in
section 673(1)(A) to challenge a ballot.
[¶23] Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the two challenged ballots must
be counted, and the Town shall certify the election result with the two ballots
counted.
Dated: 	July 16, 2026
/s/
CATHERINE R. CONNORS
Associate Justice

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/s/
RICK E. LAWRENCE
Associate Justice
/s/
JULIA M. LIPEZ
Associate Justice
/s/
CHRISTOPHER C. TAUB
Associate Justice
___________________________
STATEMENT OF NONCONCURRENCE
STANFILL, C.J., with whom MEAD, and DOUGLAS, JJ., join
[¶24] Because I believe that the two challenged voters did not properly
apply for or return the absentee ballots and thus the two challenged ballots may
not be counted, I respectfully decline to concur in the Court’s judgment.
[¶25] A voter may challenge the right of another to vote at an election in
that municipality on the ground that the challenged voter “[d]id not properly
apply for an absentee ballot” or “[c]ommitted any other specified violation of
this Title.” 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)(A)(5), (11) (2026). Here, the family member
who signed the applications for absentee ballots for the voters was a candidate
for a three-year term on the Select Board in the same March election on the

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same ballot as the race at issue here. The Clerk was expressly prohibited from
issuing the absentee ballots to that candidate. 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(2)(E) (2026)
(“The clerk may not issue an absentee ballot . . . [t]o any candidate, except for
the candidate’s own ballot.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the ballot is arguably
void for that reason. See 21-A M.R.S. § 7 (2026) (“When used in this Title [21-A],
the term ‘may not’ indicates a lack of authority or permission to act or refrain
from acting in the manner specified by the context.”).
[¶26] I agree with the majority, however, that the question presented by
section 673(1)(A) is whether the voters did not properly apply for the absentee
ballots or committed any other violation of the election statutes. 	The Court
concludes that the voters did properly apply for absentee ballots and did not
otherwise violate the election statutes, but I disagree.
[¶27] Maine voters may “designate an immediate family member or a 3rd
person to deliver the [absentee] ballot on the voter’s behalf. 	An immediate
family member of a voter may also make an application or written request for
an absentee ballot for the voter.” 	21-A M.R.S. § 753-A(3) (2026) (emphasis
added).6 	Here, the candidate who was an immediate family member of the
6 Under section 753-A(3), the absentee voters need not designate an immediate family member
to apply for their absentee ballots, but they must designate the person who will deliver their ballots
back to the Clerk on their behalf.

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voters requested and applied for the challenged absentee ballots, and he also
delivered them on Election Day. 	His actions on behalf of the voters were
improper in several respects.
[¶28] First, this was an improper application for the absentee ballots. A
candidate who “delivers, receives, accepts, notarizes, assists or witnesses an
absentee ballot, other than the candidate’s own absentee ballot,” may commit a
Class C crime. 21-A M.R.S. § 791(3)(B) (2026). Here, the candidate received
and accepted the two absentee ballots, and he did so by submitting applications
in writing “for the voter[s]” under section 753-A(3); see id. § 673(1)(A)(5).
[¶29] Second, the candidate delivered the absentee ballots on Election
Day, and he did so “on the voter[s’] behalf.” 	Id. § 753-A(3). 	Delivering the
absentee ballots may also be a criminal offense. 	Id. 	§§ 673(1)(A)(11),
791(3)(B).
[¶30] 	Finally, neither absentee voter actually designated anyone to
deliver the absentee ballot to the Clerk on the voter’s behalf, in further violation
of section 753-A(3). See id. § 673(1)(A)(5), (11).
[¶31] I agree with the Court that when the statutory language is clear,
we obey it. See Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15, 895
A.2d 965. 	I am somewhat mystified, however, by the conclusion that the

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absentee ballots here cannot be challenged because it was not the voters
themselves who submitted the applications. 	The first two violations are
attributed to the voters by the plain language of section 753-A(3) because the
candidate acted “for the voter” and “on the voter’s behalf.” The third violation,
the failure of the voters to designate an immediate family member or other
third person to deliver the absentee ballots to the Clerk, is a direct violation by
the voters themselves of section 753-A(3).
[¶32] 	These statutes were enacted to prevent fraud, with the criminal
statute, section 791(3), enacted in response to ballot tampering and section
753-B(2)(E) enacted to draw municipal clerks’ attention to the prohibition on
candidates handling other voters’ ballots. 	See L.D. 1477, Statement of Fact
(116th Legis. 1993) (indicating a purpose to implement the recommendations
of 	the 	Special 	Commission 	to 	Review 	the 	Electoral 	Process); 	Special
Commission to Review the Electoral Process, Report to the Secretary of State
13, 21 (Mar. 23, 1993) (referencing recent ballot tampering and stating that the
purpose in enacting section 791(3)(B) was to “limit opportunities for fraud and
abuse by tightening up several additional aspects of absentee balloting”
because “security would better be served by restricting the ability of third
parties to deliver and return absentee ballots”); Office of Policy & Legal

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Analysis, Summary of L.D. 1363, at 6 (130th Legis. 2021) (noting that the
enactment of section 753-B(2)(E) was “consistent with existing 21-[A] M.R.S.
§ 791(3)(B), which establishes that a candidate commits a Class C crime if that
candidate delivers, receives or accepts any ballot other than the candidate’s
own absentee ballot”); Testimony of Julie L. Flynn, Deputy Secretary of State on
L.D. 1363 (130th Legis. 2021) (indicating that the legislation “adds an explicit
restriction on issuing an absentee ballot to a candidate unless it is the
candidate’s own ballot” and noting that “section 791, subsection 3(B)—the
violations and penalties section—already makes it a Class C crime for a
candidate to deliver, receive, accept, notarize, assist or witness an absentee
ballot that is not the candidate’s own ballot. 	We believe that adding the
restriction in the ballot issuance section of the law makes the requirement more
transparent for candidates and election officials.”).
[¶33] Under the statutory language listing the grounds upon which the
votes may be challenged, each voter “[d]id not properly apply for an absentee
ballot.” 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1)(A)(5). The candidate was legally prohibited from
receiving or accepting the absentee ballots or indeed from assisting at all. See
id. § 791(3)(B). 	When he nonetheless did so, in the language of section
753-A(3), he was acting “for the voter[s],” and therefore they did not properly

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apply for their absentee ballots, see id. § 673(1)(A)(5). The candidate was also
prohibited from delivering the absentee ballots to the Clerk on Election Day.
See id. § 791(3)(B). Again quoting the statute, he did so “on the voter[s’] behalf,”
see id. § 753-A(3), and therefore the voters committed another violation of Title
21-A, see id. § 673(1)(A)(11). 	The voters failed to designate any person to
deliver the absentee ballots to the Clerk, also in violation of Title 21-A. See id.
§§ 673(1)(A)(11), 753-A(3).
[¶34] While the failure of the voters to designate an immediate family
member or other third person to deliver the absentee ballots to the Clerk may
be an immaterial irregularity standing alone, see 21-A M.R.S. § 762 (2026), the
combination of these violations strikes at the very heart of the statutory scheme
regulating absentee ballots to prevent fraud. The challenged voters themselves
were indeed absent from the entire process apart from their signatures on the
envelopes. 	They did not execute the applications, they did not designate
anyone to apply for them, they did not designate anyone to return their ballots
for them, they did not return their ballots themselves, and everything was
handled by a candidate for office who was prohibited from doing so. 	The
legislative 	efforts 	to 	“limit 	opportunities 	for 	fraud 	and 	abuse,” 	Special
Commission to Review the Electoral Process, Report to the Secretary of State

21
13 (Mar. 23, 1993), were bypassed. Although there may not be any actual fraud
here, there were multiple serious violations of the statutes governing absentee
ballots.
[¶35] 	There is apparently room for disagreement in interpreting the
statutory scheme, and so I urge the Legislature to clarify the grounds upon
which an absentee ballot will not count. 	I agree that we should not lightly
disenfranchise any voter. In my view, however, based upon a plain reading of
the statutes, the two challenged voters have not “satisfied all the statutory
requirements with which [they] must comply,” and they are not “entitled to
have [their] vote[s] counted.” 	Marden v. City of Waterville, 226 A.2d 369, 370
(Me. 1967) (quotation marks omitted). 	Because I believe the challenged
absentee ballots are invalid and must not be counted, I do not concur in the
judgment.
Dated July 16, 2026
/s/
VALERIE STANFILL
Chief Justice
/s/
ANDREW M. MEAD
Associate Justice

22
/s/
WAYNE R. DOUGLAS
Associate Justice
Jeffery F. Niles, Jr., pro se
Stephen W. Wagner, Esq., Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for the Town of Clifton
Cynthia Grant, pro se
Steve Armenia did not file a memorandum