Estate of Erica J. O'Donnell

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 20
Docket: Yor-23-41
Argued: September 14, 2023
Decided: March 19, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.*

ESTATE OF ERICA J. O’DONNELL

DOUGLAS, J.

[¶1] Christopher O’Donnell, as personal representative of the estate of

Erica J. O’Donnell, appeals from a judgment of the York County Probate Court

(Houde, J.) approving the report of a referee for the distribution of the estate.

O’Donnell challenges several aspects of the referee’s report, including the

determination that the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A of the

Maine Revised Statutes apply to this estate. O’Donnell also argues that the court

erred by adopting the referee’s report without holding a hearing on O’Donnell’s

amended objection to the report. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts and procedure are drawn from the record.

*
Although Justice Jabar participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.
2

[¶3] Erica J. O’Donnell died intestate on January 14, 2019. The decedent’s

heirs were her husband, Christopher O’Donnell; her father, Kirk Webber; and

her mother, Deborah Burns.1 Probate proceedings commenced on March 5,

2019, when O’Donnell filed an application for informal appointment of personal

representative in the York County Probate Court. The court issued letters of

authority, appointing O’Donnell as personal representative of the estate.

[¶4] More than two years later, O’Donnell sent Webber and Burns a letter

with a final accounting of the estate, explaining that (1) the decedent had died

intestate, (2) the intestacy provisions of Title 18-C of the Maine Revised

Statutes applied, (3) O’Donnell was entitled to the first $300,000 of the estate,

and (4) Webber and Burns would not receive a distribution because the estate

did not exceed the $300,000 threshold. Webber filed a petition for a complete

settlement of the estate, asserting that the intestacy succession provisions of

Title 18-A applied. On November 24, 2021, the court issued a notice of

beginning of formal probate.

[¶5] By agreement of the parties, the court appointed a referee. The

order of reference directed the referee to “conduct all further proceedings in

1 Burns had minimal involvement as a party in interest before the court, and she has not
participated in this appeal.
3

this case” and empowered the referee to hold pretrial conferences and

hearings, enter interlocutory and procedural orders, hold a final hearing within

ninety days, find facts and apply Maine law on all issues raised by the pleadings,

and file a report with the court with a proposed form of judgment. The parties

reserved the right to object to the referee’s report. The court also entered an

order scheduling a “status conference” for October 25, 2022, to “hear any

objections to the Referee’s Report or confirmation of the Report.”

[¶6] A final hearing before the referee was scheduled for September 23,

2022. Before the final hearing, the parties agreed that, given the value of the

decedent’s estate, there would be no need for an evidentiary hearing if the

referee ruled that Title 18-C—and not Title 18-A—applied. The referee issued

a preliminary order, concluding that the intestate succession provisions of

Title 18-A applied. A contested hearing was held on the remaining issues.

[¶7] On October 13, 2022, the referee submitted to the court a report

entitled “Referee’s Report Pursuant to Rule 53.” In the report, the referee

included his earlier conclusion that the intestacy succession provisions of

Title 18-A applied and made factual findings on the contested issues, including

a finding that the value of personal property that had been distributed to

Webber and Burns was either de minimis or offset by the value of personal
4

property that had been distributed to O’Donnell. The referee found in favor of

O’Donnell regarding the disputed expenses and reimbursements, except for

three transactions totaling $9,411.36. The referee concluded, inter alia, that the

estate should pay the reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the

parties.2 Finally, the referee stated that O’Donnell should prepare a plan of

distribution and that the referee would recommend to the court that the plan

be submitted to the referee for review and approval. The referee’s report

concluded: “To be clear, [the plan of distribution] will not be an opportunity to

re-litigate any of the issues decided in this report. Rather, the plan of

distribution should incorporate the findings and conclusions set forth above.”

[¶8] On October 24, 2022, O’Donnell timely filed an objection, purporting

to challenge numerous aspects of the referee’s report, including the referee’s

application of Title 18-A, determination that the personal representative must

reimburse the estate for certain claimed expenses, failure to conduct a

discovery hearing, failure to assign value to personal property distributed to

Webber, admission of Webber’s summary exhibits, and award of attorney fees

2 The referee directed the parties’ attorneys to file fee affidavits. On October 24, 2022, the referee

filed a brief supplemental report—“Referee’s Report on Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Rule 53”—in
which he stated that he had reviewed both parties’ attorney fee affidavits and found that the claimed
fees were reasonable. O’Donnell objected to the supplemental report.
5

to Webber. None of the purported individual objections, except for the one on

the application of Title 18-A, contained references to the record or citations to

legal authorities. The objection essentially was styled like an answer to a

complaint, wherein O’Donnell “denied” or otherwise took issue with

approximately half of the referee’s factual findings.3

[¶9] On October 25, 2022, the court held a hearing on the referee’s

report. The court stated that it had received the referee’s report and

O’Donnell’s objection. Webber moved the court for acceptance of the referee’s

report, noting the thoroughness of the report, the fairness of the findings, and

the deferential standard accorded findings of a referee. The court allowed the

parties, without limitation, to present their arguments, after which the court

took the matter under advisement.

[¶10] By an order dated November 14, 2022, the court ordered

O’Donnell to provide the referee with a proposed plan of distribution and

recommitted the matter to the referee to review the plan of distribution and

incorporate it in his report. On December 22, 2022, the referee submitted a

“Referee’s Report on Plan of Distribution Pursuant to Rule 53,” incorporating

3 It was confirmed at oral argument, however, that some “denials” were in fact challenges to
undisputed factual findings.
6

by reference his earlier reports.4 Eight days later, O’Donnell filed an “Amended

Objection to Report of Referee.” The “amended objection” was identical to

O’Donnell’s October 24 objection, except that it was titled as an “Amended

Objection” and added only the single, bare allegation that “the resulting plan of

distribution is incorrect.”

[¶11] On January 10, 2023, the court entered, without further hearing, a

judgment accepting the referee’s report. O’Donnell timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶12] O’Donnell advances numerous challenges both to the referee’s

findings and conclusions and to the trial court’s decision adopting those

findings and conclusions. Before turning to O’Donnell’s arguments, we address

the adequacy of O’Donnell’s objection and whether O’Donnell’s challenges to

the referee’s findings and conclusions are preserved for our review.

A. Specificity of the Objection

[¶13] Title 14 M.R.S. §§ 1151-1155 (2023) and Maine Rule of Civil

Procedure 53 govern the use of referees in civil actions. Maine Rule of Probate

Procedure 53 expressly incorporates the referee procedures set forth in the

The referee’s report on the plan of distribution differed from his earlier reports only in minor
4

respects, by including exempt property and homestead allowances—which were not disputed by the
parties—and by making final adjustments to the awards of attorney fees and referee costs.
7

civil rules. In a nonjury action where a reference is by agreement, “the referee’s

conclusions of law and findings of fact shall be subject to the right of the parties

to object to acceptance of the referee’s report.” M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).

[¶14] By agreeing to a reference, “[t]he parties have selected their own

tribunal to try th[e] case, and under such circumstances are held to a strict

compliance with the provisions of the statutes and of the rules of court

governing the procedure authorized in such instances.” Throumoulos v. First

Nat. Bank of Biddeford, 132 Me. 232, 233, 169 A. 307, 307 (1933); accord

Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 368 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1977);

Camp Maqua Young Women’s Christian Ass’n v. Inhabitants of the Town of

Poland, 130 Me. 485, 486, 157 A. 859, 860 (1931). A party objecting to a

referee’s findings or conclusions “must identify the asserted error and present

it to the court through an objection for final adjudication,” and “[a]ny objections

must be supported by legal argument with citations and precise references to

the record.” Gorman v. Gorman, 2010 ME 123, ¶¶ 5, 7, 10 A.3d 703; see also

66 Am. Jur. 2d References § 50, Westlaw (database updated February 2024)

(“To assist the court in resolving an exception to a master’s finding of fact, a

litigant must provide specific citations to the record, and the court need not

comb the record for evidence supporting or refuting the finding.”).
8

[¶15] Thus, the right to claim error in a referee’s report is predicated

upon the filing of seasonable and specific objections. Thompson v. Willette,

353 A.2d 176, 178-79 (Me. 1976). A party who fails to properly object to the

referee’s report is in the same position as a party who has failed to reserve the

right to object. See Smith v. Tonge, 361 A.2d 254, 256 (Me. 1976). Any matters

not seasonably or specifically objected to become conclusive. Id.; see also

3 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 53:4 at 158 (3d, 2023-2024 ed.) (“General

statements of objection provide no basis for analysis by the referring court and

will not be considered on appeal.”).

[¶16] Here, O’Donnell’s objections are not sufficiently specific and, with

the exception noted below, failed to state how or why the referee’s conclusions

were contrary to the law. See Bickford v. Bragdon, 149 Me. 324, 327, 102 A.2d

412, 414 (1953); Dubie v. Branz, 146 Me. 455, 457, 73 A.2d 217, 218-19 (1950).

The only issue raised by O’Donnell’s objection that is properly preserved and

which we therefore need discuss is which statutory scheme applies. As to all

other issues raised on appeal related to the objection, the bases of the

objections were not set forth specifically or the evidence so clearly justified the

findings of the referee that we do not address them. See Depositors Tr. Co. v.

Bruneau, 144 Me. 142, 146, 66 A.2d 86, 88 (1949).
9

B. Applicable Probate Code

[¶17] O’Donnell argues that the referee erred by applying the intestacy

provisions of Title 18-A when he should have applied the intestacy provisions

of Title 18-C. If Title 18-C were to apply, then O’Donnell would be the sole heir

to the decedent’s estate where the net value of the estate was less than

$300,000. See 18-C M.R.S. § 2-102(2) (2023). If Title 18-A applies, then

O’Donnell would be entitled to the first $50,000 plus half the balance of the

intestate estate. See 18-A M.R.S. § 2-102(2) (2018).

[¶18] We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Estate of

Chartier, 2005 ME 17, ¶ 6, 866 A.2d 125. “When interpreting a statute, we look

first to its plain meaning and seek to give effect to the intent of the Legislature,

construing the statutory language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent

results.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶19] When the decedent died on January 14, 2019, Title 18-A was in

effect. Title 18-A was repealed and replaced with a new probate code,

Title 18-C,5 effective September 1, 2019.6 The new Code contained “provisions

Compare 18-A M.R.S. § 1-101 (2018) (“Probate Code”), with 18-C M.R.S. § 1-101 (2023)
5

(“Maine Uniform Probate Code”).
6P.L. 2017, ch. 402, §§ A-1 to A-2, F-1 (effective July 1, 2019) (repealing Title 18-A and replacing
it with Title 18-C); P.L. 2019, ch. 417, §§ A-103, B-14 (effective June 20, 2019) (amending the effective
date of the repeal and replacement of Title 18-A from July 1, 2019, to September 1, 2019).
10

for transition” that governed its applicability. See 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301 (2023).

For example, section 8-301(2)(D) provided that “[a]n act done before

September 1, 2019, in any proceeding and any accrued right is not impaired by

this Code,” and section 8-301(2)(A-1) stated that the “elective share provisions”

and “exempt property and allowances provisions” of the new Code applied to

the estates of decedents who died on or after the effective date. As enacted,

section 8-301 did not expressly address the applicability of the new Code to

estates of decedents who died intestate.

[¶20] Nine months later, however, the Legislature remedied this

omission by amending section 8-301(2)(A-1) to provide that the intestate

succession provisions of Title 18-C apply to the estates of decedents who die

on or after the September 1, 2019, effective date.7 The bill summary of the

proposed amendment, which was based on a recommendation from the

Probate and Trust Law Advisory Commission, explained as follows:

The bill amends Title 18-C, section 8-301, subsection 2, paragraph
A-1 to add a reference to the intestate succession provisions of Title
18-C to avoid any ambiguity as to the timing of the applicability of
the intestate succession provisions of Title 18-C.

7 P.L. 2019, ch. 598, § 8 (effective June 16, 2020) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(A-1) (2023)).

Title 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301 has since been amended but not in any way that affects this appeal. See
P.L. 2021, ch. 4, § 6 (emergency, effective Mar. 17, 2021) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(A-1)
(2023)).
11

L.D. 1863, Summary (129th Legis. 2020).

[¶21] There is no dispute that Title 18-A was in effect, and Title 18-C was

not, when the decedent died on January 14, 2019. And there is no dispute that,

at the time of the final hearing in September 2022 and the entry of judgment in

January 2023, Title 18-C had been amended to clarify that its intestacy

succession provisions applied only to decedents who died on or after

September 1, 2019.

[¶22] O’Donnell advances several arguments in support of his contention

that Title 18-C, not Title 18-A, applies to this proceeding. We find none of his

arguments persuasive.

[¶23] First, he contends that Title 18-C applies because this matter was

“pending” when Title 18-C went into effect and the provisions of 18-C M.R.S.

§ 8-301(2)(B) require application of the new Code. Section 8-301(2)(B)

provides as follows:

[Title 18-C] applies to any proceedings in court pending on the
effective date or commenced on or after the effective date
regardless of the time of the death of the decedent except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court the former procedure should
be made applicable in a particular case in the interest of justice or
because of infeasibility of application of the procedure of this Code.

[¶24] We rejected a similar contention to the one O’Donnell makes here

regarding a nearly identical provision in Title 18-A when it replaced the former
12

Title 18 over forty years ago. See Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8, 8-9 (Me. 1985).

In Scribner, the decedent died prior to the effective date of Title 18-A, but the

probate proceedings regarding his estate were commenced after the effective

date and were pending at the time Title 18-A took effect. Id. The question

raised was whether construction of the will was controlled by the newly

enacted Title 18-A or the law in effect prior to Title 18-A’s effective date. Id.

Title 18-A contained a transition provision virtually identical to 18-C M.R.S.

§ 8-301(2)(B),8 the provision O’Donnell relies upon here. We held in Scribner

that the parallel provision in issue there, 18-A M.R.S. § 8-401(b)(2), “is by its

terms only applicable to the code’s procedural rules, not its substantive rules.”

Id. at 9. Intestacy succession provisions are substantive and not procedural.9

Compare Substantive Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining

“substantive law” as “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates

the rights, duties, and powers of parties”), with Procedural Law, Black’s Law

8 Title 18-A M.R.S. § 8-401(b)(2) provided:

[Title 18-A] applies to any proceedings in Court then pending or thereafter
commenced regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent that
in the opinion of the court the former procedure should be made applicable in a
particular case in the interest of justice or because of infeasibility of application of the
procedure of this Code.
9 See 18-A M.R.S. § 3-101 (2018) (providing that an intestate estate devolves to the heirs upon the

death of the decedent, subject to certain limitations); 18-C M.R.S. § 3-101 (2023) (same).
13

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “procedural law” as “[t]he rules that

prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to

the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves”). Consistent with

Scribner, we hold that, with respect to matters pending as of Title 18-C’s

effective date, section 8-301(2)(B) applies only to the new Code’s procedural

rules, not to the underlying substantive provisions governing intestate

succession. See also 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(D) (stating that any right accrued

before the effective date is not impaired by the new Code).

[¶25] Second, O’Donnell argues that, because the June 2020 amendment

to 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(A-1) was not made expressly retroactive to

September 2019, it would be illogical to “resurrect” Title 18-A to apply to this

case absent clear legislative intent. The Legislature’s intent, however, is clear.

As noted above, at the time the new Code took effect, section 8-301 did not

contain a provision expressly addressing the Code’s applicability to intestate

estates. The new Code did contain section 8-301(2)(D), however, which

provided that any right that had accrued prior to the new Code’s effective date

would not be impaired. Thus, even without an express provision addressing

intestate succession, Title 18-C would not have applied to intestate estates of

decedents who died before September 1, 2019. See also 18-C M.R.S. § 3-101
14

(2023) (“Upon the death of a person, the person’s real and personal property

devolves . . . in the absence of testamentary disposition, to the person’s

heirs . . . .”). The legislative history reinforces our reading of the original

version of section 8-301. The bill summary makes eminently clear that the

purpose of the amendment was “to avoid any ambiguity as to the timing of the

applicability of the intestate succession provisions of Title 18-C.”10 L.D. 1863,

Summary (129th Legis. 2020). To interpret the statute as O’Donnell urges

would lead to “absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.” Estate of Chartier,

2005 ME 17, ¶ 6, 866 A.2d 125 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶26] Finally, O’Donnell contends that applying Title 18-C is more

“appropriate” because most of the “estate activity and conduct to sell estate

assets” occurred in the nine-month period between the enactment and

amendment of section 8-301(2)(A-1). O’Donnell offers no legal authority to

support this as a proper consideration in statutory interpretation. Again, the

clear point at which substantive rights accrued under Title 18-C was its

10O’Donnell points out that in the same legislation in which 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(A-1) was
amended to add language regarding intestate estates, the Legislature also amended 18-C M.R.S.
§ 8-301(2)(F) with express language that that amendment was to be given retroactive effect.
P.L. 2019, ch. 598, §§ 8, 11-12 (effective June 16, 2020) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 8-301(2)(A-1), (F)
(2023)). The amendments are distinguishable. The amendment to paragraph A-1 added only
clarifying language, but the amendment to paragraph F restored certain provisions that had
erroneously been changed when Title 18-C was enacted. See L.D. 1863, Summary (129th Legis.
2020).
15

effective date, and the Legislature, in our view, clarified any ambiguity with

respect to the new Code’s effect on intestacy rights in its subsequent

amendment.

[¶27] Therefore, we conclude that the referee correctly determined that

the intestacy provisions of Title 18-A apply to the decedent’s estate.

C. Hearing

[¶28] O’Donnell next argues that the trial court violated due process by

not holding a hearing on his objection, as required by M.R. Civ. P. 53, prior to

acting on the referee’s report. We review alleged procedural due process

violations de novo. Guardianship of Jones, 2017 ME 125, ¶ 19, 164 A.3d 969.

[¶29] When a party timely objects to a referee’s report, the court “must

hold a hearing on the matter.” Estate of Gilbert, 2016 ME 92, ¶ 6, 142 A.3d 583.

The hearing “allows the court to identify and address any issues that may need

correction, clarification, or further legal analysis.” Gorman, 2010 ME 123, ¶ 5,

10 A.3d 703. The hearing is not an opportunity for a new trial. Id. ¶ 7. “[R]ather,

it is a means for a party to identify errors, for the court to correct those errors

if so persuaded, and potentially for the parties to avoid the need for appellate

review.” Id. After hearing, the court may adopt, amend, or reject the report (in

whole or in part); receive further evidence; or recommit the matter to the
16

referee with instructions. M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2). “Once the court has addressed

the objections and entered a judgment, a party who raised the objections may

seek appellate review of those issues.” Gorman, 2010 ME 123, ¶ 6, 10 A.3d 703.

[¶30] Contrary to O’Donnell’s contention, the court did hold a hearing.

After the referee timely filed a report on the contested issues and a

supplemental report on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, O’Donnell

timely objected. At the October 25 hearing, held after the court had received

the referee’s reports and O’Donnell’s objections, the parties were given a full

opportunity for, and engaged in, argument and rebuttal. O’Donnell was not

deprived of a hearing on the referee’s report. See Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc., 388 A.2d

103, 106 (Me. 1978) (stating that due process requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard).

[¶31] Furthermore, O’Donnell’s “amended objection” did not set forth

with sufficient specificity any new issues that would have required the court to

hold another hearing. After the matter was recommitted to the referee to

review O’Donnell’s plan of distribution, the referee filed a report on the plan of

distribution. O’Donnell filed an “amended objection” that was practically

identical to the objection on which he had had a hearing. The only substantive

difference was a bare allegation that “the resulting plan of distribution is
17

incorrect.” The exact nature of O’Donnell’s objection to the plan of distribution

is unknowable because O’Donnell failed to include any legal argument, citations

to legal authority, or references to the record.

[¶32] The trial court did not err by not holding a hearing on O’Donnell’s

“amended objection” because the court had already conducted a hearing on a

virtually identical objection and O’Donnell’s “amended objection” lacked the

required level of specificity to preserve his objection to the plan of distribution.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Pamela Holmes, Esq. (orally), and Mary-Ann Letourneau, Esq., Holmes Legal
Group, LLC, Wells, for appellant Christopher O’Donnell

Tudor N. Goldsmith, Esq. (orally), Jensen Baird, Portland, for appellee Kirk
Webber

York County Probate Court docket number 2019-0238
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY