In Re Catherine R. Connors

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 21
Docket: Jud-24-3
Argued: December 15, 2025
Decided: February 26, 2026

Panel: DOW, J., MURRAY, J., RAIMONDI, A.R.J., STOKES, A.R.J., and WORTH, A.R.J. *
Majority: DOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STOKES, A.R.J.
Concurrence: RAIMONDI, A.R.J., and WORTH, A.R.J.

IN RE CATHERINE R. CONNORS

DOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STOKES, A.R.J.

[¶1] On October 11, 2024, the Committee on Judicial Conduct submitted

a Report to the Supreme Judicial Court containing numerous factual and legal

assertions with respect to conduct by Associate Justice Catherine R. Connors of

the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. On November 14, 2024, the Court remanded

the matter for further proceedings before the Committee. On December 16,

2024, the Committee submitted a new report, titled “Amended Report,” which

the Executive Clerk of the Court docketed as a “Second Report,” recommending

disciplinary action against Justice Catherine R. Connors for violation of M. Code

Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A). On June 24, 2025, the Supreme Judicial Court

* Note by Reporter of Decisions: The members of the Panel for this matter were selected pursuant

to M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Procs. 8(B) by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court and the
Chief Judge of the District Court. The members of the Panel are Charles Dow, Judge of the District
Court; Ann M. Murray, Justice of the Superior Court; Barbara Raimondi, Active Retired Judge of the
District Court; William R. Stokes, Active Retired Justice of the Superior Court; and Patricia G. Worth,
Active Retired Judge of the District Court.
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promulgated Rule 8(B) of the Rules for the Committee on Judicial Conduct and

for Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings, setting forth the procedure for

disciplinary proceedings when the Supreme Judicial Court receives a report

concerning the conduct of one of its own justices. The Rule requires that such

matters be heard by a panel composed of jurists from the Superior and District

Courts. On June 27, 2025, Chief Justice Robert Mullen of the Superior Court and

Chief Judge Brent Davis of the District Court entered an order selecting a jurist

to serve as the “hearing of�icer” and �ive jurists to serve as the panel to decide

the matter. See M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Procs. 8(B).

[¶2] The parties—the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Justice

Connors—submitted a joint statement of facts. As a result, there is no hearing

of�icer report. The parties submitted briefs and the matter was submitted to

the Panel for consideration. On December 15, 2025, the Panel heard the parties’

oral arguments.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the parties’ joint statement of

facts and the other materials in the stipulated record. Catherine Connors

practiced law for thirty-four years at the �irm of Pierce Atwood before becoming

an Associate Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in early 2020. She

primarily practiced as an appellate attorney and represented clients in many
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areas of the law. These clients included banks and banking interests, including

the Maine Bankers Association (Maine Bankers) and the National Mortgage

Bankers Association. At the time of her con�irmation hearing, Attorney Connors

had written and argued more than one hundred appeals, mainly before the

Maine Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court. Attorney Connors never

litigated a foreclosure case at the trial level.

[¶4] Before her appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court, in the case of

Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230, 175 A.3d 103, which was a

foreclosure appeal before the Law Court, Attorney Connors and Attorney John

J. Aromando wrote, signed, and �iled a brief dated September 14, 2016, on

behalf of the lender and appellee Bank of America, N.A. On December 12, 2017,

the Law Court decided the Pushard appeal, vacating the trial court’s judgment

in the Bank’s favor and remanding for judgment in favor of the Pushards, the

homeowners, due to the bank’s failure to meet statutory notice requirements.

[¶5] Also before her appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court, in the

foreclosure appeal Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190,

170 A.3d 230, Attorney Connors and Attorney Aromando wrote, signed, and

�iled an amicus curiae brief with the Law Court on behalf of Maine Bankers and

the National Mortgage Bankers Association. In Deschaine, on September 7,

2017, the Law Court held that res judicata principles barred a mortgage
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company from bringing a second foreclosure action against a mortgagor

involving the same property and based on the same note and mortgage.

[¶6] After her appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court, Justice

Connors sat on the appeal of Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, 307 A.3d 1049,

which involved Maine foreclosure law and called for the Law Court to

reconsider the res judicata issues that had previously been decided in Deschaine

and Pushard, i.e., whether a note and mortgage were discharged in full by a

foreclosure judgment for a mortgagor following a �inding that the mortgagee

failed to give the mortgagor statutorily effective notice of default and right to

cure. On June 6, 2022, Justice Connors participated in oral arguments on the

Finch appeal. Also pending before the Law Court at that time was the appeal of

J.P. Morgan Chase Acquisition Group v. Moulton, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134,

which considered whether a defective notice of default and right to cure

resulted in the discharge in full of the note and mortgage, i.e., the same issue as

in Deschaine. In August 2022, the Law Court invited amicus briefs in Moulton

and requested that counsel �ile supplemental briefs in Finch.

[¶7] On September 27, 2022, Maine Bankers �iled an amicus brief in

Moulton.

[¶8] On September 30, 2022, Justice Connors wrote to the Judicial Ethics

Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) asking if she should recuse herself
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from participation in the Finch and Moulton appeals. In her inquiry, she noted

that Maine Bankers had �iled an amicus brief in Moulton and that she had

previously �iled an amicus brief on behalf of Maine Bankers in Deschaine. In her

inquiry to the Advisory Committee, Justice Connors stated that she became a

Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 2020 and that although she did

not think that she was ethically required to do so, she had recused herself from

every mortgage foreclosure appeal for two years. On October 4, 2022, the

Advisory Committee informed Justice Connors that it did not believe that she

needed to recuse herself from the Finch and Moulton appeals, stating that the

two pending cases before the Law Court (Finch and Moulton) were “totally”

separate from the Deschaine and Pushard matters decided �ive years earlier.

[¶9] On November 1, 2022, Justice Connors participated in the oral

argument in Moulton and continued to sit on Finch. In Finch, Justice Connors

voted with a 4-3 majority in the bank’s favor, overturning the Pushard and

Deschaine decisions. At no time during the pendency of the Finch and Moulton

cases did any party, litigant, or participant object to Justice Connors’s

participation or �ile a motion for Justice Connors’s disquali�ication or recusal.

[¶10] On January 18, 2024, after the Court published the Finch decision,

Attorney Thomas Cox wrote to the Committee on Judicial Conduct alleging that

Justice Connors had violated Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by
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failing to recuse herself from the Finch and Moulton appeals. See M.R. Comm.

Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Procs. 1(A) (providing for written complaints of

judicial misconduct).

[¶11] The Committee wrote to Justice Connors and asked why she did

not recuse herself from the Finch and Moulton appeals. Justice Connors

responded to the Committee, and then the Committee asked further questions

relating to Justice Connors’s January 2020 testimony before the legislative

committee then considering her nomination to the Court. Justice Connors

replied from memory without having the transcript or audio recording of her

testimony available to her. After evaluating Justice Connors's response to the

Committee’s questions, her e-mail exchange with the Advisory Committee, and

her testimony at her judicial con�irmation hearing, and examining Rule 2.11(A),

the Committee found that Justice Connors had violated Canon 2, Rule 2.11(A).

The Committee �iled a report with the Court, which determined that it was not

clear that the factual assertions and legal conclusions in the report were those

of the Committee and that the report contained no recommendation that the

Court take any particular disciplinary action. The Court remanded the matter

to the Committee, which �iled a second report in which it recommended that

Justice Connors should receive a public reprimand for creating and maintaining

the appearance of impropriety.
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II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

[¶12] The Committee on Judicial Conduct bears the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A) as

the Committee has alleged in its report. See M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud.

Disc. Procs. 8. 1

[¶13] The Committee argues that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A)

of the Code by participating in proceedings in which her impartiality might

reasonably be questioned. Rule 2.11(A) is found within Canon 2 of the Code.

Canon 2 provides that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial of�ice

impartially, competently, and diligently.” Rule 2.11(A) provides:

(A) A judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any
proceedings in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to the following
circumstances:

1 The Committee has emphasized throughout its argument that Justice Connors's answers to

questions raised at her con�irmation hearing before the Legislature's Joint Standing Committee on
Judiciary supports its contention that she violated Rule 2.11(A) by not recusing from
the Finch and Moulton cases. The Panel has examined Justice Connors's testimony before the
Judiciary Committee and notes that at least one legislator asked her questions relating to potential
recusal issues with respect to her representation of banking interests and mortgage foreclosure
cases. In Maine, state judicial of�icers function under two separate systems of accountability: (1) the
limited tenure of judicial of�icers under Art. VI, Sec. 4 of the Maine Constitution, combined with the
appointment process in Art. V, Sec. 8; and (2) the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct. This Panel's focus
is on the latter. The fact that members of the Legislature, in ful�illing their responsibilities under Art.
V, Sec. 8, explored issues of potential recusal for Justice Connors in future foreclosure cases does not
resolve the question of whether her involvement in the Finch and Moulton cases constituted a
violation of Rule 2.11(A).
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(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party or a party’s lawyer, or the judge has personal
knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding when
the personal knowledge that would form the basis for
disquali�ication has been gained outside the regular course
of present or prior judicial proceedings.

(2) The judge knows that the judge, individually or as a
�iduciary, the judge’s spouse, domestic partner, a person
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or
any other member of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s
household

(a) Is a party to the proceeding, or an of�icer, director,
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a
party;

(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) Is a person who has more than a de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding; or

(d) Is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(3) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made
a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial
decision, judicial opinion, or judicial administrative matter,
that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a
particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding
or controversy.

(4) The judge

(a) Served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
was associated with a lawyer who participated
substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association;
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(b) Served in government employment, and in such
capacity participated personally and substantially as a
lawyer or public of�icial concerning the proceeding or
has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion
concerning the merit of the particular matter in
controversy; or

(c) Was a material witness concerning the matter.

M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A)(1)-(4).

[¶14] To determine whether a justice has violated Rule 2.11(A), we must

apply an objective reasonableness test that asks whether a reasonable observer

of the judicial proceeding presided over by the subject justice, informed of all of

the surrounding facts and circumstances, would have reasonable doubts as to

the subject justice’s impartiality in that proceeding. See M. Code Jud. Conduct

Preamble; M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A); M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11

advisory notes to 2015 amend.; see also Allphin v. United States, 758 F.3d 1336,

1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2014); United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Super. Ct., 216

Cal. Rptr. 4, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S.

1301, 1302 (2000); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004). The

reasonable observer is regarded as a “thoughtful observer rather than . . . a

hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” In re Sherwin Williams Co., 607

F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2010).
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[¶15] Rule 2.11(A) requires justices to recuse in matters where their

participation might reasonably create a question as to their impartiality.

However, where there is “no reasonable basis for recusal, a judge is obliged not

to recuse[.]” M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 advisory notes to 2015 amend. The

Code requires a justice to “hear and decide matters except when

disquali�ication or recusal is required,” M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.7, and cautions

that “a judge who disquali�ies himself or herself for no reason other than an

unfounded and meritless claim of partiality, has abused the judge’s discretion.”

M. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.11 advisory notes to 2015 amend. (quoting In re

Michael M., 2000 ME 204, ¶ 15, 761 A.2d 865).

[¶16] There is also a presumption that judges will ful�ill their duty of

impartiality faithfully. Bond v. Bond, 127 Me. 117, 141 A. 833, 836 (1928) (“Our

government is a ‘government of laws and not of men.’ In addition to their legal

learning, judges are presumably selected because of their ability to lay aside

personal prejudices and to hold the scales of justice evenly. The presumption is

that they will do so.”); Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 928 (2024) (“The people must have

con�idence in the integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist in a system that

assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship or favor, and in an

atmosphere where the press will be eager to �ind foot-faults.”); Armenian

Assembly of Am., Inc., v. Cefesjian, 783 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A
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reasonable observer must assume that judges are ordinarily capable of setting

aside their own interest and adhering to their sworn duties to ‘faithfully and

impartially discharge and perform all the duties’ incumbent upon them.”)

B. Justice Connors did not violate Rule 2.11(A) by sitting on the Finch
and Moulton appeals

[¶17] A complaint about a judge’s impartiality must be carefully

reviewed when the complaint is �iled after the case in question has been

decided. See Samara Mem’l Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107,

¶¶ 25-27, 102 A.3d 757. In this case, the complaint was �iled by an advocate for

housing issues and was �iled only after Finch had been decided. The

complainant was af�iliated with an entity entitled “Maine Attorneys Saving

Homes,” and he had �iled an amicus curiae brief on behalf of that entity in

Deschaine. The possibility of Finch and/or Moulton changing the law in Maine

was well known to the bar; the Law Court asked for amicus brie�ing in Moulton

and supplemental brie�ing in Finch.

[¶18] None of the attorneys in Finch or Moulton, and none of the lawyers

who �iled amicus briefs in Moulton, raised any issue about Justice Connors’s

impartiality.2

2 In fact, there were several attorneys who appeared in Pushard and/or Deschaine who were also

involved in Finch and/or Moulton: Clifford and Golden (Pushard and Finch), the National Consumer
Law Center (Deschaine through L. Scott Gould and Moulton through Andrea Bopp Stark), Doonan Law
Of�ice (Deschaine and Moulton), Frank D’Alessandro for Pine Tree Legal Assistance in Deschaine and
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[¶19] As noted above, the operative portion of Rule 2.11(A) provides: “A

judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in which

the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” and then speci�ies

four examples of circumstances in which a judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned. There has been no suggestion by the Committee that

Justice Connors had any personal biases or prejudices concerning any of the

parties in Finch and Moulton or their attorneys; nor does the evidence support

any such �inding. Nor has there been any suggestion that the Finch or Moulton

appeals involved anyone living in Justice Connors’s household or within a third

degree of relation to her or her spouse. Nor does this case involve Justice

Connors’s making any public statements that committed or appeared to commit

her to rule a certain way in the proceedings. Upon review, it is readily apparent

that the evidence in the stipulated record does not implicate any of the �irst

three circumstances explicitly identi�ied by Rule 2.11(A). The fourth special

circumstance listed in Rule 2.11(A), requiring recusal when the judge “served

as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,” requires more explanation.

[¶20] It is clear that Justice Connors did not participate in the trial court

proceedings in Finch or Moulton. While Justice Connors wrote and �iled a brief

for Maine Equal Justice in Moulton, and Pine Tree Legal Assistance through D’Alessandro in Deschaine
and Pine Tree Legal Assistance through Jonathan Selkowitz in Moulton. None of these attorneys or
any other attorneys raised any issues regarding Justice Connors’s sitting on Finch and/or Moulton.
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on behalf of appellee Bank of America, N.A. in Pushard and wrote and �iled an

amicus curiae brief on behalf of Maine Bankers in Deschaine, Deschaine and

Pushard were not the “matters in controversy” in Finch or Moulton within the

meaning of Rule 2.11(A)(4)(a). The matters in controversy in Pushard,

Deschaine, Finch, and Moulton all concerned different properties and different

parties.3 Each of the defendants—Pushard, Finch, Moulton, and Deschaine—

had a separate agreement with a different plaintiff that held the mortgage on a

separate piece of property. Maine Bankers was not a party to any of the above

litigation and had no interest in the Lincoln, Wales, Durham, or Buck�ield real

estate at issue in those matters. Rather, Maine Bankers �iled an amicus brief in

the Moulton case on a substantially similar legal issue to that which then-

Attorney Connors had argued for Bank of America in the Pushard case and for

Maine Bankers in an amicus brief in Deschaine. 4 While the legal issues are

substantially similar, the matters in controversy are not.

[¶21] Moreover, the record shows that Justice Connors was aware of her

obligations under Rule 2.11(A) and made efforts to address a possible question

3 The controversy and issue in Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230, ¶ 1, 175 A.3d 103,

related to property located in Wales. The controversy and issue in Federal National Mortgage
Association v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, 170 A.3d 230, related to property in Lincoln. On the other
hand, the controversy and issue in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, 307 A.3d 1049, related to
property in Durham, and the controversy and issue in J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. v.
Moulton, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134, related to property in Buck�ield.

4 Maine Bankers’ amicus brief in Deschaine is not in the record before the Panel.
14

about her impartiality by seeking input from the Advisory Committee on

Judicial Ethics (Advisory Committee). Justice Connors’s request to the Advisory

Committee regarding the Moulton and Finch matters identi�ied the most

important underlying circumstances and asked whether she had a duty under

Rule 2.11 to recuse herself from the matters. The Advisory Committee

responded that it unanimously believed that recusal was not necessary in either

case.

[¶22] There is no question that Justice Connors did not violate any of the

four enumerated circumstances set forth in Rule 2.11(A), and the Committee

has not claimed otherwise. Rather, the Committee argues that Justice Connors’s

conduct violated the general catchall provision in Rule 2.11(A): that based on

the totality of the circumstances, Finch and Moulton were proceedings in which

Justice Connors’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See M. Code Jud.

Conduct R. 2.11(A).

[¶23] We are not persuaded by the Committee’s general contention that

a reasonable observer might question whether Justice Connors was biased or

prejudiced in favor of banking interests because of her previous advocacy for

banking interests and advocacy for those interests in Deschaine and Pushard.

[¶24] When Rule 2.11(A) was written, the drafters clearly had four

circumstances in mind when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
15

questioned. The drafters did not identify the circumstance of a prior client

coming before a judge as requiring recusal—other than in the same matter in

controversy. A judge must recuse only if the judge served as a lawyer for a client

“in the matter in controversy.” Rule 2.11(A)(4)(a). By not explicitly requiring

recusal of a judge when the judge served as a lawyer on any matter for that

client, but carving out the circumstances of the judge having served as a lawyer

for the client in “the matter in controversy” as requiring recusal, it is clear that

the rule does not require recusal when the judge was a lawyer for a client on

some other case. See generally Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994)

(“[A] well-settled rule of statutory interpretation states that express mention of

one concept implies the exclusion of others not listed.”); Wescott v. Allstate Ins.,

397 A.2d 156, 169 (Me. 1979) (“The maxim—expressio unius est exclusio

alterius—is well recognized in Maine as in other states. It is a handy tool to be

used at times in ascertaining the intention of the lawmaking body.”) There is no

suggestion that Justice Connors possessed any con�idential information as a

result of representing Maine Bankers that she used in deciding Finch or

Moulton, and that is logical given that Maine Bankers did not have any interest

in any of the real estate involved in Finch or Moulton.

[¶25] Nor did the drafters of Rule 2.11(A) identify as a circumstance

requiring recusal a judge’s having previously litigated a particular legal issue as
16

an attorney. Moreover, case law from other jurisdictions is clear that a lawyer’s

advocacy for a client on particular issues does not require recusal on those

issues if the lawyer becomes a judge. See Hoke Cnty. Bd. Of Educ. v. State, 896

S.E.2d 720, 723 (N.C. 2022) (collecting cases). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has remarked, “Courts have uniformly rejected the notion that

a judge’s previous advocacy for a legal, constitutional, or policy position is a bar

to adjudicating a case, even when that position is directly implicated in the case

before the court.” Carter v. W. Pub. Co., 1999 WL 994997, at *9 (11th Cir. Nov. 1,

1999) (citing numerous cases). The Committee has not submitted any case law

to the contrary.

[¶26] The drafters of Rule 2.11(A) could easily have included the

circumstances of (1) a prior client appearing before a judge on any matter or

(2) a legal issue the judge previously litigated coming before the judge as

speci�ic examples requiring the judge to recuse, but did not. These

circumstances do not require recusal.

[¶27] A reasonably well-informed observer would understand that law

�irms represent a variety of clients and that lawyers advocate for clients even

when their clients’ beliefs or interests con�lict with the lawyers’ own personal

beliefs or interests. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food & Drug

Admin., 156 F. Supp. 3d 36 (D.D.C. 2016). A reasonably well-informed observer
17

would also recognize that the positions for which a lawyer advocates when

representing clients do not necessarily re�lect the lawyer’s own personal

beliefs. No reasonable person, for instance, would think that because a lawyer

has represented defendants in criminal cases that the lawyer favors breaking

the law. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 156 F. Supp.

3d 36, 50 (D.D.C. 2016). The same is true here—it is not reasonable for a well-

informed person to question Justice Connors’s impartiality in Finch and

Moulton merely because she advocated for particular banking interests in

foreclosure cases in her previous work as a lawyer.

[¶28] Clearly there was a similarity between the legal issues in Pushard

and Deschaine and the legal issues in Finch and Moulton. However, because (1)

a judge is not required to recuse in matters involving prior clients unless the

representation was on the same “matter in controversy,” and (2) a judge is not

required to recuse in matters involving prior legal issues she litigated, a well-

informed person should not believe that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned on either of these two bases. A well-informed

observer is a person who believes that, generally, judges follow their obligation

to perform their duties impartially. A well-informed person could not

reasonably question a judge’s impartiality when she is following the law which

does not require her recusal. While a person might reasonably question
18

whether the law is appropriate, a well-informed reasonable person must accept

the law when determining whether a judge has committed an ethical violation.

When a judge follows the law on recusal, she cannot be found to have committed

an ethical violation.

[¶29] For all of the above reasons, we �ind that the Committee failed to

meet its burden of proof and therefore dismiss the Report.

The entry is:

Report dismissed.

RAIMONDI, A.R.J., and WORTH, A.R.J., concurring

[¶30] Although we agree with the Panel that the report should be

dismissed, we conclude that Justice Connors violated the Code of Judicial

Conduct.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶31] We agree with the Panel’s description of the background, with

changes for the purposes of this discussion set out below.

[¶32] Before joining the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 2020, Catherine

Connors practiced law for thirty-four years with Pierce Atwood. In 2016, she

and an associate lawyer wrote, signed, and �iled a brief on behalf of appellee
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Bank of America in Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230, 175 A.3d

103. In 2017, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,

vacated the trial court’s judgment in favor of Bank of America and remanded

for judgment in favor of the homeowner, Pushard.

[¶33] During that same time, Attorney Connors represented amicus

participants the Maine Bankers Association and the National Mortgage Bankers

Association in Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, 170

A.3d 230. She and an associate wrote, signed, and �iled an amici curiae brief on

behalf of those associations. In 2017, the Law Court ruled in favor of the

homeowner and against the mortgagee.

[¶34] In 2020, Attorney Connors was nominated to the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court to serve as an associate justice. During her con�irmation hearing

before the Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary, statements

by legislators and questions asked of her made it clear that some legislators—

reasonable, well-informed persons—were concerned about the appearance of

impropriety were she, once con�irmed, to participate in cases in her areas of

expertise. She said to the Committee that “[t]hen as to client, clients of Pierce

Atwood, any Pierce Atwood case that comes, I believe it’s appropriate to recuse

myself” for the term of seven years. She said that “when there’s any doubt” she

would “defer on the side of recusal.” She also said that “if it’s somebody who
20

was once (her) client,” there would be a recusal for a signi�icant period of time.

She made reference to representing parties on amicus briefs in foreclosure

litigation appeals and said, “So I’d probably be recused from, well, certainly

from those particular clients.” Transcript of Con�irmation Hearing of Catherine

R. Connors, Esq., Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary 31-36 (Jan. 30, 2020),

available at https://perma.cc/6YN9-QLDS.

[¶35] Attorney Connors was con�irmed to the Maine Supreme Judicial

Court in, and has served since, 2020. She retains a �inancial interest in an

unknown amount in her former �irm, Pierce Atwood. Pierce Atwood is an

af�iliate member of the Maine Bankers Association, Justice Connors’s former

client.

[¶36] The foreclosure case of Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, 307 A.3d

1049, called for the Law Court to reconsider the res judicata issue decided in

Deschaine and Pushard: whether a note and mortgage were discharged in full

by a foreclosure judgment for a mortgagor following a �inding that the

mortgagee failed to give the mortgagor the statutorily required notice of default

and right to cure. In June 2022, Justice Connors participated in oral arguments

on Finch. The case of Morgan Chase Acquisition Group v. Moulton, 2024 ME 13,

314 A.3d 134, before the Court at about the same time as Finch, called for the

Court to consider whether a defective notice of default and right to cure resulted
21

in the full discharge of a note and mortgage, the same issue as in Deschaine. In

August 2022, the Law Court invited amicus briefs in Moulton and requested that

the attorneys in Finch �ile supplemental briefs. The Maine Bankers Association,

represented by new counsel, �iled an amicus brief in Moulton.

[¶37] In September 2022, Justice Connors wrote to the Advisory

Committee on Judicial Ethics asking for its informal opinion about whether she

should recuse herself from participation in Finch and Moulton. She directed the

Advisory Committee’s attention to the provision in Rule 2.11 mandating recusal

when “the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy.” In response,

in October 2022, the Advisory Committee gave its opinion that she did not need

to recuse herself from the Finch and Moulton appeals based on its conclusion

that the two pending cases were separate from the Deschaine and Pushard

matters decided �ive years earlier.

[¶38] In November 2022, Justice Connors participated in oral argument

in the Moulton appeal and continued to sit on both the Finch and Moulton

appeals. On January 11, 2024, the Law Court issued its decision in Finch. Justice

Connors voted with a 4-3 majority in the bank’s favor, overturning Pushard and

Deschaine.5

5 No party or participant in Finch and Moulton filed a motion for Justice Connors’s disqualification or
recusal.
22

[¶39] On January 18, 2024, Attorney Thomas Cox wrote to the Committee

on Judicial Conduct alleging that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A) of the

Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to recuse herself from the Finch appeal and

by continuing her involvement in the companion appeal in Moulton, decided by

the Law Court on January 30, 2024.

[¶40] In response to Attorney Cox’s complaint, the Committee on Judicial

Conduct wrote to Justice Connors asking why she did not recuse herself from

the Finch and Moulton cases. After Justice Connors’s initial and subsequent

response, the Committee on Judicial Conduct found that Justice Connors

violated Canon 2, Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee

on Judicial Conduct then submitted a report to the Maine Supreme Judicial

Court. The Court remanded the matter back to the Committee because the

report did not make clear whether �indings and conclusions in the report were

those of the Committee and did not make a recommendation on the discipline

to be imposed. The Committee �iled an “Amended Report,” which the Executive

Clerk of the Court forwarded to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court and the

Chief Judge of the District Court pursuant to M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud.
23

Disc. Procs. 8(B). The Chief Justice of the Superior Court and Chief Judge of the

District Court selected the Panel.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Violation of Rule 2.11(A)

[¶41] The Committee bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A).

[¶42] The Committee argues that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A)

of the Code by participating in proceedings in which her impartiality might

reasonably be questioned. The operative portion of the rule provides that “a

judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in which

the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (emphasis added).

The Rule’s use of the word “might” sets a low standard.

[¶43] Rule 2.11(A) provides that four speci�ic circumstances require

recusal. The Committee does not allege, nor does the evidence support, that

any of the four speci�ic circumstances set out in Rule 2.11(A) were present.

[¶44] In asking whether a judicial of�icer has violated Rule 2.11(A), the

examiner must apply an objective reasonableness test, asking whether a

reasonable observer of the judicial proceeding, informed of all the surrounding

facts and circumstances, would have reasonable doubts as to the judicial

of�icer’s impartiality. As the Panel has pointed out, Panel’s Opinion ¶ 14, the
24

reasonable observer is regarded as a “thoughtful observer rather than . . . a

hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” In re Sherwin Williams Co., 607

F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2010).

[¶45] Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates that Justice Connors’s

conduct violated the general catchall provision: based on the totality of the

circumstances, Finch and Moulton were proceedings in which Justice Connors’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

[¶46] The evidence is straightforward. A reasonable observer might

question whether Justice Connors was biased in favor of banking interests

because of her previous advocacy for banking interests and speci�ic advocacy

for those interests in Deschaine and Pushard, in light of the participation of her

former client, the Maine Bankers Association, in which her former �irm

maintains a membership.

[¶47] It is correct that, as the Panel has noted, a reasonably well-

informed observer would understand that lawyers and law �irms represent a

variety of clients and advocate for clients even when their clients’ beliefs or

interests con�lict with their own personal beliefs or interests. Panel’s Opinion

¶ 27. The Panel has also correctly pointed out that case law advises that a

lawyer’s advocacy for a client on an issue does not mandate recusal on that issue

if the lawyer becomes a judge. Panel’s Opinion ¶ 25.
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[¶48] The facts here, however, shed a different light on what an ordinary,

reasonable person might perceive.

[¶49] As a partner at Pierce Atwood, then-Attorney Connors wrote,

signed, and �iled a brief before the Law Court on behalf of Bank of America in

the Pushard case and wrote, signed, and �iled an amicus brief before the Court

on behalf of the Maine Bankers Association in Deschaine.

[¶50] Justice Connors knew from her con�irmation hearing that

reasonable persons were concerned about the appearance of impropriety

should she participate in appeals implicating her areas of expertise and her

former clients.

[¶51] Once the Maine Bankers Association �iled its amicus brief in

Moulton, a reasonable observer might have reasonably questioned the justice’s

impartiality.6 Finch and Moulton implicated one key dispute: whether the 2017

Pushard and Deschaine decisions should be overturned. Seen in this light, the

6 Indeed, some of the arguments that the Maine Bankers Association raised in its amicus brief in
Moulton are substantially the same arguments that Justice Connors raised on behalf of the Association
in Deschaine. Compare Amici Brief of the Maine Bankers Ass’n and the Natl Mortg. Bankers Ass’n at
19-22, Federal National Mortgage Association v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, 170 A.3d 230 (No. Pen-16-
316) (arguing that barring a second foreclosure action based on subsequent defaults is bad public
policy and would be unfair), with Brief of Amicus Curiae Maine Bankers Association at 17-21, J.P.
Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton, 2024 ME 13, 314 A.3d 134 (No. Oxf-21-412) (arguing that
barring a second foreclosure action based on subsequent defaults is bad public policy and would be
unfair). In such a situation, confronted with her own arguments and asked to vote for the position
favoring the legal interests she advocated for as a private attorney, a reasonable person might doubt
whether Justice Connors would be able to analyze the Moulton appeal impartially.
26

fact that a lawyer who had represented the losing side in Pushard and who had

argued for the Maine Bankers Association in its amicus brief in Deschaine was

now sitting as a justice on the Finch and Moulton appeals might cause a

reasonable person to question that justice’s impartiality.

[¶52] In sum, we conclude that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A) by

participating in the Finch and Moulton appeals, proceedings in which her

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

B. Disciplinary action

[¶53] Rule 8(C)(iii) of the Rules for the Committee on Judicial Conduct

and for Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings provides:

(iii) If the panel concludes that no violation of the Code has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence, or that the violation is
not of a suf�iciently serious nature as to warrant formal disciplinary
action, the panel shall dismiss the report and may also refer the
matter to the Committee for informal correction if appropriate. If
the panel concludes that a violation warrants formal disciplinary
action, the panel may impose upon the judicial of�icer who is the
subject of the report any one or more of the forms of discipline
permitted by law, such as admonishment, reprimand, suspension,
�ine and probation. A divided decision need not identify how panel
members voted.

[¶54] The determination of any appropriate sanction must be based on

“multiple factors, including the judge’s professional history, the context within

which the violations occurred, the harm to the litigants and public, the

seriousness of the violations, the judge’s acknowledgement of the violations
27

and understanding of the impact on the litigants, and the prospects for ensuring

public trust and con�idence in the judge’s work in the future.” In re Holmes,

2011 ME 119, ¶ 4, 32 A.3d 1011 (citing M. Code Jud. Conduct Preamble).

[¶55] As discussed above, Justice Connors was aware of her obligations

under Rule 2.11(A) and made efforts to address a possible appearance of

impropriety by asking the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics for advice.

[¶56] As importantly, the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial

system or others has not been shown to be substantial. Finch was decided by a

4-3 vote and Moulton by a 5-2 vote. It is not possible to predict the outcome in

Finch were Justice Connors to have recused herself because there is no way of

knowing whether the Court would have replaced her, in the usual manner, with

an active retired justice. In Moulton, the Law Court noted that it was guided by

its decision in Finch. Justice Connors was not a determinative vote; it is not

possible to predict how the Court would have proceeded, and ruled, were

Justice Connors to have recused herself in Finch and Moulton. Accordingly,

because Finch overturned the holdings in Deschaine and Pushard, Justice

Connors’s recusal in Moulton would not have resulted in a change in Maine

foreclosure law.

[¶57] In sum, the evidence demonstrates by a preponderance of the

evidence that Justice Connors violated Rule 2.11(A) by not recusing from the
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Finch and Moulton appeals. However, in light of the circumstances and the state

of the law, this violation does not warrant formal disciplinary action. Having

found a violation but �inding that no disciplinary action is warranted for the

violation, we agree that dismissal of the Committee’s report is the proper

disposition of the matter. See M.R. Comm. Jud. Conduct & Jud. Disc. Procs.

8(C)(iii).

John A. McArdle, III, Esq. (orally), Maine Committee on Judicial Conduct,
Augusta, for the Committee on Judicial Conduct

James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Benjamin J. Wahrer, Esq., and Caitlin Ross Wahrer,
Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for Catherine R. Connors